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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated isiZulu-speakers' conceptions of morality. The relationship between 
concepts of the self and morality was also explored, as were influences of gender, family and 
community on moral reasoning. Fifty-two participants of both genders were interviewed. The 
sample was drawn from urban, peri-urban and rural areas in KwaZulu-Natal. The participants 
were invited to tell a story involving a moral dilemma they had experienced in their lives. The 
resulting narratives were analyzed using an adapted version of the Relational Method, an analytic 
procedure developed by Gilligan and her colleagues (e.g. Brown & Gilligan, 1991) to analyze 
narratives of real life conflict. 
Respondents considered morality to be a state of connection or equilibrium between the person, 
other people, and his or her social milieu. Connection is characterized by caring, just and 
respectful relationships among people and everything to which they stand in relation. 
Immorality, which is characterized by relationships devoid of care, justice and respect, results 
from a breakdown in social and communal relationships. Conceptions of morality were found-to 
be dependent on respondents' understanding of the self. The view that morality is characterised 
by connection was associated mainly with the communal or familial self. However, tensions 
were also noted between competing concepts ofthe self within the person, namely the communal 
. .. ' -. 
and independent selves. These tensions complicated respondents' choices in the face of moral 
conflict. Gender was also found to influence moral reasoning: in the face of moral dilemmas 
involving gender, men were concemed with the preservation of their masculine identities, while 
women found themselves positioned powerlessly by culturally defined narratives of femininity. 
These results are discussed with reference to traditional African philosophical frameworks and 
dialogical theory. The implications of the study to psychological theory, social science research 




The purpose of this study is to investigate understandings of morality among isiZulu 
speaking people in South Africa. Further, it explores the relationship between 
conceptions of morality and the self (personhood). The study is motivated by the fact that 
moral development research has been dominated by cognitive-developmental approaches 
(e.g. Kohlberg, 1981, 1984). These approaches maintain that psychological processes, 
including moral reasoning, are free of contextual influences. For instance, Kohlberg 
(ibid) posited a sequence of six structurally defined stages of moral reasoning, 
supposedly invariant in sequence and universal across cultures. Further, he defined the 
highest and most adequate stages of moral reasoning solely in terms of the principles of 
.i lIstice, to the exclusion of considerations arising out of empathy or care. According to 
cognitive-developmental approaches, decisions at the most advanced stages of moral 
thought are made from a disinterested, impartial position, independently of historical and 
social influences. 
Cross-cultural studies have failed to support the universality thesis. Research has 
consistently shown that people from indigenous societies in particular tend to stabilize at 
Stage 3, falling under conventional morality (Edwards, 1975, 1981; Kohlberg, 1981, 
1984). Cognitive devetopmentalists have argued that indigenous societies do not advance 
to postconventional morality due to absence of opportunities for role taking and 
leadership (Edwards, 1981; Kohlberg, 1984). The present study maintains that 
differences in moral decision-making occur because the notion of an autonomous self, on 
which cognitive-developmental approaches are based, is not universal. From a traditional 
African point of view, mature selfhood entails living interdependently with others 
(Ikuenobe, 1998; Menkiti , 1984). Thus, what appears to be conventional moral reasoning, 
from a cognitive-developmental framework, is based on a different concept of morality: a 
1 
concept that prizes hatmony and interdependence between people and their social milieu 
(Verhoef & Michel, 1997; Ward, 1991). 
There has been a growing awareness ofthe meta-theoretical, theoretical, and 
methodological limitations of cognitive-developmental approaches to morality (Day & 
Tappan, 1996; Gilligat1, 1982; Shweder, 1982). These critics have pointed out that 
cognitive-developmental approaches do not take into account the multi-dimensional 
nature of the moral domain. Cognitive-developmental approaches disregard the 
relationship between moral experience, gender, culture and power (Day & Tappan, 
1996). In psychology, these largely disregarded factors were given attention by Gilligan 
(1977, ] 982), who questioned the assumption that psychological maturity involves an 
increasing differentiation of the self from the social and cultural context. Her research 
showed that, for women in particular, the morality of care exists simultaneously with the 
morality of justice. 
\ \ 
Gilligan's work has led to the recognition that people are not limited to a single moral 
voice (Benhabib, 1992; Day & Tappat1, 1996; Miller, 1997). Particularly, it is 
increasingly recognized that moral reasoning does not occur in a vacuum: it is mediated 
by language and other socio-cultural processes (Bhatia, 2000; Brown & Gilligan, 1991; 
Day, 1991). The present study explores traditional African moral perspectives that may 
have been marginalized because of researchers' reliance on Western philosophical 
assumptions about the self and the world. 
At the methodological level, cognitive approaches have been criticized for relying on 
hypothetical moral dilemmas (Gilligan, 1982). This isolates the process of moral 
decision-making from the complexities of real life problems. Methods that use 
hypothetical dilemmas are consistent with the disembedded view of the self. From this 
perspective, both the knowing subject at1d the process of knowing are independent of 
social, cultural, and historical influences (Lapsley, 1996). Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, 
and Tarule (1986) have refelTed to this mode of knowing as "separate." It is characterized 
by an impersonal and distanced stance toward the object of one's knowledge. Separate 
2 
knowing is not universal, however (Belenky et al. , 1986). It stands opposed to 
"connected" knowing, which involves dialogue with the object of one's knowledge, be it 
an idea, another person, or a community (Belenky et al., 1986; Clinchy, 1996). 
Connected knowing is sensitive to the context in which one knows. Methodologically, it 
is consistent with nanative investigative approaches, which examine human experiences 
as they occur in culture, space and time (Brown & Gilligan, 1991; Day & Tappan, 1996; 
Lapsely, 1996). Given that the purpose of the present study was to investigate situated 
understandings of morality, participants were asked to narrate real life dilemmas. This is 
consistent with the tradition of story-telling, prized in most African communities (Akbar, 
1984; Verhoef & Michel, 1997). 
The present study is motivated by the increasing awareness that psychological science is 
a cultural manifestation (Gergen, Gulerce, Lock, & Misra, 1996). Psychology is based on 
culturally determined, presuppositions about the nature of reality and personhood. 
Traditional Westem approaches to knowledge, for example, assume that individuals are 
unique, with a mind that is separate from the body. Further, it is assumed that scientists 
apply rules of inductive or deductive logic to record events in the world, without undue 
influence from values, motives, and other biases (Gergen et al., 1996). These 
presuppositions are neither universal nor timeless: they are products of the scientific 
revolution that took place in the 16th and 1 i h centuries (Cushman, 1990): This perioq saw 
a gradual shift from community and religious orientations to a materialistic outlook 
toward social inquiry. This led to the view that social inquiry should be based on 
principles that are valid regardless of time, place and context. Following on this tradition, 
cognitive-developmental approaches sought to uncover timeless and universal stages of 
moral decision-making. 
The universality of presuppositions derived from Westem psychology has been 
questioned . Shweder (1991) has argued that cultural traditions and social practices 
transfol111 the way we think about the world, resulting in divergences in psychological 
processes sllch as thinking, self and emotion. In an essay introducing cultural psychology, 
Shweder (ibid) questioned the dichotomy between mind and body, psyche and culture, 
3 
often assumed in the West. He defined cultural psychology as "the study of the ways 
subject and object, self and other, psyche and culture, person and context, figure and 
ground . . . require each other, and dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make each other 
up" (p . 7J). Shweder emphasized that human beings give meaning to the socio-cultural 
environment inasmuch as their mental life is shaped by meanings emanating from it. 
Bruner (1990) has echoed similar views. He maintained that "the central concept of a 
human psychology is meaning and the processes and transactions involved in the 
construction of meanings" (p. 33, emphasis original). These developments highlight the 
need to study psychological processes such as morality with reference to the meaning 
systems of the people concerned. 
The awareness that knowledge is mediated by social and cultural practices has opened up 
possibilities for investigating indigenous accounts of psychological processes (Bhatia, 
2000; Gergen et al., 1996; Kim & BelTY, 1993; Sinha, 1986, 1993). To understand 
morality in indigenous contexts, we need to pay attention to the philosophical 
frameworks, linguistic practices, and other cultural meaning systems through which 
people make sense of themselves and the world. 
The present study investigates the meaning of morality among isiZulu speakers, using 
African-based philosophical frameworks and epistemologies (Akbar, 1984; Myers, 1'988; 
Verhoef & Michel, 1997). It is recognized, however, that in the modem world people are 
exposed to multiple worldviews and social realities. The challenge therefore, is to 
investigate not only exclusively African understandings of morality. Of most 
psychological relevance is the dynamic interpenetration of African and other worldviews. 
This thesis argues that this task can be accomplished by adopting the dialogical model of 
selfhood, based on Bakhtin's (1981, 198411993) ideas. Dialogism is an appropriate 
framework for studying morality in multi-cultural societies because it provides for 
influences of multiple social practices on psychological development. In a country such 
as South Africa, it is important to study psychological phenomena with reference to 
different social and cultural practices. Apart from its long colonial history, the country 
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continues to be influenced by the Western world through the media and other forms of 
social contact. 
Research Problem and Questions 
The purpose of this research is to study conceptions of morality among isiZulu speakers. 
[t seeks to relate these understandings to emic theoretical frameworks, including 
traditional African concepts of selfhood. Contextual influences on moral decision-
making, such as community values, gender-related beliefs, and family influences, are 
explored. Questions addressed in the study are listed below. Theoretical issues pertaining 
to these questions are elaborated throughout the literature review. 
• What is the meaning of morality for isiZulu speakers? 
• How are these meanings related to concepts of personhood or the self? 
• How do family and community values influence moral decision-making? 
• What is the interface between gender and power in moral decision-making? 
Justification for the Research 
Modern psychology originated in the West. It was brought to developing countries a~ part 
of the general transfer of knowledge and technology. When the study of psychology was 
introduced in developing countries, attempts were made to understand indigenous 
people's experiences with reference to concepts derived in the West (Sinha, 1986,2002). 
With the advent of cultural psychology and the increasing influences of interpretive 
disciplines such as henneneutics, it is now recognized that psychological processes are 
culture-based (G~rgen et al., 1996; Lucariello; 1995). Sinha (1986, 2002) has argued that 
unless serious attempts are made to indigenize psychology, the discipline will continue to 
have a limited impact on issues facing developing countries. To address this concern, the 
present study investigates understandings of morality among the Zulu, with reference to 
traditional, African conceptual frameworks. 
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The most immediate applications of the study are in the area of research into ethics and 
info1111ed consent. Faden and Beauchamp (1986) argued that ethical principles such as 
autonomy are founded on (deontological) moral theory. It follows that without 
knowledge ofa people's understanding of what constitutes right and wrong (their theory 
of morality), ethical conduct in research and practice may be compromised. At the 
moment, these issues are most important in South Africa, where research is under way to 
develop culturally appropriate procedures for conducting HIV/Aids vaccine trials in 
vulnerable populations (Gasa, 1999; Lindegger & Richter, 2000). 
Methodology 
Cognitive-developmental approaches to research in moral development have used 
standard hypothetical dilemmas (e.g. Colby & Koh1berg, 1987a, 1987b). These dilemmas 
are based on the assumption that principles of justice are the primary defining feature of 
the moral domain. The use of hypothetical dilemmas is meant to elicit issues of rights and 
duties, to the exclusion of moral concems arising out of empathy and care (Kohlberg, 
Boyd & Levine, 1990). 
Given that the purpose of this study is to investigate culturally situated understandiggs of 
morality, the above mentioned methodology is inappropriate. Instead, data were collected --
and analyzed using a revised version of Gilligan's voice-centered, relational method 
(Brown & Gilligan, 1991; Gilligan, Brown, & Rogers, 1990). Participants were invited to 
tell a story involving a moral dilemma which they had faced in their lives. Influences of 
family, culture, community, and other factors, were explored through probing questions. 
Lnterviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed. The transcripts were then analyzed 
using guidelines for reading interviews of moral conflict and choice (Gilligan et al., 
1990; Mauthner & Doucet, 1998). The method involves reading a respondent's story 
several times, each reading focusing on a particular aspect of the narrator's lived 
experience. For the purposes of this study, the reading process was adapted to take into 
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account the value attached to family and community in traditional African settings. This 
adaptation is discussed in Chapter 6. 
Definitions of TemlS 
This section introduces and defines key theoretical concepts used in the study. It should 
be noted, however, that while operational definitions are given, the meaning of these 
terms unfolds throughout the study, as the reader grasps the context of the work as a 
whole. 
indigenous psychologies: have as a distinguishing feature the study of human 
psychological processes in their cultural context, using concepts, theories, and belief 
systems that are indigenous to the groups under investigation. Human experience is 
studied and interpreted from local actors' perspectives (Ho, 1998; Kim & Berry, 1993). 
Indigenous psychologies differ from indigenization, which is an attempt to transform 
concepts and theories developed in the West, in order to make them relevant to local 
cultural contexts (Sinha, 1993). The move toward indigenous psychologies follows on 
from the understanding that modem scientific psychology, as it is taught in academic and 
other institutions, reflects Westem assumptions about knowledge, people, and the world. 
These assumptions mayor may not be appropriate for explaining experiences of others in 
the rest of the world (Sinha, 1986, 1993,2002). 
It should be noted that the move toward indigenous psychologies is not concemed with 
studying exotic people in distant places. It applies to developing as well as developed 
countries (Kim & BelTY, 1993). Heelas (1981) demonstrated this using the concept of 
personhood as an example. He argued that the concept of a person as a unique, bounded 
entity is indigenous to the West. When psychology was imported to colonized countries, 
its concepts were unilaterally applied as if they were universal, to the exclusion of local 
llnderstandings and explanations (Sinha, 1986). 
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Indigenous psychologies recognize the multiplicity of perspectives within a group. For 
this reason, they do not assume a priori that some perspectives are superior to others. 
Neither is the call to explore indigenous psychologies a rejection of Western or other 
perspectives. The position taken in this study is that psychology needs to develop 
perspectives that interpenetrate each other, given people's exposure to multiple points of 
view (Gergen et al., 1996). However, this requires a full explication of historically 
marginalized perspectives, as well as attention to political and power dimensions 
involved in the production of knowledge. 
The independent construal of self: refers to the traditional Western understanding of the 
self as a bounded container, existing independently of other similarly bounded selves. 
From this perspective, the goal of socialization is to achieve independence from others. 
This entails that one's behaviour be organized with reference to internal thoughts, 
feelings, and actions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1994; Matsumoto, 1994). People are 
treated as prior to, and more fundamental than, the social order, which is in turn regarded 
as a means to realize individuals' ends (Miller, 1994). This notion of the selfis also 
known as self-contained individualism (Hennans, Kempen, & van Loon, 1992; Sampson, 
1988). 
The interdependent construal of self: is the view of the self prevalent in ilon-WestedJ. 
cultures such as Asia (Matsumoto, 1994) and Africa (Mwawenda, 1995). These cultures 
emphasize the fundamental cOlmectedness among people. The goal of socialization is not 
separation, but harn10ny of one's interests and goals with those of the group. No clear 
boundaries are drawn between self and other, mind and context. It is also known as the 
collectivist self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991 , 1994; Mwawenda, 1995). 
Dialogism: is a tenn arising from the literary writings ofBakhtin (1981 , 1984/1993). It is 
the vi ew that meaning, knowledge and understanding do not arise from actions of isolated 
individuals, but from the dynan1ic interdependence between actors located in space, time 
and context. Psychological processes such as mind and self do not unfold internally, from 
with in the individual; they emerge dialogically, from the communicative processes of 
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individuals located in social and cultural contexts (Bandlamudi, 1994; Hermans & 
Kempen, 1993; Morson & Emerson, 1990). 
Izinvol/yo (ancestors): According to traditional African belief, especially in the region 
South of the Sahara, life does not end with physical death. The deceased who lived moral 
and exemplary lives join other ancestors before them in the spiritual world. This would 
happen provided their families had performed appropriate rituals of integration on their 
behalf. Once elevated to ancestorhood, izinyanya can intercede with God on behalf of 
their descendents (Ngubane, 1977). 
Herm eneutics: There cannot be a simple definition ofhermeneutics, given the historical 
developments in the understanding of the term. Broadly, hermeneutics is the discipline 
that seeks to interpret and understand the meaning of recorded expressions of human 
experiences. It is concemed in particular with experiences of real life actors, rather than 
hypothetical sUbjects. It therefore emphasizes the perspectival and situated nature of 
human understanding (Burkett, 1988; Ricouer, 1979; Tappan, 1990). 
The moral point of view: is the view that moral judgments should be taken from a 
perspective that transcends the patiicularity of all situations, and they should disregard 
the value systems of those concemed (Kohlberg et al., 1990). ~ 
Aji-ican: In this study, the tenn "African" is used in a narrow sense to indicate indigenous 
African people, particularly those living in the region South of the Sahara. 
Delimitations 
The main sample in this study comprised isiZulu speakers. For this reason the study 
refers to understandings of morality among the Zulu. It should be noted, however, that 
the philosophical framework that forms the basis of the study is shared by a number of 
African communities, especially in the region South of the Sahara. Findings therefore 
apply potentially to those African communities that subscribe to this framework. It is 
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only for methodological reasons that I refer to understandings of morality among the 
Zulu. It is important to make this distinction because there is nothing about Zulu-ness per 
se, that explains the findings, excep t the shared conceptual framework . However, it is 
methodologically sound to wait until similar studies have been repeated with African 
communities other than isiZulu speakers, before entertaining such a generalization. 
Outline of Thesis 
This thesis consists of 9 chapters. The present chapter presents the background and scope 
of the study. Chapter 2 discusses Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Philosophical 
underpinnings of cognitive-developmental approaches to morality are presented. It is 
argued that these approaches fall s ort because, taking the Kantian tradition as a point of 
depm1ure, they attempt to understand morality independently of the philosophies, 
languages, and cultures ofthe people concerned. Gilligan's (1982) work, premised on the 
relational self, has shown that altemative conceptions of morality exist, over and above 
the justice dimension identified by Kohlberg (1981). The chapter concludes with an 
introduction to narrative approaches. These approaches make it possible to understand 
psychological processes as they occur in context, space and time. 
A framework for understanding morality in African contexts is introduced in Chapt~r 3. 
According to this framework, morality cannot be understood independently of the social 
and culturaJ context. The notion of person hood behind this understanding of morality is 
introduced and discussed. Given ex osure to various worldviews and perspectives 
characteristic of the modem world, psychological research can no longer rely on one 
conceptual framework. Chapter 4 examines socio-cultural approaches to morality and 
self, beginning with the work ofVygotsky. Bakhtin's (1981) notion of dialogism is then 
introduced . It is argued that dialogism enables one to study multiple cultural factors 
impinging on moral decision-making, without resorting to "either-or" approaches that 
have characterized cross-cultural research. 
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The thesis is based on the narrative paradigm. Narrative approaches reject the notion that 
universal , timeless criteria exist by which one is able to distinguish right from wrong. 
Chapter 5 discusses altemative, hemleneutic approaches to the problem of moral 
rel ativi S111, given the absence of grand narratives of legitimation. Methods used to collect 
and analyze data are discussed in Chapter 6. It is argued that, unlike methods relying on 
hypothetical dilemmas (e.g. Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a), Gilligan's relational 
methodology is most appropriate for investigating situated understandings of morality 
(Brown & Gilligan, 1991). Results are presented and discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Chapter 9 draws conclusions of the study. Implications for social service delivery are 
highlighted, as are recommendations for further research. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the background to moral development research. Studies of 
morality in developing countries have relied on Westem concepts. For psychology to 
have an impact on problems facing developing countries, it is important that social 
phenomena be explained with reference to indigenous concepts. This study examines 
understandings of morality among isiZulu speakers, using traditional African frameworks 
as points of departure. Data were collected and analyzed using Gilligan et al.' s (1990) 
guide for analyzing interviews of moral conflict and choice. Key concepts in the study 
were defined, and the outline of the thesis was provided. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACHES TO MORALITY 
The previous chapter highlighted the importance of adopting a socio-cultural perspective in 
studying psychological phenomena. This chapter introduces some of the key tenets of 
Kohlberg's (1981,1984) theory ofm ral development. This is followed by a critical 
evaluation of findings pertaining to the cross-cultural applicability of the theory. It is argued 
that to understand cultural variations in moral decision-making, one has to come to terms with 
world views or conceptual frameworks that people use to make sense of the world. The model 
of personhoocl that underpins cognitive-developmental approaches to morality, self-contained 
individualism, is introduced and critiqued. It is shown that cultures with different conceptions 
of person hood understand morality differently . Finally, using Gilligan's (1977, 1982) work, it 
is argued that nalTative approaches to psychology provide a meaningful framework for 
investigating morality in indigenous contexts. 
Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development 
Due to the sheer volume ofKohlberg' s work, a full account of his ideas on moral reasoning is 
beyond the scope of this study. The following section introduces what he saw as being the 
stages of moral development. Their characteristics are then discussed, as are cross-cultural 
findings. It is argued that Kohlberg, :fi)llowing the Western philosophical tradition, defined 
morality in terms only of justice. As a result, he ignored care and empathy, regarded as 
important aspects of moral being in other cultures. 
Building on Piaget's (1924/1969, 1932/1965) earlier work on moral theory, Koh1berg (1981, 
1984) identified ~e~ve1s o f..ll1~m~!.thought: the p~ventiona1, cgm::entioilal and 
Rost~ntional. Each of these is subdivided into two stages, resulting in six stages 
altogether (Table 1, page 13). Cross-c I1tural findings concerning the first three of these stages 
have, on the whole, yielded consistent findings (Murphy & Gilligan, 1980). These stages will 
be discussed briefly. Stages 4, 5, and 6, on the other hand, have been a focus of a number of 
cross-cultural controversies. These stages are therefore discussed at length. 
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Table 1. Kohlberg 's Stages of Moral Development 
Leve l I Prccollventiollal 
A t thi s levcl , the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these 
la be ls in tcrms of cither the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of 
ra vors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels . The level is divided into the 
following two stages: 
Stage': The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or 
badn ess regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences . A voidance of punishment and unquestioning 
deference to power are valued in their own right, not in tenns of respect for an underl ying moral order supported by 
punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4) . 
Stage 2: Th e illstrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of what instrumentally satisfies one's own needs 
and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of 
fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. 
Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice. 
Level 2: COllvelltionallevel 
At thi s leve l, maintaining the expectations of the individual 's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its 
own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only of conformity to personal 
ex pectations and socia l order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of 
identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level there are the following two stages: 
Stllge 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good-boy nice-girl" orientation. Good behavior is what pleases or helps 
others and is approved by them. There is much confonnity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" 
beha vior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention- "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns 
approva l by being "nice". 
Stage 4: The "'aw IInd order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of 
th e soc ial order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given 
soc ial order for its own sake. 
Level 3: Posrconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level 
At this level, there is a clear eff011 to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from ... 
the auth ority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with . 
these groups. This level again has two stages: 
Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones . Right action tends to be defined 
in terms of general individual rights, and standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole 
society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis 
upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the 
right is the matter of personal "values" and "opinion ." The result is an emphasis upon the " legal point of view," but 
with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than 
freezing it in terms of stage 4 "l aw and order") . Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding 
clemcnt of obligati on. This is the "official" morality of the American gove111ment and constitution. 
SI((ge 6: The univers((1 ethical principle orientation . Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-
chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are 
abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten 
commandments. At heaJ1, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and 
of res pect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. 
(From Kohlberg, 1981 , pp. 17-18) 
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The Preconventional and Conventional Levels of Moral Thought 
At the flrst stage of the preconventionallevel (Table 1), also known as the "punishment and 
obedience" orientation, the moral status of an action is detelmined by the physical 
consequences for the actor. If the action results in punishment, then it is bad and should not be 
done. [f it results in reward or lack ofpunislunent, then it should be done, regardless of the 
human meaning of the act. In the second stage, also known as the "naIve instmmental" 
orientation, good actions are those that are instrumental in satisfying one's needs, and 
occasionally, those of others. A Stage 2 individual may help others, with a view to being 
helped in retum. 
Goodness at the conventional level entails conformity to others' needs, including family, 
nation, and social groups. The existing social order is supported and justified. 
At Stage 3, pleasing others and living up to expectations is of paramount importance to the 
individual. What is good is that which earns one approval. This stage is also known as the 
"good-boy nice-girl" orientation. Maintenance of the social order, showing respect for 
authority, and doing one's duties, are the major determinants of the good for Stage 4 
individuals. This stage is also known as the "law and order" orientation. 
Kohlberg (198]) maintained that the major disadvantage of Stage 4 reasOlling is that h does 
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not provide guidelines for creating new norn1S. At this stage, individuals abide by already 
existing group nonns: they take no part in their creation. Furthermore, this stage does not 
provide a basis for making judgments involving different interest groups in society. Morality 
remains relative only to one's group. From a cognitive-developmental perspective, this is a 
major shortcoming, given the assumption that moral judgments should transcend particular 
contexts . Kohlberg (1981) therefore reasoned that universality in moral judgment can only be 
possible at the level that defines morality for anyone and in any situation, that being the 
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Morality at the Post-conventional Level 
At the postcollventionallevel, also known as the principled or autonomous level, morality is 
"freed" from the authority invested in any person or group at any point in time (Kohlberg, 
1981 , 1984). Unlike Level 2 moral reasoning, moral principles become universal and valid 
regardless of one's group's beliefs and ideas. 
Within this level, and representing what are regarded as the most advanced and most adequate 
stages of moral thought, are Stages 5 and 6 (Kohlberg, 1981; Kohlberg et al., 1990). At Stage 
5, also known as the "social-contract legalistic" orientation, morality is based on social 
standards that have been critically examined, and consented to, by society as a whole. The 
postconventional nature of Stage 5 derives from the fact that morality entails "cognitive action 
upon, rather than cognitive conformity to, the values and institutions of society" (Kohlberg et 
aI. , 1990, p. 174). Stage 5 differs from Stage 4 because the latter "has a perspective primarily 
determined by the given rules and values of society" (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 153). Rules 
goveming Stage 4 are not derived from mutual agreement among citizens. On the other hand, 
Stage 5 "has a perspective necessary for rationally creating laws ex nihilo" (ibid, p. 153, 
emphasis added) in the form of a mutually agreed-upon social contract among citizens. The 
social contract consists of procedural rules, as may be found in a constitutional democracy. It 
'. "presupposes that both the obeyer of the law and the lawmaker have the proper orientation 
and that the lawmaker has received the rational consent of the individuals who make society" 
(Kohlberg, 1981, p. 154). Stage 5 is thus legalistic and utilitarian in character: it assumes that 
all citizens participate in the creation of laws, from which they supposedly benefit. 
The procedural nature of Stage 5 moral reasoning provides a framework for the elimination of 
moral relativity, a major problem for Stage 4 reasoning. There is a possibility, however, that 
relativity and arbitrariness wilf result from individual differences when dealing with social 
situations which are not covered by the legal sphere or the social contract (Kohlberg, 1981). 
Falling within this group are instances in which individuals may be required to disobey 
constitutionally legitimate laws which prescribe unjust action. A good example would be 
support for apartheid laws of the fOlmer South African Nationalist govenunent. These laws 
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denied franchise and advancement opportunities to Blacks. According to Kohlberg (1981), 
only Stage 6 mora'1 reasoning suffices for such situations. At this stage, also known as the 
"universal ethical principle" orientation, moral judgments are based on the recognition of the 
unconditional worth and dignity of all human life, the principle of justice, and the principle of 
role-taking (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Kohlberg et al., 1990). Stage 6 requires us to treat each 
person as an end, and not a means, given the inherent value of human life. It is therefore an 
unconditional duty to save human life wherever possible, irrespective of the social standing or 
group membership of the person whose life is at stake. Furthermore, this decision should be 
made from a disinterested point of view, so that it is consistent with the actions of any moral 
agents who would find themselves in a similar situation (Kohlberg, 1981). 
Other central characteristics of the Stage 6 moral position are justice and reciprocity. 
The Morality of Justice 
Although individuals have concern for others' well-being throughout the six stages of moral 
development, it is mainly at Stages 5 and 6, and especially Stage 6, that this concern is based 
on what Kohlberg (1981, 1984) regarded as true principles of justice. Kohlberg (ibid) defined 
the moral point of view in tenns of justice. The morality of justice is best understood with 
reference to the work of Raw Is (1972), from whom Kohlberg drew considerably in 
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formulating his theory. Rawls presented a theory of justice based on social contract theories, 
as found in the works of philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau and Kant. According to the 
social contract theory, principles of justice "are the principles that free and rational persons 
concemed to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as 
defining the fundamental terms of their association" (Rawls, 1972, p. 14, emphasis added). 
That is, principles are "just" if they have been formulated under conditions that recognize the 
equality, autonomy and rationality of each individual. Rawlsian subjects are free and 
autonomous in the sense that they are not influenced by cultural and historical values. Their 
deliberations are guided by principles to which they themselves have consented. Because of 
its supposed independence from historical and cultural factors, this notion of subjectivity is 
sometimes referred to as existing "prior to society" (Witherell & Pope-Edwards, 1991). 
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As mentioned above, parties taking part in deliberations to determine principles of justice 
must be "rational." It is important to expand on the model of rationality envisaged in social 
contract theories, given that this is one of the most criticized aspects of Kohlberg's work. 
Rawls ' s model of rationality is instrumental: it assumes that an individual would take the most 
effective means toward desired ends. Thus, "a rational person is thought to have a coherent set 
of preferences between the options open to him [sic]" (Rawls, 1972, p. 143). Options are then 
ranked depending on how they fUliher one's purposes. Finally, a plan of action is developed 
that is considered most likely to achieve one's desired ends. One of the shortcomings of this 
model is that it assumes that, in the face of dilemmas, individuals will have all the necessary 
infolll1ation to act upon. It further assumes that value orientations do not come into the 
picture. Alternative models of rationality are explored in Chapter 5. 
If principles of justice have been chosen under the conditions spelt out above, they are 
referred to as "justice as faimess" (Rawls, 1972, p. 11). With these principles in mind, moral 
agents begin a dialogue, with a view to achieving consensus. Consensus does not mean 
however, that individuals will agree to be bound by the decisions of the majority in society. 
Borrowing from the work ofFrankena, Kohlberg argued that the moral point of view is 
characterized by an ideal consensus that comes only at the end. It is consensus that "will be 
concurred in by those who freely and clear-headedly review the relevant facts from tIle moral 
-_ .. ..... 
point of view" (Frankena, cited in Kohlb~rg et al., 1990, p. 163). In other words, this is the 
consensus that will be achieved by those who have examined relevant facts from an impartial 
perspective: a position that transcends the particularity of each situation (Young, 1987). 
To fully constitute "justice as faimess," moral principles must be chosen from the "original 
position" and under the "veil of ignorance." The "original position" is a hypothetical situation 
corresponding to the state of nature in social contract theories. Its essential characteristics are 
that no one knows his or her social status, class, position, gender, or race in society. Neither 
do participants know their "fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, 
intelligence, strength, and the like" (Rawls, 1972, p. 12). Because parties do not know their 
identities or bow altematives available to them will affect their individual cases, they are said 
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to be deliberating "behind a veil of ignorance." Rawls envisaged that it is only under such 
circumstances that no one will be advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of the principles 
of justice. Justice as faimess is thus a product of an agreement between mutually-
disinterested , rational agents. The agents are "mutually-disinterested" in the sense that they 
take no interest in one another's interests, or their religious or metaphysical orientations. 
Following Rawls (1972), this is the idea of justice endorsed by Kohlberg and his colleagues 
(Koh Iberg ,1981, 1984; Kohlberg et al., 1990). 
The above mentioned concept of justice has had a major influence on the research conducted 
in the cognitive-developmental paradigm. Kohlberg et al. (1990) admitted that the assumption 
that justice is the defining feature of the moral domain led his research team to focus on 
dilemmas that were meant to gauge subjects' reasoning about conflicting rights, or the 
distribution of scarce resources: 
The kinds of questions which we asked in our dilemmas were deontic questions 
focLlsing on rights and duties. The questions we have seldom asked are aretaic 
questions, that is, questions that focus on the moral value of lives or persons that ask 
about ideals of the good life or the good person. (ibid., p. 305, emphasis added) 
Throughout this dissertation, this is what is meant whenever it is maintained that cognitive 
developmental approaches defined the domain of the moral too narrowly. Kohlberg's concept 
of morality excludes responsibilities arising out of care or empathy. His views on the~role of 
care in moral decision-making are discussed below. 
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Ideal Reciprocal Role-taking 
Another essential characteristic of Stage 6 moral reasoning is ideal reciprocal role-taking. This 
entails taking others ' perspectives in resolving moral dilemmas. Reciprocal role-taking 
involves "temporarily separating the actual identities of persons from their claims and 
interests in order to assess what would be the relative merits of those claims and interests from 
the point of vi ew of any person implicated in the dilemma" (Kohlberg et al., 1990, p. 167, 
emphasis added). It is envisaged that this is possible if people adopt the position of the 
"generalized other" (Benhabib, 1992). We reason from the point of view of the "generalized 
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other" if we deliberately approach issues from an impartial position, without taking into 
account the historical and contextual circumstances of those concerned. This position, it is 
envisaged, would help moral agents to "transcend the particularity of every personal point of 
view and to look at the situation from a position that considers every individual value system 
in the same way, disregarding whose value system it happens to be" (Taylor, cited in 
Kohlberg et al., 1990, p. 167). 
The notion of ideal reciprocal role taking led Kohlberg (1984) and his colleagues (Kohlberg et 
al., 1990) to liken the highest level of moral decision-making to "moral musical chairs." 
Moral musical chairs requires each individual to imaginatively consider moral dilemmas from 
the position of others who are also involved. They should continue doing so, until they reach a 
fair or balanced situation (Kohlberg, 1984). A solution is considered fair if it is reversible. 
Reversible solutions are those that would be considered just or acceptable by all parties 
concerned, irrespective of their initial positions. It is further envisaged that all moral agents 
who have engaged in the requisite cognitive activities, such as reciprocal role-taking, would 
" arrive at these solutions. 
Conclusions reached under reciprocal role-taking are regarded as being able to be made 
universal in the sense that if a judgment is deemed right for particular instances, it should be 
right for an imaginary universe of all similar situations, and for all moral actors who 'could be 
-- -' ..... 
involved. Universality is achieved when "a decision is acceptable to any person involved in 
the situation who must play one of the roles affected by the decision, but does not know which 
role he or she will play" (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 168). In other words, moral judgments should be 
consistent across persons and time (Kohlberg et al., 1990). Universality and reversibility are 
thus the essential components of Stage 6 reasoning. 
General Characteristics of all Stages 
So far, emphasis has been laid on the special characteristics of postconventional moral 
reasoning. Characteristics of all the stages are discussed next. Attention will be paid to issues 
that are most pertinent to cross-cultural comparisons, namely the invariant sequence 
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hypothesis and the cultural universality thesis. 
The Invariant Sequence Hypothesis 
According to Kohlberg (1981 , 1984), the six stages of moral development are invariant in 
sequence and are universal across cultures. Invariance of sequence means that people progress 
through the stages in a forward directed mmmer. Stages cannot be skipped, nor is regression to 
previously held stages possible. Furthe11110re, the latter stages are considered ethically higher 
and adequate than the previous ones (Kohlberg, 1981). 
In support of the invariant sequence hypothesis, Kohlberg (1981) cited studies in which 
adolescents were presented with prepared arguments in favour of or against a particular 
choice, for each stage of the moral dilemmas. These adolescents could understand and put the 
arguments in their own words, if the arguments were at or below their own modal stage. On 
the other hand, arguments pitched at a level higher than their own modal stage were distorted 
into ideas consistent with their own stage or the one below. Because the subjects understood 
arguments at their own level and below, while only those subjects who were already in 
transition to the next stage understood arguments pitched one level above their own stage, 
Kohlberg (1981) concluded that the "stages constitute a hierarchy of cognitive difficulty with 
lower stages available to, but not used by those at higher stages" (p. 132). Failure to '. 
--_ . .... 
understand advanced stages was interpreted as evidence that advanced stages supplant the 
previous ones. Lower stages, however, remain available to subjects at higher stages of moral 
thought. Later, it will be shown that "regression" to previously-held stages of moral 
development has been observed (Murphy & Gilligan, 1980), thus casting doubt on the 
invariant sequence hypothesis. 
The Assumption of Cultural Universality 
TbTOUghout his career, Kohlberg was opposed to what he considered the threat of ethical 
relativism in moral theory. In his first volume of essays on moral development (Kohlberg, 
1981), he declared: "I am happy to report that I can propose a solution to the relativity 
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probJem that has plagued philosophers for three thousand years" (p. 12). He attributed this 
problem to what he regarded as a confusion resulting from the tendency to conclude that 
people ought to have different moral values simply because their values were different in the 
empirical realm (i.e. the confusion between the philosophical and empirical basis of 
universality) . Basing his argument on "detailed cross-cultural studies on the development of 
moral thinking" (ibid. p. 12), he maintained that the stages of moral development are universal 
across cultures. Individuals in all cultures are said to pass through these stages in the same 
order (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982). Where individual or group 
differences occlmed, Kohlberg argued that this was due to cultures progressing through the 
stages at varying speeds, with possible differences in the end-points of development. The rate 
and terminal point of development, he argued, are influenced by societal complexity and the 
availability of opportunities for role-taking (Kohlberg, 1981). Kohlberg thought that not only 
are the basic moral categories universal across cultures, he was also of the view that the 
sequence of moral development "is not significantly affected by widely varying social, 
cultural, or religious conditions" (Kohlberg, ibid. p. 25, emphasis added). 
The view that societal factors retard moral development in traditional societies is problematic. 
How can we conclude that a phenomenon (stages of moral reasoning) that has not been 
empirically demonstrated in a group, has been retarded by social and cultural factors, when it 
is the very existence, or nature of the phenomenon, that is being questioned? The assumption 
that, had the phenomenon been observed, it would have followed a sequence already obserV~a 
in another setting (i.e. the sequence of stages is the same across cultures) is equally 
problematic. What if the influence of "societal complexity" is so profound, that the 
phenomenon itself is altered, rendering our investigative methods incapable of capturing it? 
In other words, it may be possible that "advanced" stages of moral reasoning are not observed 
in traditional societies because their understanding of morality is different. Evidence 
pertaining to the universality thesis is evaluated below. 
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On Empathy and Care 
It has been mentioned that Kohlberg defined morality in tenns of criteria of justice. Excluded 
from his definition were obligations arising fi.·om care or empathy, which he, like Rawls 
(1972), regarded as supererogatory obligations. He thus maintained that "the quantitative role 
of affect is relatively ilTelevant for understanding the structure and development of moral 
judgment" (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 140). 
Tt is important to expand on the notion of sup erero gatory obligations. Rawls (1972) defined 
supererogatory obligations as acts which "a person does for the sake of another's good even 
though the proviso that nullifies the natural duty is nullified" (p. 439). That is, when we 
engage in supererogatory obligations, we are not under any obligation to pursue those acts. 
The acts are supererogatory in the sense that they go beyond the call of duty. Consequently, 
Rawls (ibid) argued that the "difference between the sense of justice and the love of mankind 
[sic] is that the latter is supererogatory, going beyond the moral requirements and not 
invoking the exemptions which the principles of natural duty and obligation allow" (p. 476). 
Similarly, Kohlberg (1984) maintained that moral judgments oblige us to take action because 
they are "universalizable prescriptions" (ibid., p. 289, emphasis original) in the Kantian sense 
of the categorical imperative: that one acts according to a maxim that one wishes at the same 
time to be a universal law. Examples of such prescriptions are prohibitions against thert, 
hurting ilU10cent others, or breaking of promises (Kohlberg, 1984). 
- --~ "'" . 
Another reason Kohlberg (1981) regarded moral decisions based on empathy as non-
universalizable, is that he thought it would be unrealistic to expect moral agents to act all the 
time from considerations of care. The logic is that they would soon tire, given the number of 
situations that call for empathy. He conculTed with Nunner-Winkler (1984) that an ethic of 
care falls under positive or imperfect duties. These are "duties which do not prescribe specific 
acts but formulate a maxim which is to guide action, for example, the practice of care" 
(Kohlberg, 1984, p. 359). On the other hand, negative or perfect duties, such as the injunction 
to refrain from haIJ11ing innocent others, "can be followed by everybody at any time and 
location and with regard to everybody" (ibid, p. 359). 
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1n summary, Kohlberg proposed a theory of moral development, consisting of six stages. The 
stages are organized hierarchically, with higher stages representing advanced and adequate 
modes of moral reasoning. At the most advanced level, the moral point of view is defined in 
temlS of justice issues. Moral responsibilities arising out of care and empathy are regarded as 
sllpererogatory. The stages are characterized by an increasing differentiation of the moral 
point of view from the social context. The stages are also supposed to be invariant in 
sequence, and universal across cultures. 
Anomalies in Kohlberg's Theory: The Feminist Challenge 
Gilligan (1977,1982) was the first to launch a serious challenge to Kohlberg's theory of 
moral development. She critically questioned the sex differences in moral decision-making 
that had been observed in previous studies (e.g. Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969, cited in Gilligan, 
1977). These studies had shown that women's moral reasoning tends to stabilize at Stage 3 
(the interpersonal concordance orientation). Kohlberg and Kramer maintained that Stage 3 is 
sufficient for resolving moral dilemmas faced by women, which have to do with interpersonal 
relationships. Gilligan (1977) argued that conventional morality was not an indication of an 
inferior mode of moral thought on women's part. She pointed out that traditional approaches 
to psychological development are premised on Westem, male understandings of psychological 
maturity . They assume that developmental maturity involves "an increasing differentiation or 
self from the other and a progressive freeing of thought from contextual constraints" 
(Gilli gan , 1977, p. 481). 
Gilligan (1977) argued that women's moral judgments differed from those of men, owing to a 
different way of knowing self, others and the world. She pointed out that women emphasize 
connection to and empathy for others, rather than separation and detachment. From this 
perspective, the purpose of development is not to separate from but to develop and promote 
meaningful relationships with others. This requires making judgments that are sensitive to the 
concrete CirCUl11stances of another, rather than deciding from an impartial position envisaged 
in the Kohlbergian framework. A relational understanding of self, argued Gilligan, leads 
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women to a different, but not deficient, conception of morality: the ethic of care or 
respol1sibili ty. 
The ethic of care or responsibility was illuminated when real life, open-ended interviews were 
substituted for the standard hypothetical dilemmas (Gilligan, 1977, 1982). Unlike the morality 
of justice, this ethic recognizes feelings, empathy and connection to others as important 
aspects of moral decision-making. Premised on human interdependence and responsiveness, it 
highlights prevention ofhann and promotion of others' welfare (Lyons, 1988). It is not 
concerned with hypothetical moral subjects but the consequences of one's actions on real life, 
concrete people (Murphy & Gilligan, 1980). 
The morality of care should not be confused with an endorsement of the morality of the 
oppressed, as others have argued (e.g. Card, 1988; Chang, 1996). Following Harding (1987), 
Card and Chang are skeptical of the coincidence of African and feminine moralities. They 
argue that this is a Nietzchean slave morality, arising out of the social domination that both 
women cU1d Africans have endured. Human interdependence, and hence, caring, is an i~tegral 
part of traditional African philosophical frameworks (Akbar, 1984; Mbiti, 1991; Myers, 1988; 
Verhoef & Michel, 1997) (see Chapter 3). There is no reason why Africans should not have 
developed a different moral orientation, consistent with their philosophies or worldviews, 
independently of West em domination. Further, ifthe African caring orientation is bOfn out of 
domination, one would expect it to be least prevalent in societies that have had little contact 
with Westem cultures. Those most exposed to Westem ways oflife should show the most 
caring orientation. This has not been borne out by research evidence. Using the traditional 
Kohlbergian research method, Edwards (1975, 1981) found that the scores of Western 
educated Africans were closer to those of their Westem counterparts. The morality of care 
does not reflect Western domination: it is a different moral voice, based on a different 
understanding of self and relationships. This understanding recognizes connection as an 
integral aspect of human life (Gilligan et al., 1990). 
Another problem that emerged with Kohlberg's framework was that, in the transition from 
adolescence to adulthood, a significant proportion of subjects appeared to regress from 
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previously acquired stages of development. This was an anomalous finding because, 
according to the theory, the stages of moral development are invariant in sequence. How 
should we make sense of these findings? Is the regression an indication that these subjects had 
become incapable of using what are supposedly the most advanced stages of moral decision-
making? Murphy and Gilligan (1980) used these finding to hypothesize that there are two 
types of postconventional thought: postconventional fonnal and postconventional contextual. 
The fonner addresses the problem of moral relativism by appealing to concepts such as the 
social contract or natural rights. These concepts are used with the view of hypothetical 
subjects, or what Benhabib (1992) has called the "generalized other," in mind. 
Postconventional contextualism, on the other hand, remains sensitive to the concerns of real 
life, concrete SUbjects. Postconventional contextualism recognizes that answers cannot be 
objectively free from context. As a result, it remains responsive to the situation by focusing on 
the consequences of one's choices (Murphy & Gilligan, 1980). Thus, the apparent regression 
from previously attained stages of moral development can be explained with reference to 
di fferent understandings of postconventional morality. 
Following Gilligan, other critics of Kohlberg's theory have argued that the assumption that 
the moral point of view should transcend all perspectives, abstracts people from concrete 
circumstances to situations that do not exist in real life (Benhabib, 1987, 1992; Young, 1987). 
These authors point out that it is difficult to envisage the kind of person that remains,~once 
contextual markers such as gender and identity, have been removed. Furthennore, how does··'" 
one apply the notion of reversibility or reciprocal role-taking, unless one considers issues 
from the standpoint of people with a concrete history, identity, attitudes and desires? Without 
knowledge of the concrete other, argued Benhabib (1987, 1992), it is not possible to 
meaningfully test whether situations are universal and reversible, because we lack the 
essential inforn1ation to detennine whether others' moral situations are like or unlike ours. 
Is the ethic of care exclusive to women? Although research (Gilligan & Attanuci, 1988; 
Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988; Lyons, 1988) has shown that this ethic is significantly associated 
with women, it can exist simultaneously with the morality of justice. Gilligan et al. (1990) 
adopted a musical metaphor to explain this co-existence. They argued that the ethics of care 
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and justice can accompany each other, in the same way that different melodies G0mplement 
each other according to the laws of counterpoint. Counterpoint-is defined as "the art of adding 
Lt related, but independent melody [with] fixed rules ofhannony, to make a hannonic whole, 
.. . a thing set up in contrast or interaction with another" (Webster, 1970, cited in Gilligan et 
el. 1990, p. 115). If one adopts the musical metaphor, moral maturity is no longer 
characterized by either justice or care: it is the ability to hannoniously blend the two together, 
according to tbe demands of a situation. 
The recognition ofthe morality of care points toward the need to diversify the moral domain 
by identifying voices that have as yet not been accorded significance in the moral landscape. 
These are the voices of the marginalized groups in society (Bing & Reid, 1996). The call to 
recognize the voices of these groups is in line with the increasing recognition of the social and 
cultural mediation of moral thought (Brown & Gilligan, 1991; Day & Tappan, 1996; Tappan, 
2000). However, before understandings of morality in different cultural settings are discussed, 
the cross-cultural validity of Kohlberg's theory will be evaluated. 
Cultural Findings and Critique 
As mentioned previously, Kohlberg's studies, and those of others (e.g. Edwards, 1975, 1981; 
Kohlberg, 1971 , 1981,1984; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982) indicate that higher stages ofnlOral 
development are "absent" in traditional and peasant commlmities. Stages 1,2 and 3 were 
found to be common in traditional and peasant societies, whereas advanced stages (4, 5, and 
6) were associated with Westem liberal societies. Kohlberg (1981) explained these differences 
in terms of opportunities for role taking. He argued that in societies where there is greater 
participation in institutions of civil society, such as the family and schools, moral 
development is stimulated through peer interaction and communication, participation in 
decision-making, and delegation of responsibilities to the child. Edwards's (1975, 1981) 
studies, conducted with an African popUlation, will be used to illustrate this point. 
Using an adapted version of the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview, Edwards (1975) 
assessed moral reasoning among university students, secondary school pupils and community 
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leaders in Kenya. Stage 4 reasoning was found to be significantly more common among 
university students than among community leaders. However, the two groups did not differ 
with respect to the prevalence of Stage 3 reasoning. Edwards (1975) argued that university 
students had had access to higher education and the modem economy, both of which 
supposedly promote higher stages of moral reasoning through increased participation. She 
fmiher attributed Stage 4 reasoning to a movement away from traditional ways of life, where 
face-to-face interactions and kinship bonds prevail, towards more anonymous and impersonal 
modes of existence, characteristic of urban societies. This, she argued, familiarizes one with 
notions of authority, punislmlent, rule and law. These are considered important to conditions 
of life in urban societies (Edwards, 1975). 
An "absence" of advanced stages of moral development in traditional societies is a common 
finding. For example, Nisan and Kohlberg's (1982) comparison of the moral judgment of city 
and rural dwellers in Turkey led to the same conclusion as that of Edwards (1975). The rate of 
moral development was found to be "slower" among village dwellers, who tended to stabilize 
at Stage 3. Echoing Edwards (1975), Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) suggested that Stage 3 may 
be a sufficient mode of moral functioning in traditional societies, where social consensus is 
important, and face-to-face interactions still constitute the dominant social order. Studies 
reviewed by Snarey (1985) all indicate that Stages 4 and above are absent among working 
class and traditional folk societies. Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) argued that simple and 
undifferentiated ways of life prohibit these societies from reaching higher stages of ethical 
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thought. On the other hand, however, Snarey (1985) suggested that complete absence of Stage 
4 and above in all traditional societies, including leaders, may be an indication of biases in the 
scoring system. Snarey also suggested that Kohlberg' s higher levels of moral reasoning could 
be based on culturally defined values, which are not salient in indigenous communities. 
Cultural Differences and Absence of OpportlUlities for Role-taking 
The argument that advanced stages of moral development are absent in traditional societies 
because of the absence of opportunities for role-taking will now be considered. The question 
is : what constitutes "opportunities for role-taking?" Kohlberg (1981) mentioned "family 
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participation, communication, emotional warmth, sharing in decisions, awarding 
responsibilities to the child, [and] pointing out consequences of action to others" (p. 142). 
Equally important are the extent of interactions in peer group discussions and opportunities 
for active leadership roles (Edwards, 1981). 
The question is: Why should the above mentioned characteristics be the sole preserve of 
liberal Westem societies? Consider, for example, the way children were raised in most 
traditional African societies. They were organized into age-equivalent groups, each group 
havi ng an overall leader. In addition, leaders for specific functions, such as dancing, were 
chosen (Msimang, 1975). These groups had mechanisms for resolving disputes and for 
communicating with other, similarly-constituted groups or elders. Within the group, 
individuals were allocated various responsibilities. Even the highest office in the land, that of 
the king, was subject to the ibandla Ca gathering of elders) who, through indaba (dialogue or 
debate), were responsible for making decisions affecting the nation. This system extended 
downward to the family, where mechanisms for resolving disputes such as marital discord 
were in place. Even to date, rural African societies continue to use these mechanisms in 
resolving disputes. All the above point at the importance attached to dialogue and the 
allocation of responsibilities in traditional societies. Therefore, it does not follow that the 
"absence" of advanced stages of moral thought among traditional African communities is due 
to a lack of opportunities for leadership or peer interaction. 
To understand differences in moral decision-making, one needs to engage with the way 
morality is defined in cognitivist theories. It is important to examine whether Kohlberg's 
moral dilemmas are comprehensive enough to cover the way morality is understood in 
different cultures. Kohlberg (1981,1984) argued that the moral issues covered in his 
dilemmas, namely life versus law, conscience versus punishment, and issues of contract 
versus authority, represent real moral conflicts for anyone anywhere, provided appropriate 
cultural mod!fications were made. The following section addresses the possibility that 
differences in moral reasoning between Westem and traditional societies are due to 
inadequate cultural adaptations of the testing material. 
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Cultural Adaptations and Translations 
It could be argued that cross-cultural differences in moral reasoning occur because Kohlberg's 
moral di lemmas have not been satisfactorily adapted for use across cultures. Cultural 
adaptation involved translating dilemmas into interviewees' languages, changing the names of 
characters involved, and the use of locally relevant content. It should be noted, however, that 
even with the revised and improved scoring system, village societies scored lower than urban 
dwellers. Studies conducted in Turkey showed that even the oldest village dwellers did not 
advance beyond Stage 3 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, 1987b). How can these results be 
explained? 
Simpson (1974) pointed out that even if standard translation procedures have been adhered to, 
and other adaptations made, stimulus equivalence cannot be guaranteed in psychological 
assessment. This view was supported by Greenfield (1997), who argued that for a test to have 
the same meaning across cultures, testees must share the assumptions, values and 
communication patterns assumed by the test. It is incumbent upon the researcher not only to 
show that items mean the same thing for all cultures involved; but also to ensure that the value 
of responses to particular questions be agreed upon. Furthermore, the traditional Western 
assumption that knowing occurs independently of one's context must be shared. The value 
attached to testing, which assumes that it is acceptable to communicate with strangers about 
issues that have no immediate relevance to one's context, must also hold across cultures 
(Greenfield, 1997). It is only when there is agreement on these issues that stimulus 
equivalence can be guaranteed. Alternatively, the issues on which dilemmas are based should 
emanate fro111 the culture under investigation. If neither of these conditions is met, differences 
in moral development may not mean cultural differences in ethical principles. Quite to the 
contrary, these may reflect "differences in the comprehension and definition of a situation 
according to the meaning which it has for specific groups" (Simpson, 1974, p. 90). 
Cross-cultural differences in perfonnance, reSUlting from variations in the definition and 
meaning of a situation, were best illustrated by Co le, Gay, Glick and Sharpe's (1971) work on 
abstract thinking among non-literate village communities. Cole et al. initially thought that the 
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Kpelle people of Liberia were not capable of abstract thinking. This followed the observation 
that in a categorization task, the Kpelle kept on arranging objects in tenns of their functional 
relatedness, and not according to conceptual categories. It was only when they were asked 
how afoofish person would arrange the objects, that they sorted them conceptually. Had 
instructions not been varied, the researchers would have concluded that the Kpelle are 
incapable of abstract thinking. Moral development researchers should also look into the 
meaning that questions have for various groups, before declaring that other groups are not 
capable of principled moral thinking. 
The importance of a cultural and situated understanding of problem solving is further 
illustrated by the following anecdotal example, told by a student in a graduate cultural 
psychology class: A European-educated, African primary school teacher was detennined to 
make arithmetic education relevant to her pupils. So she posed the following question to a 
rural boy: "Jfyou are looking after 5 goats, and one of them jumps over the fence, how many 
remain behind?" The boy answered: "None." Puzzled, the teacher posed the question again, 
w.ith some slight variations : "Remember, you had 5, and one jumped over the fence." The boy 
insisted : "None remain behind, Ma'am." The teacher then asked the boy to give a reason for 
his answer. To which the boy responded: "Ma'am, ifone of them jumps over the fence, all the 
goats will follow suit. So, none will remain behind." Although anecdotal, this story clearly 
shows that what appears to be a stupid answer, is in fact based on a good contextual • 
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understanding of goat behavior. What appears to be a neutral stimulus, couched in a language 
and content that a rural boy should identify with, turns out to be not neutral at all. 
Similarly, before cultural differences in moral development can be pronounced, one has to 
demonstrate that the groups involved are in fact engaged in the same activity: that the 
meaning of the situation is the same for all (Simpson, 1974). In conducting cross-cultural 
research , it is not sufficient to adapt testing material. A group's philosophical assumptions 
about knowledge; the assumed relationship between oneself as a Imower and what is to be 
known; and the context in which one has to know, must be taken into account (Belenky et al., 
1986; Green fielcl , 1997). This is consistent with cultural psychology, which maintains that 
cultural trad itions transf01111 people in various ways, resulting in a dynamic interdependence 
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between mind and culture (Shweder, 1990). Cultural psychology differs markedly from 
traditional cognitive approaches, which seek to isolate the mind and study it independently of 
context. 
The Philosophical Bases of Morality 
Could cultural differences in moral decision-making be due to different philosophical 
frameworks? To answer this question, it is important to consider Kohlberg's position on the 
relationship between morality and philosophical assumptions. Kohlberg (1981) maintained 
that "there is no philosophically neutral starting point for the psychology of morality" (p. 98). 
However, he did not follow up on this insight by studying the philosophical underpilmings of 
morality in non-Western cultures. Probably, this was because of his conviction that the 
content and structure of morality is the same across cultures, irrespective of each group's 
philosophical orientation. Simpson (1974) pointed out that Kohlberg's philosophic pluralism 
is limited to Western liberal philosophy. His conception of morality is based on the Kantian 
formalist tradition, as evidenced by extensive citations from philosophers such as Rawls, 
Frankena, and Habe11l1aS (Campbell & Christopher, 1996). 
Given the philosophical basis ofKohlberg's theory in Western liberal thought, how are cross-
cultural differences to be explained? How do we account for the absence of Stages (5 and 6 
in traditional non-Western societies? As mentioned previously, Kohlberg conveniently argued 
that this is due to a lack of opportunities for role-taking. A more informed approach, however, 
would involve a critical examination of the life philosophies of the communities concerned. 
Commenting on the observed cross-cultural differences in Kohlberg's work, Simpson (1974) 
maintained that "a philosophical system which supports a universal theory of development 
must account for conceptual differences which arise in the varying perceptions and 
explanations of reality adhering to the customs and broad social environments of diverse 
groups" (p. 84, emphasis original). Because Western liberal philosophy does not represent 
systems of thought in the entire world, definitions of morality should take into account the 
particular world in which one has to be moral. Before pronouncing cultural differences in 
moral decision-making, Kohlberg should have made an attempt to understand cultures 
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through their own languages, philosophies and history (Huebner & Garrod, 1991). 
The importance of taking into account a culture's own definition and understanding of reality 
in moral research is shown in the work ofVasudev and Hummel (1987). Working with an 
Indian sample, they found that participants construed dilemmas, such as Heinz's, as real rather 
than hypothetical. As a result, they were reluctant to prescribe that Heinz should steal the 
drug, favouring social and collective solutions instead. Vasudel and Hummel (1987) argued 
that this should not be regarded as conventional morality "but a principle in favor of socially 
and morally responsible solutions which CalUlot, should not, under their conceptions of justice, 
be the burden of a single individual" (p. 111). Similar results were reported by Snarey (1985), 
who found that in addition to the traditional Kohlbergian postconventional morality, kibbutz-
born Israelis subscribed to the principle of collective community equality alld happiness. This 
principle is not captured in Kohlberg's scoring system. Working in China and New Guinea 
respectively, Dien (1982) and Tietjen and Walker (1984) concluded that the issue of the 
relationship of the individual to the community was of great moral significance to these 
communities. 
It is evident from the studies cited above that the differences in moral decision-making 
between Westem liberal societies and other communities are consistent across continents. 
These differences cannot be explained by the absence of opportunities forTole-taking~ecause 
__ .1 ...... 
most cu Itures provide such opportunities. Furthermore, it cannot be said that differences are 
due to indigenous societies progressing through the stages at a slower rate because, unless the 
full range of stages has been demonstrated, it is impossible to know ifthey would indeed 
follow the hypothesized sequence. The fact that even in Westem societies, very few 
individuals attain Stage 6 (Kohlberg et al., 1990), lends further support to this point. Given 
that cross-cultural differences exist nonetheless, what is needed is an overarching conceptual 
framework to account for them. Following Jensen (1997) and Miller (1994), I hypothesize that 
differences result from variations in worldviews, the cultural hypotheses we use to explain 
reality and to navigate the world. 
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Moral Decision-making and Worldviews 
Miller (1994) and Jensen (1997) have argued that differences in moral decision-making 
emanate from cultural variations in meaning systems or worldviews. A worldview is a set of 
basic assumptions that a group of people develops in order to explain reality, its place, and its 
purpose in the world (Mishra, 1997). These assumptions provide a frame of reference that is 
lIsed to address problems in life. 
Worldviews arise in response to a set of core questions that people in all cultures have had to 
respond to, in the course of their development (Sue & Sue, 1999). These are questions 
pertaining to the nature of the world (what is the world like?) and the meaning ofpersonhood 
(Aerts et al ., 1994). Once established, worldviews shape our attitudes, values and opinions, as 
well as the way we think and behave (Sue, 1978). Although minor variations exist in how 
worldviews have been conceptualized, the following have been identified as important 
components in the literature: people's relationship to nature/environment, their orientation 
with respect to space and time, the preferred mode of activity, and the relational orientation 
(Lock, 1981; Shweder, 1982; Sue, 1978; Sue & Sue, 1999). 
Time and Space Orientation 
Space and time orientation are important aspects of world views. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck ... '" 
(1961) argued that cultures vary in their conception of time. A culture may emphasize history 
and tradition, the here and now, or the distant future. For example, Western societies tend to 
emphasize the future. Time is further organized into linear segments, marked by what people 
are doing at the time (Hall, 1983; Hall & Hall, 1990). Traditional communities, on the other 
hand, concentrate on the past and the present. The importance of the past among traditional 
Africans is evidenced by the value attached to keeping the memory of ancestors alive (Mbiti, 
1991). From an African perspective, it is not the passage of time per se that matters. One's 
lived experience - the relationship between oneself and others, including the ancestors and 
God - is more important. People should promote the balance or interdependence that is 
thought to exist between themselves and everything to which they stand in relation. Paying 
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The Nature of Human Activity 
The human activity dimension of world views answers the question: What is the preferred 
mode of human activity? Traditional Westem cultures place value on doing over the being or 
being-in-becoming mode of activity. This emanates from the belief that one's value as a 
person is determined by personal accomplishments (Sue & Sue, 1999). It is believed that 
progress in life results from effort and hard work. This mode of being is most evident in the 
way people identify with what they do (their occupations), and the value placed on children 
knowing what they will become when they grow up (Sue & Sue, 1999). Other cultures, on the 
other hand, emphasize being or being-in-becoming. In this mode, value is placed on harmony 
and attainment of spiritual fulfilment. It is believed that human beings are born worthy of 
respect and dignity, irrespective of their achievements. Furthennore, people are obliged to 
fulfil responsibilities to others and the community, in accordance with their position and 
status. Failure to do so may be regarded in moral terms (Miller & Bersoff, 1992). 
The Relational Orientation 
Thi s dimension of world views is concemed with how the selfis defined in relation to the 
other and the environment (Lock, 1981; Sue & Sue, 1999). Markus and Kitayama (1991, 
I 994) and Shweder (1991) have argued that there are cultural differences in how the ~elf is 
defined. Traditional Westem cultures regard the self as a bounded entity: it is defined in tern's' 
of its intemal attributes such as thoughts and emotions. Individuals are regarded as 
autonomous beings: they exist independently of social and contextual factors. Where 
relationships with others and the social order exist, they are thought to be established through 
discretionary choice (Shweder, 1982). This view ofselfhood is also known as self-contained 
individualism (Sampson, 1988) or the independent view of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 
1994). On the other hand, the self in indigenous societies and non-Western cultures in general 
is context-based (Shweder, 1991). The selfis defined in terms of one's relationships with 
others, including the family and the community. The goal of socialization is not to be 
autonomous but to harmonize one's interests with those ofthe collective. This view of 
selfhood is also called the collective or interdependent self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991 , 1994). 
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The dimensions of world views mentioned above are intertwined. Self-definition, for example, 
is not only inJ:1uenced by place (where one is located), but it also takes into account the time 
dimension (Lock, 1981). When traditional African approaches to the self are discussed 
(Chapter 3 ), it will be shown that the decision to honour family obligations is influenced by 
both the memory of one ' s ancestors (the past), and the contemplation of what will happen to 
oneself after death (the future self). 
It should be noted that although worldviews differ between cultures, technological 
developments in the modem world make it possible to be exposed to diverse perspectives. The 
present study recognizes that moral decision-making in a changing society is influenced by 
multiple worldviews. It is therefore the dialogical interchange between worldviews that is of 
significance to research. Researching the relationship between multiple worldviews and 
psychological processes, argued Hermans and Kempen (2001a), requires the notion of the 
dialogical self. 
Although all components of world views are impOliant in moral decision-making, the present 
study focuses primarily on the relational orientation. Influences of self-contained 
individualism on cognitive approaches to morality are explored below. It is argued that self-
contained individualism is by no means universal. It is a product of historical and cullural 
_ .. . .....  
circumstances. 
Cognitivist Theories and Self-contained Individualism 
Cognitive approaches to morality are premised on the notion of an autonomous self. This view 
of the self, characterized elsewhere as "self-contained" (Sampson, 1988) and "independent" 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1994), defines people with reference to unique intemal attributes 
such as thoughts and emotions. It is assumed that the goal of human development is the 
realization of these attributes. If individuals are free and autonomous, it follows that context 
will have little or no bearing on moral development. This is why Kohlberg's highest stages of 
moral reasoning assume that individuals are bound only by laws and principles that they have 
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created ex nihilo or from behind a "veil of ignorance" (Rawls, 1972). It is assumed that family 
and community values play no role in these deliberations. 
Self-contained individualism emanated from a positivistic approach to social science: the 
dominant paradigm in the 20th century (Cushman, 1990). Positivism regards social science 
phenomena as part and parcel of nature, to be analyzed through the same methods that have 
brought undoubted success in the natural sciences. As a result, attempts are made to explain 
human consciousness in tenns of universal, ahistorical, and acultural psychological laws 
(Cushman, 1990; Richardson & Fowers, 1998). 
Cushman (1990) and Richardson, Rogers and McCaroll (1998) have argued that positivism 
ori ginated in the scientific revolution of the 16th and 1 i h centuries. During this period, there 
was a gradual shift from commwlity and religious orientations, to a scientific materialistic 
outlook that extolled the value of detached reasoning (Richardson et aI., 1998). The major 
proponents ofthis view were Descartes and Hobbes (Dunne, 1995; Fau1coner & Williams, 
1990). Descartes argued that the mind and the world were two separate entities. He 
maintained that the "I" or "ego" is "irrefutably present to itself as a pure extensionless 
consciousness, . .. without a body and with no acknowledged complicity in language, culture, 
or community" (Dunne, 1995, p. 138). Similarly, Hobbes regarded human action and 
personality as part and parcel of nature. He argued that social inquiry should be based on 
assertions that were valid regardless of time, place, and circumstances (cited in Bemstein, 
1976). Following on this tradition, traditional cognitive approaches to morality have tried to 
establish moral principles that are true of anyone, anywhere, and at any time. 
Criticisms of Self-contained Individualism and Positivism 
The individualistic view of the self came under severe scrutiny in the latter half of the 20th 
century. Critics pointed out that the conception of the self as rational and transcendental is 
neither universal nor ahistorical. Faulconer and Williams (1990) argued that even for early 
Greek philosophers, it was the relationship of the individual to the community, rather than 
individuals p er se, that was important. Hannony and interdependence between humans and 
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the larger cosmos was the central feature of the traditional Greek view of the self. Individuals 
were regarded as the smallest unit of the community. Most important, they derived their 
definition from the community more than they defined the community (Faulconer & 
WiIliams, 1990) . 
If the traditional Greek view of the self preceded the idea of self-contained individualism, it 
ShOll Id be noted that this is the case if one takes the Westem history of ideas as the point of 
departure. A lthough self-contained individualism is the dominant basis of intellectual 
discourse and societal organization in the West, it is by no means the dominant force in the 
world (Geertz, 1979; Sampson, 1993). Self-contained individualism has not been the 
dominant basis ofsocietal organization in many communities. Shweder and Boume (1991) 
have shown that the communal sense of personhood is prevalent in many Asiatic and Indian 
comnmnities, even at present. Similarly, Markus and Kitayama (1991, 1994) and Mwawenda 
(1995) argued that people of Asiatic and African origin value an interdependent construal of 
the self. In most non-Westem societies, self-understanding takes place in the context of a 
significant group (Sampson, 1993). The goal ofsocialization is not individuation, but the 
promotion of connection and interdependence among individuals, and helping children to 
realize their position and responsibilities within the social order (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 
1994; Shweder, 1990). 
-.. --. 
]f one takes interdependence between people as a point of departure, the view that 
interpersonal duties and responsibilities are supererogatory, becomes questionable. This view 
is based on the individualistic assumptions of the Kantian philosophical framework. Miller 
and Bersoff (1992) showed that the Hindu Indian perspective on morality, premised on the 
interdependent view of the self, regards interpersonal duties and responsibilities in fully 
principled terllls. Similarly, it is argued in the next chapter, people in traditional African 
settings are said to be moral beings (bangabantu) to the extent that they fulfil their 
responsibilities toward others and the social group (Menkiti, 1984; Ogbonnaya, 1994). 
Social constrllctionists have also criticized positivistic approaches to social science (Burr, 
1995; DUlTheim, 1997; Gergen, 1973, 1985, 1990, 1994; Hermans et al., 1992). From a social 
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constructionist perspective, the way we understand the world is "a product of historically 
situated interchanges between people" (Gergen, 1985, p. 267). Knowledge does not reside in 
people's heads: it is co-created by a community of people with a shared understanding and 
history. Knowledge is transmitted socially through linguistic and other social practices 
(Cottone, 200 I ; Gergen, 1999). Social constructionists position themselves against 
Descartes's dictum: cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). The dictum is based on the 
classical theory of mind, which prizes reflective thought or "pure reason" (Labouvie-Vief, 
Orwoll, & Manion, 1995). From a social constructionist perspective, mind and body cannot be 
separated because" [b ]uried in a body, the human mind is in history and makes history at the 
same time" (Hemlans et al., 1992, p. 24). Because mind is a product of a social reality, there 
cannot be a transcendental reality beyond language and culture (Burr, 1995). As a result, 
Gergen (1985) argued that social inquiry should be directed not at uncovering underlying and 
timeless bases of human behaviour, but at the historical and sociocultural origins of various 
world constructions. 
Social constructionists regard morality and ethics as social and cultural practices that can be 
,j" meaningfully understood in context (Cottone, 2001; Gergen, 1999). From a practical point of 
,Y 
'-~ t Y view, this means that the study of morality in indigenous contexts should involve genuine 
\::" v 0 
f-/ r- , 
\)'" y q:Z- dialogue with (and not about) the people concerned (Sampson, 1998; Shotter, 1998). This 
~~ . 
'I"' I~ entails engaging with the .voices of displaced, oppressed, and marginalized people, whose 
reality has traditionally been explained by others, often from detached, theoretical 
perspectives (hooks, 1990). 
Incorporating culture and context into psychological studies does not imply that a single 
culture has a monolithic influence on individuals. Nor does it mean that culture is static. 
Gergen ( 1990) pointed to the multiple social and cultural factors that contribute to self 
formation . He maintained that television and other media expose us to cultural and social 
perspectives from all over the world. The process whereby we are exposed to various 
relationships and vrewpoints he called social saturation. The self emanating from this process 
\ jle referred to as the saturated self The saturated selfis populated, or even overpopulated, 
\ with others' perspectives. "Increasingly we emerge as the possessors of many voices. Each 
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self contains a mUltiplicity of others, singing different melodies, different voices, and with 
different rhytlU11s" (Gergen, 1990, p. 83). The question becomes, how is it possible to speak in 
many voices and yet retain the unity of the self? It will be argued later that a dia10gical view 
of personhood makes it possible to acconU11Odate multiple selves. 
Narrative and Moral Development 
The above-mentioned problems with cognitive-developmental approaches have intensified 
calls for the need to take into account the multi-dimensional nature of the moral domain 
(Benhabib, 1992; Day &Tappan, 1996; Gilligan, 1982). Using a narrative perspective, the 
present study investigates understandings of morality among isiZulu speakers in South Africa. 
This perspective was chosen as the paradigmatic framework because it is evident from the 
literature (Benhabib, 1992; Gilligan, 1982) that it is most suitable for studying psychological 
phenomena in their cultural and historical context. 
Moral experience exists in time and relationship, these being the fundamei1tal dimensions of 
narrative (Day & Tappan, 1996; Gilligan et al., 1990; Tappan, 1991a, 1991b). When people 
are asked to account for their choices, they always do so by composing a story that recounts 
events in a temporal sequence (Day, 1991). What is important, however, is not the sequencing 
of events per se, but the moral meaning, or the point of view, that is taken with respeCt to 
them (White, 1981). In the following sections, the relevance of narrative approaches to the 
study of situated morality is demonstrated by drawing contrasts between the basic frameworks 
(root metaphors) guiding cognitive and narrative approaches respectively. 
Root Metaphors in the Study of Morality 
Root metaphors are frameworks for construing events in the natural or social world. They are 
world hypotheses, derived from common sense, which are used to understand and interpret the 
world (Sarbin, 1986). Pepper (1942) argued that to understand the world comprehensively, 
human beings search for basic analogies. Once established, these analogies play an important 
role in determining the philosophical or scientific models to be applied in observing, 
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classifying, interpreting and explaining data. 
Cognitive-developmental approaches to morality take organicism as the root metaphor. 
Organicism sees the world as striving toward integration or wholeness. It is assumed that there 
are internal processes concealed within an organism. These processes are supposedly 
unfolding and striving toward integration over time. This is evidenced by the emphasis placed 
on th e progressive attainment of stages, culminating with principled reasoning, the "end 
point" of moral development. Organicism attempts to unravel general laws of human 
development. It is assumed that culture, context, time and place play little or no role in this 
process. Where these factors are considered, they are usually regarded as nuisance variables 
that obscure the emergence of universal psychological principles. It is thus not surprising that 
the "absence" of advanced stages of moral thought among indigenous societies is blamed on 
lack of opportunities for role-taking. 
Narrative and Contextualism 
Unlike organicism, the narrative paradigm considers psychological phenomena in their 
context (Sarbin, 1986). Attention is paid to intentions and meanings people attach to their 
experiences, as these are lived in space and time (Bruner, 1986). People resort to story-telling 
to organize these events and experiences in a meaningful way. The human tendency tb assign 
meaning to even meaningless events was demonstrated by Michotte (1946, cited in Sarbin, 
-- '~ -, 
] 986). Michotte showed this by manipulating the movements of two rectangles, A and B. If 
rectangle A was moved toward a stationery rectangle B, and then stopped, followed by the 
movement of rectangle B, participants resorted to a narrative to attribute causality to the 
movement of the rectangles. For example, they would say that rectangle B got out of the way 
of rectangle A. Bruner (1986) and Sarbin (1986) used this finding as evidence that people are 
not passive recipients of experience. Quite the contrary, they are thought to be actively 
involved in the construction of meaning. In the process they use narratives to organize actions 
into meaningful sequences of events. 
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Once completed, nalTatives provide coherent, plausible and intelligible accounts of how and 
why things happened (Polkinghorne, 1988; Freeman, 1997). Thus, argued Bruner (1990), "the 
central concept of a human psychology is meaning and the processes and transactions 
involved in the construction of meanings" (p . 33, italics in original). 
Bruner ( I 98() ) has highlighted the characteristics of nanative approaches. Re distinguished 
between paradigmatic and nan'ative modes of thought. The former is most common in the 
natural sciences. It is characterized by a search for proofs and truth that go beyond particular 
contexts. Its intention is to discover general laws to explain all cases of the same kind. On the 
other hand, nalTative thinking is meant to convey the richness and variety of life experiences. 
It is most suitable to considerations of meaning in life: these are considerations such as the 
kind of life one should live, or the ethical or moral thing to do in particular circumstances 
(Roward, 1991). Thus, while paradigmatic thinking leads to universal truths, nalTative modes 
of thought seek connections and meaning between events as they occur in space and time. 
NalTative and culture. 
It is sometimes argued that nalTative approaches make it difficult to distinguish between 
acceptable and unacceptable meanings (Lourenc;o, 1996). The question of validation in the 
narrative paradigm is addressed in Chapter 5. 
It shou.1d be noted , though, that the narrative paradigm recognizes that meaning is not an 
idiosyncratic property of individuals. NalTatives are socio-culturally embedded: they contain 
meanings shared by a group of people (Bruner, 1990; Cushman, 1990; Roward, 1991; Gergen 
& Gergen, 1988; Polkinghorne, 1988; Sarbin, 1986; Vitz, 1990). Bruner (1990) and Reelas 
(1981) argued that every culture develops an indigenous psychology. These are cultural 
views, theories, assumptions and metaphors that have a bearing on psychological topics 
(Reel as, 1981). An example of an indigenous psychology is a shared understanding of what it 
means to be human (the theory of the self). Culture tales or nanatives are the primary vehicles 
of indigenous psychology (BruneI', 1990; Roward, 1991). Cultural knowledge is passed on 
from generation to generation through language, myths, fairy tales, histories and stories 
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(Polkinghorne, 1988). To participate as a competent member in one's society requires an 
appreciation and know ledge of the range of meanings that the culture has developed over 
time. The social and historical embeddedness of narrative was emphasized by Gergen and 
Gergen (1988): 
The process of story telling is not the act of an autonomous and independent actor. 
First, \-ve found that the actor's capacities for intelligibility are embedded within a 
sociohistorical context; in the telling of a story the actor is relying on certain features 
of a preexisting social order. In this sense it would be plausible to say that the culture 
is speaking through the actor to produce itself. Further, we found that self-narratives 
depend on the mutual sharing of symbols, socially-acceptable performances, and 
continued negotiation. (p. 40, emphasis added) 
The fact that narratives are situated in cultural and historical contexts does not mean that 
culture provides a single narrative for individuals to tell. Culture provides a multiplicity of 
narratives, within which individuals' narratives are nested. For example, in addition to 
resorting to nan-atives that are part of their historical and cultural tradition, individuals also 
constme unique narratives portraying their development from childhood to adolescence and 
adulthood. These narratives will cover aspects of their lives such as their school or 
professional careers (Gergen & Gergen, 1988). 
. ... ....  
Cultural narratives, and the meanings associated with them, are not static. Nor is there a uni-
directional and predictable relationship between narratives and how individuals employ them 
to deal with problems in life. Quite to the contrary, cultural meanings are subject to continued 
negotiation and re-negotiation over time. This is a vindication of the dynamic interdependence 
between mind and culture. Cultural traditions and practices transform the psyche (the way we 
think). On the other hand, we also apply our thought processes to change the traditions 
themselves (Bruner, 1990; Shweder, 1990). This dynamism between mind and cultural 
meaning systems allows for vibrant changes through new contributions and/or gradual 
deletion of old pattems. It also makes it possible to explain the existence of multiple 
narratives within a culture, as individuals position themselves in relation to cultural narratives 
in different ways. This issue will be discussed at length, once the notion of a dialogical 
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self has been introduced. 
Conclusion: Toward the Dialogical Self 
This chapter presented the major tenets of Kohlberg's theory of moral development. From a 
Koblbergian perspective, morality occurs in stages, beginning with the hedonistic 
preconventionallevel, and culminating in principled, postconventional thought. Stages are 
supposedly invariant in sequence and universal across cultures. Following Rawls (1972), 
Kohlberg (1981) defined morality in justice tenns, thereby relegating actions arising out of 
empathy and care to a supererogatory status. 
Moral universality has not been demonstrated across cultures. Even in Western societies, most 
people do not reach Stage 6 (Kohlberg et al., 1990). It was argued that differences in moral 
decision-making result from different philosophical assumptions and worldviews. The 
morality of justice is premised on the view that individuals are autonomous and disembodied. 
People's moral actions are hence guided by abstract and timeless principles. On the other hand 
it has been shown that cultures that emphasize hannony and interdependence see interpersonal 
duties and responsibilities, regarded as supererogatory obligations in Kohlberg's scheme, in 
fully principled terms (Miller & Bersoff, 1992). This has led to calls to investigate the socio-
~ 
cultural mediation of moral thought, with a view to identifying voices that have not yet 
become part of the moral landscape. 
~, -- ' .... 
NalTative approaches are most suited to studying morality in context, given the emphasis 
these approaches place on history, space a11d time. This does not mean however, that 
approaches premised on self-contained individualism are irrelevant. Individualistic 
approaches to the self calmot be completely disregarded, given that they are also products of 
historical and cultural orientations (Cushmal1, 1990). What is called for is a comprehensive 
theory that will take us beyond "either-or" explanations. Such a theory should account for the 
co-existence of altemative, and even competing perspectives, within a single personality. 
Dialogical approaches to the self (Bakhtin, 1981, 198411993; DUlli1e, 1995; Taylor, 1991) 
make it possible for an individual to hold multiple positions (Hennans, 2001a, 2001b; 
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Hermans & Kempen, 1995). 
Before the dialogical self is discussed, it is important to examine the worldview and 
philosophical assumptions that infonn traditional African understandings of the person and 
the world. This worldview and philosophical orientation need to be discussed at length, lest 
one falls victim to the tendency to uncritically subordinate locally-derived empirical data to 
the assumptions, theories and concepts emanating from the West (Anyanwu, 1981). This is 
not meant to renege on the dialogical concept of selfhood. It is an attempt to ensure that 
traditional African approaches to the self enter the dialogue as full partners with other 
approaches. 
. "' - , 
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CHAPTER 3 
AN AFRICAN METAPHYSICAL ONTOLOGY 
The concept of culture I espouse. .. is essentially a semiotic one .... Man [sic] is an 
animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take culture to be those 
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law 
but an interpretive one in search of meaning. (Geertz, 1973, p. 5) 
A proper understanding of morality in non-Western cultures should begin with an examination of 
the philosophies, languagesaild worldviews, through which people experience their world 
(Hubner & Garrod, 1991; Simpson, 1974; Vasudev & Hummel, 1987). This chapter presents a 
metaphysical framework that infol1ns an understanding of reality from a traditional African point 
of view. The 1110st important aspect of this framework is that reality is organised hierarchjcally, 
from ina . vels 
culminatin - 'tll God at the a ex. All organisms and objects in the hierarchy are endowed with a 
creative energy or life force, by virtue of which they are capable of influencing and being 
influenced by other elements. To know is to understand the dynamic interdependence between 
elements within the system. The self which emanates from this framework is immersed in social 
relationships. Similarly, morality is grounded in everyday life experiences. 
The following section discusses the above-mentioned metaphysical framework, followed by its 
moral implications. Although discussed with reference to African experiences, the basic tenets of 
the framework are shared by a number of indigenous societies. Furthennore, these ideas are 
neither static nor the sole detenninant of African moral thought. The framework exists alongside, 
and in dialogue, with other ideas and belief systems. 
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An African Metaphysical System 
Metaphysics is concemed with eo le's conce tions ofre~ their position in the u . erse and 
their relation to others and the environment. It i~~:rapple with fundamental 
'-
all ertainina to existence spac_e, time and kausal"L (.Teffo & Roux, 1998). It could be 
seen as a worldview, throu h which people think, fe~l ~d act, in relation to the world. 
Metaphysical ontologies not only prescribe what is, but also incorporate ideals of what can be, 
the ideal of the cosmic and natural order, and its possible defects. For example, traditional 
African societies hold the view that there should be hannony and interdependence between 
elements in the cosmos. From this perspective, immorality ensues from a disconnection between 
parts comprising the whole: rovide a framework by' eans of which 
~~~~~~~,.,e~o:.:.f~tl~le~m~se. ll es ~the$orld. 
Metaphysical systems may be regarded as cultural models (Quinn & Holland, 1987) or meaning 
systems (Miller, 1997). These are the taken-for-granted models, by means of which people make 
sense of the world and their behavior in it. Let me address a common criticism of attempts to 
introduce indigenous knowledge systems to academic and other fonns of discourse. It is often 
said that this amounts to reification of culture. This criticism fails to take into account the 
dynamic nature of meaning systems. Cultural meaning systems are always in dialogue with other 
bodies of knowledge, thereby undergoing ilIDovation and renewal. Such has been the case with -"-" 
independent Christian churches in Africa. These churches have successfully interwoven 
traditional African and Christian belief systems (Oosthuizen, 1989). Discussing African belief 
systems, without taking into account historical changes, is neither meaningful nor desirable. 
There are indeed changes and adaptations, reSUlting from colonization, Western-type education, 
industrialization and exposure to Westem media. Exposure to multiple worldviews entails that 
there cannot be a simple, one-to-one conespondence between a meaning system and how it is 
employed in real life. In order to understand the complexity of human experience, we have to 
take into account the dynamic interpenetration between various worldviews, a process Gadamer 
(1975) called the fusion of horizons of meaning. This process is explained in Chapter 5. Rather 
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than arguing for a complete break with cultural meaning systems, or a complete immersion in 
them, attention should be paid to the processes through which they unfold or fail to unfold over 
time, as they come into contact with other bodies of knowledge (Maffi, 1998). 
A related issue is the relationship between metaphysical ontologies and psychological topics 
such as morality. Do we need metaphysical ontologies to make sense of morality? Much and 
Han:e (] 994) maintained that a culture's psychological discourse is a reflection of dominant local 
metaphysical ontologies, from which are derived theories of the person, the social context, and 
the natural order. All psychologies are somehow "colli1ected to underlying metaphysical 
ontologies which . .. order things in specific ways with regard to what is 'good' and 'bad', 
'right' and 'wrong' about conditionsoflife" (Much & Harre, 1994, p. 308). Unfortunately, the 
Western history of ideas has created an illusion that theories of right and wrong are objective, 
universaIizable, and free of roots in historically particular metaphysical systems. 
Although Westem psychologies deny roots in metaphysical systems, Much and Harte have 
(1994) argued that the dualistic Westem concept of the person can be traced back to the soul 
(mind)-body dichotomy of early Christian thought. During this period the soul was considered 
part of the person complex oriented toward divinity or God. Hence it was given preference over 
the body. This laid a foundation for a morality that favoured the spirit, and later, the mind, over 
the body. Eventually this led to psychological theories of morality that valued abstract 
generalizations, and not concrete paliiculars. Metaphysical ontologies are central to traditional 
African understandings of morality (Verhoef & Michel, 1997). Furthennore, it has been argued 
that they can serve as a foundation for an African-based psychology (Akbar, 1984; Nobles, 1972, 
1991). 
Before discussing the worldviews tlu-ough which Africans make sense of themselves and their 
relationship to the world, it is importal1t to note that these views are not necessarily shared by all 
Africans. Afr'ican scholars are not in agreement about the existence of a unifying African 
worldview or metaphysics. As a result, there has been a tendency of late to approach 
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metaphysical issues in a culture-specific way (e.g. Wiredu, 1991, 1992). However, I would 
argue, along with Teffo and Roux (1998), that although there may not be a unifying African 
metaphysics, there is nevertheless an approach to reality shared by Africans. Its central tenets are 
beliefs about God, the universe, and notions of causality, person and time (Myers, 1988). 
Historically, these views have been associated with large parts of Africa and can be regarded as 
typical of African metaphysical thinking, especially in the regions South of the Sahara. To say 
that there is an African worldview does not mean every member of a culture should adhere to it, 
in the same manner that not every European adheres to individualism as a way of life. The 
worldview described here should be regarded as an attempt to explain human reality that is 
indigenous to Africa (Myers, 1988). Every group is confronted by challenges and problems in the 
course of its historical development. Over a period of time concepts, worldviews and 
assumptions are developed to address these problems (Heelas, 1981). The theoretical framework 
discussed in this chapter should be seen in that context. 
While Western psychologies often deny their roots in metaphysical systems, these are very 
important in African thinking (Myers, 1988; Nobles, 1972, 1991; Verhoef & Michel, 1997). In 
the next section, four . earin~ on 
psychological topics such as morality, are discussed. These are (a) t~gs, (b) 
the communal view 
The Hierarchy of Beings 
From a traditional African point of view, all things in the universe are connected onto logically to 
each other. Beings and objects in the universe are organized hierarchically (Mbiti, 1991; 
N gubane, 1977; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). Intricate webs of relationships exist between 
organisms and objects in the hierarchy, with each object and organism dependent upon and 
capable of influencing and being influenced by others. The nature and direction of influence is 
determined by the amount of life force (energy 01· power, discussed below) possessed by each 
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object or organism. 
At the lowest level of the hierarchy are inanimate objects and plants. These have very little life 
force of their own. As a result, they have no direct influence on supelior beings such as humans, 
except through an intervention of a higher force (e.g. herbs being manipulated by humans for 
magical purposes). Animals occupy the level immediately above that of objects and plants. The 
next level , which Ngubane (1977) referred to as the intermediate world, consists of humans. 
Humans can communicate directly or indirectly with the living-dead (ancestors) (Mbiti, 1991), 
who occupy the next level of the hierarchy. Ngubane (1977) maintained that the world of the 
ancestors is divided into two. First, there is the world of the recently deceased. The recently 
deceased do not proceed directly to ancestorhood. First, they remain in an "in-between state" 
unti I thei r relatives have performed rituals of integration on their behalf. While in this state, they 
are incapable of interceding with God on humans' behalf. Then there is the world of integrated 
ancestors, those who have had rituals performed for them. Integrated ancestors are capable of 
cOlllnlunicating with God on behalf of their relatives. Ancestors, whose world is both analogous 
and contiguous to that of humans, continue to interact with, and remain interested, in the affairs 
of their relatives (Teffo & Roux, 1998). Through acts of libation and sacrifices, a link is 
maintained with one's ancestors, thereby ensuring a continued audience with God. The 
relationship between the three worlds is represented graphically, in Figure 1 (page 51). 
~ .. -~ . 
It is important to expand on the notion of ancestors because this has caused a great deal of 
confusion, sometimes resulting in misrepresentation of African belief systems. This is often 
reflected in the view that Africans worship ancestors (Dzobo, 1992; Mbiti, 1991). This confusion 
is complicated by the fact that in English, the word "ancestor" means any person from whom one 
is descended (Geddie, 190111964; Swannell, 1992). However, Africans' conception of ancestors 
is different. Who is an ancestor, from an African point of view? To begin with, I would propose 
that the word izinyanya be substituted for ancestors, to avoid the possible confusion with the 
meaning of ancestors in the English language. 
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Fig 1. Relationships Between Elements in the Hierarchy of Beings I 
Legend: 
~ ~ -. ----.. 
~~ 
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t COMMUNITY OF INTEGRATED ~ ANCESTORS 
t '" , WORLD OF THE ...... . RECENTLY t DECEASED 





PLANTS & INANIMATE 
OBJECTS 
Indicates bi-directional communication 
Proceed to Integrated state, once rituals performed 
Direct communication between God and humans, although velY rare, may be invoked. 
Not every person qualifies to be an inyanya (singular). Only those who have lived an exemplary 
life, a life characterised by high moral standards, can be elevated to the status of an inyanya. An 
I The influence of animals, plants and objects on other elements on the hierarchy of Beings has not been mapped 
because there is very little that has been written about it. This is perhaps because they are thought to have limited 
life force or energy. 
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example of these standards is the promotion of mutual interdependence and harmony within 
one's family and community. Once rituals of integration have been performed, the deceased who 
were good moral exemplars join the community of izinyanya. This is a spiritual community of 
deceased family members who lived according to high moral standards. 
A person does not have to die to be considered inyanya, however (Dzobo, 1992). Older members 
of the family, whose lives are worthy of emulation, may be referred to as izinyanya. In this case 
also it remains essential that integration rituals be performed after death, to bring their 
uhunyanya status to completion. The relationship between the living and izinyanya is one of 
interdependence. The latter need the former to perfOlID rituals on their behalf, so that they can be 
elevated to an influential status that gives them an audience with God. Having been elevated, 
they can now negotiate with God on behalf of their descendants, thereby ensuring family 
prosperity and unity (Ngubane, 1977). Thus, family members and izinyanya need each other for 
continued existence. 
l zinyanya are moral paragons or exemplars of good conduct. Because oftheir superior moral 
qualities, their values and principles continue to be cherished. These are adopted as normative 
standards of conduct. It is believed that the world of izinyanya is no different from that of 
humans. In their world, izinyanya continue to live an exemplary life. They remain interested in 
their families ' affairs. As guardians of morality, izinyanya punish bad conduct by withdrawing···· -· 
their interest in family matters . Such withdrawal is undesirable because it breaks the chain of 
communication between individuals and God. When izinyanya withdraw, it is believed that the 
family is effectively cut off from God, the source of all life. Rituals and acts of libation are not 
ancestor worship. They ensure that through izinyanya, one remains connected to God, the highest 
source of life. 
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God is at the apex of the hierarchy. Although at the apex, God2 is not apart from the rest of the 
world . Teffo & Roux (1998) maintained that "together with the world, God constitutes the 
spatio-temporal 'totality ' of existence." (p . 140) That is, God does not rule the world from a 
distance, but permeates everything in it. In the forthcoming discussion, it is shown that God's 
omnipresence is consistent with the holistic worldview: an account of the world in which 
everything is intercOlmected in such a way that elements of the whole are contained in each part. 
The Notion of Vitality or Life Force 
Beings and objects in the hierarchy are endowed with a life force. Since first propounded by 
Tempels (1959), the notiOlyoflife force has been a source of great controversy in African 
scholarship. According to Myers (1988)'fIife force refers to the energy or power that is the 
essence of an phenomena, material and il,:J;uuaterial'fEverything is endowed with "energy," spirit, 
or creative force. The idea of life force as "spirit" does not imply ghost-like, inner powers of an 
occult nature~t refers to dynamic creatjyjty, thought to be the mOlOt precio1Js gift of God, 
descending hierarchically from God to..iziI1J!Oll)fO, elders, hllman beings and all that is create~ 
(Kasenene, ] 994). The creativity of God's power is manifest in the changing seasons, birth, the 
cycles of nature, and in human achievements. t d is the ve sou c!:-O-:£.tl:H,s...<;reati"e force It is 
111 
descendin ·1 order. HUlnall beillgs are, to a certaill degree, capable of influencing events in the -- --- .... 
world because they partake of this creative life force.~deall ,Qne should alwa.)lS-use life fm:ce to. 
.IDaintniJll'.itaJ...€.e+HleGti~etw€et faml1y-members,.t11€ GQ.mmunity, and the rest of natl,!Le "* 
Life force is a religious principle that is very difficult to explain in human terms. Dzobo (1992) 
refers to it as the God-life, the supreme creative power of God that is found in all creation, a 
2 "Clod" is used redundantly, to avoid the traditional use of the male pronoun. Most languages in Southern Africa do 
not have gender pronouns. Furthermore, there is no evidence of the notion of a gendered God in most palis of 
Southern Africa at least. This is probably due to the fact that although the existence of God was acknowledged, the 
natme of the Supreme Being was considered to be beyond human comprehension (Mbiti, 1991). 
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power that all people should affinn in their daily lives. Whether life force exists or not is 
ilTelevant for the purposes of this study. What is i1 partant is that the d by a large 
~~~~~~..!do!J,M-"~'-!.!...!.!~~~~~",--,-",h..,.ec.u..ir Qerception oftbe world. Myers (1988) argued, 
and I concur with her, that life force may entail a reality, beyond that which can be known 
through the five senses. Insofar as humans are concemed, however, life force can be inferred 
fro 11 ]2.e.Qpl~s .bebavioral.x~~~ips witl! their .. mili.eQ.. 
Before expanding on the idea that life force is inferred from people's relationships with their 
environment, a crucial distinction needs to be made between the principle of life force, the 
principle of life (being aliveb and being full of e}1~rg (vitalit as in liveliness). The principle of r __ 
life for~e cannot be reduceli'to the quality of being alive, g}ven that both the living and the 
deceased partake of this vital element. When the Nguni ~d the Sotho of Southem Africa say 
uyaphila / 0 ea phela (he or she has life), they are not referring to biological life. They are 
refelTing to a person's lived experience: the hannony that ought to exist between a person and his 
7 -
or her social !Bilieu; as evidenced in a person's day-to-day relationships with others. From an 
Afri ~ ~ldj.!!, s iral of human and communal relati _s iJ:l.s, 
defi ned in terms of reciprocal obligatu 1S (Dzobo, 1992; Mbiti, 1991 )\i..sjh~...!es onsibility of 
all i I:.dividuals to J2(omote vitality in the comml,Jnity lnr.fulfilling their duties and L~Qonsibilities, 
acc<;>rding toJ heir positions or roles (Kasenene~.l 924r 
.... ..... 
~uman . gs...~s..o ~expected to live 1annoniousl imals and n e. This organic 
view of the universe, t e 2rincip,aUeature_ iliich is -o-think .. ec~lo.gica11.yrmaking.£ew~oL.110 
di_s~l~ctions b.et~eeJ] n ture and culture, is another cQIDmGfl..GnaFactlino·,stic..ot-indig.e 0 s societies * 
(Howard, 1994; Maffi, 1998). Living hatmoniously with the natural environment meant that it 
had to be harvested to the extent that it was necessary to support human needs. This had to be 
done respectfully and religiously, the example of which being rituals that accompanied planting 
and harvesting. Respect for the principle of life is also illustrated in the practice or'l'raditional 
healers in offering ray-ers to SQ1"!le plant efore harvesti em 'for me..di.cilla, ~se~s 
believed that not only does this make the plant more effective, but also failure to do so could 
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cause it to fail to re-gelminate . .Ihe idea behind this practice is that harvesting the plant in a 
) 
disres ectful n anller would cause it to die, which means that it would not be available to support - -
human life in the future. Indigenous healers working with Westem- trained scientists to find a 
cllre for H1V/Aicls have indicated that plants should be harvested respectfully. This involves 
~erformin~Ql11e religious practic~~befQre !la -yestingJh.en¥{Burford, Bodeker, Kabatesi, 
Ge111l11ill, & Rukangira, 2000). Behind this concem is the respect for thee rinci le of life, and a 
-ecoanition of tile interde endence between the natural and the human environment. 
It should be noted that I am not arguing that Africans followed (or follow) this principle all the 
time. My intention is to present what is regarded, from a traditional African point of view, as the 
ideal standard of the Good:>In summary, the principle of yitality entails co-existence wjth one's 
milieu and strengtbe.uin,b-'<..t-l~~::::.!.:::.:;:;.:;:.=_ 
Anyanwu, 1981). Severance of vital relationships constitutes the opposite of the Good, and is 
morally unacceptable from a traditional African point of view. 
Due t ')'Star , ' -~\l.e.llatru:e...oLli£e.i~ 'n the universe itis-pDssihl ~ UB1m€>'wn. 
(QJ;f..e tnterverre-tR4ll~1-:G-€- o"t'.€vents he nature of this intervention is beyond human 
understanding. Because of the belief that unknown events can intervene in human affairs, 
Africans deny the possibility of events happening by accident. Should something happen (e.g. a 
personal tragedy), cause is sought as to how individual, family, or a sinister force might have ---- ' 
contrived to bring about the undesired consequence. This is because of the belief that the creative 
life force can be manipulated for sinister purposes. Witchcraft is an example (Ngubane, 1977). 
The tendency amon Africans to r.et! - eleolQg' c..al inclined ex lanatiollli canJLe..attIihu-too..to - -- - - • this belief. Teleo logical orientations assume that "realit ha s to ether becau e s 
• c!riven by aims" (Teffo & Roux, 1998, p. 134). Consequently, questions are not only directed 
toward why events happen. Of most interest is why they happen to someone at a particular 
locality and at a certain point in time. That is, meaningful explanations are those that take into 
consideration individuals' relationships with their milieu (Teffo & Roux, 1998). 
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ed. In conclusion, life force is the creative eller~ xtending.diI:eJ........"~ ......... ~~;\,,,jI<¥.,.j;I;J;,;I.j~,~""" 
Through this life force all share in God's creative energy or spirit, although not to the same 
degree. The creative power descends vertically from God to izinyaU)la,..human beings, and all that 
i2.. cl~11e.d. Mutual sharing in the creative spirit eschews dualistic cOIiceptions of the world. This 
entails that there cannot be clear-cut distinctions between object and subject, self and other, given 
that we all share in God's creative energy. Life force is predicated upon the notion of 
con substantiation, which is the sharing of the substance of the whole with each of its parts 
(Myers, 1988).12 ualistic distinctions between mind and bod and pm! and matter, do not malfe 
~ because .. -C!.ye .. ,.,tlling is-depende u on and sh .. ares in,_ anoth_er. Tbe notion of being.in 
h '!!1110n.)L with ol1~~her an<i the universe, or consubstantiation, is best explained throu h the. 
principle of cosmic unity; " . 
The Principle of Cosmic Unity 
Cosmic unity is closely related to the notion of vitality (Anyanwu, 1981; Kasenene, 1994; 
Kinoti , 1992; Verhoef & Michel, 1997). Sometimes refelTed to as a~, it 
entails a en God, izinyan nimals lants and inanimat ~s (Mbiti, 1969; 
Verlloef & Michel, 1997).~osmic unity means that everythin is e e i otion, -
i!:fluencing and being influenced by som~hin else~This is another principle shared by a number 
of indigenous societies. According to Howard (1994) and Maffi (1998), indigenous societies do'" 
not view the world in a mechanical, cause .. effect manner. They subscribe to a holistic view of the 
world in which units of analysis are not abstracted from their context. What has evolved from 
this point of view is that ~dge througb participation, rather than sepata1ion..and.abstt:~, 
is to be prized. OI2.S®es not know by standing and observing at a distance ~ow is to 
12~aI~"t~ic::.!i t:.pa~t:::::e...!i!!n....l;t~h~e~dc.J-bl'........., ......... ~"o.:,):c~e:!!ss~w~h:!:ic~h involves interaction between arts and the ok 
Analysis of discrete elements in isolation from their context cam10t account for the flux of 
becoming (Myers, 1988). Rather, becoming can only be accounted for by a holistic approach that 
relates incli vidual elements to the total system. The dynamism between parts and the whole, 
characteristic of the African worldview, is illustrated in the following quotation from Senghor 
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(1966, p. 4), in which he draws contrasts between traditional European and African worldviews: 
[T]he African has always and everywhere presented a concept of the world, which is 
diametrically opposed to the traditional philosophy of Europe. The latter is essentially 
static, objective, dichotomous; it is in fact dualistic in that it makes an absolute distinction 
between body and soul, matter and spirit. It is founded on separation and opposition, on 
analysis and conflict. The African on the other hand, conceives the world, beyond the 
diversity of its fomls, as a fundamentally mobile yet unique reality that seeks synthesis. 
Myers (1988) has argued that a holistic conception of life is compatible with the new physics 
(quantum and relativity theories). Unlike class ' ~h€ neu!p~ 111 
terms of interactinn il eatable components lich are 12ergetually in motion. The observer or 
sciel}tjst~integral to tlli.s pro~ess, ratllecthalLdetache<i. Similarly, Capra (1988) has drawn 
parallels between the new physics and the mystic philosophical traditions of the East and other 
traditions. He has argued that mystical thought "provides a consistent and relevant conception of 
the world in which scientific discoveries can be made in perfect harmony with spiritual and 
religious beliefs" (p. 11). Although writing about Eastem belief systems, Capra maintained that 
his views apply equally to all mystically based belief systems. 
- _. ' -., 
Parallels between traditional African worldviews and modem physics are found in bootstrap 
philosophy in particle physics (Chew, 1968; Chew, Gellman, & Rosenfeld, 1964). The.ide.a. 
b~H&jJQSQplu . tha ther.e areJlojundamental building.hlo..ck oirruttter...Ih. 
~!1iverse is..CJllllpOsed_of d.ynamicalL)LinteJ.:acting .. parf des. These particles behave in a self-
consistent manner. Their behaviour is self-consistent because they contlibute to the generation of 
others, which in turn generate them (Chew et aI., 1964). Bootstrap philosophy, argued Chew et 
et!', might be extended to the existence of consciousness alongside with the rest of nature. 
Although it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the relationship between 
consciousness and the new physics, Chew et al.' s (1964) position is supported by Capra's 
(1988) study ·of mystical traditions. These traditions do not draw distinctions between 
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co.nscio.usness and nature. Furthe1111ore, net o.nly do. we beco.me aware o.f o.urselves through 
participatio.n in the wo.rld but we co.ntinue to. pro.duce cultural traditio.ns and life f0.1111S, which in 
tum shape o.ur co.l1scio.usness~~s~y.thing is . etua.lJ-y-ffi.,H*}~iQ.n,..infl\Wncing..and.heing 
influenced by so.methin else so.cial science res a ch t fo.llo.w the 
fraumented cl's · er.este.d-u:1ooe1-O-f-the J..1amral-seierrce . In the natural scientific mo.del, human 
pheno.mena are investigated in iso.latio.n fro.m their co.ntext. This mo.del is inadequate, especially 
in co.mmunities that subscribe to. a wo.rldview such as the o.ne described here. Capra (1988) has 
argued that co.nscio.usness has to. be at the fo.refro.nt in the study o.fhuman pheno.mena. In ether 
wo.rds, what we knew abo.ut the wo.rld and o.urselves is inseparable fro.m o.ur wo.rldviews er ways 
ofknmving (Belenky et af., 1986; Reward, 1994). Likewise, we need to. understand mo.rality with 
reference to. the metaphysida:l framework o.fthe peo.ple co.ncerned. 
The Co.mmunal View o.fPerso.nho.o.d 
Ano.ther impo.rtant principle underlying traditio.nal African thinking is that o.f f9..mmunaf~ 
P,e:Wlho.o.d in African tho.u 11 . s ned in relatio.n to. the co.~ty. This co.nceptio.n o.f 
perso.nho.o.d makes it essential to. discuss understandings o.fthe tenn "co.mmunity" in African 
scho.larship. Co.mmunity do.es net mean a "mere co.llectio.n o.findividuals, each with his [sic] 
private set o.f preferences, but alLo.f who.m get to.gether no.neJhele because they realize . . . that 
n asso.ciatio. lish things which they are net able to. acco.m lish o.therwise" 
--~-- - -- ~ .. ~ ..... 
(Menkiti, 1984, p. 179). The telID do.es net refer to. a co.llectio.n o.f ato.mistic individuals who. 
gather to.gether to. pursue co.mmo.n go.als. The idea o.f co.mmunity refers to. an er . c relationshi 
~!:'!'!"><"><'!'!'~ ~~.A.L.b!.!.A.. LI.·~ulU!als (Menkiti, 1984). Co.etzee (1998) defined the idea a!"an en o.ing 
_asso.cia!i.o.Il ~f ~and \l{QIDen who. have special commitmenLt~Ile..anGtller_anG a deve10ped 
(distinct) .sense o.fthei · commo.nlife': t p . 276). A co.mmlmity results fro.m a shared understanding 
o.f a characteristic way o.f life. A sense o.f co.mmunity exists if peep le are. clo.sely interco.nnected 
and mutually reco.gnise the o.bligatio.n to. be respo.nsive to. o.ne ano.ther's needs~The tendency 
t rkgard a number o.f peo.p le as members o.f o.ne's family, 
lnes ective o.f the actual letic..r.elatio.nshi stems fro.m this understanding o.f co.mm~y.' 
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Extension of terms such as mother and father to others goes hand in hand with a moral obligation 
to act responsively, in a maIUler that is befitting of these terms (Verhoef & Michel, 1997). For 
example, parental responsibilities may be assumed by anyone, through the practice of collective 
rearing of chi ldren (Mkhize, 1999). This is infol1ned by an understanding that the child will grow 
and develop leadership and/or other qualities that will enhance the life of the community as a 
whole . ,=,s_ a result ~!le entire commu ..:::n:::it'.:!...y..:.i::..s -=e:.:.x==::::...:.=--t:.:.::.!~~=-::":::"':':':':"':;==>.-""'== 
If'l1terdependenc.e.-between-ind·viduals and community'" means that ersonhood CaIU10t be defined --- - - .. _-.... ..-- . 
solely in terms of physical aIld psychological attributes (Menkiti, 1984). I t is through 
;m.ticipation in a communi ty that a. rson finds meanin in life~Kasenene, 1994; Kinoti, 1992; 
Menkiti, 1984; Verhoef & Michel, 1997). The importance of the community in self-definition is 
~m])] ed lip by Mbi ti ' P 969) diet "am because we are, and since we are therefore anl" (p. 
214). The rootedness of the self-in-community is reflected in sayings such as umuntUJlgumulltu 
ngabantu (Nguni) or motho lee motho lea batho babang.(Sotho). These roughly translate to "it is 
through others that one attains selfhood." Similarly, the Xhivenda equivalent, muthu u bebelwa 
munwe (a person is bom for the other) points at th: interde endence betwee • 
Personbood in African thought is defined relationally: ~t..alOlle, bllt alw ys 
,belongs to a cOllul1unity of similarly c Belonging carries with it a dynmnism or 
"dance of hal11lony [because] everyone who belongs is continuously moving, adjusting to the 
rhythm of life within the community" (OgbOlUlaya, 1994, p. 77). This occurs as individuals 
attend to their responsibilities to others and the natural enviromnent, in order to maintain 
communal equilibrium. Social equilibrium is maintained if all fulfIl their duties and 
responsibilities, according to th.eir positiOl ta,tus. 
_ .. . ..... 
The notion of ubuntu (roughly, "humaIUless"), as in the saying umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, is an 
affirmation ofthe relational principle of being. It is all affil1nation of the principle that U1..Qrde to 
qualify to b~ human, one needs to recognize and respect the humanity..,Q[ other~ in the diversi!r 
of this humanjty'S forms and cQnteoJ: (Louw, 1999). The concept ofubuntu locates the self not 
inside the person, but at the point of contact with other human beings. This contrasts sharply with 
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the dominant Euro-American view that re ards the self as " > " of one's ment 
)2LQ12erties an~ers (Sampson, 1993). Ubuntu is also consistent with Gilligan's (1982) view 
that the self is immersed in webs of relationships, comprised of ~rs. If the concept 
ofthe selfis at the centre a people's conception of the moral (Gilligan, 1982; Hekman, 1995), it 
follows that studies assuming a traditional Euro-American view of the self as a point of departure 
cannot arrive at a critically balanced understanding of African moral systems. 
Possible Criticisms ofthe "Self-in-COlmnunity" 
Ikuenobe (1998) raised some plausible criticisms of the African concept of the person. He notes 
that a communitarian viewbfthe selfpresents a picture of individuals under the~ 
~. While it is possible that obligation to the community could be 
tJe~ed for ideolo jcal or qppr.e sive u oses the notion ofth a 
denialofin .. . ~Myers, 1988; OgbOlmaya, 1994). Individuals can transcend the 
perspective of the community in creative ways. The assumption, however, isthat as a result of 
this transcendence the community will be transformed to a higher level of functioning and 
harmonization. The relationship between an individual and the community is thus a multi-
directional one in which "the community is preserved and enriched by the 'highest riches' of the 
person . .. j LIst as the person is continually enriched by the experience of emergent selves in the 
persona-communal" (Ogbonnaya, 1994, p. 78). This is a vindication of the principle of 
interdependence between parts and the whole: individuals are part of a collective (community) 
that they create, and which in tum, creates them (Myers, 1988). 
The relatiollsbip..b e~ indiyiduals and the community is not alwa s a smooth one: tensions ... 
~re lik~ Gyekye, 1984, 1992). e a:1heless,..iL~"isag~'LthaUhe~.eJ.eusi~Jl1s...c.ould 
- s.ol.Y.W-i>~1-.. a...w&y-1:hat-resrores inter€lep6Bdel1ce and.p.eJ;har> €¥ell aGVaHG€S the commlll1it~ to 
<V1ig11er.. Lev:el of func.tloningJ.!1~1!JldpJe. This could be the case with creative individuals who 
invent novel ways of doing things. Initially, their inventions may be viewed with suspicion: 
however, once the invention has been shown to benefit the community as a whole, the individual 
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is acclaimed as a hero, a model to be emulated. Dzobo (1992) illustrated the dynamic 
interdependence between an individual and the community using the analogy of the fingers and 
the hand. The fmgers represent free, unique, independent members of society. However, they are 
firml y rooted in the hand (the whole). However, the hand (community) is incomplete without the 
fin gers (individuals). The view ofthe self-in-community recognises the possibility of tensions 
between the person and the community. l4.e ideal is that these tensions would be resolved in a 
w~a!...y...:tl~1a~t~e:.!.ll!t.h!.!:aJ~1~c::::es:!...b~0~t~h'-lt~"""'"'""""""·a...r..I..i· wu~a!.!;l...:::aJ~1:.:::d~t:!.!h;::.e ..:::.c~0!>J,I .I.I.M~i:.!:.Lt . However, with exposure to a myriad 
influences and with participation in maJ1Y communities, such tensions are likely to be more 
problematic. What is needed is a comprehensive model to explain the effects of exposure to 
multiple worldviews. Such a model should be able to explain the emergence of the self from 
multiple perspectives, while accounting for the power dimensions involved in the process. The 
next chapter argues that the notion of a dialogical self, based on the literary writings of Bakhtin 
(1981 , 198411993), makes this possible. 
The Family Community 
~fthe community in general is important, then the family community is of utmost significance. It 
fOl1l1S an essenti ql.§lem.ent of an individual's social realit and ersonal 'de tit a art from - ~ 
whic hoo . a1mo.s.t · K,Onceivable (Paris, 1~95). It should be noted that the African 
family is not restricted to the Western notion of a nuclear family. It constitutes a closely-knit 
community of relatives, including both the living and the deceased (izinyanya) (Moyo, 1992). 
Deceased family members continue to participate in the day-to-day affairs of their families once 
integration rituals, known as ukubuyisa in Nguni or kugadzira mudzimu in Xhivenda (meaning to 
bring back or to domesticate izinyanya), have been performed. Through the totemic system, the 
--- ----
defi nition ~Q he .. J amil CQuL extended to include lants, other non-living objects and 
anythinu ---- ed ith Ul @1 relationships (Mbiti, 1969). The family, as defined above, is the 
most important aspect of self-definition. To be disowned by one's family is to cease to exist as a, 
.human bein&..-
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The family is hierarchically organized, from the oldest member to the youngest child. Members 
are bound by a reciprocal understanding of their roles and responsibilities. ~
ope 's posLtio an.d_status i.n the bier.archy-. _Th§~elder, usually the oldest member of e family, has 
the <dl-important responsibility to ensure that the family remains a Q.niving, cohesive unit, and is 
tb.llS highl~ respected~ ~embel~s _have the most comRlete memory oLthe family's lineage, 
and are consi lo...he ... ml,H;R-GlQseo to..i . e (Mbiti, 1991). The 
notion of respect is often misunderstood. It emanates from a mutual understanding that a person 
with an elder's status and position would act in a dignified and ~sible mmme~s 
'-=;;:;..,::.::-;::.;;;,..:;.;;.._.....::.:= ____ .... t;;;;h:.;;e...;e .... d .... e.;.;r;...' s ...... st .... a ... t _ . ~ onsible elders 
The moral nature of Rersonhood. 
It has been mentioned that the concept of a person in African societies is that of a person-in-
relation, a "being-with-and-for-others," and not an isolated, atomistic individual. To attain 
personhood, it is not sufficient to be merely a biological organism with physical and 
psychological attributes. Personhood does not follow automatically simply because one is born 
of human seed. Rather, it is something that must be earned (Menkiti, 1984; Ruch & Anyanwu, 
1981). Menkiti (1984) referred to this as the "processual" nature of being. Children are born into-' 
first a family community. They then undergo rituals of incorporation, culminating in some 
societies in the rites marking the passage from childhood to adulthood. It would seem that the 
"processual" nature of personhood means that one becomes a person as one "goes along" in 
society. lndeed , Menkiti (1984) took this position when he argued that children are not fully 
human. Following Gyekye (1992), however, I would argue that the idea that personhood must be 
earned refers to a person's moral conduct. It is not a denial ofpersonhood to children. The notion 
that personhood is not a given is an affirmation of an understanding that there are moral ideals 
and standards that ought to guide a person's life. These are standards such as generosity, 
benevolence, and respect (Gyekye, 1992). A person who is wanting in these standards cannot be 
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called a human being, no matter their age: no matter the rituals they have undergone or 
performed. Rituals are cultural practices or vehicles for moral education (Mbiti, 1991). While it 
makes sense to assume that a person who has completed them has received more moral education 
than the one who has not, it does not follow that completion of rituals insulates a person from 
moral defici encies . Because one can fall short of moral standards at any stage in the life cycle, 
being a person could be regarded as a process of becoming; an unpredictable, open-ended process 
during which personhood may be achieved, lost, and regained, depending on one's 
circumstances. 
It should be noted that the view that morality is inseparable from personhood is not solely 
African . Indeed, Hekman (1995) has argued that in every culture "to become a person is to 
become a moral person" (p . 126). This view is discussed here because it is central to African 
thinking. It contrasts sharply with traditional cognitive approaches, which define morality in 
te1111S of universal and invariant stages. Furthermore, concepts of personhood differ across 
cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder & Boume, 1991), thereby making it important to 
investigate what it means to be a moral person in diverse cultural settings. 
A number of sayings exist in African societies to refer to people who have failed to meet moral 
standards expected of a fully human person. These are sayings such as ga e se motho (Tswana) or 
a ku si l11untu (Nguni), literally meaning "he or she is not a person." According to Gyekye 
(1992), the Akan of Ghana have a similar phrase, onnye' nipa, meaning "not a human being." 
The fact that similar sayings are found in a number of African states South of the Sahara, points 
at commonalities in African conceptions of person hood. It should be emphasized that standards 
of personhood are not of an abstract, theoretical type. Possession of the qualities of personhood is 
reflected in people's relationships with others and their milieu. It is referred to as ubuntu in the 
Nguni languages, and botho in Sotho/Tswana. Ubuntu is inferred from people's knowledge of 
their duties and responsibilities within a community of other, interdependent human beings. It 
goes beyond consciousness of one's position and responsibilities within the family and the 
community: it is the be-ing of this knowledge itself. Ubuntu is the concrete or practical 
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realization of this knowledge, and not a cognitive appraisal thereof. However, because a person is 
always a being-with-and-for-others, failure to attain personhood points blame at the individual, 
his or her family and his or her community. Just as it is a collective responsibility to raise 
children, people's moral shortcomings reflect poorly on their family and community. This is 
consistent with the notion of a person-in-community, discussed above. 
Contextualising the Metaphysical System 
The metaphysical system discussed above should be viewed in the context of history, time and 
place. It does not have a monolithic influence on African morality, nor is it limited to Africans. 
As mentioned previously, p'eople are exposed to mUltiple perspectives, resulting from cultural 
and historical changes. Once incorporated into people's ways of thinking, these perspectives are 
capable of entering into a dynamic relationship with each other: a dialogical process that may 
result in the emergence of new perspectives out of the old. It is this dialogue between 
perspectives that is of psychological significance. The dialogue should address questions such as 
how African worldviews interface with new ideas such as Christianity and individualism? Do 
they exist simultaneously with these other worldviews? Does exposure to new ideas affect men 
and women, the young and the old, in the same way? These questions are important, especially 
given findings by Gilligan and her colleagues (Gilligan, 1982; Lyons, 1988), who have shown 
that a different moral voice (care) can exist alongside the voice of just ice. It is therefore pertineiif 
to establish a place for African voices in the wider moral landscape. Before the relationship 
between African and other worldviews is discussed, the moral implications of the metaphysical 
system mentioned above will be considered. 
Implications for Moral Theory and Ethics 
From a traditional African point of view, morality CaIU10t be understood independently of the 
relationships between people, and their context. Social equilibrium between people should be 
maintained : this occurs as individuals observe their responsibilities toward each other, izinyanya, 
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God, and everything to which they stand in relation. Severance of relationships in the hierarchy 
of beings and objects results in disequilibrium, and this is considered undesirable. Consequently, 
people should know their position and behave in a manner that ensures that equilibrium is 
maintained. This view of human relationships will be discussed with reference to three main 
points: human solidarity and reciprocity, familial interdependence and hannony, and 
responsiveness to one's position and status. The aim is to show that morality in African thought 
is not only grounded in practical, everyday life, but also that it defines the very nature of what it 
means to be a person. To fall Sh011 of moral standards is synonymous with deficiencies in 
personhood. 
,' . Communal Solidarity and Reciprocity 
Morality in traditional African thought is grounded in practical activity. It calls for people to live 
harmoniously and in solidarity with others. Children are socialised to this view through 
observation and participation in activities that foster hannony and solidarity. From birth 
onwards, they are expected to learn from others' selfless efforts to maintain interdependence and 
social harmony within their family and the community. At the level of the community, these 
efforts involve activities such as ilimo3 and ukusisa4• Although the nature of these activities is 
changing with the times, they continue to be manifested in a variety of ways. Their most 
common adaptations are found in Stokvels (community saving schemes) and MasingcwabisariiF 
(community-organized burial schemes). Having been socialised through similar activities, 
children become aware of the caring they have received from others. As a result, they feel 
morally obliged to reciprocate in kind when a need arises (Gbadegesin, 1998; Verhoef & Michel, 
1997) . 
.1 11;1110 is a practice whereby neighbours join together to help till another's fields. It is extended to other activities 
such as building a house or burying the dead. 
4 Loaning someone cattle so that he or she can plough the fields and milk the cows. 
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Moral transgressions disrupt communal unity. This occurs when people fail to observe their 
obligations and responsibilities toward each. Verhoef and Michel (1997) called this a circular 
moral process. In a circular process, the community is always in a state of flux: it is strengthened 
ifpeople fulfil their mutual obligations; moral transgressions weaken the community by causing 
separation between people. Furthermore, there is an ontological dimension to moral goodness. 
Doing wrong entails not just being individually in disharmony with the social order, it may 
disorganise this order itself. The disorganization of the social order may result in calamitous 
consequences to the community as a whole. For example, it is believed that breaking a taboo may 
result in drought (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). However, separation resulting from moral 
transgression could be rectified if the community works interactively to re-establish social 
connection, interdependence~ and hence, communal unity (Verhoef & Michel, 1997). Thus, 
human action is geared toward reconstructing, preserving and enhancing the community. In turn, 
the community is supposed to enhance the quality oflife of its members. 
Familial Interdependence and Harmony 
It has been mentioned that the family community is the most important community of all. Given 
that connection to the family is regarded as the definition of personhood par excellence, it 
follows that separation from it is of extreme moral significance (Mbiti, 1969). The ethical 
implication is that family members ought to observe mutual obligations toward each other 
(Ackah, 1988; Gyekye, 1992; Mbiti, 1991). Family members are bound together by bilateral 
relations. They are expected to be generous to family members in need, and to maintain close 
contact with the family by, amongst other things, attending important rituals and gatherings. 
Maintaining unity and hannony within the family is of supreme significance, as is behaving in a 
manner that does not dishonour it. Members who dishonour their families risk being disowned, 
which is regard ed as the worst punishment that could be visited upon a person (Mbiti, 1991). To 
be disowned is to be discOlmected, which is equivalent to non-existence. 
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It is the responsibility of the head of the family to ensure that discord between family members 
does not occur. Family discord disrupts the bond with izinyanya. This in turn terminates the 
family's audience with God. The Nguni people refer to this as ukufulathelwa izinyanya (literally, 
to have ancestors tUl11 their backs on the family). A discOlmected family is without protection 
from God, and is unlikely to prosper. The duty to ensure that the family does not become 
disconnected frol11 God rests with the head of the family. This duty is perceived in moral tenns. 
The author is aware of the social and cultural changes taking place within African families and 
communities. One of the purposes of this study is to investigate how these changes affect moral 
reasoning. People living in transitional societies are often faced with competing points of view. 
In a modernising society, traditional obligations toward the family and the community exist 
amidst other worldviews. It is possible to envisage tensions between loyalty to one's family and 
the community, and the desire to pursue individualistic interests. The study seeks to shed light on 
moral dilemmas such as these, and the processes by which they are resolved. 
Moral Obligations Toward Strangers 
It remains controversial whether the generosity accorded to family members is extended to 
strangers. For example, Ackah (1988) and Kasenene (1994) maintained that generosity has to be 
extended to strangers, while Verhoef and Michel (1997) argued that it is limited to relatives. 
Responding to this question in an "either-or" fashion is not likely to be productive. It would 
further entail the notion that a culture's way of understanding is complete, without contradictions 
and inconsistencies. What has to be pointed out, however, is that a slight distinction should be 
drawn between generosity to family members, and generosity in general. As mentioned 
previously, family nlembers are morally bound to be responsible to one another by virtue of the 
special nature of their relationship. As members of the same kin, they share special memories of 
how they were nurtured by other family members in time of need. Further, they are connected to 
God through the same izinyanya. to whom they are all morally accountable. The importance of 
this point will be clearer in the next chapter, when the role of internalised "audiences" in moral 
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decision-making (Day, 1991) is discussed. For now, it is sufficient to state that generosity to 
family members is of moral significance because of the special nature of the relationship between 
family members, who are bound to each other by bonds of kinship. 
Generosity to strangers is a question that cannot be resolved in a simplistic, "either-or" way. 
There are i njullctions from traditional proverbs and sayings, urging people to be good to 
strangers. To this effect, an isiZulu proverb states that isisu somhambi asingakanani, 
singangenso yenyoni (literally, "the stomach of a traveller is not that big, it is about the size of a 
bird's kidney"). The proverb urges people to provide food to strangers, and to be good to them in 
general. On the other hand, however, it is likely that because of the close-knit family system, 
moral offences committed DY outgroup members against members of one's own group would 
receive serious attention. This is more likely if offences in question pose serious threats to the 
harmony and continued existence of the kinship group as a whole (Verhoef & Michel, 1997). 
How could this seeming inconsistency between caring for members of one's family as opposed 
to caring for strangers be explained? Opotow's (1990) notion of moral communities could prove 
useful here. Opotow argued that people create moral communities, resulting in those outside the 
group being excluded from that moral domain. Ward (1991) observed a similar phenomenon in 
her research with African-Americans. She explained it in terms of a group's collective history 
and memory. In instances of conflict between in-group and out-group members, a group's 
collective memory becomes salient, thereby influencing people's actions or decision-making. 
This is particularly so if there is a history of antagonism (e.g. racial or ethnic oppression) 
between groups concerned. In view of these studies, it is important to adopt a cultural and 
historically situated perspective in researching moral decision-making. Such a perspective is 
likely to shed light on individual inconsistencies in moral decision-making involving in-group 
and out-group members. 
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Moral Action and Position 
We have seen that people in African societies are uniquely positioned in their communities, 
depending on status variables such as age and gender (Verhoef & Michel, 1997). Each position 
entails obligations thought to befit a person of that status. To be a fully functioning, morally 
competent person entails knowing one's culturally designated position, and acting accordingly. 
Age is very important in detennining one's social position. Older people are likely to have a 
longer collective memory of the community than younger community members. With this 
comes the knowledge thought to be indispensable to the survival of the group, such as the 
preservation of community integration and social hannony (Menkiti, 1984). Thus, the status of 
the elders is eamed by virtlle of the richness of their knowledge and experiences, which they are 
expected to bring to bear in matters of moral judgement (Ikuenobe, 1998). The role played by 
elders in resolving marital and other fom1s of conflict, is an example. By virtue of their age, 
elders are considered closer to izinyanya. The all-important duty to conduct rituals to ensure that 
the family remains connected to izinyanya and God is entrusted to them. This is why respect for 
elders is regarded as one of the most important moral injunctions. COlmections to izinyanya and 
God and hence social equilibrium are maintained by respecting elders. It should be emphasised, 
however, that respect goes with the mutual understanding that elders will exercise their wisdom 
fairly and to the benefit ofthe group as a whole (Paris, 1995). Older people have a moral 
responsibility to conduct themselves in a mam1er that promotes connection between people and--- ' 
the community_ 
Gender remains the most problematic of all status variables in theorising African morality. A 
tendency to accord women lower status than men has been reported in a number of studies 
(Ansah, 1991; Kayonga, 1992). The origins of this practice are not clearly documented. 
Possibly, it stems from the mostly patriarchal nature of African societies, which recognise 
succession along male lines. There are also differences in the moral upbringing of boys and girls. 
For example, while good character is encouraged in the raising of both girls and boys, it is 
regarded as the defining feature of mature womanhood. 
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These gender disparities, however, are by no means an indication of blanket disrespect for 
women in African cultures. There are moral injunctions exhorting men to respect won'len. For 
example, traditional African societies considered beating a woman to be a cowardly act. It 
resulted in loss of dignity and status for the perpetrator and family alike. Age was also a 
moderating factor in the gender hierarchy. Although women in general were accorded lower 
status than men, older women were treated with the same respect as their male counterparts, even 
by men (White & Pm'ham, 1990). In view of the repOlied gender disparities in the upbringing and 
treatment of women in African societies, it is important to investigate how experiences of moral 
dilemmas are mitigated by one's gender. It is also essential to explore the interface between 
gender, power and age in Ih'oral decision-making. 
Conclusion 
A philosophical framework for understanding morality has been presented. According to this 
view, objects and organisms in the universe are organised hierarchically, from inanimate objects 
at the bottom, to God at the apex. Human and spiritual beings occupy intennediate levels. A 
dynan1ic interdependence exists between all elements within the system, which are capable of 
influencing m1cl being influenced by others, depending on their life force. This dynamism means 
that reality can be understood by studying the system as whole, rather than isolated parts. 
Similarly, personhood cannot be conceived independently of the relationship between the 
individual and his or her community. It is argued that incorporation of this framework in 
researching and theorising morality may lead to an identification of moral perspectives that have 
not been adequately accounted for as yet in the psychological literature. From a traditional 
Afi'ican perspective, morality is grounded in communal life, and it is characterised by 
harmoniolls relationships between individuals and their milieus (Anyanwu, 1981; Verhoef & 
Michel , 1997). This differs from the traditional Westem tradition, which regards morality as an 
individualistic concem dictated by one's conscience. 
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However, with the rapid social and cultural changes taking place in African communities, and the 
cross-pollination of ideas between cultures, psychological research can no longer afford to 
remain insulated in one conceptual framework. The current study explores the relationship 
between an African concept of personhood and morality, using the philosophical background and 
worldview presented above, as points of depaIiure. FUliher, it examines African moral 
perspectives in the context of the voices of justice and care identified by Kohlberg (1981,1984) 
and Gi 11 igan (1977 , 1982) respectively. Exposure to different cultures and systems of thought 
makes it imperative to take into account the many factors that influence individual development. 
The task of acknowledging these influences is made possible by the socio-cultural approaches 
advocated by Vygotsky (1978, 1981a, 1986) and Bakhtin (1981, 1984/1993), amongst others. In 
the next chapter, a historical overview of socio-cultural approaches to psychological phenomena, 
including the self, is undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOCIO-CULTURAL APPROACHES TO SELF AND MORALITY 
This chapter introduces socio-cultural approaches to morality and the self. Vygotsky's account 
of the social origins of higher mental functions (Valsiner & van der Veer, 1988) provides a 
framework by means of which to investigate the socio-cultural bases of moral thought. 
According to Vygotsky, cultural tools, such as language, mediate thinking and other 
psychological functions. Once intemalized, these tools are used to guide people's behaviour. 
Intemalisation enables people to function as competent members of their societies. The purpose 
of this chapter is to show' that moral reasoning, like thinking, has social origins. Moral 
reasoning is a product ofintemalized social relations and practices (Tappan, 1991a, 1991b). 
Although Vygotskian perspectives shed light on moral reasoning, they do not make clear how 
collective soci al practices influence individual functioning (Werstch, 1991). Vygotsky 
concentrated on the relationship between mental life and interpersonal or small group 
processes. Bakhtin (1981) went a step further. He pointed at the dynamic relationship between 
individual psychological processes and collective social practices. His notion of dialogism, and 
in particular, the analogy between literary authorship and living, provide a model that can be 
used to account for the emergence of psychological processes from collective cultural practiCes'. 
Further, dialogism emphasizes the impOliance of engaging others' perspectives or worldviews. 
This facilitates the possible recognition of previously ignored moral voices, alongside other 
moral orientations. 
To introduce the thinking ofVygotsky and Bakhtin, two central concepts of theirs, mediation 
and intemalization, are discussed. The ethical and moral implications ofVygotsky's theorizing 
are then discussed, followed by an analysis ofBakhtin' s dialogism. Bakhtin's work is 
introduced to show that, from a dialogical point of view, morality results from a selective 
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assimilation and appropriation of world views. The openness (flexibility) of the dialogical self 
facilitates this process. 
Mediation and Internalization 
Vygotsky, one of the leading figures in the socio-cultural tradition, located the origins of higher 
111 enta I fllllcti ons in social life (Werstch, 1991). This was against the dominant social science 
view that psychological functions can be broken down into smaller propeliies, and studied in 
isolation from their context (Werstch & Stone, 1985). Vygotsky maintained that in order to 
understand higher mental functions (e.g. thinking), we have to understand how cultural tools 
mediate them, and how these tools are internalized to direct our behaviour (Shotter, 1989; 
Werstch & Stone, 1985). Mediation is a process by means of which individuals or groups 
employ cultural tools, such as language, to can)' out their actions (Wertsch, -1995). Through 
mediation, social relations between people (the inter-psychological realm) become part of an 
individual ' s internal (intra-psychological) world. 
Mediation can be illustrated by contrasting Piaget and Vygotsky's understanding of the role of 
"self talk" in child development. Piaget (192411969) viewed children's "self-talk" as an 
= --.-
indication of immaturity or lack of social interest. He expected this tendency, which he termed 
--.~ ~ . 
"e ~ri~h," to disappear as children matured cognitively and socially. Vygotsky 
(1966), on the other hand, argued that children use "egocentric speech" as a tool to solve 
problems. He noted that "egocentric speech" repeats earlier social relations between children 
and adults. It marks the beginning of a process by which children begin to converse with 
themselves in the same way that they had earlier conversed with others. Initially, children 
require extemal assistance to solve problems. Gradually, they begin to guide themselves 
through problems, while verbalising instructions previously given by adults or competent peers. 
Eventually the language used by others is incorporated into children's psychological world (i.e. 
internalized). It becomes a tool that directs their behaviour (Shotter, 1989; Wertsch & Stone, 
1985). For Vygotsky, the supposed disappearance of "egocentric" speech means that the social 
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relations it represented have become part of the inner world of the child. This implies that an 
understanding of social relations between children and their social environment can provide 
insight into psychological functions. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the process of 
internalization can be used to theorize about moral reasoning (Tappan, 1997c). 
How are interpersonal activities transferred to the intra-psychological realm? To answer this 
qllestion it is necessary to analyse Vygotsky's account of learning and development in children. 
Vygotsky distinguished between two levels of development, namely the "actual developmental 
level," and the "potential" or "zone of proximal development" (ZPD) (Vygotsky, 1978). The 
zone of "actual development" refers to fully-matured mental functions. It is indicated by 
children's ability to solve problems independently. It could be regarded as the end product of 
development (Vygotsky, 1978). The "zone of proximal development" on the other hand, refers 
to maturing functions . It is detellliined by what the child can do with the assistance of adults or 
other competent children. Formally, it is defined as "the distance between the actual 
developmental level as detern1ined by independent problem solving and the level of potential as 
determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more 
capable peers" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). Development takes place at the ZPD level. Adults and 
competent peers interact with children, supporting them to master the values and skills essential 
to become competent members of their society (Tappan, 1998). This viewhas found support 
from Rogoff (1990, 1995), who also maintained that children advance their understanding 
through "apprenticeship" with others in culturally organized activities. 
~.-' -. 
The end product of mediation is internalization. With internalization, processes originally 
outside of people's control, such as using verbal rehearsal to solve problems, become part of 
their intra-psychological world. People resort to "inner dialogue" to recall internalized 
processes, in order to use them to construe, infOllli and direct their behaviour (Shotter, 1989). 
For example, children in traditional African villages are introduced to the behaviours of sharing 
and interdependence through practices such as eating from a common bowl. Initially, young 
children do not know values like sharing. Thus, they may want their own bowl. At this stage it 
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may be necessary for parents or someone else to supervise this activity. They may even refer to 
the legend of Manyosi I to reinforce the behaviour of sharing with others. Once these practices 
have been internalized, however, parental or extemal involvement is no longer necessary. Let 
us assume that these children are now grown-ups. In the face of a dilemma between helping 
their younger siblings financially through school, and pursuing an individual life in the city, 
they are likely to recall the story of Manyosi . Now, their "inner dialogue" with this story guides 
their actions. 
Implications for the Study of Morality and Ethics 
Mediation and intemalizatibn have several moral and ethical implications. To highlight these, it 
is important to point out that intemalization does not represent a mere transfer of what words 
stand for - their referential or indicative function - into the intra-psychological realm. Although 
initially words have an indicative function for children (they point at things), it is the multiple 
meanings and associations that they arouse in one's consciousness, that are of importance in 
intemalization. To begin with, children understand word meaning in telIDS of the sign-object 
relationship - what the words stand for. For example, the word "lion?' initially refers to the animal 
known by that name. It is only when a child has reached an advanced understanding of the 
meaning of words : an understanding based on sign-sign relationship, that a truly symmetrical 
.. ,~ ' . adult-child interaction can take place (Lee, 1985; Welisch & Stone, 1985). This is illustrated 
with a situation that may occur in a traditional village community. In this context, the shout 
"lion!" is correctly interpreted as a signal that danger is around the comer. Whereas previously it 
might have been necessary to tell children to run for their lives, this becomes ullilecessary once 
an understanding based on sign-sign relationship has been grasped. The word "lion" is now 
understood in its sense, in telIDS of the psychological connotations it arouses in one's 
consciousness (Vygotsky, cited in Tappan, 1997c). This interpretation is consistent with 
Shotter ' s (1989, 1993b), who argued that the meaning of words in "ilmer speech" does not come 
I According to Zulu cultural legend, Manyosi ate an entire goat all by himself, refusing to share with others. The 
saying "Sohohl11 MlIl1yosi! " warns him that he will need others' assistance in the future, because a goat cannot fill 
him lip for life. 
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from dictionaries. Rather, it is derived from the cOlmotations associated with their use in one's 
speech community. Words in "inner speech" represent "the nature of those psychological 
processes that are mediated by the use of historically invented and socially developed aids and 
devices" (Shotter, 1989, p. 194). 
Ethical and moral implications of internalization will now be addressed. Moral reasoning is 
accomplished through words, language, and forms of discourse. Language and other forms of 
discourse act as "psychological tools": they enable people to be, think, feel, act, and experience 
their sUlToundings in a mmmer that is intelligible and legitimate in their socio-cultural context 
(Tappan, 1997c). It was argued above that what is important in internalization is word sense: the 
psychological cOlmotatiot1's 'aroused by words in one's consciousness. The words we use are not 
neutral: they are endowed with a moral sense. To become an autonomous member of a society, 
one has to understand the moral sense of the words, as they m-e used in specific settings. Moral 
reasoning can be thought of as a socio-cultural practice mediated by a people's vernacular 
language (Tappan, 1998). The Nguni word "umuntu" is a good example. A growing child first 
understands this word in tenns of its sign-object relationship (a human being). However, as we 
saw in Chapter 3, the word is also imbued with the sense: "to be human is to be moral." It is only 
when children understand this meaning that they can participate competently in society. 
. .,~ ' . 
Internalization is also a moral activity in that it involves an ethical trmlsformation. Shotter 
(1993a, 1993c) contends that internalization enables children to learn to do on their own what 
they initially did under the supervision of adults. Through internalization, "the child learns to 
practice with respect to himself (sic) the same fonns of be ha vi or that others fonnerly practiced 
with respect to him" (Vygotsky, 1966, pp. 39-40). Internalization may be construed as a 
transformation of our responsibility for things (Shotter, 1993a, 1993c), which is an indispensable 
part of becoming a competent person in one's society: 
I n learning how to be a responsible member of a certain social group, one must learn to 
do certain things in the right kind of way: how to perceive, think, talk, act, and to 
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experience one's sunoundings in ways that make sense to the others around one in ways 
considered legitimate. (Shotter, 1993b, p. 73, emphasis original) 
Internalization is an ethical-moral process because it involves acquiring ways of understanding 
oneself as a human being, in relation to others. The ethical-moral nature of this process lies in the 
fact that these ways of being are not ours. They have always been there, serving other people's 
purposes (e.g. the intemalization of dominant gender relationships). 
Vygotsky ' s concepts, such as mediation and intemalisation, provide us with a framework to 
theorize about the emergence of morality from collective fonns of social life. Furthermore, the 
notion of "inner dialogue" can shed light on how people rehearse their options in the face of a 
moral dilemma. ;\ . 
The Relevance ofVygotsky' s Views to Traditional African Worldviews 
How relevant are Vygotskian perspectives to the study of morality in African contexts? The 
dialectical relationship between the person and his or her community in traditional African 
societies has been discussed. From a traditional African point of view, personhood does not 
reside "inside" the person: people are always seen in the context of their surroundings. This view 
of personhood, also known as the self-in-community, is consistent with Vygotsky's notion that 
psychological processes, which would include self-understanding, originate in social life. We .... -. 
saw in Chapter 3 that traditional African societies locate human functioning within the context of 
the family and the community (the social realm). Further, the tradition of socializing children 
through story-telling (Verhoef & Michel, 1997) is a form of semiotic mediation. Behind each 
story is a moral lesson, pitched at a level that the child can understand. The importance accorded 
to the spoken word in most African societies provides fertile ground for studying how language 
mediates moral functioning. 
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Beyond Vygotsky 
Although Vygotskian perspectives provide fertile ground for studying cultural conceptions of 
moral reasoning, these approaches are limited. They do not adequately address the role of 
broader social and cultural processes in individual development. Vygotsky's work was limited to 
small group interactions, such as parent-child dyads. He did not spell out the relationship 
between cultural, historical, and institutional settings, and various forms of mediated action 
(Wertsch, 1991). As a result, he fell Sh01i of providing a genuinely socio-cultural approach to 
mind. Baldltin's (1981,198411993) dialogical account of human functioning addresses these 
issues comprehensively. 
Further, Vygotsky did not spell out the nature of the relationship between various internalised 
words in the individual's psyche. Obviously, in the process of growing up, children are exposed 
to various, sometimes contradictory, socio-cultural traditions and points of view. Vygotsky did 
not deal with the processes by which these contradictions are negotiated and resolved. 
Vygotskian psychology also tends to be limited to instrumental action or labour activity, such as 
technical, tool using knowledge. As a result, it ignores phronesis2 - a form of practical knowledge 
concerned with the know-how of making decisions according to one's social responsibilities and 
situational demands (Shotter, 1989). Further, Vygotskian psychology does not emphasize ones·" 
social identity, nor does it take into account influences of positioning in interpersonal 
relationships. Positioning refers to "a complex cluster of generic personal attributes, structured in 
various ways, which impinges on the possibilities of interpersonal, intergroup and even 
intrapersonal action through some assigmnent of such rights, duties and obligations to an 
individual as are sustained by the cluster" (Harte & Langenhove, 1999a, p. 1). For example, the 
views of a person who is positioned as knowledgeable in a particular field will be accorded more 
respect, should issues pertaining to that field be discussed. The respect and status accorded to 
elders in traditional African societies, illustrate positioning. Elders have a longer collective 
~ Phrol1 f!sis is discussed at length in chapter 5. 
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history of the community: they are expected to use their knowledge and experience to promote 
communal interests (Paris, 1995). Their opinions take precedence when moral and ethical issues 
arise. Vygotskian psychology cannot account for the power or lack of it, which results from 
one' s positioning, in the process of moral decision-making. 
The above-mentioned shortcomings call for an extension ofVygotskian accounts of 
development. The dialogical framework, advocated by Bakhtin (1981, 198411993), appears to be 
a logical extension ofVygotsky's work. 
Bakhtin's Dialogism 
It should be noted that Bakhtin was a literary analyst: he analysed relationships between 
characters and the author in written works. However, he was interested in living language, which 
is speech as it is spoken by concrete individuals, and addressed to immediate as well as distant 
audiences (Skinner, Valsiner, & Holland, 2001). He took the Russian literary tradition as his 
point of departure. This tradition regarded the creative process, and in particular, the creation of 
literary texts (e.g. writing a novel) as a model for the study of human life (Kozulin, 1991). 
Bakhtin drew parallels between the process of writing (production ofliterary texts) and living. 
His account of individual development (becoming) is based on the concept of "life as authoring" 
and existence as a dialogue (Holquist, 1990; Kozulin, 1991). 
Life as Authoring 
The idea of life as authorship is premised on the understanding that "the world is not given but 
conceived" (Clarke & Holquist, 1984, p. 59). The world is not given to us as an object of our 
consciousness because we cannot have direct access to it independently of our experiences. Quite 
to the contrary, we make sense of the world and ourselves through an active process of 
engagement. This may involve activities such as thinking, doing and communication (Kozulin, 
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1991}. Human activities, argued Bakhtin (1981), parallel the process of literary authorship. 
Clarke and Holquist (1984) expressed the relationship between authorship and living as follows: 
Life as event presumes selves that are performers. To be successful, the relation between 
me and the other must be shaped into a coherent performance, and thus' the architectonic 
activity of authorship, which is the building of a text, parallels the activity of human 
existence, which is the building of a self. (p . 64) 
Writing a novel is an active process. It involves building ideas into a text, within the context of 
established literary genres. In so doing, novelists express their opinions, thereby authoring their 
point of view. Similarly, we inevitably express (author) our points of view in our responses 
(actions) to challenges in life. With the analogy of "life as authorship," a foundation was laid for 
a meaningful understandin'g of psychological functioning through the study of literary processes. 
Another similarity between literary authorship and living is that, in the same way that novelists 
situate their works within established literary genres, so do human actions take place within the 
sphere of particular cultures. We live in a world that is already pre-configured in a particular 
way. Therefore, our actions must take into account what is already established, within a given 
sphere of communication (Kozulin, 1991; Shotter, 1993a). In the study of morality, these are the 
already existing models of the good and the bad life. People judge our actions with reference to 
these models. 
. .'~ - . 
Bakhtin 's analogy between living and authorship provides us with a framework to understand 
psychological processes by studying human activities. Human activities cannot be studied out of 
context, however. By definition, our lives unfold in a world populated with other people, with 
whom we interact on an ongoing basis. Human actions are better studied with the utterance as the 
unit of analysis because the utterance is concerned with the relationship between speech subjects. 
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Utterances as Units of Analysis 
Utterances are appropriate for studying real life human activities. Although he studied literary 
texts, Bakhtin was concemed with language as a living process; namely the manner in which 
language expresses relationships between real embodied people, and their life conditions in 
general . For this reason Bakhtin positioned himself against the prevailing theory of linguistics of 
his time, which was dominated by Saussurian linguists. Saussurian linguists studied grammatical 
units , sllch as sentences, phrases, words and phonemes, in order to uncover underlying and stable 
pattems of language. These units were studied independently of the context of their users. 
Sentences are abstract linguistic units which do not belong to anyone and are not addressed to 
anyone. Bakhtin argued that ·such units are inappropriate because they CaImot tell us anything 
about actual relationships between embodied beings. 
Tounderstand language as a living process, Bakhtin tumed his attention to the study of the whole 
utterance (Holquist, 1983; Vasileva, 1985; Wertsch, 1990). Utterances are real, responsive, 
interactive units (Shotter, 1993a). Bakhtin (1986) defined the utterance as: 
a unit of speech communication ... detennined by a change of speaking subjects, that 
is, a change of speakers. Any utterance - from a short (single-word) rejoinder in 
everyday dialogue to the large novel or scientific treatise - has, so to speak, an 
absolute begilming and ail absolute end: its begilming is preceded by the utterances of 
others, and its end is followed by the responsive utterances of others .... The speaker 
ends his utterance in order to relinquish the floor to the other or to make room for the 
other's active responsive understanding. (p. 71) 
Unlike sentences, words, and plu'ases, utteraI1CeS always belong to "individual speaking people, 
speech subjects" (Baldltin, 1986, p. 7) . They aI'e thus consistent with a model of human 
understanding based on people as perfonners. Bakhtin maintained that human speech acts cannot 
be fully understood outside the actual conditions of use. "Speech acts can only exist in reality 
only in the fom1 of utteraI1CeS of individual speaking people, speech subjects" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 
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7). Utterances not only belong to real, embodied people, they also elicit a response from the one 
to whom they are addressed. Bakhtin (1986) referred to this as the responsiveness and 
"addressivity" of utterances. 
Utterances and Responsiveness 
Utterances presuppose someone with whom one can agree or disagree. Bakhtin (1986) found the 
study of utterances appealing because utterances indicate the gaps or boundaries in the flow of 
speech between speaking subjects (Shotter, 1993a; Wertsch, 1990). Once the utterance of one 
speaker has been finalized, the other speaker can assume a responsive attitude toward what has 
been said: 
When the listener perceives and understands the meaning ... of speech he [ sic] 
si l11ultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward it. He [sic] either agrees or 
disagrees with it ... augments it, applies it, prepares for its execution and so on . . .. Any 
understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently responsive, although the 
degree of this activity varies extremely. Any understanding is imbued with response and 
necessarily elicits it in one form or another: the listener becomes the speaker. (Bakhtin, 
1986,p.68) 
. .. . .. , The responsive nature of utterances makes them consistent with the model of human life as 
"authoring." Utterances are concerned with social relations between embodied rather than 
abstract beings. Bakhtin (1986) sees communication as movement. It is a constant struggle in 
which people occupying different positions attempt to influence each other in some way 
(Holquist, 1983; Shotter, 1993a). We express our points of view as we engage with other people, 
in the same way that novelists express theirs in writing. Furthermore, life "authorship" takes 
place within constraints and/or affordances provided by the culture. When the question of speech 
genres is addressed, we shall see that people resort to personal attributes such as social class or 
gender in their everyday utterances. By studying the responsive positions people take toward 
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each other's utterances, we leal11 not only about each's social position, but the origin of each's 
worldviews from the collective basis of social life (Shotter, 1993a). 
The "Addressivity" of Utterances 
One of the distinguishing features of the utterance is what Bakhtin tenned the "addressivity" of 
voices (Bakhtin, 1986; Welisch, 1991). Utterances are by definition, dialogical. Whenever an 
utterance is made, there is always an actual or imaginal audience oflisteners (Hennans, 1997; 
Wertsch, 1991). Every utterance has an addressee or a "second party" whose responsive 
understanding is being sought. The notion of "addressivity" follows from the fact that people are 
not passive in their conversations with others. Quite to the contrary, they engage in activities 
such as negotiation, agreeing, disagreeing and questioning (Sampson, 1993; Shotter, 1995). The 
very composition and style of the utterance will depend on the audience for whom it is meant, 
and must, of necessity, take into account the effect it will have on them (Bakhtin, 1986). For 
example, a young boy who wants pennission from his mother to play football for his team on a 
Sunday mOl11ing, instead of going to church, will put his request with great politeness and 
respect. 
"Addressivity" extends beyond actual participants in a dialogue: it includes real or imagined 
others, for W]101TI tlleutteral1ce is l11eallt and frolll whom some respollsive llnderstanding is .... ,. 
sought (Bakhtin, 1986). For example, when we contemplate doing something our parents do not 
approve of, we may engage in an intel11al dialogue with them, though they are not present. 
"Acldressivity" brings to our attention that higher mental functions do not involve the activity of 
a solitary thinker, because the intemal world of the person is "populated" with others. In a similar 
vein, Arendt, noted that: 
the thinking process . . . is not, like the thought of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me 
and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up 
my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I must finally come to 
some agreement. (cited in Bel11stein, 1983, p. 218) 
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The fact that "addressivity" includes imagined others highlights that we CaImot claim to be alone 
in what we are doing, even in our thoughts. Our actions must always be oriented toward others, 
and must anticipate their responses, in order to be meaningful. Traditional psychological theories 
of human development, on the other hand, posit that people reason in isolation (SaIllpson, 1993). 
For example, in the cognitivist paradigm, moral reasoning (e.g. Kohlberg, 1981, 1984) is a 
matter of individual legislation (Day & Tappan, 1996). It is envisaged as occurring 
independently of others, history, context and time (Benhabib, 1992). Bakhtin's dialogism opens 
up the possibility of studying the role played by others, real or imagined, in moral reasoning. 
Bakhtin (1986) also maintained that the "addressivity" of utterances extends to a "third party" or 
a "superaddressee." This is an indefinite audience: it consists of anyone who may subsequently 
encounter the utterance. The "superadressee" also includes a system of ideas or beliefs, an appeal 
to God, or scientific knowledge. Utterances exist within an established sphere of communication, 
a sphere already imbued with meaning (Bakhtin, 1986; Holquist, 1983; Shotter, 1993a). Their 
meaning cannot be deciphered independently of the history of ideas and social relations. To be 
meaningful, utterances must take into account perspectives, worldviews, and positions associated 
with a given sphere of communication or topic: 
However monological the utterance may be . .. however much it may concentrate on its 
own object, it cannot but be, in some measure, a response to what has already been said'---' 
about the given topic, on the issue given, even though this responsiveness may not have 
assumed a clear-cut external expression. It will be manifest in the overtones of the style, 
in the finest nuances of the composition. The utterance is filled with dialogical overtones, 
and they must be taken into account in order to understand fully the style of the utterance. 
(Bakhtin, 1986,p.92) 
The fact that utterances can be addressed to an indefinite audience, or refer to a system of ideas 
aI1d beliefs (Bakhtin, 1986), is illustrated by fon11er South African president, Mr Rolihlahla 
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Nelson Mandela's closing remarks at the opening of the defence case during the Rivonia trial on 
the 201h of April 1964: 
I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I 
have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live 
together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for 
and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die. 
(A va i lable: http ://www.anc.org.zalancdocs/history/rivonia.html) 
To whom is this speech addressed? It is addressed to the judge, those present in court, the entire 
South African community, and the intemational community. Further, the speech escapes its 
immediate circumstances. It has relevance to anyone who subsequently encounters it, such as 
groups finding themselves In circumstances similar to those of the former South African 
president. It is an appeal to the universally acknowledged ideal: the equality of all peoples, and 
the unacceptability of the domination of one group over another. 
In moral decision-making, we appeal to the "superaddressee," consisting of world views, ideas, or 
perspectives associated with a given topic, to function as "witnesses" or 'judges" of our actions. 
For example, when African elders caution their children against neglecting family 
responsibilities - invoking izinyanya in the process - they are appealing to a "superaddressee," 
consisting of a system of ideas pertaining to the relationship between izinyanya and the living . 
To do justice to local understandings of morality, researchers need to pay attention to various 
idea systems. 
Utterance and Voice 
... . .... 
Closely intertwined with the utterance is the concept of "voice" (Holquist, 1983; Holquist & 
Emerson, 1981; Vasileva, 1985; Wertsch, 1990). Every utterance exists insofar as it can be 
produced by someone (Wertsch, 1990). The tenn "voice" indicates "the speaking personality, 
the speaking consciousness" (Holquist & Emerson, 1981). An utterance is endowed with a voice 
when speakers adopt an expressive, evaluative attitude toward the subject of their speech 
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(Baldltin, 1986). Although language contains expressive words, their evaluative nature is realized 
only in particular concrete situations. Baidltin argued that "words belong to nobody, and in 
themselves ... evaluate nothing .... [T]hey can serve any speaker and be used for the most 
varied and directly contradictory evaluations on the part of the speakers" (Baidltin, 1986, p. 85). 
Voice entails an expression of a personal (i.e. authorial) position with respect to a pruiicular 
subject (Vasileva, 1985). It touches upon, but is not reducible to, expressive intonation and other 
vocal-auditory signals. IfI stick my tongue out at someone, I am expressing my contempt for 
that person. My action is voiced. On the other hand, ifI am rulgry with my superior but pretend 
to be happy in his presence, I lack voice. The tenn "voice" generally applies to the speaking 
subject's perspective, worldview and belief system with regard to written and other fonns of 
communication (Welisch, 'T990). Having a "voice" is the very condition for the existence of a 
dialogue, an altemation of sUbjective points of view between partners (Vasileva, 1985). Speakers 
have "voice" when they use words in a language to express their point of view. 
The concept of "voice" does not mean that individuals produce utterances independently of their 
social contexts. Baidltin, like Vygotsky, situated the origins of psychological functions in social 
relationships (Tappan, 1991a). The speaking subject is "embedded in a particular sociocultural 
context, and a specific semiotic and a liriguistic milieu, out ofwhich come voices, languages, and 
forms of discourse that serve to shape and mediate their psychological functioning and their 
experience" (Tappan, 1991a, p. 12, emphasis added). Individuals never fonnulate their speech' hi 
isolation. Even in our thoughts, we take into consideration "audiences" that have been 
intemalised as a result of growing within celtain speech genres or spheres of communication 
(Shotter, 1993a). The authorial positions people take in relation to issues do not emanate from 
inside their heads. They are appropriated, as it were, from opinions and views of speech 
communities of which they are part. Meaning arises out of the dialogical relation between self 




Apart from unique speech events such as individual utterances, Bakhtin was concerned with how 
collective voices shape psychological development, or what he called "becoming" (Bakhtin, 
1986; Werstch, 1990). He paid attention to types of speech, produced by certain groups in 
society. He refelTed to these types of speech as collective voices (Bakhtin, 1986; Wertsch, 1990). 
The term refers to opinions, points of view, and perspectives that reflect the views of our social 
and cultural cOlllll1unities. These voices can be reflected in the way individuals speak about 
themselves. Dialogism includes ventriloquation, a process by which a person's utterance 
incorporates voices of social groups and institutions (Bakhtin, 1981). 
Collective voices are not neutral: they are imbued with expressive meanings. This is because 
utterances do not belong entirely to individual speakers. They have always existed "out there," 
belonging to other people and social groups. Words cannot be "neutral" because they have 
always been used for pruiicular purposes. They thus carry with them traces of meanings 
associated with their use in particular spheres of cOlmnunication (Bakhtin, 1981; Shotter, 1993a). 
Bakhtin (1981) expressed this as follows: 
The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes 'one's own' only when the 
speaker populates it with his (sic) own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates 
the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior to this momenC -' 
of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language ... , but 
rather it exists in other people's mouths, in other people's concrete contexts, serving other 
people's intentions: it is from there that one must take the word, and make it one's own. 
(Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 293-4) 
The notion of collective voices enriches our understru1ding of psychological mediation. 
Collective forms of life also mediate higher mental functions. Collective voices tie psychological 
processes to the social and cultural context, because by definition, they belong in the social and 
cultural sphere. For the purposes of studying morality, attending to collective voices provides a 
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basis for exploring tensions that people expelience, as they struggle to make personal sense of 
voices from various speech communities. When a person is speaking, we can ask critical 
questions such as: "Who is speaking?" In other words, by attending to collective voices, we can 
understand how people ventriloquate their social groups' ideas wheri they speak. It also enables 
us to study whether these ideas have been appropriated into the self as one's own. 
Two types of collective voices are critical in this study: social languages and speech genres. 
Social Languages 
" 
Bakhtin (1986) noted that 'a'variety of social languages might exist within a national language 
(e.g. isiZulu). Social languages represent the position or status of the speaker in society 
(Hennans, 1996; Wertsch, 1991). Languages spoken by different professional groups, urban and 
rural dialects, and the languages of various age groups or generations, are all examples of social 
languages. For example, we can distinguish between the young and adult population in one 
linguistic community, based on their social languages. In South Africa, Tsotsietaal (township 
slang) is associated with the youth. Apart from indicating that one is trendy, its use fOlms an 
impOliant part of one's social identity (belongingness). On the other hand, an adult who uses 
Tsotsietaal is unlikely to be respected by fellow adults, because the language is inappropriate for 
his or her position. Speakers never produce utterances in isolation; they speak in social 
languages. 
The fact that we speak in social languages has several implications for research into moral . 
reasoning. In studying nan'atives of moral choice, we can ask the question: What is the 
relationship between an individual's views, and the sociallanguage(s) of his or her group? To 
what extent has the person made personal sense of these views? Where tensions between 
personal and social/collective views are noted, we can study the processes by means of which 
these are resolved. 
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Also, the notion of social languages has implications for researchers. To understand the diversity 
of moral voices, we need to engage critically with the social languages of the people concerned. 
Cognitive developmental approaches to morality have been criticised for relying too heavily on 
the language of abstraction. This language is associated with a select group of highly educated 
Western males, who were subjects in Kohlberg's studies (Simpson, 1974). As social scientists, 
we need to be aware that our theories and methodologies are tied to particular social languages. 
The fact that our social languages are class-bound, calls upon us to reflect critically on the 
historical, professional, and cultural discourses that constrain or enable us to understand 
psychological processes across cultures (Hawes, 1998). 
Speech Genres 
Wbile the distinguishing feature of social languages is the social position of the speakers, speech 
genres are characterised by the typical situations in which they are invoked. They are the 
"generic forms of the utterance" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 78), such as greetings and intimate 
conversations between friends. Speech genres are products of a community's history and 
collective way of life. They are acquired from our concrete experiences with those around us. 
Speech genres represent a mmmer of viewing the world and the self (Sampson, 1993). When a 
person uses a particular genre, his or her experiences are structured by it. For example, suppose'a" 
man is on the verge of separating from his girlfriend, against his wishes. Ifhe tells her that "you 
can't do that to me, because I am a man," what are we going to make of this statement? This man 
is expressing himself through a speech genre. The expression "I mu a man" is being invoked in a 
situation in which his manhood is at stake. The expression cannot be understood independently 
of the relations between the sexes in his community. 
Speech gemes take into account not only the context and personal interrelations between 
speakers, but also their social positions (Bakhtin, 1986). People may resort to the use of many 
genres, depending on the context and position of those being addressed. For eXaITIple, a young 
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boy may use Tsotsietaal in the company of his peers, to impress upon them that he is part of the 
group. However, he will use standard isiZulu when addressing his parents or teachers, in order to 
show respect. We can thus think of speech genres in tenns of related, interdependent and 
continually changing speech "positions" between speakers. 
It is important to pay attention to speech types in studying moral reasoning. This will enable us 
to understand how moral voices emerge from the social and cultural context. It can possibly 
highlight the gender and other contradictions inherent in moral reasoning. For example, Maccoby 
(1990) studied communication pattems between boys and girls. She found that girls favoured an 
enabling style. This style pays more attention to the relationship, in order to facilitate the 
conversation. On the other'band, boys favoured a critical, restrictive style, which often led to 
conflict escalation. However, Brovennan, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson and Rosenkrantz (1972) 
showed that the enabling style was thought to be characteristic of mature womanhood, but not of 
mature adulthood. Mature adulthood was defined in tenns of autonomous (abstract) thinking, 
traditionally associated with men. Postconventional morality, it will be remembered, favours 
abstract modes of thought. The fact that characteristics defining "mature womanhood" and 
"mature adulthood" differed for women puts them at a disadvantage (Benhabib, 1992; Gilligan, 
1977, 1982; Hekman, 1995). To be a "mature woman" means "not being a "mature adult." 
Paying attention to speech types allows us to study tensions arising from contradictions such as 
this one, especially as they apply to moral reasoning. 
It has been shown that Bakhtin' s (1981) analogy of "life as authorship" enables us to study 
psychological processes with reference to social relations and practices between people. It has 
been argued that such studies should use the utterance as the unit of analysis. Utterances express 
dialogical relations between embodied beings. These utterances are also imbued with 
perspectives or points of view, within a given sphere of communication. This makes them 
meaningful units of analyses for studying contextualised psychological phenomena. 
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Morality and the Self Re-considered 
In the previolls chapters, it was argued that morality calmot be separated from concepts ofthe 
self (Bel1b abib, 1992; Gilligan, 1982; Hekman, 1995). The view of selfl100d emanating from 
Bakhtin's dialogism is discussed next. 
Toward a Dialogical Self 
Traditional approaches to psychology proclaim a unitary, disembodied self. Bakhtin's dialogism 
leads to a socially-engaged self. A dialogical self is decentralised: it is composed of mUltiple 
characters, all capable of ellgaging dialogically with each other (Hennans & Kempen, 1993). 
Although others have proposed that the selfis multiple (e.g. Higgins, 1987; Markus & Nurius, 
.". 
1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987), a Bakhtinian approach accounts for the social and cultural 
emergence of these selves. 
To introduce the aspects of a dialogically-conceived self, the forthcoming discussion will 
distinguish between logical and dialogical relationships. Characteristics of the dialogical self, 
namely, polyphony, spatialisation, innovation, and power dynamics, are then highlighted. 
Wherever possible, parallels are drawn between the dialogical self, and the traditional African 
view of selfhood, discussed in Chapter 3. 
Dialogical Relationships 
The starting point in understanding Bakhtin's ideas on the selfis the notion of dialogue. l he self 
iffi. co!!structed actively and dialogically, in our encounters with oth:r~C~andlamudi, 1994). 
Dialogical relationships are better understood in comparison with logical relationships (Hennans 
& Kempen, 1993). Logical relationships constitute a closed system. That is, they do not allow for 
further commentary, beyond what is pel111issible in tenns of the logical rules by which the 
statements are related . Bakhtin (1984/1993) showed this by comparing two identical statements, 
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namely " life is good" and "life is good" (see also Helmans & Kempen, 1993, 1996; Vasileva, 
1985). From the point of view of Aristotelian logic, the two statements are identical. Similarly, 
the statements "life is good" and "life is not good" only express a relationship of negation. 
Dialogical relationships, on the other hand, pre-suppose (and recognise) the other, with whom 
one can agree or disagree. A dialogical relationship between these pairs of statements exists if 
they are uttered by two embodied beings, either in agreement or disagreement with each other. 
The meaning of the statements can be fully grasped only in the context of the relationship 
between speakers. 
The same could be said of the dialogical self. Unlike the unitary self, affirmed in idealistic 
philosophy, the dialogical self is located at the point of contact with another, equally voiced 
consciousness. Bakhtin regarded communication as an essential aspect ofpersonhood. For him, 
"the very being of man [sic] ... is a profound communication. To be means to communicate . ... 
To be 111.eans to be for the other; and through him [sic] for oneself' (Bakhtin, 1984/1993, p. 287, 
emphasis in original). ~g!g.a -...:;;;.;:=-,,,. ____ ___~_=~, ...... .=..-:-=-"e~-"Rosure to o1b.ers' 
v:o ' e.s Onc~i!lternalized, these xchange di 1Q ue with each otheL 
The view that the self emerges from relationships is consistent with African conceptions of 
personhood. Let me illustrate this by re-examining the saying umuntu ngym1£:!tu_ngabantu. This 
saying can be interpreted as: "the bein~ of selfhood i§..attaine. dialogicall~,- through articiI2ation 
il1 the conll11unizy.o!ath.,ex)n ynan beings." Dialogicality is even more evident in the Xhivenda 
equivalent, muthu ubebelwa munwe. This translates: "'l ~rsonjs...~lread}'] hO:KJ:Lfg t e ot.l:J&.r." 
Both sayings highlight that the self cannot b.e conceived of indep.endeHtly, 0 o' trelationships. 
Parallels between African views of the self and dialogism make the latter a meaningful 
theoretical base for exploring conceptions of morality in an African context. 
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Polyphony and the Dialogical Self 
The dialogical self can be further understood with reference to Bakhtin's (198411993) analysis of 
Dostoevsky's literary works, and in particular, the relationship between characters and the author 
in his novels (see also, Hennans, 1996, 1997; Hennans et al., 1992, Vasileva, 1985). Bakhtin 
(1984/1993) noted that Dostoevsky created a special kind of novelistic genre, namely, the 
polyphonic novel. ~olyphony is concemed with .!he position ~n..the text, or what 
may b~called the authOlia iewp.oint (Morson & Emerson, 1990). A polyphonic novel does not 
~ - -- (~ 
c<;ll1tain one authorial viewpoint. Instead, there are severa~ cb.~racte s . h inde endent and \..' ,\ 
- - ('I \\ 
mutually opposing voices. The characters are continually engaged in a dialogical relationship 
~-.-- - - -
with each other. The author's (Dostoevsky's) erspective is just one of many: characters are also 
,-"","",-~ ...- - -- - -- ~------ ..".:; 
capable of authoring and defending tb~ir views and pe~sp~ctive.s. Each character is "ideologically 
authoritative and independent; he [sic] is perceived as the author of a fully-weighted ideological 
conception of his own, and not as the object of Dostoevsky's finalizing artistic vision" (Bakhtin, 
1984/1993, p. 5). This leads to a ''plurality of independent and unmerged voices and 
consciousness, a genuine polyphony offully-valid voices" (ibid., p. 6, emphasis in original). The 
voices are capable of entering into a dynamic relationship with each other. This involves, 
amongst others, questioning, agreeing and disagreeing. 
~9§~nd~es characteris th~ dialogical self. These voices represent points of "'- '. 
view that we intemalise as a result of growing up within certain social and cultural spheres. 
These voices can be accommodated within a single person. The different voices, like characters 
in a polyphonic novel, can engage dynamically with each other. Unlike the unitary self, the 
dialogical self is characterised by a p~ity of ~onsciousness. 
Pluralism and the self in African thought. 
A pluralistic conception of selves is consistent with the African worldview discussed in Chapter 
3. Ogbonnaya (1994) argued that "the human person must be seen as a community in and of 
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itself including a plurality of selves" (p. 75). Plurality of selves is expressed differently, 
depending on one's cultural group. The Balong of Cameroon believe that a person is born with 
different souls, which represent the parents, izinyanya, God and other spiritual beings 
(Ogbollllaya, 1994). Similarly, most traditional societies in South Africa believe that over and 
above a unique self, a person is bom with a spiritual self, representing his or her izinyanya. The 
spiritual self is thought to be more pronounced in those called to become traditional diviners and 
healers (izangoma). Because the call is unsolicited, it sometimes results in a struggle between the 
spiritual self and the individual personality. The former seeks to dominate the latter by directing 
it to assume a healing function in society. Should the individual accept the call to healing, the 
spiritual self becomes capable of holding an independent conversation with the individual self. It 
can be consulted for healilig purposes. This example shows that the idea of mUltiple selves lends 
itselfto a meaningful conceptualisation within a traditional African worldview. 
From a research point of view, polyphony opens the possibility of studying a single individual's 
inner world in the forn1 of the relationship between the various characters positioned at different, 
albeit sometimes opposing, conflictual spaces within the self. These could be the parental, 
spiritual, religious or other voices that are part of the self. 
Spatialisation in the Dialogical Self 
... . -. 
At this point, it is necessary to briefly discuss Bakhtin's under~tanding of the relationship 
between an idea and a person entertaining it. For Bakhtin, an idea represents a person's point of 
view: it cam10t be separated from the person voicing it. Likewise, the person holding it becomes 
a fulJy-fledged personality by viliue of that idea (MOl"SOn & Emerson, 1990). Because it is the 
idea that defines the person, it is possible to metaphorically externalise it, in order to give it a 
personality of its own. The spatial metaphor refers to an idea that has been externalised, with a 
personality of its own, telling its own story, from its own vantage position. The best example of 
this is found in Dostoevsky's novel The Double, which introduces a second hero (the Double) 
who personifies the interior voice of the first author (Golyadkin). Once the voice of the first hero 
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has been personified and extemalised, a fully-fledged, dialogical relationship between the two 
becomes possible. 
The dialogical self could be conceived spatially, as a multiplicity of autonomous authors in an 
imaginal landscape. Each author is capable of telling different stories from different perspectives 
(Hermans, 1996, 1997). The imaginal others could be parents, grandparents, and even deceased 
relatives (Hermans, 1997, Josephs, 1997). Once voices have been spatialized, it becomes 
possibJe for a person to move from one position to another, in response to changes in situation 
and time. Each of these positions can be endowed with a voice (Hennans & Kempen, 1993). 
Each voice is capable of telling its own story, independently of other voices (Hennans, 1996, 
1997). 
Spatialisation and the self in traditional African thought. 
The traditional African view of the self can be re-conceptualised in a way that is consistent with 
the spatialisation metaphor. As mentioned previously, traditional healers are capable of speaking 
in various voices. When a voice representing izinyanya is speaking, it does so independently of 
the person's view. That is, it represents its own perspective. This is supported by the view that 
the voice of izinyanya can be at odds with the individual's, leading to a struggle between the two. 
... . ... . 
It is envisaged that, with the assistance of a highly trained spiritual medium, dialogical 
interchange can be entered into with the spiritual voice. In the case of people being called to 
become healers, against their wishes, izinyanya can be addressed directly, through the medium of 
impephoJ. During this process, a request is made that they give the person leave to lead a life of 
his or her own. This lends support to the view that a framework for a dialogical, communicative, 
and spati alised view of the self already exists in traditional African thought. 
For the purposes of studying morality, polyphony makes it possible to ask individuals to situate 
themselves temporarily and spatially in relation to their narratives. Asking individuals to reflect 
.I Holy incense, used by diviners and elders, for traditional religious purposes. 
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on their thoughts at the time of the dilemma can elicit the temporal dimension. These thoughts 
can then be compared to their present thoughts. Both time positions could be endowed with a 
voice (e.g. What was your view then? What is your view now?) Spatially, individuals could be 
asked to take other persons' perspectives. Respondents could be asked to view a situation as a 
man, a woman, or someone from a different religion or culture, endowing each position with a 
voice of its 0\\1 11 . III this way, dialogue between different perspectives becomes possible. The 
meaning attributed to moral dilemmas arises from the dialogical contact between various selves, 
located differently with respect to space and time (Holquist, 1990). 
The Innovative Quality of the Dialogical Self 
Another feature of the dialogical selfis its ilUlovative character (Hermans, 1996, 1997). The 
dialogical self is always ch~llenged by _quesJ:i0ns dis~~ments and confrontations. This 
interchange of voiced perspectives leads to re-positioning, and eventually, innovation or self-
renewal (Hermans, 1996). This is in line with the behaviour of characters in a polyphonic novel, 
who continually ridicule attempts to tum them into voiceless objects at the mercy of others' 
finalising descriptions. That is, the characters "s~se their own inner unfinalizability, their 
~ - --
~apacity to outgrow ... from within. aneLto rendeLUlltJ:Ue...al+y..ex.temalizing and nal~g 
definitiQll of them" (Bakhtin, 198411993, p. 59, emphasis original). 
-_ .. .... 
Because of its ability to position and re-position itself, the dialogical self cannot be described 
exhaustively. ~y~riented toward the future, th~dialogical self is continual1¥_chaUetlg.ed. to 
.r.epositionitsciLin tb 1i.ghLo£.new infmmatio,ll. This is consistent with Bakhtin's (1984/1993) 
argument that "nothing conclusive has. yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the -
w.,£rd has 22.0~ yet been s12oken, the wOLd is free, everything is still in~futuIe_~ will_~ays be 
"-.g;,the future" (p. 166). For example, when a rural man who believes in patriarchy comes to study 
i 1 a modem university in a major city, he is soon challenged to~re-consider his positionjn the 
.!igh~fnew i nfomlation (e.g. gender equality). The innovative nature of the dialogical selfhas 
several implications for moral experience. From a dialogical perspective, an authentic moral 
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position cannot be finalized . Il is always open and willing to consider moral voices emanating 
from a diversity of j?erspecttyes. 
The Dialogical Self: Implications for the Study of Morality 
Dialogism entails the requirement that moral and ethical discourse should pay attention to voices 
of local bodies. The te1111 "bodies" in dialogism is not limited to physical bodies (Holquist, 
1990). It incorporates "bodies" of knowledge, such as indigenous psychologies (Heelas, 1981; 
Ho, 1998; Kim & BelTY, 1993; Kim, Park & Park, 2000) and traditional knowledge systems 
(Myers, 1988). It is indeed these knowledge systems that constitute collective voices essential to 
individual development. Cultures differ in their orientation of the self with respect to dimensions 
such as time and space (e.g. see Hall, 1983; Hall & Hall, 1990; Lock, 1981). Space and time are 
indispensable components of the dialogical self. A truly dialogical account of human functioning 
should consider how local time, space and self orientations influence psychological processes. 
At the same time, we need to capitalise on the relational and innovative nature of the dialogical 
self. According to dialogism, meaning emerges at the point of contact between "bodies" of 
IGlowledge (Holquist, 1990). A more fruitful approach is the one that explqres processes that 
happen at the point of contact between indigenous and other (e.g. Western) knowledge systems . 
. .. ' ~ . 
The following section discusses a dialogical account of moral reasoning. It is argued that moral 
action should be understood as an appeal to another being. The role played by internalised 
"audiences" in moral reasoning, be they significant others or beliefs systems, is discussed, as are 
issues of power and authority in moral dialogue. Finally, questions of accountability and 
responsibility in moral action are discussed. 
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Moral fairness: An Appeal to Another 
Given that dialogism rejects the view that moral decisions are made with reference to internally-
held principles, how can people's appeals to moral fairness be understood? From a dialogical 
perspective, appeals for moral fairness represent an attempt to accomplish something with 
another person (Day & Tappan, 1996). Dialogism implies that one is always talking to som~one. 
Speech is all attempt to craft a belonging. It is an attempt to enter into a dialogue with, and be 
recognized by, another. Moral action does not ensue from internally-held principles. It represents 
"an ongoing dialogue among different stories, scripts, and scenes ... that can be put into practice 
by the people who take them as tools, their guides for joining, reproaching, and in other ways 
" 
mending and breaching retationships" (Day & Tappan, 1996, p. 9). 
Day and Tappan (1996) thought that cultural tools such as stories mediate moral life in four 
related ways. First, in the face of a moral dilemma, possible courses of action are rehearsed with 
the aid of stories. Second, stories are employed to communicate what has happened to figures 
comprising the moral audience, that is, those who are important in the psychological world of 
actors. Third, actors use stories to alTive at their own understanding of what has happened or 
what might happen. In the process, they "induce their audience (and interviewer) to participate in 
both the production and the comprehension of what is intended in the act of speech" (Day, 1991, 
p. 38). The meanings of our actions are not arrived at in isolation. They are "recruited," as it "", 
were, from the audiences comprised of those who matter to us . This results in the expansion of 
the repertoire of our own possible interpretations. Lastly, individual narratives do not take place 
in a vacuum, but follow the common discursive "forestructures" (Gergen & Gergen, 1988) or 
cultural narratives that both enable and constrain everyday thoughts, feelings and experience 
(Bruner, 1990). In the process of rehearsing their stories, actors compare them against the 
dominant narratives in their social world (Day, 1991). An individual is never alone in moral 
decision-making. 
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The Moral Audience 
Drawing from empirical interviews with children, adolescents and young adults, Day (1991) 
argued that moral life does not only take the f01'm of stories, but is also theatrical. Actors 
rehearse their stories before real or imaginary audiences of significant others in their lives. The 
concept of the "moral audience" follows directly from the multifaceted, spatialised self proposed 
by Bakhtin (1986). It is also consistent with the idea of the "addresssivity" of voices, discussed 
earlier. Even as one grows, one continues to tell stories, to consult, rehearse, and be accountable 
to someone. The difference is that the audiences we appeal to may change or become associated 
with different meanings over a period of time. Moral development, argued Day (1991), ensues 
from the "formation and tr~llsformation of moral audiences" (p. 28) before whom one most 
centrally acts . 
It will be remembered that "addressivity" extends to the "third party," such as systems of ideas 
and beliefs. Belief systems are also capable of acting as moral audiences. For example, we may 
judge our actions with reference to religious or cultural beliefs and traditions. For the purposes of 
studying culturally-situated conceptions of morality, the pertinent question is: Who constitutes 
audiences in people's moral deliberations? We can also investigate tensions arising from 
stmggles between different, perhaps equally important moral audiences. I have in mind here 
tensions between responsibilities toward the community and the need to pursue an individual .,,' , 
career. Africans with a Westem-type education are likely to experience such tensions (Mkhize & 
Frizelle, 2000). The relevance of audiences before whom one acts could also differ according to 
one's gender and relative positioning within a group . This study explores some of these issues. 
Hierarchy and Power in NruTatives of Moral Conflict 
It has been argued that in the process of growing up, we assimilate ways of seeing the world and 
ourselves that are dominant in our speech communities. In tum, these may be reflected in our 
speech . Ventriloquation is a process by which voices of groups and institutions are reflected in 
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individuals' utterances. Dialogism makes it possible to study the origins of the way people speak 
about themselves, what is ventriloquated in their speech, because it focuses on voiced 
perspectives. Dialogism addresses questions such as: Whose voice(s) dominate moral narratives? 
Wh ose story is being told? From whose perspective? By carefully studying the way people speak, 
we may identify influences of gender, class, hierarchy and power in narratives of moral conflict 
(Brown & Gilligan, 1991). 
Given that the dialogical self is composed of multiple voices, the question of the power dynamics 
between them becomes inevitable. Hermans (1996) and Hennans and Kempen (1993) have 
argued that dialogue not only creates a differential ordering of positions, but it also "restricts the 
multiplicity of possible positions in the process of socialisation" (Hermans & Kempen, 1993, p. 
73). 
The voices comprising the dialogical self are not necessarily equal in importance. Dialogue is not 
only ordered horizontally, but vertically as well (Hennans, 1996). Referring to Linell ' s (1990) 
work, Hennans (1996) and Hermans and Kempen (1993) showed that conversations between 
interlocutors are characterized by the emergence of symmetrical and asymmetrical ( dominance) 
relationships between voices. Although conversation usually requires turn taking between 
interlocutors, and hence alternation between dominance versus SUbjugation; it is possible for one 
-_. -... . 
conversant, or groups, to hold perpetual power over others. This follows from the fact that 
positions emerging in a conversation "can be partly understood as reproductions of culturally-
established and institutionally congealed provisions and constraints on communicative activities" 
(Hem1ans & Kempen, 1993, p. 73). 
It is important to examine dominance and power relations in this study, given the argument that 
morality in traditional African communities is dependent on social position and personal 
attributes such as gender and age (Verhoef & Michel, 1997). 
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Responsibility and Authorship 
The fact that dialogism locates meaning between self and other raises the question of individual 
responsibility or accountability in moral action. Ascription ofresponsibility is essential to any 
moral theory. If meaning emerges between self and other, can we hold individuals accountable 
for what they do? Despite the dialogical nature of our being, Bakhtin (1990) maintained that we 
nevertheless assume responsibility or "answerability." The world is always addressing us and we 
are alive and human to the extent that we respond to it (Holquist, 1990). Addressivity calls upon 
us to respond to issues confronting us in life. Our responses begin to take a form or text of their 
own, as we engage with the world (Holquist, 1990). We inevitably express our point of view in 
the way in which we respo~'d to life challenges. 
According to Tappan and Brown (1989) and Day and Tappan (1996), authorship is expressed in 
the stories we tell Just as an author of a novel expresses his or her point of view in the process of 
writing it, so too do we express our responsibility in the moral stories that we tell . In telling a 
story, we adopt a point of view or position in relation to the events in the narrative as a whole. 
Clark and Holquist (1984) maintain that responsibility comes about as a result of individuals 
making meaning for themselves out of the voices that initially exist between self and other: 
The means by which a specific ratio of self-to-other responsibility is achieved .. . comes 
about as the result of efforts by the self to shape meaning out of the encounter between-- -· 
them . What self is answerable to is the social environment, what self is answerable for is 
the authorship of its responses. (pp. 67-68, emphasis added) 
To say that we are responsible for our actions does not mean that Bakhtin is abandoning the 
notion ofdialogism (Tappan, 1991a, 1991b). Dialogism is very complex: it eschews simple, 
"either-or" distinctions. Individuals are responsible for their actions not because they are 
autonomolls, independent agents. The very act of entering into dialogue presupposes a position 
or voice that has been formed as a result of exposure to others' voices. However, because the 
diaiogical self is not fixed, people remain open to change resulting from exposure to others 
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voices. When individuals claim authority for their perspectives, they do so in the context of other 
voices, which have now been appropriated to become their own: 
The importance of struggling with another's discourse, its influence in the history of an 
individual's coming to ideological consciousness, is enonnolis. One's own discourse, 
one 's own voice, although born of another or dynamically stimulated by another, will 
sooner or later begin to liberate themselves from the authority of the other's discourse. 
(Bakhtin, 1981 , p. 348, emphasis added) 
This citation highlights that although our perspectives are bom of others' voices, it is through a 
process of selective assimilation that we can merge these perspectives, resulting in a voice of our 
own. 
Bakhtin's (1981) distinction between two types of discourses, namely authoritative and 
internally-persuasive discourses, further illustrate authorship. Authoritative discourse is the word 
of authority or tradition. Transmitted from the distant past, it is accepted wholeheartedly, without 
scrutiny. It demands unconditional allegiance, and refuses to be challenged. Therefore, it 
constitutes monologue, rather than dialogue. For example, an imposition of theories of morality 
and ethics derived mainly from the West on indigenous people, without taking into account local 
understandings of these concepts, constitutes an authoritative discourse between different bodies 
of knowledge. 
--_ . .... 
Moral autonomy is achieved when one speaks with an internally-persuasive voice. Initially, the 
word is on the borderline between self and other, it "is half someone else's" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 
293). Moral development involves a selective assimilation of others' voices, thereby making 
them one's own. Internally-persuasive discourse pennits individuals to engage in a dialogue with 
other internally-persuasive voices. This results in new meanings. Individuals are responsible for 
their thoughts and actions, to the extent that these are populated with their own intentions and 
accents (Bakhtin, 1981; Day & Tappan, 1996). 
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The idea of a struggle between various discourses opens up the possibility of studying the 
hegemony of one moral voice over another. NalTatives of moral choice are populated with 
different 1110ral voices, struggling for hegemony within the individual. Which of these voices is 
authoritative? Which ones are intemally-persuasive? Can the social languages or speech genres 
from which the voices emerge be identified? How do individuals deal with conflicts between 
various moral perspectives? The purpose of this study is to shed light on these questions. 
Conceived ciialogically, morality ensues from the struggle of being an embodied and relational 
being. It is an attempt to find one's voice, in a world populated by a myriad of competing voices. 
Conclusion 
Begilming with the work ofVygotsky, this chapter introduced socio-cultural approaches to 
morality and the self. Vygotsky maintained that cultural tools, such as language, mediate 
psychological functions. Vygotskian approaches to psychology, however, tend to be limited to 
interpersonal and small group interactions. Bakhtin's dialogism accounts for the role of 
collective voices in psychological mediation. Dialogism acknowledges that people can vacillate 
between multiple perspectives. Viewed from this perspective, moral development results from a 
selective appropriation of others' voices. Once appropriated into the self, these voices serve as 
"audiences." People appeal to these "audiences" in moral decision-making. One ofthe purposes 
of this study is to investigate personal tensions resulting from dialogical interchanges between"" 
multiple moral audiences. 
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CHAPTERS 
NARRATIVE AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION: HERMENEUTIC APPROACHES 
This chapter reviews the main criticisms against narrative approaches to moral thought. The 
comerstone of these criticisms is that the rejection of metanarratives oflegitimation, in favour of 
local ones, makes it impossible to adjudicate between various moral points of view. Drawing 
from the hermeneutics ofWittgenstein (1953), Gadamer (1975) and Haberrnas (1984), it is 
argued that theorizing about the diversity of moral points of view, without resorting to moral 
relativism, is possible. The above-mentioned hemleneutic traditions maintain that criteria for 
adjudicating between oppo·sing moral claims are arrived at intersubjectively, through dialogue. 
These criteria emerge from a group's shared background practices and traditions. Moral relativity 
can be avoided because background cultural practices arise in response to common human 
problems. Tt is therefore possible to understand others' background practices with reference to 
our own. 
Two main hel1lleneutic approaches that have addressed the process by means of which we can 
understand others' way of life are discussed: Gadamer's fusion of horizons of understanding, and 
Habemlas ' s discourse ethics. The strengths and weaknesses of each position are discussed. 
Following RicoLler (1979), it is argued that a truly moral point of view should always remain 
open to alternative ways of seeing the world. 
Narrative Approaches: An Overview of Criticisms 
One of the major contributions of narrative approaches to the study of moral development is the 
rejection of the idea of a disinterested blower. From a narrative point of view, the self is 
relational, contextual and mediated by language. Because the self is contextual, narrativists argue 
that moral theory should take local narratives into account. This position has led to the criticism 
that nanative approaches prefer local to grand narratives. Universalists have argued that by 
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rejecting grand nalTatives, in favour of local ones, narrativists make it difficult to distinguish 
between right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable narratives (Kahn, 1993; Madsen, 1992; 
Puka, 1991a, 1991b). Oflate, the most vehement criticism has come from Lourenyo (1996), who 
has argued that rejection of grand narratives may lead "to nihilism in tenns of action, and to 
opportunism in terms of justice and interpersonal relationships" (p. 84). He supports this 
argument by refelTing to the meta-ethical assumptions comprising the cornerstone of Kohlberg's 
theory. Kohlberg (] 984) discussed a number of interdependent assumptions that fonned the 
basis of his empirical investigations. These were drawn mainly from analytic philosophy. 
Because the assumptions are interdependent, only the three that bear most directly on questions 
of validation will be discussed: legitimacy, commensurability and universality. 
The assumption of legitimacy is concerned with criteria for distinguishing between legitimate 
(acceptable) and illegitimate (unacceptable) moral positions. Universalists have argued that 
rejection of grand nalTatives oflegitimation leads to fragmentation and discontinuity between 
moral points of view (Lourenyo, 1996; Puka, 1991 a). They maintain that without universal 
narratives, it is difficult to detennine if one way oflife is preferable to another. Lourenyo opined 
that to discount grand narratives amounts to embracing the view that all moral narratives are of 
equal value. Such a position, he argued, makes it impossible to define a truly moral point of 
Vlew. 
Closely related to the assumption of legitimacy is commensurability, namely the comparability 
of various conceptions of morality. For example, if there are no grand narratives, how do we 
compare the moral conceptions of different cultural groups? For example, should a group that 
endorses female circumcision be left uncensured, because the practice is "moral" within its own 
sphere? For universalists, multiple moral narratives make it impossible to make comparisons 
between differing moral points of view. 
Finally, traditional Kohlbergian approaches first assume that the meaning of morality is universal 
across cultures. They then proceed to demonstrate universality in the empirical realm. Proponents 
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ofKohlberg's theory argue that this approach is preferable because it avoids contradictions and 
moral opportunism. Universalism appeals to meta-ethical assumptions that go beyond the 
contextual and cultural origins of a theory (Helwig, Tisak, & Turiel, 1990). Further, the 
assumption of universality requires that stages of moral development occur in the same sequence 
across cultures. 
Uni versalists attempt to avoid incommensurability between different moral narratives, by 
appealing to context-free criteria. They conveniently ignore the fact that grand narratives of 
legitimation have not been empirically demonstrated. If one begins with an assumption that the 
meaning of morality is universal, and then proceeds on this basis to investigate morality 
empirically, should one hotd on to the original assumption if group differences are observed? 
How are these group differences to be explained? 
Furthermore, Kohlberg (1984) derived his meta-ethical assumptions from Westem moral 
philosophy (e.g. Frankena, Kant, and Rawls). Would the study of Buddhism or African moral 
philosophy have led to the same meta-ethical assumptions? What if, like the philosophers that 
Kohlberg relied on, the "grand narratives" tum out to be Westem narratives? Hekman (1995) has 
emphasized the need to be aware of dominant moral codes, whose hegemony is maintained by 
powerful public institutions. Similarly, Bakhtin (1981) was highly critical of universal languages. 
-" --. He argued that such languages often operate in the midst ofheteroglosia. In the study of 
morality, it could be argued that "grand narratives" of legitimation also exist in the midst of 
heteroglosia: the marginalised local codes of indigenous and other minority groups. The critical 
question is not whether a trans-historical code exists. Rather, researchers need to address the 
dialogical relationship between dominant and marginalised moral codes. That is, given that some 
codes are dominant, and others marginalised, how can we establish validation criteria that are fair 
to all? From the point of view of this study, the first step is to identijjl marginalised codes. It is 
only then that a meaningful dialogue between codes can take place. 
106 
Despite the above-mentioned criticisms of universal approaches to morality, the problem of the 
normative justification of moral action remains important (Gardiner, 1992). How are our actions 
to be evaluated, given the absence oftrans-historical, pre-given normative criteria? Although 
this issue cannot be addressed comprehensively in this thesis, possible henneneutic approaches 
that can be built upon to establish criteria to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate 
moral narratives are introduced. Given that there are multiple conceptions of morality, I am of 
the vi ew that moral universality emerges from the common human predicament (Kempen, 1996; 
Lock, 198 1). Every cultural group encounters life challenges during the course of its 
development. These are challenges such as birth, death, and other life transitions. Although 
groups handle these challenges in different ways, it is possible to understand others' ways oflife, 
by engaging dialogically with them, and by comparing others' to our own. Hermeneutic 
approaches renounce absolute truth, but avoid moral relativism by postulating historically 
situated conditions that, although culturally-variable, nevertheless make intersubjective 
agreement, and hence meaning, possible (Matthews, 1994; Widdershoven, 1992). 
Hermeneutics' Response to Moral Relativism 
As mentioned previously, it is beyond the scope of this study to comprehensively address the 
problem of relativism and objectivity in moral theory. Nevertheless, developments in the 
hermeneutic tradition are discussed. These developments can enable us to establish criteria with"-' 
which to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable moral narratives. The discussion 
draws mainly from the anthropological hermeneutics ofWittgenstein (1953), Gadamer's (1975) 
historical henneneutics, Habennas's (1984) critical hermeneutics, and to a limited extent, 
Ricouer ' s (1979) philosophy. Although differences exist between these traditions, for the 
purposes of this study, and following Gardiner (1992), Pirog (1987), and Widdershoven (1992), 
they will be treated as variations of the same theme. 
The above-mentioned philosophers renounce absolute truth but also maintain that intersubjective 
agreement can be alTived at through dialogue. These philosophers ' ideas are also related through 
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the concept of life-world: the shared background activities or cultural traditions that give rise to 
our actions. However, there are some notable differences of approach, especially between 
Gadamer and Habemlas. The two disagree on the role of tradition in the justification of actions. 
Although these differences are touched upon, the purpose of this discussion is not to resolve 
them but to shed more light on the problems involving moral justification. It is argued that an 
emancipatory hemleneutics should guide decision-making by critically relating our actions to the 
past, while recognizing that human experience should always remain open to new and multiple 
ways of conceiving the world (Bakhtin, 1984/1993; Ricouer, 1979). 
The Anthropological Hermeneutics ofWittgenstein 
The purpose of this section is to draw parallels between Wittgenstein's argument that there are 
mUltiple language games, and the narrativists' position that there is a diversity of moral 
discourses (Hekman, 1995). Wittgenstein rejected the view that there is a universal, 
metanarrative: he argued that there are mUltiple "language games," each justifiable with 
reference to criteria intemal to the game itself. Justification is to be found in a group's form of 
life: the taken-for-granted background social practices and cultural traditions. Due to the shared 
nature of human life, it is possible to understand others' forms of life by relating them critically 
to our own. The relationship between Wittgenstein's (1953) philosophy and moral justification is 
discussed with reference to two critical terms: language games and forms oflife. .-_ . .... 
Language Games and the Fonns of Life 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, his notion oflanguage games in particular, provides a way for 
theorising about the diversity of moral voices (Hekman, 1995). The term "language games" is 
better explained with reference to Wittgenstein's understanding of the relationship between 
words or concepts in a language and objects of experience. In Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein (1953) argued that language does not have a unitary essence that can be captured in 
a single fonmda. This position is different from that of logical positivists, who thought the task 
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of philosophy was to find the exact meaning of words. For Wittgenstein, the function oflanguage 
is not to name objects: each word is capable of assuming a number of meanings, depending on 
the context in which it is used. Language is not uniform: we use it for a host of different 
activities, such as reporting, describing, taking orders and expressing emotions. The various 
usages of linguistic expressions, as well as the functions they fulfil, Wittgenstein called 
"language games" (van der Merwe & Voestem1ans, 1995; Widdershoven, 1992). Wittgenstein 
(1953) maintained that "the term 'language game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that 
the speC/king of a language is part of an activity, or a form of life" (par. 23, emphasis original). In 
other words, the speaking of a language Calmot be separated from what we are trying to achieve 
through speech, nor can it be thought of independently of the social and cultural traditions of the 
people speaking it. The use of the term "game" does not mean that the activities described by 
Wittgenstein are frivolous (Grayling, 2001). The term highlights that words in a language, like a 
variety of games, can be thought of in tenns of a network of complicated, overlapping 
relationships . To understand the meaning of language, we have to come to terms with the way in 
which words al'e used in mUltiple contexts. 
The concept of lal1guage games can be illustrated with a hypothetical example of a simplified 
communication between a builder (A) and an assistant (B), in a society with a limited vocabulary 
(Wittgenstein, 1953). When A says "pillar" or "block," B responds by passing the required 
bui lding material on to A. The words "pillar" and "block" do not just refer to the building 
~ .. -- , 
material in question, but the entire network of responses or social relations between the builder 
and the assistant. A's speech and B's responses derive their meaning from the context of what 
they are doing (e.g. building a house), and not from a correspondence between the word "pillar" 
and the building material. Wittgenstein (1953) argued that children lemn their native language 
through practical activities, such as the one described above. That is, to know a language is to 
know the network of responses and practices associated with its use. 
The emphasis on social responses into which language is woven puts Wittgenstein's position 
close to Vygotsky's (Shotter, 1993a; Shotter & Katz, 1996). Vygotsky (1978) maintained that 
109 
meaning is present in the social act before we can become consciously aware of it. For example, 
he attributed the origin of the gesture of pointing to a child's unsuccessful attempt to grasp 
something. The child's action (pointing), however, engenders a response from others: it becomes 
a gesture for them. The meaning of the act of pointing is rooted in spontaneous reactions. It 
cannot be understood independently of the context and social responses it elicits from others. 
Similarly, the notion of language games indicates that word meaning is contextual: words get 
thei r meaning from the way we use them at crucial moments, to make differences in the flow of 
events in the activities in which we are involved (Shotter & Katz, 1996). 
Wittgenstein (1953) fmiher argued that within a language there are contained a multiplicity of 
language games, such as tRe language describing the relationship between the builder and the 
assistant described above, the simplified language used by children, and acts such as shouting 
and giving orders. The tem1 "language games" draws our attention to the fact that "the speaking 
of a language is part of an activity, or a form oflife" (Wittgenstein, 1953, par. 23, emphasis 
original). That is, words do not refer to objective entities "out there," rather, speech is embodied 
and relational: it points at the differentways by means of which we engage with each other and 
the world . Put differently, we make contact with the world through language games or forms of 
talk available in our social and cultural communities (Shotter & Katz, 1996). 
It has been mentioned that the speaking of a language crumot be separated from a form of life. 
Specifically, what are the fom1s of life that Wittgenstein is referring to? In order to answer this 
question, it is importru1t to point to the bi-directional relationship between language games and a 
group's collective representation of reality. Language grunes crumot exist independently of social 
practices represented normatively by a group (van der Merwe & Voestermans, 1995; 
Widdershoven, 1992). Lru1guage games crumot function without "a set of publicly accepted rules 
or culturally dete1111ined conventions which govem the use of language within that language-
game" (van der Merwe & Voestennans, 1995, p. 33). Forms oflife are the practices ru1d 
traditions assumed by a group of people in the language game they use (Grayling, 2001). Put 
differently, they are the taken for-grru1ted, "hurly burly" or "background" social activities that 
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reflect a group ' s shared way of life. The relationship between experiential fonns of life, and 
language-games through which their meaning is expressed, is one of interdependence. The 
shared experiences constituting specific fonns oflife precondition the meaning and people's 
understanding of the language-games. That is, language (in a language game) finds meaning 
against a group 's background fonns of life. On the other hand, fonns of life have to be expressed 
through language. Without the sharing of meaning through language games, our life experiences 
"would be senseless and would not lead to the collective fonnation of the fonns of life in which 
ollr cOlllmon experience of the world is encapsulated" (van der Merwe & Voestennans, 1995, p. 
34). From a Wittgensteinian point of view, moral justifications have to be understood with 
reference to criteria emanating from a group's fonn of life. 
F onns of Life and Moral Justification 
Does the argument that words derive meaning £i'om the way they are used compound the 
problem of moral justification? It should be noted that although language is central to human 
functioning, Wittgenstein (1953) maintained that one cannot resort to linguistic justifications 
indefinitely. Eventually, when justifications have been exhausted because one has reached 
bedrock and the spade is tumed, one can only state, "this is simply what I do" (Wittgenstein, 
1953, par. 217). In other words, our actions are eventually justified by the surrounding 
circumstances: the presuppositions, social practices or fonns oflife, constituting a group's tried""" " 
and trusted patterns of dealing with life's problems (van der Merwe & Voestennans, 1995; 
Widdershoven, 1992). Our judgments are not detennined by the actions of isolated individuals, 
but by the background social activities shared by a group: 
How could human behavior be described? Surely only by sketching the actions of a 
variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. What detennines our judgement, our 
concepts and reactions, is not what one man [sic] is doing now, an individual action, but 
the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action. 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, par. 567) 
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The process of growing up consists ofleaming the fom1 of life of one's cultural community. To 
be a competent member of one's society, indeed, to be an umuntu (moral human being), requires 
one to be competent in the language games of one's culture. The view that our actions gain their 
meaning from cultural fonns of life, is consistent with the notion of the self-in-community, 
discussed in Chapter 3. According to the notion of the self-in-community, to be a human being is 
to know and observe obligations and responsibilities associated with one's position in society. A 
person who has failed in these obligations is considered a "non-human person" (aku si muntu). 
This means such a person lacks the moral sensibilities associated with mature personhood. In 
other words, the person's social relations and practices are at odds with the fonns of life; the 
cultural practices and traditions that serve as a reference for moral conduct in his or her group. 
Psychological concepts, including morality, can be understood as language games (Hekman, 
1995). Hekman (1995) has argued that if one begins with the assumption that moral discourse 
constitutes a language game, then different moral voices, such as care (Gilligan, 1977, 1982) and 
justice (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984) are predicated on different fonns of life. The voice of care prizes 
caring and interdependent relationships, while the voice of justice extols autonomy and 
independence. Because there are multiple moral language games, it is possible to envisage the 
voices of care and justice existing simultaneously. This position is consistent with Gilligan's 
(Brown & Gilligan, 1991) thinking. It is incumbent upon researchers, therefore, to identify moral 
languages rooted in culturally varied fonns of life. The present study investigates moral 
language( s) informed by a philosophical framework that prizes interdependence between the 
individual and the community. 
.-.- -. 
The possibility of diverse moral languages does not mean that moral action cam10t be justified. 
Unlike traditional cognitive approaches, which seek to establish universal narratives of 
legitimation, a Wittgenstenian account holds that justification is grounded in the fonns of life 
(Hekman, 1995). Morality is not relative because fonns of life provide "the inherited background 
against which . . .[weJ distinguish between true and/alse." (Wittgenstein, 1953, par. 94, 
emphasis added) 
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Understanding Others' Form of Life 
The notion of forms of life provides a partial answer to the problem of moral justification. It 
could be argued that there are indeed cultural variations among different forms of life. If moral 
action is justified with reference to criteria internal to the language game itself, does it follow 
that what is morally right is detern1ined by my group's way oflife? Can people in one group 
understand others ' fon11S of life? Can we establish a common basis for distinguishing between 
acceptable and unacceptable moral nalTatives? 
Although forms of life are likely to differ between groups, there is nevertheless a unity brought 
about by, to bOlTOW Heidegger's (1962) tenninology, our "thrown-ness." This term refers to the 
fact that existence is not a matter of choice. As human beings we find ourselves in the world, a 
situation that requires us to engage in thought and action to solve problems we encounter. These 
are problems emanating from our corporeality, such as self-definition (e.g. what does it mean to 
be human?) and orientation with respect to time and space (Lock, 1981; Kempen, 1996). For 
example, spatial orientation requires all human beings to travel physically from one place to 
another. However, there are historical variations in what is regarded as an adequate means of 
transport (Widdershoven, 1992). Because fonns oflife arise in response to basic life problems, it 
is possible to arrive at universal but variable understandings of human phenomena, or what 
Sbweder and Sullivan (1993) called "universalism without the uniformity" (p. 514). This is the '" 
reason that Wittgenstein (1953) rejected the argument that alien forms oflife cannot be 
understood. He maintained that "the common behavior of mankind [sic][serves as a] system of 
reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language." (par. 206) 
Although we can understand others' forms of life with reference to our own, the process by 
which this is to be attained has not been spelt out. There is also a possibility that one cultural 
group will impose its fonn of life on others. We have already seen the hegemony of the language 
game of justice in the study of morality (Hekman, 1995). In an attempt to shed light on the 
problem, this thesis discusses two main henneneutic approaches that have examined this issue. 
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These are Gadamer's (1975) historical henneneutics, in particular his notion of the "fusion of 
horizons" of understanding, and Habennas's (1984, 1990) theory of discourse ethics. Although 
there are some notable differences of opinion between these scholars, they nevertheless share 
with Wittgenstein the notion that language and historically constituted life fonns are important 
determinants of meaning and human rationality (Gardiner, 1992; van der Merwe & Voestennans, 
1995; Widdershoven, 1992). 
Gadamer and Habennas: The Intersubjective Nature of Knowledge 
It is beyond the scope of this work to fully articulate Habennas's and Gadamer's positions on the 
': .. 
question of rationality and ·u~iversality. Only the essential elements of their positions are 
discussed . The purpose is to point to aspects of their theoretical works that can be built upon to 
justify moral claims. To begin with, an overview of their criticism of instrumental reason in 
soc.ial science inquiry is presented. 
Basing his work on the philosophy of Aristotle, Gadamer (1975) drew a distinction between two 
kinds of knowledge: techne (teclmical knowledge) and phronesis (practical-moral knowledge). 
Habennas (1984) agreed with Gadamer that practical-moral knowledge should be at the forefront 
of human inquiry. However, despite the importance both attached to phronesis, they differed in 
their appropriation of the term. Their differences centred on the role of tradition in practical 
decision-making. Before looking into their understanding of the role of tradition in decision-
making, it is important to touch briefly on the major differences in meaning between phronesis 
and techne. 
Technical and Practical-moral Knowledge 
Aristotle drew a distinction between two kinds of knowledge systems: techne and phronesis 
(cited in Bemstein, 1976). Techne refers to knowledge associated with expert mastery of 
activities or techniques that are essential in order to create products or artifacts. It is routine 
114 
knowledge that, once mastered, can be applied with little or no variations to any situation at 
hand . An example is the skill associated with the work of an artisan, such as a cabinet-maker 
(Bemstein, 1976; Gadamer, 1979). Once artisans have mastered the basic skills required for 
cabinet-making, they can apply them routinely to make any cabinet.Phronesis, on the other 
hand, is the ethical know-how: the knowledge essential to accommodate one's actions to others 
and to respond appropriately to the demands of one's environment. Unlike objects in the natural 
environment, human beings acquire knowledge of themselves, and hence become who they are, 
through their actions or deeds. Phronesis can thus be regarded as the knowledge one has of 
oneself as an ethical being. It is concemed with social relations and practices. Although both 
forms of knowledge involve a practical element, it is phronesis that is relevant to narrative 
approaches to morality. It~relevance is highlighted by the differences between the two. 
Differences between phronesis and techne. 
Gadamer and Habermas criticized modem society for failing to distinguish between techne and 
phronesis (Richard son & Fowers, 1998; Richardson & Woolfolk, 1994). According to Aristotle 
(cited in Bemstein, 1976),phronesis involves an aspect of wisdom that cannot be found in 
techne. Once a technical skill has been mastered (techne), it can be applied habitually, without 
taking the specifics of the situation into account (McGee, 1998). Phronesis, on the other hand, 
requires one to make context-sensitive judgments (Gadamer, 1982). For example, despite the -- -'. 
presence of codified rules, phronesis comes into being in courts of law when judges apply their 
wisdom by softening or intensifying an instance of law, in accordance with the demands of a 
particular situation (Gadamer, 1982). The practical wisdom required of phronesis distinguishes it 
from techne, which involves a habitual application of rules following a predetermined plan. 
Moral decision-making does not involve a habitual application of previously leamed skills to 
cases of the same kind. Hence, it cannot proceed in a technical manner. Moral decision-making 
involves phronesis: the ability to vary one's judgments in order to respond to the demands of the 
situation. 
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Another essential feature of techne is that it is characterised by a constant relationship between 
means and ends. Once miisans have mastered their trade, they need not re-evaluate their 
technique every time it is used to make a similar product. That is, techne does not require a re-
appraisal of the technique each and every time it is used. The outcome of technical applications 
is always known in advance. Technical procedures exist which, if followed, result in a table, no 
matter the piece of wood used, no matter the craftsperson. Phronesis, on the other hand, is 
Inanifest in our day-to-day encounters in a myriad of ways. It is not defined by a predetermined 
tetos, but the constant re-appraisal of both the strategies for attaining goodness, as well as the re-
appraisal of the potential for good in particular circumstances (Gadamer, 1982). As a result, the 
right means to realize ends cmmot be known in advance because the ends are not fixed but 
variable, and are often beiri'g questioned (Gadamer, 1982; Mc Gee, 1998). This distinction is 
important for moral decision-making, which requires agents to respond to concrete life situations, 
rather than to apply abstract or teclmical principles. 
Phronesis also differs £i'om techne in that it is not just something that one knows: it is part of 
one's Being or selfhood. Practical-moral knowledge requires us to display aspects of ourselves in 
all situations and social relationships. We come to a better understanding of ourselves through 
engagements with others and the world. Thus, argued Gadamer (1982), the phronimos "does not 
know and judge as one who stands apart and unaffected; but rather as one united by a specific 
bond with the other" (p. 288). Phronesis is characterized by a connected way of knowing: one'Is-
not detached from the subject to be known. Technical knowledge, on the other hand, is 
something that one knows apart from oneself. For exmnple, artisans do not have to relate aspects 
of their lives to the technical know-how of their trade. That is, they do not have to approach life 
as cabinet-makers in everything they do (Gadamer, 1982). This is an important distinction for the 
study of morality: to be moral cannot be separated from selfhood. This being the case, it is 
essential to begin with a culture's understanding of person hood in studying moral decision-
making. 
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Gadamer (1982) and Habem1as (1984) argued that the priority given to purposive rationality has 
led to technical issues being confused with practical-moral ones, in many spheres of life. We use 
purposive rationality to maximise control of events toward desired end-states. Decisions based 
on purposive rationality rely primarily on the calculation of costs and benefits (Richard son & 
Woofolk, 1994). Due to the over-reliance on purposive rationality, knowledge has become more 
technical in nature. The result is that where one would have expected to find a phronimos, one 
finds instead people whose expeliise is based on the tec1miques of their respective fields (McGee, 
1998). Such an approach to science reduces practical-moral concems to matters oftec1mical 
application (Bernstein, 1976). A current example of this is found in HIV/Aids prevention 
programmes in Southem Africa. These programmes promoted the use of condoms (a technical 
solution) without taking irito account the cultural, gender and power dimensions among people 
using the intervention device. Practical-moral knowledge would have paid attention to processes 
such as how gendered subjects negotiate sexuality, given historical and culturally-sanctioned 
power differences. 
Although Gadamer and Habermas agree that our judgments are guided by practical knowledge, 
they differ on how phronesis operates in real life. For Gadamer (1975),phronesis has an 
ontological dimension: it is concemed with how individuals make concrete decisions in the 
context of their traditions and culture. For him, the validity of our actions results from the 
process he calls theJusion oJhorizons oJunderstandings. For Habermas, on the other hand, ---- ... . 
decision-making is guided by rules and principles that can be agreed to by everyone in a given 
situation . Our decisions, he maintained, are binding because they have been subjected to 
communicative practices goveming discourse ethics. 
Gadamer' s Historical Hermeneutics 
We have seen that Gadamer emphasized phronesis: the ability to make judgements according to 
the exigencies of a situation. Given the variability that goes with context, how is the validity of 
judgements made under these circumstances to be determined? Furthermore, can these 
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judgements be universal and binding upon all participants? Like Wittgenstein, Gadamer (1975) 
argued that "reason exists for us only in historical concrete tern1s" (p. 245). As a result he 
rejected the idea of an abstract universal standard. The validity of our interpretations, he 
maintained, is grounded in tradition. It results from our participation in the activities of our 
culture. Tradition provides a worldview or perspective that frames our understanding. The 
following section explores the historical nature of understanding. It also looks at how this 
process is mediated by language through the fusion of horizons of understanding. Following 
Hekman (1995) , parallels are drawn between Gadamer's historical hermeneutics, and Gilligan et 
al. 's (1990) argument that moral theory should pay attention to the multiple ways in which we 
construe experience and hence, reality. 
The historical nature of understanding. 
Gadamer (1975) maintained that understanding is inescapably immersed in tradition. That is, 
understanding is mediated by presuppositions about the nature of knowledge that are shared by a 
historical community. Tradition can be understood with reference to Heidegger's notion of the 
forestructure of understanding (Jolmson, 2000). For Heidegger, understanding is based on what 
we already know, a fore-having that serves as a framework to guide our interpretations and 
actions. For example, when we are ill, we go to a physician, who diagnoses the illness, and 
prescribes treatment, according to established medical understandings of the time (Johnson, 
2000). A person who has a different understanding of illness may go to a traditional healer or 
spiritual medium instead. In both cases, patients' and healers' responses are not arbitrary. They 
are guided by traditions or pre-suppositions of the communities in which they belong. Because 
we are immersed in traditions of our communities, Gadamer (1975) argued that it is impossible 
to stand outside of a situation so as to have an objective understanding of it. 
One of Gadamer' s concerns was the rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice. Beginning during 
the Enlightenment period, the idea of prejudices was associated with unfounded, irrational 
jUdgements. Authority emanating from tradition was frowned upon: everything had to be 
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subjected to the objective canons of reason. Contrary to this tradition, Gadamer (1975) uses the 
term "prejudice" to point at the fact that understanding is always subject to effective history. 
That is, understanding always occurs within an historical context. Effective history "detennines 
in advance both what seems to us worth enquiring about and what will appear as an object of 
investigation" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 264). From a Gadamerian point of view, arbitrariness of 
meaning and moral relativity can be avoided because understanding is rooted in the historical 
interpretations of a given object. This position is in contrast to traditional approaches to morality, 
which maintain that mature moral understanding results from the acquisition of abstract 
principles, independently of context and time. Gadamer's position that understanding is 
community-based makes his views consistent with Wittgenstein's (1953), who argued that 
background forms of life provide a basis for interpreting human actions. If understanding is 
historical, it follows that morality should be studied contextually, beginning with pre-
suppositions constituting the background understandings of communities under investigation. 
The linguistic mediation of human understanding. 
If our interpretations are detennined by the traditions in which we are immersed, cannot tradition 
give rise to different interpretations? If cultural traditions could be interpreted differently, how 
does one decide between different interpretations? Furthennore, how does one distinguish . ... .... 
between historically-situated understandings that throw more light onto the meaning of a text 
from those that obscure its meaning? These are some of the issues raised by Warnke (1987) with 
respect to Gadamer's hermeneutics. She points out that Gadamer (1975) addresses some of these 
questions by appealing to the linguistic character of all understanding. Although all knowledge is 
situated in tradition, the tradition is constructed through language to fonn what Gadamer (1979) 
called "hermeneutics ' claim to universality" (p. 87). He argued that the human world is 
constituted thTOUgh language. In other words, it is not possible for human understanding to 
occupy a position outside of language, which can then be translated back into language. 
Language is not just a tool that we use to speak with each other about the world "out there." 
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Quite to the contrary, the world itself is constituted through the medium oflanguage. Language 
provides a horizon of human experience: a worldview through which we experience and express 
ourselves in new ways (Gadamer, 1975). 
Given the mUltiplicity of world views or horizons expressed in various languages, is it possible to 
arrive at a universal human understanding? Gadamer (1975) argued that various languages might 
be regarded as variations of "one logic of experience" (p. 413). In other words, we cannot 
conclude that reason is divided because there are many languages. It is our finiteness, the 
particularity of our existence, that is captured in the variety oflanguages. Gadamer's position 
that language arises in response to problems posed by our concreteness brings him closer to 
Wittgenstein. As argued previously, although Wittgenstein's forms of life differ between groups, 
they nevertheless arise in response to basic human concerns shared by all. Because there is "one 
logic of experience," we can understand others' languages by relating them to our own. 
Although language arises in response to common human concerns, we nevertheless respond to 
these in culturally-varied ways. For example, although all groups have understandings of what it 
means to be human, concepts of personhood vary from culture to culture (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Shweder & Bourne, 1991). Understandings of what it means to be a man or woman in 
society also vary. Consider, for example, a group that practises female circumcision. Someone 
who has not undergone this practice may be considered "incomplete" as a woman, and "unfit" --"· 
for maniage. Do others have a right to intervene in this group's way oflife? Can Gadamer's 
hermeneutics help us to alTive at a non-relative understanding of what is the right thing in such 
circumstances? How does truth emerge from various languages and fonns of life? Gadamer-
(1967, in Widdershoven, 1992) argued that we should not conclude that reason is divided simply 
because there are a variety of languages. The historical and linguistic nature of our situation 
provides a perspective or horizon, from which it becomes possible to understand the other. By 
engaging in what he called "the infinite conversation oriented to truth" (Gadamer, 1967, cited in 
Wicldershoven, 1992, p. Ill), it is possible to alTive at a universal understanding of human 
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experience. Gadamer envisaged this happening through a dialogical process known as the "fusion 
of horizons." 
The "fusion of horizons" of understanding. 
Genuine understanding according to Gadamer (1975) emanates from a dialogical process, 
resulting in what he called the fusion of horizons. This is a special type of dialogue, undertaken 
with a genuine and sincere attempt to understand the other. Although understanding is inevitably 
situated in prej udices, Gadamer (1979) maintained that we must nevertheless "seek and 
acknowledge the immanent coherence contained within the meaning claim of the other, [and be 
prepared to] recognize the other as right and to let him [sic] or it prevail against me" (p. 86). 
Genuine dialogical understanding involves an attempt to view something from the perspective of 
another. The process entails entering into a conversation with a view to reaching consensus. In 
the example of female circumcision mentioned above, we can envisage proponents of this 
practice arguing that it enhances their daughters' prospects of marriage. They may even argue 
that many women in their community support it. On the other hand, detractors may argue that it 
amounts to genital mutilation and also results in complications during childbirth. We can 
envisage that participants in the debate are motivated by the desire to reach consensus, and are 
hence open to the possible truth of their opponents' perspectives. When the fusion of horizons is 
reached, both groups of participants emerge with a broader and enhanced understanding of the ... -, 
various issues sUlTollllding female circumcision. 
The notion of reaching an enhanced understanding begs the question whether the fusion of 
horizons should result in substantive agreement? Wanlk:e (1987) addressed this issue at length. 
She argues that the fusion of horizons does not entail concrete agreement with the other's 
position, although this is not ruled out. Rather, conversation oriented to tmth is entered into in 
order to understand another. The fusion of horizons reflects an advanced understanding ofthe 
issues in question. This results from a critical examination of one's perspective in relation to the 
claim to truth emanating fro111 the other's views. From a Gadamerian perspective, the fusion of 
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horizons ofunderstandings helps us to address the problem of relativity owing to differences 
between groups' forms of life. 
A Critique of Gadamer's Historical Hel111eneutics 
Where does Gadamer's historical henneneutics take us, insofar as the problem of the normative 
justification of moral action is concemed? Gadamer has been criticized for allegedly denying the 
role of critical reason in the justification of actions (Gardiner, 1992; Johnson, 2000). His position 
that tradition serves as a basis for detennining the validity of our claims, it is argued, makes it 
impossible to adjucate between rival interpretive traditions. Questions have also been raised 
about the relevance of Gadamer's henneneutics to emancipatory ethics, given his emphasis on 
tradition (Hekman, 1995; Johnson, 2000). Does it mean that oppression of groups such as women 
and minorities, can be justified with reference to tradition? Whose tradition should be used as a 
frame of reference? These questions highlight the need to address the relationship between 
tradition and critique in the normative justification of moral action. 
It shou Id be noted that although Gadamer maintained that human understanding is shaped by 
tradition, he did not advocate an uncritical acceptance of authority. He alsormaintained that "it is 
a grave misunderstanding to assume that emphasis on the essential factor of tradition which 
enters into all understanding implies an uncritical acceptance of tradition and sociopolitical 
conservatism" (Gadamer, 1979, p. 87). Gadamer realized that prejudices may impair our 
recognition of a historical experience. For this reason he urged that pre-understandings be 
subjected to criticism, in order to distinguish between true and false prejudices. True prejudices 
facilitate our understanding of the text by connecting it to a shared body ofmeanings that define 
particular linguistic communities. False prejudices, on the other hand, result in misunderstanding 
because they are not tied to a community's shared body of knowledge (Gardiner, 1992). By 
adopting an interpretive stance distant to one's position, Gadamer (1975) maintained that false 
prejudices could be filtered from true ones. Distancing involves questioning one's prejudices. It 
involves temporal and other fOl111S of distancing, such as having an encounter with someone who 
122 
has a different point of view (Jolmson, 2000). Gadamer envisaged that this process would lead 
eventually to enhanced understanding and elimination of false prejudices. However, he remained 
convinced that the process cannot be undertaken from outside tradition. Historical 
understanding is neither possible nor meaningful if we situate ourselves beyond tradition 
(Gadamer, 1979). Because there cannot be a universal, Archimedean point from which the 
authority of tradition can be evaluated, Gadamer concluded that eventually tradition should be 
accepted as the only judge of a community's self-understanding. The correctness of our 
interpretations rests, finally, on their confOlmity to the horizons of meaning or prejudices shared 
by a linguistic or cultural community. 
Gadamer's position that prejudices can be overcome through communication has been criticised 
by Habennas (1971) and Wellmer (1974), amongst others. They have pointed out that language 
and tradition are not neutral media, serving only to facilitate understanding. Language and 
tradition can serve ideological purposes: for example, both can be used to legitimize relations of 
domination and oppression between groups. Also, one can refer to the literature pointing at the 
inferiority of women and minorities to justify the exclusion of these groups from positions of 
public responsibility (Bing & Reid, 1996). One can also quote statistics pertaining to women 
who are repOliedly happy with female circumcision, as a reason to uphold this practice. 
Habermas (1970) , in particular, argued that Gadamer's acceptance of tradition as the final arbiter 
of claims to truth renders historical hel111eneutics incapable of dealing with what he called 
systematically-distorted communication. This is a distortion of communication that is carried 
through language and tradition. It may involve coercion and force. Habel111as agrees with 
Gadamer that understanding is mediated by language, but criticises him for what he regards as an 
idealistic treatment of language. For Habel111as, Gadamer's treatment oflanguage fails to take 
into account the oppressive nature of social relations (Gardiner, 1992). 
Habermas ' s concerns find support in the work of Ricouer (1973a). Ricouer maintained that, 
contrary to what Gadamer's hern1eneutics would have us believe, ideology "cannot be treated as 
a particular case of misunderstanding, amenable to interpretive methods which would dissolve it 
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into a higher understanding" (p. 159). Thus, although Gadamer's hermeneutics can deal with 
contingent lllisunderstandings, it remains helpless in the face of institutionalised disruption of 
cOlllmunication through ideology (Gardiner, 1992; Ricouer, 1973b). Attention to ideology and 
other forms of domination is important to ethical theory, especially given the race, gender and 
economic disparities in society (Ansah, 1991; Bing & Reid, 1996). Habermas sought to address 
the problem of systematically distorted communication by appealing to standards of practical 
reason, which he argued, exist independently of tradition. His position is spelt out in the theory 
of discourse ethics. 
Habem1as's Discourse Ethics 
Habermas (1984) attempted to avoid the constraints of both instrumental rationality and moral 
relativism by positing generic features of dialogue that can be used to test the validity of truth 
claims. He argued that a theory of moral development is doomed to failure from the start if it 
does not address the question of the universality of the moral point of view (Habermas, 1990). In 
his theory of discourse ethics, Habennas introduced what he called the principle of 
universalization CU). This principle is based on presuppositions of argumentation, called 
communicative action, which supposedly transcend cultural perspectives. 
The principle of universalization CU). 
Habermas's principle of universalization (U) is based on his theory of discourse ethics (D). 
Discourse ethics can perhaps be better explained with reference to Kant's categorical imperative. 
Kant held that the test of the universality of the moral point of view is the categorical imperative. 
The categorical imperative requires one to act only on the maxim by which one can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law (Kant, in Campbell & Christopher, 1996). As we 
have seen with Kohlberg's, moral theories derived from Kant's position have been criticised for 
relying on abstract, fonnal criteria to justify moral claims. In the previous chapter, it was shown 
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that abstract moral principles are insensitive to context: they are difficult to apply to concrete, 
real life cases. 
Habermas (1990) sol..lght to replace the Kantian categorical imperative with the theory of 
discourse ethics. This theory holds that "for a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects 
that its general observance can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the particular interests 
of each person affected must be such that all affected can accept them freely" (Habennas, 1990, 
p. J 20, emphasis original) . In other words, valid nonns are those that can be freely accepted by 
all participants, irrespective of their role in dialogue. Paliicipants must also be willing to accept 
the consequences emanating from the observation of these nonns, without coercion. Habennas 
thus maintained that a universal moral point of view is still feasible. Universality, however, is not 
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arrived at mono logically or behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. It results from practical 
discourse (D) , and requires reciprocal role taking. In other words, D requires participants to 
place themselves in the place of everyone else and to be prepared to accept the outcome of the 
dialogue no matter what their own position. Discourse ethics is procedural: it establishes 
communicative presuppositions to be made to ensure the impartiality of the process by which 
claims to validity are tested. These presuppositions are discussed in Habennas's (1984, 1990) 
theory of communicative action. 
The theory of communicative action. 
Discourse ethics is guided by argumentative presuppositions spelt out in Habennas's (1984, 
1990) theory of communicative action. According to communicative action, speakers are rational 
ifthey can substantiate their positions or actions with reasons. These reasons should be 
convincing and acceptable to anyone taking part in the dialogue. Furthennore, participants accept 
that consensus will be achieved not through coercion, but argumentation. It is the force of the 
better argument that should win. 
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Communicative action presupposes an ideal speech situation. This is an argumentative situation 
characterised by a fi"ee exchange of ideas. The ideal speech situation requires human beings to be 
fully responsible to one another, and to be prepared to consider as many perspectives as possible, 
in the search for truth. It is assumed that speakers can participate equally in dialogue, have a right 
to initiate, question or defend any nonnative claim, without being dominated by others 
(Bernstein, 1976). Communicative action requires participants to be oriented toward 
understanding, and not success. Orientation toward success is driven by the need to have one's 
arguments prevai lover those of others. It may result in actors trying to influence each other 
strategically through weapons, threats, or other coercive means, if argument fails. Orientation 
toward reaching understanding, on the other hand, requires actors to remain sincere in their 
attempts to reach consensus (the truth). They justify their positions with reasons, and not 
arbitrary authority (Habennas, 1990). 
Communicative action also assumes that actors share a background lifeworld. The lifeworld 
consists of the cultural practices that are taken as givens in dialogue. Habennas (1990) 
recogni zed that human rationality is embedded in the social, cultural or natural environment. 
Rationality is not only the ability to support one's position with evidence, it also involves 
justification of one's actions against a reservoir of culturally transmitted knowledge. The 
lifeworld "offers a storehouse of unquestionable cultural givens from which those participating 
in the communication draw agreed-upon pattems of interpretation for use in their interpretive ---- . 
efforts" (Habermas, 1990, p. 35). 
It should be noted that Habennas (1990) drew a distinction between what he called the 
"l!feworld" and the "world." The lifeworld comprises undifferentiated, traditional worldviews, 
passed down from generation to generation. Undifferentiated worldviews, he maintained, are 
characterized by a mythical understanding of reality. They involve an uncritical acceptance of 
cultural norms and traditions. He gave an example of traditional societies' ways oflife, whose 
understanding, he maintained, is tied up in myths, such that it is impossible to distinguish 
between subjective and objective understandings of the social and cultural worlds. A universal 
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moral point of view, he argued, requires that "the spheres of things about which we can reach a 
fallible agreement at a given point become detached from the diffuse background of the lifeworld 
with its absolute cert,ainties and intuitive presence" (Habennas, 1990, p. 138). Habennas 
maintained that we can distinguish between undifferentiated worldviews, immune from critique, 
and decentered ones, arrived at intersubjectively through dialogue. Worldviews become 
decentered when they are freed from traditional fonns of life, cultural heritage or political 
affiliation. Decentered worldviews are a product of dialogue and argumentation. Because they 
follow from a due process of dialogue, they are acceptable to all parties, irrespective of their 
value orientations. Our actions are justified against decentered worldviews, and not the 
undifferentiated l~feHlorld. 
Decentered worldviews, in tum, become part of world perspectives. This refers to the 
background knowledge, assumed by the speakers, that provides a horizon for further 
argumentation. Should this background knowledge be called into question, discourse arises "to 
test the truth claims of opinions (and nonns) which the speakers no longer take for granted" 
(Bernstein, 1976, p. 210). At this point, Habem1as has diverged from Gadamer's (1975) 
understanding of phronesis. Gadamer was more concemed with how embodied beings interpret 
tradition to make decisions in the face of concrete problems. His concems were thus ontological. 
Habermas, on the other hand, is concemed with epistemological issues. For him, practical 
knowledge consists of commonly agreed upon rules and principles. Universal values are those" -
that have been arrived at argumentatively, by engaging in communicative practices, freely 
acceptable to all, no matter what position they take in the dialogue. The background lifeworld, 
consisting of previously tested cultural knowledge, provides a reference system to test the 
validity of participants' claims. 
Discourse Ethics: An Evaluation 
Habermas attempted to avoid the constraints of both instrumental reason and relativism by 
positing generic features of dialogue, to be used to test validity claims. His major achievement, 
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according to Richardson and Woolfolk (1994), was the substitution ofa dialogical form of 
argumentation for the traditional silent thought-experiment, characteristic of the Kantian model 
of universal ity. That is, discourse ethics does not ask what an individual moral agent should or 
would will, without self-contradiction, to be a universal moral maxim. Instead, attention shifts to 
the norms or institutions that members of an ideal speech cOlmnunity would freely abide by in 
testing truth claims. The test of universalizability in discourse ethics is not a position of non-
contradiction, but communicative agreement. 
Discourse ethics also requires all actors to participate in the moral conversation. Participants 
have the right to raise objections and to defend their positions with reasons, without fear of 
victimisation. It thus offers'a communicative model of rationality. Human rationality is defined 
as the ability to aIiiculate and support one's position in dialogue, rather than the ability to 
decipher the truth, behind the veil of ignorance. The test of the validity of our claims to truth, 
according to Habennas, is not their confonnity to universal, abstract principles. Members of an 
ideal speech community determine valid nonns intersubjectively. 
Although Habem1as's emphasis on language is welcome, his notion of an ideal speech situation 
has been criticized. It has been argued that it is idealistic and impossible to realise in real life 
(Bemstein, 1976; Gardiner, 1992; Richardson & Fowers, 1998; Richardson & Woolfolk, 1994). 
The ideal speech situation requires a person to act according to rules and procedures that have ... -. 
been agreed to by everyone. It is not clear how these rules would guide moral agents in the face 
of real life, concrete dilemmas (Gardiner, 1992). Habelmas interprets phronesis in a technical 
way, as the application of rules and principles. What is lost in the process is the explanation of 
how embodied moral agents use their wisdom to interpret tradition, in order to respond according 
to the demands of a particular situation. For Gadamer (1975), this is a critical component of 
phronesis . Thus, although discourse ethics is a welcome departure from Kantian-type thought 
experiments , others have argued that it aI110unts to a return to the categorical imperative. The 
only difference is that discourse ethics requires moral agents to act according to rules agreed to 
by all (Benhabib, 1992; Bemstein, 1976). 
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The ideal speech situation has also been questioned on the grounds that it is unrealistic to expect 
a macro-ethic to be developed through discourse in a context in which a significant percentage of 
the world lives in dire poverty (Dussel, cited in Mendieta, 1995). Can the poor contribute equally 
with the rich to this dialogue? It is also questionable whether the model of communicative action 
Habermas proposed is consistent with the values of the rest of the world. Is communicative 
action not modeled on the West's emphasis on reason? This position is by no means shared by all 
cultures. 
Another problem with Habermas's discourse ethics is that it re-invents the Kohlbergian distinction 
between justice concems and "matters of the good life." Discourse ethics requires that issues of 
justice, which can be settled by rational argument, be set apart from evaluative ethics. A truly moral 
point of view, argued Habermas (1990), requires that: 
moral questions, which can in principle, be decided rationally in terms of criteria of justice or 
the universalizability of interests are now distinguished from evaluative questions, which fall 
into the category of issues of the good life and are accessible to rational discussion only 
within the horizon of a concrete historical fOlm of life or an individual life style. (p. 178, 
emphasis original) 
Consequently, Habennas (1990) argued that issues of care and responsibility, raised by Murphy 
and Gilligan (1980), are matters of personal decision-making, falling outside the domain ofthe "-' 
moral. This argument results in the narrowing of the domain of the moral, and runs counter to the 
need to identify previously ignored or oppressed moral perspectives. As Benhabib (1992) has 
argued, the way the domain of the moral is defined, and the kinds of justificatory constraints that 
moral judgements should be subject to, are two different matters. That is, universalism in ethics 
should spell out the procedures through which decisions are made, rather than specifying the 
domain of the moral itself. The task for discourse ethics should be to spell out how procedural 
universalism can be applied to instances of care, rather than excluding care concems from the 
domain of the moral (Benhabib, 1992). Ifwe exclude care concems, are we treating with respect 
the many who regard interpersonal responsibilities as truly moral? Ways of reaching agreement 
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are important in moral and ethical decision-making. They should not come at the expense of 
marginalising others' moral perspectives, however. 
Despite the above-mentioned criticisms, Habermas's theory highlights the importance of 
criticism in ethical theory. The challenge is to develop a critical theory that is not distanced from 
moral agents' concrete historical circumstances. 
HeI111eneutics and Relativism: A Summary and Extension 
Henneneutic approaches provide fertile ground to theorise about the justification of the moral 
point of view. The philosophical traditions discussed above renounce the idea of absolute truth 
that has characterised logical positivistic social science. Wittgenstein (1953) emphasised the 
diversity of language games. This position is consistent with narrativists' contention that there 
are multiple moral discourses. Moral discourses find justification with reference to the forms of 
life, namely the background social practices and traditions shared by a group. It is possible to 
understand others' languages games (and hence, moral discourses) because forms of life arise in 
response to challenges faced by all cultural groups, in the course of their development. 
To explore the process by means of which we can understand others' forms oflife, I turned to the 
philosophies of Gadamer and Habennas. Both emphasize the practical nature of knowledge. 
However, they differ in how practical knowledge guides decision-making. Although dialogue is 
central to both, Gadamer regarded tradition as the ultimate judge of our interpretations. 
Habennas, on the other hand, saw tradition as a possible repository of untruths, a source of 
ideological forces operating in the interests of dominant groups in society. Gadamer's position is 
more consistent with the argument that morality should be concerned with how embodied, 
historical beings make decisions in real life. Habennas emphasized critique and universal 
standards, which position, unfortunately, led him to a nanow definition of morality in tenns of 
only justice concems. The crucial question, it would appear, is how to recognise the role of 
tradition in moral decision-making, while making it possible to adopt a critical distance to avoid 
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opportunism? It is beyond the scope of this work to address this question. However, 
hermeneutics can benefit from the philosophy of Ricouer (1973a, 1973b; 1979). Ricouer 
defended the view that hermeneutics can foster a critical distance from tradition without losing 
the hermeneutic character of understanding. This makes a hermeneutic critique of ideology 
possible. 
Hermeneutics and Critical Distancing 
Ricouer (1979) objected to Habem1as's ideal speech situation, which he saw as a retum to a 
l110nological social science. Nevertheless, he maintained that a henneneutic clitique of ideology 
is feasible. He agreed witli'<:::radamer that our knowledge is rooted in tradition. However, he 
maintained that we ought to take a suspicious and doubting attitude toward what is handed down 
through tradition (Burkett, 1988; Gardiner, 1992; Ricouer, 1973a). The question then becomes 
one of what fom1 critical distancing ought to take. 
Critical distancing, or what Ricouer (1973a, 1979) called "distanciation," is made possible by 
poJysel11Y. This is the potential of words in a language to have more than one meaning. Words 
have infinite possibilities. These possibilities emerge intersubjectively in a dialogue between two 
or more parties (Ricouer, 1973b). The polysemic character oflanguage results in a "surplus of 
meaning," thus requiring an interpretive phase in order for the speakers to discem the meaning "Of 
a text of experience. This "surplus of meaning" makes it possible to avoid a reduction of 
meaning to a monological, ideological perspective (Gardiner, 1992). This becomes possible 
through "c1istanciation," a process by which one moves beyond what could be considered the 
"true" or "essence" of the meaning of a text of human experience, by relating that experience to 
various historical, cultural and social contexts (Ricouer, 1979). 
To illustrate distanciation, Ricouer (1979) drew an analogy between written texts and human 
actions. He argued that the human actions become distanced from actors' immediate contexts 
and intentions, in the same way that literary works are interpreted in relation to context and time. 
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The meaning of biblical texts, for example, is not tied to the intention of the authors. Their 
meanings are debated taking into account context and time. Similarly, the meaning of human 
actions is not fixed by authors' intentions. Once perfol111ed, human actions can have 
consequences of their own, over and above whatever the actor might have intended. For the 
purposes of studying morality, this means that we cannot be content with what people say they 
meant (intended) when acting in a particular way. Our interpretations should take into account 
the actor's explanations, but also critically relate these to the social and cultural understandings 
of the time. This process involves a critical, dialogical encounter with multiple interpretive 
perspectives. In order to avoid the use of tradition for ideological purposes, people's accounts of 
their actions cannot be taken at face value, simply because they argue that these accounts are 
"indigenous" or "traditional." They need to be examined critically, in relation to the socio-
cultural context. In addition, cognizance should be taken of the historical changes that have taken 
place as a result of exposure to various belief systems. 
The importance of distanciation in the exan1ination of people's explanations of their actions is 
illustrated in the case of a Swazi man who sexually abused his 13-year-old daughter, 
impregnating her in the process (Hall, 2000). In his legal defense, he argued that it is the 
traditional custom of his clan for fathers to sleep with their daughters, in order to produce a male 
heir. He further justified his position by quoting from the Bible. It should be noted that he too 
---- -. draws from multiple perspectives to justify his actions (the traditional and the religious). In 
reaching its decision, the comi considered testimony from groups of traditional elders and 
clerics. Both groups unanimously rejected the defendant's claim. This example shows that 
critical distanCing applies to both Euro-American derived perspectives as well as those of 
traditional African origin. Without critical distancing, one nms the risk of having tradition used 
to justify certain groups' interests. The Relational Method, discussed in the next chapter, makes 
such distancing possible because it incorporates temporal, cultural and historical dimensions in 
interpreting narratives of moral choice. 
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Distanciation also means that human deeds can transcend the social conditions in which they 
occur. This happens as agents' actions are recreated and related to different social contexts and 
historical epochs. For example, researchers working in medical ethics can take the Tuskegee 
experiments (Kimmel, 1996) as a point of departure. Lessons drawn from these experiments can 
be used to inform the drafting of more humane codes of ethical conduct. For this reason, Ricouer 
(1979) argued that human actions, like written text, can become an "open work, the meaning of 
which is 'in suspense' . .. waiting for new interpretations which decide their meaning" (p. 86). 
Distanciatiol1 implies that objectivity in the human sciences cannot be fixed and timeless. It 
ensues from a dialogical process in which the meaning of human action is debated, taking into 
account its historical context. Objectivity is arrived at intersubjectively and argumentatively, by a 
community of interpreters:'This process takes cultural and historical contexts into account. 
Ricouer's notion of distanciation provides a basis for theorizing about a critical hermeneutics. It 
satisfies concems raised by Habem1as by emphasizing the role of critique in moral theory. 
However, Ricouer ties critique to concrete historical circumstances, rather than the ideal speech 
situation. Furthermore, the notion of the infinite possibilities of meaning places him much closer 
to Bakhtin's (1981) philosophical position. Bakhtin (1984) would also emphasize that whatever 
meaning is arrived at through dialogue this meaning cannot be absolute and finite. Ideological 
monologism can be kept at bay only by a critical hermeneutics that prizes dialogue over absolute 
knowledge (Gal-diner, 1992). ,, ". 
Summary of the Literature Review and Context 
The study began with a review of the context of moral development research. Studies showing 
that women and people from non-Westem cultures do not attain the highest stage of moral 
thought, were reviewed and critiqued. It was shown that traditional approaches to morality 
restrict the moral domain to that which includes only justice concems. Altemative conceptions 
of the moral are either ignored or considered irrelevant to ethical decision-making. It was also 
shown that these approaches are rooted in Westem philosophical assumptions about personhood. 
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The rest of the world does not necessarily share these assumptions. To understand other cultures' 
conceptions of morality, an analysis of their philosophical assumptions about personhood and the 
nature of the world in general should be undertaken. An overview of traditional African 
approaches to personhood showed that they regard selfhood as rooted in community. Moral and 
ethical implications of this conception of selves were discussed. 
Using Bakhtin's (1981) theory of dialogism, it was argued that the individualism-collectivism 
antinomy can be breached by tuming our attention to the processes by means of which the voices 
emanating from the social world get transformed through mediation to become part of an 
individual's functioning . Hemleneutic responses to the problem of moral relativism were then 
discussed. The present study seeks to identify understandings of morality among isiZulu 
speaking South Africans. It also attempts to illuminate the relationship between gender and 
power in moral decision-making. 






This chapter describes the method adopted in the study. It begins with a brief evaluation 
of traditional and hermeneutic methods that have been used to study moral development. 
The voice-centred, relational interview procedure, used for data collection and analysis in 
this study, is then presented. This method draws from a number of theoretical positions, 
such as the philosophical works of Dilthey (1979) and Ricouer (1979), both of whom 
contributed enormously toward the development of a methodology that is appropriate for 
understanding lived as~~cts of human experience. Recently, the method has been 
enriched with concepts drawn from the literary writings of Bakhtin (1981), especially his 
notion of dialogism and voice (Brown & Gilligan, 1991). Having discussed how the 
method was applied, the present chapter addresses questions of reliability and validity in 
qualitative research. Finally, ethical considerations are discussed. 
Methods in Moral Development Research: An Overview 
Until recently, the most commonly used method in moral development research is the one 
originally developed by Kohlberg (e.g. Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, 1987b). This method 
reI ies 011 using hypothetical moral dilemmas developed by the researcher. In order to 
provide a background to the voice-centred, relational method (referred to hereafter as the 
Relational Method), cognitive-developmental approaches to moral development research 
are discussed . The purpose is to show that, owing to their reliance on hypothetical moral 
dilemmas, these approaches are inappropriate to the study of experience-based moral 
phenomena. It is argued that the Relational Method is best suited to the study of situated 
understandings of morality because dilemmas are elicited from participants, rather than 
presented by researchers. This is particularly important when investigating moral 
experiences of a people whose voices have been hithelio largely excluded from social 
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science research (Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Verhoef & Michel, 1997). While the Relational 
Method may be relevant for studying real life moral dilemmas, the question of its 
appropriateness, in comparison to other hermeneutic-grounded methodologies (e.g. 
Packer, 1985), remains unanswered. Brief comparisons are drawn between the Relational 
Method and Packer's (1985) hermeneutic method. The latter is based on an analysis of 
real life interactions between actors. It is argued that the Relational Method is more 
appropriate because dilemmas are not defined or contrived in advance by the researcher. 
They are elicited from participants' experiences. 
Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmental Method 
Kohlberg's method relied on the use ofa standard set of hypothetical moral dilenunas 
(Kob lberg, 1984; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1984). These dilemmas are posed to respondents, 
followed by probing questions. The most famous of these is the Heinz dilemma (Nisan & 
Kohlberg, 1984). Heinz ' s wife is sick ~ith a rare fonn of cancer. A dmggist has 
discovered a cure, but is charging an amount ten times what it cost to make the dmg. The 
druggist refuses to sell the drug to Heinz at a reduced cost. Having presented hypothetical 
dilemmas to subjects, Kohlberg followed up with probing questions. An example is 
whether Heinz should steal the dmg to save his wife's life? Participants' responses are 
then allocated a rating that places them in the preconventional, the conventional, or the 
postconventional mode of moral thought. 
While Kohlberg deserves credit for almost single-handedly bringing the study of moral 
development to the forefront in psychology, his reliance on hypothetical scenarios makes 
it difficult to understand real life dilemmas, a major objective of the present study. The 
grounding of his approach in the Kantian tradition of the epistemic subject makes it 
difficult to apply in communities with a different, especially communal, orientation to 
life. Gilligan (1982) and Hekman (1995) have argued that morality and self are 
intertwined. There is no place for different conceptions of selves in Kohlberg's scheme. It 
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is perhaps not surprising that those who define the self mainly in relational tenns, such as 
women (BeJenky et a!. , 1986; Gilligan, 1977, 1982) and indigenous communities 
(lkuenobe, 1998, Ogbonnaya, 1994) have been found morally wanting in Kohlberg's 
scheme. Further, Kohlberg's emphasis onjustice reasoning narrowed the domain of the 
monll considerably (Benhabib, 1992). The purpose of this study was to investigate 
participants ' own definitions and meanings of morality, with a view to identifying 
l11 arginali zed moral voices. This requires a methodology that is sensitive to embodied 
beings, speaking about their dilemmas, within social and cultural contexts. Henneneutic 
approaches are most suited to the study of situated, real life phenomena. 
The next section discusses the hel1l1eneutic methodology developed by Packer (1985). 
This method is based on the analysis of interactions between actors in a real life, 
cont1i ctual situation. 
The "Ready-to-Hand" Method 
Packer (1 985, \989) has developed a hermeneutic methodology for studying moral 
reasoning. This method is based on Heidegger's (1962) three modes of engagement with 
the world: the rea(~)l-to-hand, the unready-to-hand, and the present-at-hand. The ready -
to-hond Ill ode reflects our day-to-day engagement with the world. We engage in this 
mode automatically, without deliberation. It involves activities such as talking to friends, 
Ll sing a too l sLlch as a hammer, or driving a car. These skills are so over-practised that we 
are not full y conscious that we are using them. In fact, our ability to successfully carry 
out these activities depends on our non-awareness of them. Our performance is likely to 
be compromised if we consciously focus on them (e.g. focusing on shifting gears and 
engaging the clutch while driving a car, is likely to compromise one's performance). 
We enter the ul1rea(~)l-to-hal1d mode when we confront a problem, which results in a 
breakdo vm in ollr everyday practical activities. For example, in attempting to use a 
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hammer, we realise it is too heavy. Its weight now comes to the fore, whilst previously it 
was transparent. Even then, it is not the actual weight (e.g. so many kg's) of the hammer 
that is important, but the fact that one Calliot use it to accomplish a particular task 
(Packer, 1985). Thus, an aspect of the hammer stands out against the background, which 
is the activity we are trying to accomplish. 
The present-at-hand mode occurs when we detach ourselves from what is happening, in 
order to reflect theoretically on it. Logical analysis and calculation are engaged to solve 
the problem. For example, in the case of using a hammer, we begin to think about it as an 
object with weight and mass, independently of the situation (Packer, 1985). 
Packer (1985) argued that the ready-to-hand mode provides the most direct access to 
human phenomena, because it involves practical everyday activity, free from theoretical 
reflection. Based on this mode, he has developed a methodology for studying moral 
conflicts arising from social interaction. He begins by video-recording conversations 
between participants in a conflictual social interaction (e.g. the Prisoners' Dilemma 
Game) (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). This is followed by the analysis of video recordings . 
Valuative and moral positions, such as talk about trust and responsibility, are identified 
as they emerge from conversations between paliicipants. This method differs from 
Kohlberg's . Categories of moral experience aloe not fixed a priori: they are developed 
from the interaction itself. 
Although this method is concerned with lived experience, it differs from the one adopted 
in the present study. The major difference is that the ready-to-hand method relies on 
situations contrived and structured by the researcher, such as the Prisoners' Dilemma 
game. As a result, the range and depth of moral dilemmas that emerge aloe limited. 
Although narratives do not capture dimensions oflived experience in the same way that 
video-recordings do, they nevertheless render important information on how individuals 
refl ect on their experiences. Further, it could be argued that for moral and ethical 
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purposes, it is how individuals reflect on what they have done - the lessons leamt for 
future purposes - that is important. If one assumes that morality is about an understanding 
of individuals' own understandings of their lived experiences, then there is scope for 
interpreting narratives of real-life experience (Tappan, 1990). Interviews enable the 
researcher to inquire deeply into social and cultural influences which underpin moral-
decision-making, one of the main objectives of the study. The multiple readings 
undertaken in the voice-centred, relational method facilitate identification of these 
infl uences. 
The Voice-centred Relational Method: The Background 
[n this study, data collection and analysis were guided by the voice-centred relational 
method, originally developed by Brown, Gilligan and their colleagues (Brown, Debold, 
Tappan, & Gil1igan, 199]; Brown & Gilligan, 1991; Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller, & 
Argyris, 1989; Gilligan et al., 1990). The method was developed to study the relationship 
between voices of justice and care in girls' and women's nalTatives of moral conflict. 
Others have si nee adapted it to investigate various aspects of moral development 
(Tappan , 1990, 1997b), childhood trauma (Geismar, 1996), motherhood and postnatal 
depression, and how heterosexual couples share housework and childcare responsibilities 
(Mauthner & Doucet, 1998). 
How does one conduct research using the Relational Method? To begin with, participants 
are invited to tell a story involving a moral conflict or uncertainty in their lives. The 
intention, according to Gilligan et a1. (1990) , is "to provide a way for a reader to tune his 
or her ear to the voice of Cl person telling Cl story about moral conflict and to listen for 
voices of justice and care" (p. 94, emphasis added). The emphasis on attending to other 
peopl e by li stening to them is important in the study of those whose perspectives do not 
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form part of mai nstream academic discourse. In listening to others, we affilID them as 
human beings. 
The method is said to be "relational" because the act of telling a story implies an 
audience. Further, as we listen to another's story, we can no longer claim to be neutral 
observers. However, we are moved or affected by their sufferings, SOlTOWS, joys and 
ach i evelllents. Gi I ligan et al. (1990) have reflected on the shortcomings of methods that 
favour sight and vision for interpretation. These methods encourage objectivity and 
atemporality. In using the metaphor of voice and hearing, the Relational Method on the 
other hand draws our atJ~ntion to human connection. It brings to the fore the various 
possibilities that can occur in a conversation with another. These include the potential for 
misunderstanding, mistranslation, disagreement and even indifference to another's speech 
or plight (Gilligan et al., 1990). 
Connection with another's experience is perhaps best exemplified by Sampson's (1998) 
reflection on his reactions upon visiting Yad Vashem, a Jewish holocaust museum in 
[srael. Upon seeing carved on the wall the faces of children who had perished, and 
hearing the sounds of moaning voices, his first reaction was to flee. He wanted to get out 
of the place as fast as he could. It was only later, and upon further reflection, that he 
reali zed he was upset because he was reluctant to connect with the pain and suffering the 
children had endured. In other words, he was reluctant to understand the children's plight 
on their own te1l11S : pain and suffering. In the Relational Method, the interviewer tries to 
connect with narrators, in an attempt to understand them on their own terms. However, it 
.is recognized that in listening to and interpreting others' stories, we are influenced by 
values and assumptions of our own interpretive communities (Tappan & Brown, 1992). 
Immersion in interpretive conu11l111ities is taken cognizance of by the metaphor of 
listening. Listening allows for the possibility ofmisconununication or misunderstanding 
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arising from one's listening style, preconceived assumptions, and values (Gilligan et aI., 
1990). 
A question may be asked: why use stories? Story-telling as a research method finds 
support in the observation that nalTative is an important medium by which people make 
sense of their lives (Dunne, 1995; Polkinghome, 1988; Sarbin, 1986). Story-telling is also 
supported by Bruner (1990), Freeman (1997) and Mishler (1986), who argued that it is 
not only part and parcel of everyday conversation: interviewees almost exclusively 
respond to questions with nan-atives whenever an opportunity is given. Furthermore, in 
the process of storytelling, an opportunity is created for dialogue or engagement in the 
; .. 
form of questions, requests for clarification, and even disagreement. White (1981) argued 
that narrative not only lists a sequence of events coherently; it also endows them with a 
moral point of view. Storytelling is also consistent with the African oral tradition 
(Verhoef & Michel, 1997). As a result, participants are less likely to feel alienated by an 
invitation to tell a story. This shuuld lead, one may assume, to a better exposition of their 
voices or positions, given that they are responding in a medium that suits them better. 
Using narratives is also advantageous because they provide a fruitful avenue for studying 
human experience in its historical and cultural context, space and time. A story is always 
told from the standpoint of the nalTator, rather than the researcher (Gilligan et aI., 1990). 
This is important because nalTatives of moral development have been told mainly from 
the Western , male perspective (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan et aI., 1990; Simpson, 1974). The 
Relatiollal Method concentrates on practical, lived aspects of moral functioning, rather 
than abstract hypothetical dilemmas (Tappan, 1990). It attempts to highlight moral 
concerns as they emerge in people's nalTatives. Tensions and contradictions conveyed in 
people's stories are also noted. Unlike methods that use hypothetical dilemmas or 
situations contrived by the researcher, the Relational Method focuses on participants' 
dilemmas as they have occurred in social and cultural contexts. This makes it appropriate 
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for investigating culturally embedded constructions of moral experience (Brown & 
Gi Iligan, 1991; Tappan & Brown, 1992). 
Another advantage of the Relational Method is that, built into the analysis, is an attempt 
to consider people's stories from many perspectives. Analysis involves reading a person's 
narrative fOllr times, listening for different voices about relationships as these voices 
emerge in that person's nanative. The purpose is to explore the many positions from 
which stories can be told . Gilligan et af. (1990) conceived of the reading process as 
"looking through a different interpretive lens, each lens bring[ing] into focus different 
aspects of the narrative.". (p. 99). Consider a nanative involving, for argument's sake, a 
woman who is positioned as inferior or powerless in her marriage. If interviewed, she 
may espouse a position that is consistent with traditional beliefs about women. She may 
even appear indecisive when asked about personal decision-making. Looking at her life 
with only one interpretive lens, powerlessness and indecisiveness come to the fore. 
However, when one approaches the interview from a different angle, one may learn that 
the woman has managed to raise her children through sacrifice, dedication and hard-
work. if tlli s was done under restrictive Apartheid conditions (if she is Black and lived in 
SOLI th Africa prior to 1994) and gender restrictions imposed by cultural norms, one can 
appreciate her efforts even more. The image of a powerless woman now shifts to the 
background, and a picture of a strong willed person emerges. If the researcher adopts 
another lens, let us say an "integrative" one, it would perhaps become clear that her 
indecisiveness, apart from being an indication of powerlessness, might be based on a 
model of decision-making that is communal, rather than individualistic (Gasa, 1999). By 
approaching her story from as many view-points as possible, the interpreter is now in a 
better position to elucidate meanings or voices that would have remained hidden, had 
only one interpretive lens been used. Application of the four readings to the present study 
is discussed below. 
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Theoretical Bases of the Method 
I have emphasized that the Relational Method facilitates incorporation of African 
perspectives in theorizing the meaning of morality. Why is this the case? I shall argue 
below that this is because it is essentially rooted in hem1eneutics, a discipline concemed 
\",ith meaning and interpretation. The method is indebted to the henneneutic philosophies 
ofDilthey (1979) and Ricouer (1979). Both philosophers worked toward developing a 
methodology with which to study practical human experiences and meanings, without 
having to resort to what they considered the "alienating objectivity" associated with 
natural scientific methods of inquiry. In the sections that follow, my intention is not to 
: .. 
['ully explicate the theoretical positions of Dilthey and Ricouer, rather it is to situate the 
method within a discipline concemed with human meanings. I shall also argue, albeit 
bri efl y, that tbe method's emphasis on polyphony and voice makes it theoretically 
consistent with the dialogical conception of selves. 
Influences of Henneneutic Philosophy 
Dilthey (1979) and Ricouer (1979) were concemed with developing a research 
methodology that captures the meaningfulness of human experience, what Heidegger 
(1962) called the "life-world" (Lebenswelt). Dilthey's greatest contribution to the 
hermeneutic method was his notion ofthe hel111eneutic circle: in order to understand 
complex human phenomena, one must enter into a special kind of relationship with a 
person's experience. This involves an attempt to understand paris of the experience in 
terms of the whole, which in tum informs the understanding of the parts. For interpretive 
purposes , human experience must be moved from the realm of lived experience and must 
be captured symbolically in some way. Dilthey (1979) used the tem1 "expression" to 
indicate human experiences that have been captured symbolically (Tappan, 1990). 
Human experiences or actions can be expressed tlu'ough spoken or written language, and 
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other fon11s of communication, such as music, poetry and stories. In the study of moral 
conflicts, lived experience is expressed in the nalTatives or stories people tell (Tappan, 
1990). 
The Relational Method allows one to enter into a henneneutic circle when interpreting 
narratives of moral experience. One begins with an analysis of the constituent parts of the 
interview (Readings 1 - 4). As one moves from one reading to another, a fuller picture of 
respondents' moral dilemmas, including social and other influences, begins to emerge. 
The readings are interdependent, rather than sequential. The way respondents speak about 
themselves (Reading 2), CalU10t be understood independently of their relationships with 
:.- ' 
characters in the story (Reading 3: Self-in-relation). The position that the "I" takes is 
always in relation to other actors. For example, a nan-ator may express self-doubt or 
helplessness in relation to someone seen as more powerful. Relationships with others are 
themselves rooted in socio-cultural institutions and beliefs, such as family values and 
gender beliefs, which prescribe ways of relating to another person, given one's position. 
SOcio-cllltural institutions in turn reinforce and perpetuate ways of speaking about oneself 
(Reading 2) . The circular nature of this process means that interview parts CalU10t be 
understood independently of the nan-ative as a whole, including its context (Brown et al., 
1989; Tappan, 1990). 
Although lived experience could be studied through stories and other modes of human 
expression, studying it objectively, without losing its meaningfulness, remained a 
paradox. The paradox for Dilthey (1979) and Gadamer (1975) was that an attempt to 
objectively study, and hence an-ive at theoretical explanations about human phenomena in 
general, would alienate (distance) them from the realm of lived experience. Ricouer's 
(1979) major methodological contribution was in showing that objectivity in the humal1 
sciences need not subscribe to the natural scientific notion of a detached scientist. Unlike 
rOllndationalists (e.g. Hirsch, 1967), who argued that interpretation and objectivity reside 
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in the recreation of the original meanings of the author, Ricouer (1979), like Fish (1980, 
1986), maintained that meaning is not fixed by authorial intent. The implication is that 
the quest for objectivity in the human sciences can no longer be limited to a re-discovery 
of the original meanings of the author or actor. On the contrary, objectivity is arrived at 
C0I11111111Iicofivc/v. It results from an intersubjective process by which interpreters enter 
into dialogue about human action, taking into account history, context, and time. Ricouer 
( 1979) called this process distanciation. 
The notion of distanciation implies that when studying morality, researchers need to 
appreciate that their res.~arch methodologies and conceptual categories are not value-free. 
These reflect values and assumptions of interpretive cOlm1lUnities that have produced 
them. Consequently, it is imperative to stand back and reflect on the values and 
assumptions underpim1ing one's practice. As shown in Chapter 5, this involves a critical, 
dialogicaJ encounter with others' interpretive perspectives. The Relational Method 
facilitates this process by recommending that nan-atives of moral choice be read several 
times, from many vantage points. 
The Relational Method and Bakhtin's Dialogism 
The Relational method is also consistent with the dialogical conception of selves. This 
finds support in the argument that the challenge facing psychologists extends beyond 
issues of group differences to a critical consideration of positions from which our 
theoretical observations are made (Gilligan et aI., 1990). This can be done by addressing 
questions such as: Who is observing whom in the social sciences? In whose terms and 
/lIter cs t are these observations made? Does the researcher speak with, or about, 
participants? Whose story is being told, and under what social and cultural 
circumstances? (See Brown & Gilligan, 1991). The list of questions is endless. As we 
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pose these questions, our attention'is drawn to power dimensions inherent in the act of 
speaking (Bakhtin, 1981), By attending to these questions, we begin to engage 
meaningfully wi~h speech genres and sodallanguages ventriloquated in individuals' talk. 
Furthermore, dialogisl1l's cognizance of the co-existence of multiple voices facilitates 
incorporation of African perspectives as partners ofWeste111 voices, without falling 
victim to "either-or" explanations. 
Having discussed the origins of the Relational Method, and its relevance to the African 
context, the question of its application in the present study will be addressed. First, the 
pi lot study wi 11 be described, followed by the main study. 
Testing the Feasibility of the Relational Method 
Pilot interviews were conducted using an isiZulu version of Brown et a!. 's (1989) Real 
Life Conflict and Choice Interview (Table 2. See Appendix 1 for isiZulu version). The 
advantage of a semi-structured interview is that, while it allows respondents to provide 
complex real life narTatives, a degree of structure is retained to give direction to the 
process. It also allows the researcher to probe for clarification at different stages, 
whenever necessary. The purpose is not to extract info1111ation from interviewees, but to 
arrive at a shared understanding of how interviewees experience aspects of their own 
lives. The understarlding is a shar-ed one, in acknowledgement that interviewers 
participate in the process of generating meaning (Franklin, 1997). 
Piloting and Adaptation 
The author, with the assistance of a postgraduate student in Clinical Psychology, 
translated the Interview Guide into isiZulu. Translation focused on meaning, rather than 
linguistic equivalence between words . Particular attention was paid to the difficulty of 
conveying the concept of morality in an Nguni language. This was important because 
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there is no single word that neatly translates into "morality" in Nguni. Furthem10re, 
regional differences in language usage are common. Code-switching, a COlll110n 
phenomenon among bilingual Black South Africans, exacerbated these differences. The 
purpose of the translation was to facilitate understanding, rather than to produce an 
"instrument" that was "psychometrically equivalent" to the original English version. 
Table 2. The Real Life Conflict and Choice Interview 
Introductory paragraph: Thank you for agreeing to this interview. As human beings, we are all now and 
then faced with situations in which we have to make decisions . This may emanate from our work, family 
situations, relationships, or other aspects of our lives. However, sometimes we may not be sure what to do. 
Could you please describe ,ts"ituation in which you faced a moral conflict and you had to make a decision, 
but we re not sure what to do? If you want to, take some time to think about the situation, and tell me when 
you are ready. (Follow up with probes): 
I. \Vhat was the situation'? (get full elaboration of story) 
2. What was the conflict in this situation? Why was it a conflict? 
3. In thinking about what to do, what did you consider? Why? Is there anything else you considered? 
4. What did you eventually decide to do? (Explore the short term, long-term consequences of acting 
this way or that way, if not covered in above) 
5. Do you think it was the right thing to do? WhylWhy not? 
(l. What was at stake for you in this dilenmla? What was at stake for others? What was at stake in 
genera]'! What effect could/did the decision have on you as a person? 
7. How did you feel about it? How did you feel about the others involved? Who came to your 
support at the time? How did you manage the conflict? 
8. Is there another way to see the problem, other than the one you have described? 
9. Consider the way you acted. What does it tell us about you as a person (or, a person who is 
_____ . E.g., leader, woman, etc., depending on respondent's position) 
10. When you think back over the conflict you described, do you think you learned anything from it? 
I I . Suppose you were to face a similar situation in the future, would you still act the way you did? 
Why/Why not? Suppose the situation involved someone else (or another group), and not the 
person (group) you described. Would you still act the way you did? (exploring boundaries of 
mora lity) 
12 . Do YO ll consider the situation you described a moral problem? Why/Why not? 
What does morality mean for you? What makes something a moral problem? 
13. How does a person come to be a moral being? (Explore the role of family, ancestors, religion, and 
conulllll1ity in becoming a moral being, if these not volunteered spontaneously). 
(Adapted from Brown et a/. , 1989) 
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One of the major concerns at this stage was whether the questions would make sense to 
respondents who were not used to f01111al interviews, such as those with lower levels of 
ed ucation. J n order to address this concern, the pilot study included participants of a 
lower level of education, whose daily engagements required little or no communication in 
English. 
Six participants took part in the pilot study. Three of them (two females and one male) 
were employed as general workers (cleaners) by the local university. They ranged in age 
from 25 to 40. The highest level of education attained among them was Standard 6 
(Grade 8). The remaining three were a female lecturer, a male lecturer, and a female 
postgraciuate student in ~sychology (age range: 24-45). All respondents were Nguni-
speakers (Five isiZulu-speaking, and one isiXhosa-speaking). Interviews were conducted 
in isiZuLII , although in interviewing the latter three, English words were occasionally used 
together with isiZulu equivalents. This practice is consistent with the way African 
languages are spoken by most bilingual and multilingual youth and adults in South 
Africa . This phenomenon, known as code-switching, is well documented in the relevant 
literature (Kieswetter, 1995; Kunene, 1996). 
Using an open-ended, semi-structured interview protocol as a guide (Table 2), 
participants were invited to tell a story involving a moral dilemma they had faced in their 
lives. The interviewer followed up with probing questions for clarification. 
Contrary to my fears, the pilot study, including the interviews with general workers, 
proceeded without major difficulties. A few adaptations were necessary, however. Once 
the introductory paragraph of Table 2 had been read, a number of participants requested 
time to think about a relevant story. I therefore decided to include a sentence reassuring 
respondents tbat they could take time to think of a story, if they so wished. Three 
questions were added to the original Interview Schedule. These were Questions 9, 11 and 
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13. It was observed that some respondents reacted with surprise that some questions were 
asked at all. These respondents thought that some of the questions asked were about what 
they regarded as given, something that was understood by all. This was often the case 
with the question about why people should look after their (extended) families. Usually 
the response would be a counter-question such as: what kind of person does not honour 
tbe obligation to look after relatives? Such a response hints at respondents' understanding 
of what it means to be a person. Consequently, Question 9 was added, explicitly asking 
what the respondents learnt about themselves, given the way they responded to the moral 
dilemmas. Question 11 was added to explore how respondents would resolve a similar 
dilemma in the future, adding a time dimension to the conflict. Finally, Question l3 asked 
respondents to explain how a person comes to be a moral being. In particular, the role of 
{am i~)l. commul1 fly and religious beliefs in the process of moral becoming were explored. 
The Main Study 
The following section describes the main study. Sampling, procedure, research design, 
and anaJysis are discussed, as are matters of reliability, validity and ethical 
considerations. 
Participants 
Participants for this study were drawn from urban and rural areas in the province of 
](waZulu-Natal. Sampling was of the nonprobability,purposive type (Maxwell, 1998; 
Miles & Hubem1aI1, 1994; Patton, 1990). In purposive sampling, the researcher is driven 
by the need to select infonnation-rich cases which are then studied in depth. For the 
purposes of thi s study, participants in influential positions in their communities were 
icientified (e.g. professionals, town councilors, elders, community and youth leaders). 
These participants were chosen because, by viliue of their responsibilities, they were 
likely to be challenged to make decisions impacting on others' lives. SaInpling was also 
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influenced by the need to identify individuals representing predominantly traditional and 
urban ways of life. The choice of older people and people in influential positions was 
th earv driven. Traditional African views on morality and personhood emphasise the role 
played by elders in modelling morally-acceptable behaviour. Fmihelmore, elders are 
regarded as repositories of cultural knowledge, and often serve as "community 
coullse lors." They are consulted for advice and resolution of disputes between community 
members. They are thus a crucial source of information. 
Experiences of people in influential positions (e.g. professionals) are likely to be different 
from experiences of those occupying less influential positions (e.g. general workers). For 
;~ .. 
example, the former probably exercise more power, and are more independent in their 
work, than me the latter. Both Maxwell (1998) and Miles and Huberman (1994) 
emphasise the need to look at similar and contrasting cases in order to test the robustness 
of a theory or findings (maximum variation sampling). For this reason, the sample 
included younger and older participants of both genders. Among respondents were 
professionals , general workers, students and scholars and the unemployed. 
Participants were identified through already existing networks between the university and 
surrounding communities. Members of staff in the university were approached to help 
identify key infol111ants they had come to know through their community outreach 
programmes. Once interviewed, infOlmants were asked to identify others who could 
provide valuable infOlmation, a procedure known as snowball sampling (Miles & 
Hubennan, 1994; Patton, 1990). Sampling proceeded until redundancy of information 
was achi eved (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
The demographics of the sample are shown in Table 3. The sample consisted of 52 
participants. Of these, 29 (55 .8%) were females, and the remaining 23 (44.2%) were 
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males . There were 48 isiZulu speakers, three isiXhosa speakers, and one respondent of 
Tswana origin. IsiZulu and isiXhosa belong in one language group (isiNguni). The 
Tswana responde~lt was fluent in isiZulu. A total of24 respondents (46.2%) were from 
predominantly rural backgrounds, while the remaining 28 (53.8%) were from 
predominantly urban areas. In the South African context, it is sometimes difficult to make 
distinctions between rural and urban dwellers. During the Apartheid era, it was common 
for many B lacks to have two residential areas (one closer to the cities, for work purposes, 
and the other in a rural areas where they were supposed to be pennanently domiciled). As 
a result, all "urban" respondents spent parts oftheir lives in rural areas, but had 
subsequently come to settle pemlanently in urban areas. Similarly, "rural" respondents 
spent some time in urban areas but considered themselves pennanently settled in rural 
areas . The urban sample was highly educated compared to the rural sample. It consisted 
of professionals including psychologists, university lecturers, social workers, lawyers, 
students and a few unemployed men and women. The rural sample had a few 
professionals (mainly teachers), students, and older men and women. 
Table 3. The Demographics of the Sample 
Men 
5 professionals 









2 professionals (teachers) 
2 unemployed elders 




2 professionals: teacher & 
a high school matron 
2 unemployed elders 
2 general workers 
7 students/scholars 
- - . ~ ...... 
Procedure 
Appointments were scheduled telephonically or through home visits. Wherever possible, 
participants were interviewed in their offices or residences, in an effort to minimize 
power differences between them and myself. The study was introduced as an attempt to 
understand people's experiences of real life moral dilemmas. Participants' concems and 
questions about the study were addressed at this stage. The researcher conducted all 
interviev,'s. They were tape-recorded with participants' pennission. As recommended by 
Brown et al. (1989), interviewees' judgments about situations were followed up with 
probing questions. Attention was paid to language indicative of moral injunctions, such 
as the lIse of ought statelilents. Respondents were probed in particular about significant 
others, reaJ or imaginal, who had a bearing on their decision-making in the face of a 
moral ciilem.tlla. 
Sometimes participants used idiomatic language to describe experiences of moral 
conflict. While this added depth to emerging meanings, it was important to double-check 
that my understanding of idioms co-incided with their correct meaning as used by the 
participants. This was achieved by giving a verbal summary, and checking ifit was 
consistent with participants' meaning. 
Interviews varied in duration from 45 to 75 minutes. Interviews with older respondents 
took more time, as cultural mles of etiquette had to be observed. An attempt was made to 
transcribe interviews within two days after they were conducted. UnfOlilmately, this was 
not always possible, due to the timing of appointments. Where this was achieved, I added 
my impressions of what was happening at various stages of the interview while the 
encounter was still fresh in memory. Personal impressions were put in parentheses. After 
each interview had been transcribed, a contact summary sheet (Miles & Hubennan, 1994) 
was completed, noting main concepts, themes, issues and hunches that emerged 
(Appenciix 2). Responses that called for further clarification from respondents were noted 
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in the contact summary sheet. Where it was possible and necessary, brief follow up 
appointments of about 15 - 30 minutes were made with respondents to clarify issues 
identified during the transcribing phase. Ten follow-up interviews were conducted. 
Research Design 
Research des ign is conceived differently in qualitative research as opposed to quantitative 
research. Maxwell (1996, 1998) has argued that design can be regarded as a coherence 
between various components of a study, namely the way these components are related to 
one another. Although similar models of qualitative research designs have been discussed 
(e.g . .I anesick, 1994; p'atton, 1990), this study relied mostly on Maxwell ' s because he has 
cl earl y articu tated the relationships between various components of a study. He has 
devel oped an interactive model of research design, consisting of five main components: 
purposes of a study, its conceptual context, research questions, methods employed and 
validity considerations. 
The purpose of a study is its ultimate goal, what it intends to illuminate. It incorporates 
the practices the study seeks to influence. The conceptual context refers to its theoretical 
background, sllch as preliminary work in the field . It incorporates researchers' 
observations and experiences. Research questions address specific issues the researcher 
seeks to understand by conducting the study. Methods refer to techniques used to collect 
and analyse data. Finally, validity explores altemative explanations of findings as well as 
potential threats to the validity of conclusions (Maxwell, 1996, 1998). The extent to 
which these five components are related to each other, constitutes the design of the study. 
The purpose of the cllnent study was to investigate the meaning of morality in a sample 
of Black A I'rican, isiZulu speakers. Figure 2 illustrates the design of the study, with 
reference to the components discllssed above. 
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Figure 2. The Design of the Study 
Purposes 
• To identify the meaning of morality for 
isiZlI lll speakers 
• To identify social factors influencing moral 
decision-making 
• To determine the implications for ethical 
prac\ ice in clinical, research and other 
contex ts 
To enrich our understanding of moral 
reasoning by identifying marginalized moral 
voices and by elucidating the relationship 
between differing moral perspectives 
Conceptual Context 
• The cognitive-developmental approaches 
to moral reasoning 
• Indigenous approaches to psychology 
and African philosophy 
• African conceptions of the self 
• The individualism-collectivism debate 
• 
• 
Hermeneutics and dialogism 
Ongoing research and debates on local 
ethical understandings 
Research Questions 
• What is the meaning of morality for isiZulu speakers? 
• 1-:1 ow are these meanings related to concepts of personhood or the self? 
• How do family and community values influence moral decision-making? 
• What is the interface between gender and power in moral decision-making? 
/ 
Method 
• The "Guide-ta-Listening" Method 
Piloting and adaptation 
lnterviewer experience in clinical 
interview procedures 
Process: Respect and sensitivity to 
participants ' cultural traditions 
Analysis 
Validity 




Testing of emerging trends against rival 
theoretical positions 
Interviews recorded and transcripts read 
while listening to tapes 
Member validation 
Analysis followed the Relational Method (Brown et aI. , 1989; Brown & Gilligan, 1991; 
Gilligan et aI., 1990; Mautlmer & Doucet, 1998; Tappan & Brown, 1992). The method is 
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dialectical: interpreters continually reflect on their own values and assumptions, as they 
try to understand the meaning of human expelience (Tappan & Brown, 1992). Tllis is in 
recognition that interpretation is influenced by interpreters' relational and social contexts, 
including their theoretical backgrounds. The same as interpreters do, narrators also bring 
to bear their own horizons of understanding when telling stories. Interpretation occurs at 
the point of contact between these two horizons. It is important to address power and 
authority issues in analyzing interviews, especially given histOlical imbalances which 
have been associated with horizons of understanding in academic discourse. Therefore, 
the reader or interpreter should reflect on the values and assumptions which might 
condition his or her understanding of the text. Similarly, the horizons of understanding 
which respondents use ~.o.justify their narrative positions should be critically evaluated. 
The dialectical nature of the reading process is illustrated in Figure 3. Bi-directional 
arrows point at the interdependent nature of the four readings . 
Figure 3. The Dialectical Nature of the Reading Process 
The background life world of 
the researcher 
The researcher's interpretive 
strategies influenced -..--+ 
by the values of his or her 
interpretive community. These 
values influence researcher during 
interpretation process. 
The Sphere of Interpretation 




Reading 3 ... ~ Reading 4 Self-in-Relation Socio-Cultural 
Context 
Reading process characterized by resistance 
~
T T T 
Emerging meanings and trends 
Background life world 
of the narrator 
Narrator tells story from his or 
.. her vantage position. She or he 
brings in her or his own values 
and assumptions, __ ~~' - -' 
Lnterpretation began with this dialectical process in mind. It should be noted, however, 
that from the begimling of the study, field notes and contact summary sheets had been 
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made (Appendix 3). These f011n part of the analysis. FUliher, begilUling in the early 
stages, brief memos were written on cards, spelling out hunches, concepts and themes as 
they emerged (Miles & Hubel111an, 1994). The writing of memos continued during the 
read i ng process described below. As the reading progressed, the relationship between 
emerging concepts became focused, thus speeding up the writing of memos. 
Reading I: The Plot 
The purpose of the first reading is to identify main events and protagonists in a story. The 
reading attends to the story in general: it seeks to identify conflicts involved in the 
narrative. The research'er highlights the metaphors, images, repeated words, themes and 
idiomatic expressions used by respondents to talk about their moral experiences. 
Contrad ictions and inconsistencies in their narrative positions are also noted. Attention is 
also paid to extra-linguistic cues, with a view to understanding how the nalTators 
experienced the conflict (Brown & Gilligan, 1991; Gilligan et af., 1990; Mauthner & 
DOLlcet, 1998). 
Practically, how was this process accomplished? Using a coloured pen, the researcher 
highlighted metaphors, repeated words, idiomatic expressions, and other aspects as 
mentioned above. For example, a naITator might use the metaphor of heaviness 
(/nva!cullzimu!) to indicate that the situation was emotionally stressful. The word 
"heaviness" was highlighted whenever it occurred in the story. Marginal notes and 
comments were also entered on the transcripts. As recommended by Gilligan and her 
colleagues, J also listened to the original tapes as I was reading. Paying attention to extra-
linguistic cues captured the emotional tone of each story. For eXaI11ple, one respondent 
exclaimed "kwokulIzima!" (literally, "it was heavy!"), followed by heavy sighs. These 
extra-verbal cues support the fact that the experience was emotionally stressful. A 
worksheet was completed after each reading, capturing conflicts, contradictions and 
themes that emerged (Appendix 4). 
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This reading also involves a critical reflection on one's privileged position in listening to 
others ' narratives . Readers attend to their thoughts and feelings, including how they relate 
with narrators and their nalTatives. Attempts are made to take into account biases that 
might be the result of personal interests and social position, such as race and class 
(8ro\;>,' I1. 19()4). One of my concems during this stage was that as a Black African, I have 
['01' ,\ IOl1g time been uncomfortable with the individualistic bias of mainstream academic 
psychology. This is at variance with the communal orientation of many African cultures. 
This may have led me to be biased in favour of instances confirming communalism, 
while ignoring examples of individualism. For this reason, it was important to constantly 
reflect on my ideas, vallles and assumptions, as I read the interviews (Brown, 1994). 
Even with the personal reflection mentioned above, biases remain a possibility. In order 
to get a different perspective, a colleague was requested to independently read the first 
five interviews. She was asked because she was familiar with the Relational Method, as 
we had previously used it to study ethical dilemmas in the nursing profession (Gambu & 
Mkhize, 2000). Having read the five interviews, we compared notes, worksheets and 
themes. This broadened our perspectives by highlighting issues that had escaped our 
attentioll. We followed this by reading another five interviews independently, and 
compared OLlr notes again. The preliminary concepts and themes that guided the reading 
of the remaining interviews were derived from this joint process. Although it would have 
been preferable to read and discuss all interviews jointly, her work commitments and the 
lengthy nature of the reading process ruled this out. 
Reading 2: The Voice of the Speaking Person 
The second reading followed the one described by Brown and Gilligan (1991) and 
Mauthner and Doucet (1998). The purpose is to read for the active self, telling a story in a 
drama in which he or she is an actor (Brown et al., 1989). The listener traces voices of the 
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" I" speaking in the story. This involves attending to how people talk about themselves, 
their lives and the world they inhabit (Mauthner & Doucet, 1998). The researcher 
attempts to identify various voices colouring respondents' nanatives (Whose voices or 
jJcrspecrives can be identified in the story?). This reading also helped me to identify 
emergent representations of self in the stories. The following questions were addressed: 
How do respondents talk about themselves? Do they talk in individualistic or relational 
terms') Of more importance, however, were shifts and tensions between the "I", reflecting 
respondents' own voices, and the "we", pointing at communal or others ' viewpoints. 
Negotiation of tensions between these two perspectives has been shown to be paramount 
in conflicts involving career choice (Mkhize & Frizelle, 2000). 
Using a different colored pen, instances in which respondents used personal pronouns 
sLlch as "I", "we", "you", and other words indicating tensions between self and others, 
were highlighted. In isiZulu, these cOlTespond to ngi-, si-, U-, and their derivatives. 
Marginal notes indicating repeated words and phrases were also made. These were then 
entered into a worksheet prepared for this purpose (Appendix 5). 
It could be argued that listening for the "I" emphasizes an individualistic notion of the 
se lf. Individualism is inappropriate in an African setting, where people define themselves 
prinlariIy in relational temlS (see Davis (1994) and Lykes (1994) for this critique, and 
Brown ( 1994) for a response) . These criticisms fail to take into account that the reading 
aims not to identify the pronoun per se, but the voices or perspectives emanating from the 
way participants talk about themselves. The "I" does not imply individualism. It is an 
expression of a point of view. It will be remembered that for Bakhtin, the speaking 
subject, or the person, cannot be separated from his or her ideas (MOl·son & Emerson, 
1990). In reading for the "I", the intention is to identify the source of participants , ideas 
or perspectives. Can the ideas be attributed to the speaking subject ("I") or the social 
groups to which they belong? 
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In another attempt to avoid an individualistic (or, on the other hand, a collectivist) 
reading of the interviews, I paid attention to the shifts and tensions between these two self 
orientations. Nanative shifts and tensions are part and parcel of living in a multi cultural 
society, in which some perspectives are valued more than others. As a person who has 
had to function in Western-type institutions (e.g. a university), while maintaining my 
roots ill traditional African ways oflife, I identified with these tensions. 
Read ing 3: The Self-in-Relation 
This reading, like the fourth, differed slightly from the one by Brown and Gilligan 
( 1991 ). This was motivated by the fact that while concems of justice and care were 
expected to emerge, concentrating on these two moral voices from the start could have 
led to a selective reading. This would have made it difficult to identify emergent moral 
voices, thereby defeating the purpose of the study. I therefore approached narratives with 
openness, ready to listen to voices of justice, care and others. Brown and Gilligan (1991) 
regard the first two readings as comerstones of the method. They make provision for 
departures in the remaining readings, depending on one's purposes. 
The third reading concentrated on how participants spoke about their relationships with 
others, such as their children, spouses, and whoever was involved in their broader social 
networks. These included relationships with real and imaginal others, including the 
deceased, who nevertheless remain active audiences in the person's psyche. The purpose 
was to identify critical moral and other concems in these relationships . The logic was that 
moral concerns, be they about justice or care, should emerge within the context of 
relationships. As mentioned previously, this was done to minimize the possibility of 
excluding emerging moral voices, by focusing exclusively onjustice and care. 
I began this reading by identifying all the characters in the narrative. On a separate A3 
piece of paper, used as a summary sheet, a circle was drawn at the centre, representing the 
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narrator. It was linked by alTOWS to other circles representing actors in the narrative. The 
relationship between the narrator and the actors was then established (e.g. father or 
mother). Words used by narrators in speaking about each actor were entered on 
appropri ate parts of the summary sheet. Tappan' s (1990) tlu'ee dimensions of moral 
experi ence, namely cognition, affect and action, were applied to this reading. Analysis 
was gllid ed by the following questions : How does the narrator feel about others in the 
1l ,IIT,lti vc? Is he or she angry with them? What does the narrator think of himself or 
herse lf in relation to others? Are these thoughts voiced or censured? Is there any action 
taken? Why/Wby not? What was the outcome of action or non-action? What were the 
narrators ' thoughts and f eelings about having acted or failed to act? What did this make 
them think of themselves? For example, the reader looked for feelings of powerlessness 
or inferiority in relation to the other. The role played by differences in power and/or 
status in the interaction between the narrator and each actor was explored. 
An example of how this reading proceeded is shown in Figure 4. Once concerns between 
narrators and actors in their stories had been mapped, they were listed in point form at the 
bottom of the worksheet. These were concerns such as caring, connectedness and 
powerlessness. 
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Figure 4: Reading for Self-in-Relation 
Note .. 
Mother 
A pensioner: struggled and worked 
hard to raise her 
Thoughts about mother 
-what will happen to mother'? .... >l1li1----
-who will look after mother in 
her old age? 
-what will happen to me after mother 
dies? 
-who will keep me company? 
Feelings toward mother 
-great concern, 
-empathy with mother (ukumzwe/a) 
Boyfriend 
/ -proposes marriage 
JfL----l 
! 
Thoughts about boyfriend 
Narrator ~ -what if he stops me from working? 
Female: Aged 40 -will he allow me to support mother? 
r_M_arr_l_·ed ___ ---' ~ -will he leave me? 
~ 
Feelings toward boyfriend 
Connection to him but confusion as well 
Action taken 
-sat down and discussed (sabonisana) 
-outcome: she will continue to work. He 
would help her to support her mother. 
~ ~~ Multiple arrows indicate the main actors in respondent's moral dilemma. 
• Single arrow indicates respondent's thoughts and feelings toward those involved. 
Bidrectional arrow indicates that the action was a joint activity by the narrator and her boyfriend. , 
Reading 4: The Social and Cultural Context 
The last reading took into account social, political and cultural contexts which have a 
bearing on narrators' decisions about moral dilemmas (Mauthner & Doucet, 1998). A 
number of important social and institutional categories in moral decision-making had 
emerged during the pilot study. These were categories such as family, religious beliefs, 
community, and beliefs about gender roles. As in the third reading, a circle was drawn on ". 
an A3 sheet of paper to represent the narrator. Other circles were drawn around the centre 
to represent institutions and beliefs involved in the nalTator's story. The reading was 
influenced by questions such as: What is the nature of the relationship between the 
nalTator and each institution? What is at stake between the narrator and each institution? 
(e.g. power, subordination, support and personal integrity). As in Reading 3, these 
concems were summarized and listed in point form. An example of Reading 4 is shown 
in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. The Person in Socio-cultural Context 
Family 
-she needs to support her family. 
Note: home (ikhaya) is a place 
where she belongs 
-sense of responsibility 
-she needs to ensure continued existence 
of home as a place of belonging 
Institution of marriage 
-tensions between "marriage" and family 
-what comes first? 
-gender and sense of self implicated: 
Note meta-nalTative: "Women find 
self-definition through marriage" 
Power: Male domination 
Note: husband can ask her to stop working 









Individual's unique historical context 
-the need to remember one's background, where 
you come from as a family. The suffering the 
family has gone through "binds you together": It 
creates a bond. 
Note: Bidirectional arrows indicate that the narrator is influenced by these systems but she also influences them by her actions. 
Further, the systems are interdependent: they interact and influence each other. 
Summary and Consolidation of Readings 
Having completed the reading process, I made Sh01i narrative summaries of each 
transcript (For example, see Appendix 6). Concerns such as the power dynamics between 
participants, family and community influences, and conceptions of self, were noted. In a 
further attempt to facilitate a comparison of pruiicipants across the four readings, a matrix··· _ 
of informants by readings (Readings 1 - 4) was constructed (Miles & Huberrnan, 1994) 
(for example, see Appendix 7). The rows captured issues from one individual, while 
columns compru'ed all individuals on one reading. A count was taken of participants' 
concerns, which had been listed at the bottom of the worksheets for readings 3 and 4. 
These were "simple" counts, because the fact that an issue was raised, tells us nothing 
about the dynamics involved, such as contradictions in narrative positioning. 
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The next step was to draw relationships between emerging concepts, I again enlisted the 
services of my colleague who had assisted in the initial analysis of data. Worksheets, 
memos, and narrative summaries were laid on the table. We then theorized aloud about 
possible relationships between emerging concepts. This process took two days to 
complete. To maintain the richness ofthe data and to facilitate "thick description," I then 
returned to a copy of the transcripts. Texts illustrating similar concepts were cut and 
pasted together. These were used as excerpts in the write-up. Analysis thus involved a 
lengtJ1Y, back and f01ih process. It began with the reading of each interview narrative. 
Then, memos, sununaries, and matrix displays were constructed. Even in writing up the 
study, there were occasions when the original transcripts were consulted again. 
Issues of Reliability and Validity 
Traditional notions of reliability and validity (e.g. Anastasi, 1988) are based on 
assumptions that are irrelevant for interpretive approaches to research (Brown et al., 
1989; Janesick, 1994; Patton, 1990). Lincoln and Guba (1985), Maxwell (1992), Mishler 
(1990), Tappan (1997b) and Tappan and Brown (1992) and others have made attempts to 
clarify issues of reliability and validity from the standpoint of qualitative research. 
Despite minor differences, these authors agree that the correspondence notion of truth is 
inappropriate for assessing validity claims in qualitative research. They also concur that 
interpretive communities of which the researcher is a member play an important role in 
the construction and validation of knowledge. 
Using Kuhn ' s (1970) notion of "shared exemplars," Mishler (1990) argued that validation 
should be concerned with the trustworthiness ofprocedures by means of which validity 
claims are made. This entails an explication of how observations were transfonned into 
data and findings. Similarly, Kvale (1995, 1996) has argued that validation is concerned 
with the quality of craftsmanship during the process of data collection, analysis and 
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theoretical interpretation. Reliability and validity considerations were infonned by these 
ideas, as well as the practical recommendations made by Miles and Hubennan (1994). 
Reliability 
According to Miles and Hubel111an (1994), reliability (or dependability) is concemed with 
the extent to which the research process is consistent and stable over time and across 
researchers and methods. Following their recommendations, data were collected from a 
variety of participants and settings (e.g. younger and older people in urban and rural 
settings). Wherever possible, interviews were transcribed during the two days after they 
were conducted. This driabled me to supplement them with field observations and 
impressions. Contact summary sheets were completed, and follow-up interviews 
conducted, where necessary. Some interviews lasted longer, to accommodate cultural 
values of people in rural areas in pmiicular. For example, rushing conversations is 
deemed to be impolite. 
Feedback was also sought from colleagues and experts in African Studies as soon as 
initial data were available. The feedback looked at ways pmiicipants talked about moral 
issues, such as the use of words ubulungiswa (righteousness) and ubuntu (humanness). 
The appropriateness of these words for representing moral experience was confinned. 
The feedback was incorporated into subsequent interviews by asking respondents what 
the relationship was between these words and morality. Finally, a colleague was involved 
in the early and final stages of interpretation. I constantly checked my views against hers 
to faci litate personal reflection and to broaden perspectives that were brought to bear in 
the interpretation process. 
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Validity 
As mentioned above, validation in qualitative research is not concemed with establishing 
Cl correspondence between findings and the "real world." It purports to demonstrate that 
some interpretations of texts (human actions) are more probable than others (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Ricouer, 1979). For Ricouer, procedures ofvalidatiol1 belong in the 
same category as Popper's (1984) criteria of falsifiability. He maintained that the purpose 
of establishing the validity of interpretations is not verification, but the detennining of 
which explanations are more compelling than others. Similarly, Kvale (1995,1996) has 
argued that validation involves argumentation: it should be conceptualized 
communicatively. Thus; the types ofvalidities described below, namely coherence and 
theoretical validation, are a means to arbitrate between competing explanations. 
Coherence 
Coherence is about the credibility of the study: whether it makes sense to readers and to 
the people being studied (Miles & Huberman, 1994). It examines the consistency and 
systematic relationships between concepts. Two strategies were adopted to improve 
coherence: triangulation and member validation. 
Triangulation combines different methodologies and theoretical frameworks to study the 
same phenomena (Bloor, 1997; Janesick, 1994; Patton, 1990). This study used theoretical 
triangulation (Janesick, 1994; Patton, 1990; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Results were 
interpreted from a number of theoretical perspectives, such as hermeneutics, dialogism, 
anci African cosmoIogies. 
Findings were also refen'ed to a few infonnants for feedback, a procedure known as 
memher validation. This was an attempt to establish interpretive validity (Maxwell, 
1992). This is the extent to which results make sense to the people whose meaning is in 
165 
question. Infomlants who had indicated that they would be available for follow-up 
interviews were approached for comments on emerging themes. While an attempt was 
made to broaden the range of participants used for member validation, this was not 
always possible because oflogistic reasons. Eventually, follow-up interviews were 
conducted with four women and three men from the urban setting, and three women and 
three men i 11 the rural areas. Although Bloor (1997) wamed that triangulation and 
member validation cannot validate findings per se, he nevertheless considered the two 
important for reflexive elaboration, given that they "may yield new data that throw fresh 
light on the investigation and provide a spur for deeper and richer analysis" (p. 49). 
Theoretical Validation .' . 
Traditional notions of validity emphasize the generalisability of findings to other 
contexts, known as extemal validity (Miles & Hubennan, 1994). Generalisation from 
sample to popUlation is not the major purpose in qualitative research. The purpose of 
generalisation is analytic or theory-connected (Maxwell, 1992, 1998; Miles & Hubennan, 
19(4). Analytic generalisation "takes place through the development of a theory that not 
only makes sense of the particular persons or situations studied, but also shows how the 
same process, in different situations, can lead to different results" (Maxwell, 1992, p. 
293) . 
One of the 1110St important types of validity in the quantitative paradigm is construct 
validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). In qualitative enquiries, construct validity comes 
closest to what Maxwell (1992) called theoretical validity. According to Maxwell (ibid), 
"theoretical understanding refers to an account's function as an explanation, as well as a 
description or interpretation, of the phenomena" (p. 291). He distinguished between two 
components of a theory: the concepts or categories it employs, and the relationships 
postulated between them. The first, he argued, closely matches what is traditionally 
known as construct validity. The second comes closest to intemal or causal validation. 
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Theoretical validity was established by comparing results to the traditional African 
conception of the person, discussed earlier. Using the notion of the dialogical self, it was 
possible to theoretically account for individuals who seemed t0111 between individualistic 
and cOlllmunal selves. 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical issues are particularly important in qualitative studies because they involve 
verbatim interview transcripts, rather than statistical summaries of variables (Kvale, 
1996). The relationship between the researcher and participants had to be carefully 
managed. This was particularly so for those respondents who narrated dilemmas 
involving painful emotional experiences. The researcher relied on his skills as a trained 
therapist to handle such problems. I listened to these experiences and where appropriate, 
referred participants to appropriate counselling services. 
Participants were info1111ed about the purposes of the study and the procedures to be 
followed. Permission to audio-record the interviews was obtained. The participants were 
also made aware that, once identifying data had been removed, verbatim interview 
extracts were to be used for illustrative purposes. The tapes were kept in a locked cabinet 
to safeguard confidentiality. All interviews were conducted and transcribed by the 
researcher himself, thereby limiting access to the infonnation. A few participants who 
requested to see their transcripts were afforded the opportunity to do so when follow-up 
interviews were conducted. Often it tU111ed out they wanted to ensure their viewpoints had 
been correctly reflected. Often, these were the participants who felt very strongly about 
the need to indigenize psychology. 
Participants also signed an info1111ed consent f01111 (Patton, 1990; Punch, 1994). The fonn 
,vas written in isiZulu (Appendix 8 and Appendix 9 for the English version). It was read 
to participants where necessary. A few participants declined to sign it, citing its legalistic 
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and formal nature. It should be noted that in traditional African cultures, the trust 
participants have in the person of the researcher takes precedence over written statements. 
Trust is earned by. observing traditional rules of etiquette. This includes conducting one's 
affairs with patience and respect. Asking participants to sign fonus could be interpreted 
as Cl sign of llntrustworthiness on the part ofthe researcher. For this reason, these 
participants' cultural expectations were respected. This is in line with Gasa's (1999) 
argument that informed consent procedures should take differing cultures into account. 
Finally, in order to minimise power differences between the researcher and the 
participants, interviews were conducted in the latter's premises, wherever possible. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a brief discussion of traditional and other henueneutic methods 
used in moral development research. This was done to show that the Relational Method is 
most suitable for studying situated understandings of morality. The theoretical origins of 
the Relational Method were discussed, followed by a description of the pilot study. 
Procedures used to collect and analyse data in the main study were then presented. The 
last section addressed the reliability, validity and ethical concerns as they applied to the 
study. Results are presented and discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: PART 1 
The first research question concerned the meaning of morality for the sample. The respondents 
defined morality as interdependence or connection between people and their social milieu. Three 
interdependent levels of connection emerged: connection to (a) a transcendental Other, (b) the 
family, and (c) the community. Results in support of the "connection thesis" are presented. 
Connection is based on a dynamic worldview. It is argued that this worldview prizes connection 
precisely because of the highly permeable, and multiple view of the self in traditional African 
thought. An African approach to morality, it will be shown, is inescapably communicative and 
dialogical. This is because, in a world in which everything is functionally cOIUlected, interplay 
between elements in the ontological hierarchy cannot be avoided. 
This chapter intends to illustrate the broader worldview that underpins moral reasoning in 
traditional African thought. Thus, only those interview extracts that highlight broader aspects of 
this conception of moral reasoning have been chosen. This has been done in order to give a voice 
to a dimension of moral experience that is usually ignored in the literature. Other aspects of 
moral reasoning, such as the observed dialogical tensions between worldviews and moral 
orientations are discussed at length in Chapter 8. Transcription symbols employed in the extracts' 
are described in Table 4 (page 170). 
Morality as Connection to a Transcendental Other 
Thirty-four respondents (65%)1 maintained that morality entails a relationship with a religious 
Other (cf. Mbiti, 1991). This was often expressed as living a life cOIUlected to God and/or 
izinyanya. Moral people are aware that transcendental beings such as God appraise their actions. 
This means that one is never alone in moral decision-making. There is always an Other, before 
Ipercentages are only rough indicators. They do not necessarily indicate the prevalence or the "strength" of each 
moral orientation. In using the Relational Method, the interviewer becomes part of the process by means of which 
meaning is created on an ongoing basis. 
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whom one's actions are rehearsed (cf. Day & Tappan, 1996). 
Table 4. Transcription Symbols 
Symbol Meaning Examples 
[ ] The words between square I have no [romantic] interest in him. 
brackets have has been added by Yeah! [I did not want to] hurt his feelings . 
the author, where the meaning of 
the word could be inferred from 
the context. 
( ) The author has added the word So, people who are not connected to God 
between parentheses: have lost life (abasaphili) 
(a) where he felt that English 
translations do not adequately 
capture the original Nguni 
meaning (e.g. for idiomatic 
expressions) ; 
They realized that I was not supporting him 
(b) To add clarity, where it was (the project manager) 
difficult to detelmine the person 
to whom the pronoun refers 
(independently of the context) 
(. ) Indicates a brief pause. Ehm C.). It was very painful! 
Italic 
Indicates narrator's emphasis If you quarrel, izinyanya get angry. 
CAPITAL LETTERS Indicate changes in the tone of SHE WAS ALMOST LIKE A SISTER TO 
voice. The tone is louder, ME. 
compared to the rest of tlle . , -
interview. This was taken to 
mean a stronger conviction about 
a particular point of view. 
CAPITAL LETTERS AND Tone is louder and emphasized. SHE WAS ALMOST LIKE A SISTER TO ME. 
ITALICS 
Underlined words Indicate the author's (rather than ... I am going to lose a lot of sum~Olt from 
respondents') emphasis Black students 
Note . The Relational Method, which was used in this study, focuses on the unique relationship between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. It also focuses on the relationship between the narrator and the significant others in 
his or her story. These relationships cannot be adequately captured by transcription symbols. Attempts have been 
made to describe these relationships qualitatively in the Results and Methods chapters. Given this context, fewer 
transcription symbols were used. 
170 
The following extract illustrates the idea of morality as connection. It was drawn from an 
interview with Nomusa, a middle-aged female schoolteacher. Having described her dilemma, she 
was asked to comment on the role of religion in moral decision-making. Although the respondent 
had not raised the issue spontaneously, the follow-up question is in line with the Relational 
Method. The method makes provision for testing the limits by asking narrators to comment on 
theoretically relevant issues or concems raised by other respondents. Nomusa's responses to 









Do you think religious beliefs have a role to play in morality? 
I would like to emphasize religion. To begin with, [to] respect is to fear God. If you lrnow 
God exists, and that you are here because of God, that restrains you. You think if I've 
hurt someone', \et me apologise. Because you know that your life is ultimately connected 
tu God. 
It is connected to God? 
Yes! And then there are abaphans/. We as Black people, some of us, ... believe 
abaphansi can see us. They are watching over us, monitoring our actions. There is also 
the belief that they are much closer to God, sitting by the right hand side. By being 
connected to abaphansi, you are ultimately connected to God. 
People who are not connected to abaphansi or to God, how would you describe 
them? 
- .. ' ~ . 
It varies! If we take religion in general, every religion extols the name of God. The 
difference is how connection with God is envisaged. Some see connection coming 
through Jesus, others through Shembe.3 But ultimately, all of them point to God, the 
source oflife. So, people who are not connected to God have lost life (abasaphili) . They 
huve lost self-respect. They do not care. They have lost unembeza4• 
In other words, would you say that a person who cannot choose between right and 
wrong has no connections? 
Yes. That person never considers that, as I am doing this, God can see me. That person 
does not connect (akaxhumani). [Such people] have lost connection with God, and 
evelything that matters. They live in a world of their own. 
(Extract 1) 
~ Literally, "those below." It is another term for izinyanya. 
: Rev. 1. Shembe is the founder of the South.ern African, traditionally-oriented, Nazareth church. 
LJterally, unelllbeza means havmg a conSCIence. Respondents in this study described it as an "iru~er voice". 
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This passage highlights the moral significance of cOlmection. People are connected to an 
invisible, transcendental Other, before whom they must account for their actions. The moral 
significance of being cOlmected is that "if you know God exists, and that you are here because of 
God , that restrains you". The knowledge that one is always in the company of an invisible Other 
(God) limits the range of possible actions. 
One' s actions are also "visible" to izinyanya: "We as Black people ... believe that abaphansi 
can see us. They are watching over us, monitoring our actions". This view originates from the 
belief that izinyanya accompany their descendants wherever they go, to protect them from harm 
(cf. Mbiti, 1991; Wiredu, 1992). To be connected is to bear God and izinyanya in mind when one 
acts. This implies that conl)~cted people are never alone in moral decision-making. Their actions 
must be always oriented to a transcendental Other. 
The objection is often raised that not all Blacks believe in izinyanya. The narrator seems to 
anticipate this argument. Her remark that "[ w]e as Black people, some of us, ... believe that 
izinyanya can see us" should be seen in that context. As far as this study is concerned, the 
number of people subscribing to this view is irrelevant. To expect everyone to share one belief 
system implies that worldviews are static and rigid. This study appreciates that worldviews 
presented here probably have different meanings for different people. Nevertheless, tmless we 
engage with them from within, we can never fully understand how they are changing in context 
and time. 
Connection is an integral part oflife or being a person. For example, the narrator says " . .. 
people who are not comlected to God have lost life." What does "losing life" mean? Traditional 
African world views do not limit life to an organism's biological state. Life is a never-ending 
spiral of relationships and cOlmections (cf. Paris, 1995). To "lose life" is to be severed from God, 
the webs of significance characterising human relationships and everything one stands in relation 
to . Immoral people "have lost connection with God, and everything that matters". They" ... live 
in a world of their own." This indicates the respondent assumes that the "good life" requires that 
one's interests be haml0nized with those of others. The purpose of life is not to stand out, but to 
find one's place among others. 
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The extract also indicates that immorality is indexed by disconnection. Disconnected people are 
indifferent to the existence of a transcendental Other, be it izinyanya or God. They do not care 
that their actions are "visible" before God. A person who cam10t choose between right and wrong 
"never considers that, as I am doing this, God can see me." In other words, transcendental beings 
have no moral validity for disconnected individuals. The view that immorality results from 
disconnection is supported by the fact that disconnected people "have lost self-respect, ... care, . 
. . [and] unembeza." Care is a well-known dimension of moral be-ing (cf. Benhabib, 1992; 
Gilligan, 1977, 1982) "Unembeza" and "respect" emerged as important moral voices in this 
study. Chapter 8 captures the dynamic interplay between these moral voices. 
Transcendental Others and Moral Regulation 
The role of transcendental Others in moral decision-making has been discussed. It has not been 
indicated how this Other is invoked in actual moral decision-making, however. A story in which 
an appeal was made to izinyanya and God, during the course of a dilemma, appears below. 
Mandla, a middle-aged College lecturer, nmTated how his cousin threatened to shoot revellers 
during an ukubuyisa5 ceremony. The story highlights an appeal to worldviews or belief systems 





So, what was the dilemma for you in this situation? 
My dilemma was that, I had to seize the weapon before he hurt someone. We could not 
aiIord to have someone hurt, let alone killed within family premises, during so important 
a function. Yet, I was scared. 
So, what did you do? 
I pleaded with him to give me the weapon, telling him how dangerous it is to carry a 
weapon in the presence of so many people. I said: "Let me have the weapon for safe-
keeping, I will surrender it to you after the ceremony." But he would hear none of it. The 
situation was getting desperate because there was commotion. Anything could have 
5 A religious ceremony to integrate the spirit of a deceased person with his/her family. Literally, it means 







happened, like, someone being shot accidentally. You know, with weapons, nothing is 
predictable. 
What happened eventually? 
Can you believe it? While I was standing there, pleading with him, his sister appeared 
from the kitchen, [and] went straight to him. While I was watching, short of words, she 
slapped him on the face, took the weapon from him, and said: "What are you doing? 
What do you think the sleeping ones (izinymiya) will say, producing a weapon within 
family premises? Do you want to drive them away?" 
So, where do izillyallya come in, in the question of morality? 
Well, the family first exposes you to religion. I can put it that way, in the Western sense. 
In the traditional sense, izinyanya are one of the tracks that lead to God. Izinyanya are 
God's mess~n.gers: they mediate between humans and God .... According to tradition, 
the name Mvelinqangi (God) is not usually mentioned [because] ... for us Black people, 
God is very high. That is why we approach God indirectly, through izinyanya. As for 
your question, izinyanya are important in maintaining morality. At all times, people must 
do things accordingly: they must behave themselves. If they do not, izinyanya will turn 
their backs against them (zibafulathele). Once this happens, you no longer have 
representation before God. Now, you are like a blind person . .. . Your family is hanging 
in the air (usemoyeni njeU). Consider your family, and the homestead (umuzi), for 
example. Do you think they belong to you? ... They belong to izinyanya, and ultimately, 
to God. So, if you do wrong, you disgrace not only your name, but also your family name, 
izinyanya, and eventually, the name o.fGod. So, izinyanya give us a moral standard. ... " . 
(Extract 2) 
A brief background to the ukubuyisa ceremony is necessary to fully appreciate the magnitude of 
Mandla's dilemma. Traditional African societies believe that the ceremony "promotes" a 
deceased family member from an "in-between state" Ca state of being neither a human being nor 
an inyonya) to being an inyanya (cf. Ngubane, 1977). This gives the deceased power to protect 
progeny from harm, and to intercede on their behalf before God. The entire lineage of izinyanya 
is believed to be present during the function, having been invited through the medium of 
6 An expression, meaning to be displaced from the rightful order of things. 
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impepho7 (Mosue, 2000). They participate in the feast, together with the deceased who is being 
"promoted". The statement: "We could not afford to have someone hurt, let alone killed within 
family premises, during so important a function," should be seen in that context. Quarrelling 
disrupts the relationship between izinyanya and their descendants. It is worse if misconduct 
occurs during a religious ceremony. The presence of izinyanya is thought to be heightened 
during ceremonies. Thus, a threat of violence during the function was a serious offence. 
Izinyanya could have withdrawn their presence as a result. This would leave the family 
vulnerable to harm. 
The story again indicates that morality is conceptualised as a relationship. Both parties must 
fulfil their obligations to Inf-intain the relationship in a state of equilibrium. Immorality sets in 
. ' . 
when the equilibrium is disrupted. Usually, wrongdoing by humans destabilizes equilibrium. 
This is because humans are at the centre of the ontological hierarchy (cf. Holdstock, 2000; Sow, 
1980). This means that equilibrium or disequilibrium is thought to be caused by their actions or 
moral failures. 
The story also illustrates an appeal to a shared belief system in order to regulate behaviour. 
Worldviews prescribe what is considered acceptable and unacceptable conduct. They also offer 
the means by which to handle deviations from these prescriptions (cf. Jensen, 1997). For 
example, weapons cannot be touched during a ritual ceremony. Shouting or talking loudly is also 
prohibited . Mandla's cousin violated these prescriptions. It is of note that Mandla's appeal to 
logic (catTying a weapon is dangerous) to restore calm was ineffective. The sister, on the other 
hand, appealed to the religious and moral significance of the function itself. This empowered her 
to reprimand her brother. Outside the context ofthe function, her actions could have escalated 
'the conflict. By invoking a shared belief system, she was able to reprimand him. 
Worldviev·'!s also provide an account of causality (cf. .Tensen, 1997). They offer explanations to 
questions SLlch as: Why are things the way they are? Extract 2 hints at causes offatnily 
disintegration. Disconnection, we learn, is considered to have adverse consequences for the 
7 Traditional incense : a few days prior to the ceremony, the senior elder bums incense at Emsamo ("Upper Place" or 
altar). Known and unknown izinyanya are verbally invited to partake in the ceremony. ' 
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family as a whole. Ifpeople do not act accordingly, " . .. izinyanya will tum their backs against 
them (ziba/ulathele)." This is undesirable. It cuts the family off from God: "Once this happens, 
you no longer have representation before God. Now, you are like a blind person .. . your family 
is banging in the air." To be left "hanging in the air" is to be discOlmected from the hierarchy of 
beings, or the cosmic order of things. A disconnected family is displaced. It is without guidance 
and direction (i.e. blind). Prosperity and protection from harm, usually afforded by izinyanya (cf. 
Mbiti , 1991), are withdrawn. It is of note that an individual's actions have consequences for the 
family as a whole. It is thus in the interest of the family to ensure that actions that could lead to 
disconnection and disintegration, are avoided. 
lzinyanya are not distancedJigures. They are immediately present in their families. To "know" 
. , . ' 
them involves knowledge of a practical-moral (cf. Gadamer, 1975) rather than the cognitive 
kind. It requires people to be responsive to their circumstances. This includes fulfilling 
responsibilities toward the family, depending on one's position. The following section briefly 
explores the nature of the relationship. The extract is from an interview with Vusi, a 26-year-old 
male, fourth year University student from a rural background. 
Nhlanhla: 
Vusi : 
Morality, distinguishing between good and bad, where do izinyanya come in? 
There are many things .... Like, discord and quarrelling within the family is not good. 
There must be peace and quiet at all times, because quarrelling touches upon izinyanya. If 
you quarrel, izinyanya get angry. They lose interest (badikibale) and distance (baqhele)' -' 
Ihemselvesfrol11 you . ... A sacrifice will be required to restore connection. So, they 
require peace, harmony, and respect within the family. When they distance themselves, 
their absence will lead to great discord among family members (inxushunxushu ekhaya). 
So, knowing that izinyanya exist makes you a responsible person. You will know and love 
members of your family (wazise abantu basekhaya), and give support where necessary. 
(Extract 3) 
This extract indicates that izinyanya are not abstract beings "out there." They are experienced by 
others as persons, with whom a speaking relationship exists (cf. Holdstock, 2000). Further, they 
are interested and involved in the day-to-day affairs of their families (cf. Mbiti, 1991). Belief in 
their immediate presence is underscored by the fact that they are described in human terms. This 
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is supported by the view that they are considered capable of experiencing emotions. They can get 
"angry", engage (have "interest") or disengage ("distance themselves") with human beings. To 
invoke them is to appeal to an audience of real people (cf. Josephs, 1997), capable of having a 
relationship with oneself. 
To "know" izinyanya requires one to act in accordance with this knowledge. This involves 
responsiveness to the needs ofthe family. Thus, says the nanator, " ... knowing that izinyanya 
exist makes you a responsible person. You will know and love members of your family (wazise 
abantu hasekhaya), and give support where necessary." The word "responsible", as used here, 
does not mean "being the cause of." It refers to the knowledge of one's obligations, and 
attending to them (cf. Shweder, 1982). These obligations are discussed below. 
;~ .. 
Worldviews not only provide a diagnostic account of human problems: they also offer the means 
by which to alleviate human suffering (cf. Bruner, 1990; Jensen, 1997). For example, one can 
deduce from the extracts above that it is undesirable to be disconnected from izinyanya. Should 
discOlmection occur, however, the culture provides mechanisms to restore connection (cf. Mbiti, 
1991). Vusi mentions that "a sacrifice will be required to restore connection" (Extract 3). This 
usually takes the fonn of a dialogue between the living and izinyanya, in the presence of all 
family members. The elder addresses izinyanya directly, as if speaking to living human beings. 
Forgiveness is sought for known and/or unknown offences committed by family members. The 
elder urges izinyanya to re-establish connection with the family (cf. Mbiti, 1991; Josephs, 1991)": 
This points to the interdependent nature of the relationship between izinyanya and their families. 
Morality, Religion and Philosophy 
The results above support the religious and philosophical bases of morality in traditional African 
thought. In both Extracts 1 and 2 above, the respondents described morality in tenns of religious 
obligations to God and izinyanya, who are thought to be an integral pmi of the world of the 
living. The view that traditional African moral systems are premised on philosophical and 
religious worldviews is also echoed by Holdstock (2000) and Nobles (1991), who argue that 
African philosophy is the foundation of Black psychology. African philosophy is grounded in 
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practical life: it is inseparable from what people do. This philosophy is expressed through 
religion because traditional African scholarship makes no sharp distinctions between religion and 
philosophy (Mbiti, 1991; Nobles, 1991). Religion is not conceptualised in abstract terms. It is an 
integral part of a person's existence: a way ofbe-ing in the world (Biko, 1978; Zahan, 1979). 
Religion reflects the "concrete, real and lived whole " of a people (Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981, p. 
134, emphasis original). From this perspective, religion cannot be divorced from the realm of 
soci al relationships. It can be realized only through participation in the conununity of other 
people (Holdstock, 2000) (The notion of morality as connection to the conununity is discussed 
below). 
An important component of African philosophy and religion is the holistic conception of life 
;" .. 
(Verhoef & Michel, 1997) or living holism (Holdstock, 2000). In traditional African thought, 
human beings do not stand aloof from others and from the surrounding environment. Nor do they 
focus on teasing things apart to study their components in isolation. Instead, attention is paid to 
the organic relationship between human beings and their context. This stems from the African 
view that the universe consists of a myriad of intercOlmected, hierarchically-organized signifiers 
(Nobles, 1972, 1991; Nsamenang, 1992, 1999; Zahan, 1979). People who subscribe to this view 
conceptualise the universe as a three-tiered space (see Chapter 3). It is believed that 
communication and interrelationships between the various levels in this space continue on an 
ongoing basis (Sow, 1980). God, who is at the apex of the hierarchy, is consi:dered the overall 
creator and sustainer of life. God presides over the destinies of human beings, animals, plants, 
and all that is created (Sow, 1980; Nobles, 1972, 1991). The view that one ' s actions are "visible" 
to God and izinyanya, who in turn punish immoral conduct, is consistent with an organic view of 
the universe in which everything is influenced by everything to which it stands in relation. 
According to African mythology, God "withdrew"g His/Her active involvement in the world 
(Zahan, ] 979) . That is, God is generally regarded as remote and not concerned with the day-to-
day affairs ofthe living (Holdstock, 2000). Despite having "withdrawn" from the world of the 
living, God ' s spirit or energy is believed to penneate the whole universe. For example, the 
TswanalSotho word for God, Modimo, means the one who penetrates and penneates everything. 
8 See Zahan (1979 ) for various myths explaining how God 's "withdrawal" took place. 
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God's spi rit is believed to be available in varying degrees to izinyanya, human beings, animals, 
plants and objects (Toldson & Toldson, 2001). Because God participates in everything, every 
interaction is potentially an interaction with God (or someone/something with a Godly element). 
Immorality is conceptualised as discOlmection from God because it violates the organic inter-
relationships that should exist between human beings and their environment. 
We have mentioned that human beings are at the centre of the African metaphysical ontology 
(Sow, 1980). This means that connection and disconnection are detennined by human actions . 
To understand this, we need to re-examine the moral implications of God's "withdrawal" from 
the universe. God's "withdrawal" gave human beings greater freedom of action in the world. 
Human beings constitute "!l~e central element of a system on which [they] impose a centripetal 
orientation" (Zahan, 1979, p. 6). Their actions must always be oriented toward preserving and 
enhancing the intercOlmected quality of the universe. As Holdstock (2000) notes, "holism is 
lived experience. The bellefthat everything belongs together is directly translated into the 
actualities of daily living" (p. 162). Interdependence and hannony are achieved if people fulfil 
their duties to the family, the community, and the surrounding environment. To be "connected to 
God" is to partioipate in the rhytlun of life. 
Despite having "withdrawn" from the earth, God continues to monitor human activities. It is 
believed that God can see and punish all wrongdoers, no matter how secret their actions 
(Nsamenang, 1992). N0l111ally, God does not monitor human actions directly, according to 
African scholarship. This responsibility falls upon izinyanya, who occupy the level immediately 
below God in the hierarchy of beings (Sow, 1980). Izinyanya are powerful intennediaries 
between God and their descendants, with whom they remain in contact. Although invisible, 
izinyanya remain engaged in the world of the living. This finds support in Extract 2, where a 
threat to participants in a religious ceremony was construed as an offence to izinyanya 
themselves, who were considered to be present during the ceremony. 
To further understand the role played by izinyanya in moral decision-making, we need to re-
examine traditional African conceptions of their status and the nature of their world. Izinyanya 
are family members whose lives are moral exemplars. They are religious and social models to be 
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emulated to avoid societal destabilization. The world of izinyanya is the quintessence of 
perfection. Jt is associated with poise, tranquillity and peace because of the prestigious moral 
character of its inhabitants (Zahan, 1979). Family members ought to emulate this world. For 
example we leam from Vusi in Extract 3 that "[w]hen they [izinyanya] distance themselves, their 
absence will lead to great discord among family members." Family discord is the opposite of the 
tranquillity and poise thought to characterize the world of izinyanya: it drives them away. The 
fact that human actions impact on izinyanya is a further indication that the worlds of the two are 
intertwined. For a state of morality to exist the family and by extension, the community ought to 
be modelled on the world of izinyanya. 
Having been discOlmectedfrom the source oflife (God) because of the severance of the link with 
' ,~ - . 
izinyanya (i.e. their withdrawal), the family'S spiritual resistance is thought to be lowered. It is 
envisaged that this leaves the family vulnerable to misfortune and disintegration (cf. Extract 3). 
Among actions that potentially could cause this breakdown in the relationship are: failure to 
perform appropriate rituals, lack of compassion for family members and others, and dissension 
among kin (Nsamenang, 1992). The view that knowing that izinyanya exists requires one to be a 
"responsible person" [and to] give support where necessary" (Extract 3) should be seen in that 
context. To be connected to izinyanya is to recognise their presence by fulfilling one' s 
obligations to them and the family. 
0- - ~ . 
Morality, Tradition and Time 
African conceptions of "tradition" and time have a bearing on the relationship between izinyanya 
and moral reasoning. Zahan (1979) argues that "time is inconceivable without generations as its 
framework" (p. 45) in African scholarship. The three time dimensions - past, present and future _ 
are understood in relation to the succession of one generation by another. Nobles (1991), echoing 
Mbiti (1969), notes that time in traditional Africa was measured according to events that had 
already occLllTed, the events taking place, and events that were to occur immediately. If events 
did not have the possibility of occulTing immediately, they constituted the category of "no time". 
Most importantly, succession of individuals linked by bilih ties is oriented toward the past, rather 
than the future . It is toward the past, constituting the world of izinyanya, that the self is oriented. 
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Izinyanya, it will be remembered, have achieved personal completion (spiritual status) through 
their deeds. Human beings emulate them by attempting to follow on their high moral standards. 
It is on these grounds that traditional African understanding of morality pays more attention to 
the past. 
Time in traditional African thought was also "phenomenal." It had to be experienced with 
reference to events taking place in one's life or community, going backwards to events already 
experienced by one's predecessors. Justification of moral reasoning on the grounds that 
izinyanya did the same is not a regression to the past as an end in itself. The "aim is to trace the 
present from the past and thereby justify it." (Zahan, 1979, p. 47) Moral justification is usually 
made in the name of "tradition". Tradition is the collective experience of a community. It 
.~ .. 
"constitutes the totality of all that successive generations have accumulated since the dawn of 
time, both in spiritual and practical life. It is the sum total of the wisdom held by a society at a 
given moment of its existence" (Zahan, 1979, p. 47. This knowledge is always oriented toward 
sustaining and preserving the life of a community. 
It could be objected that the view that morality is based on izinyanya is, by definition, static. The 
community of izinyanya does not constitute a closed system. It is incessantly evolving and 
perpetually increasing with each successive generation (Zahan, 1979). This means that although 
people justify their actions with reference to tradition, changes are possible. Changes are not 
synonymous with the rejection of the past, however, unless one adopts a linear conception of 
time (as something that moves from the present to the future). Holdstock (2000) argues that "the 
ideas that nothing exists in isolation, that life is sacred, a communion of souls, cyclical, a 
constant renaissance, .. . transcends the limitations of time and space, and cannot be evaluated 
from a linear perspective" (p. 163). On these grounds, moral justification does not exclude 
tradition . It emerges from the knowledge accumulated by a commlmity over the duration of its 
existence, as it attempts to keep abreast with changes taking place in the world. 
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The Communicative and Dialogical Relationship Between Izinyanya and the Living 
The worlds of iziny anya and the living are characterised by a high degree of penneability. The 
fact that the living can be in hannony or dishal1110ny with izinyanya (Extracts 2 and 3) indicates 
that communication between the two is common. The breakdown in the relationship between the 
two can be restored through sacrifice (Extract 3), further indicating the conununicative and 
ongoing nature of the relationship. From a traditional African point of view, life is inconceivable 
independently of human and communal relationships. Parties in the relationship are bound to 
each other by reciprocal obligations. As Dzobo (1992) argues, death does not end the obligations 
of the living to the dead, nor does it terminate the privileges the living enjoy from izinyanya. To 
maintain communication C!lannony) with izinyanya, the living need to offer them prayers and 
, . " . 
sacrifices, and abide by their high moral standards. This ensures the presence of izinyanya among 
the living, which is indispensable to the life of the latter. The relationship between izinyanya and 
the living is thus a symbiotic one: "The two are intimately tied together in kinship bonds that 
make the individual and the ancestors interdependent on each other." (Hold stock, 2000, p. 171) 
The fact that the relationship between izinyanya and the living is thought to be characterized by 
equilibrium or disequilibrium points at the dialogical nature of the relationship between the two. 
For example, it has been shown that human failures are believed to cause an imbalance between 
the world of izinyanya and the living (Nsamenang, 1992; Sow, 1980). Should this happen, there 
are institutionalised systems in place, to combat familial and community disintegration that may 
occur (e.g. Extract 3). Usually, this takes a form of an appeal by the family elder(s) to the 
community of izinyanya. During the course of a sacrifice, the elder(s) address izinyanya directly, 
asking for forgiveness and re-establishment of equilibrium (Mbiti, 1991). The typical appeal by 
an elder to izinyanya, which many African people have participated in or witnessed, including 
this author, was summarised by Kopytoff (cited in Josephs, 1997) as follows: 
Communication with the dead takes the form of a conversational monologue, pattemed but not 
stereotyped, and devoid of repetitive formulae. One speaks the way one speaKs to living people: 
" You ., [such and such], your junior is ill. We do not know why, we do not know who is 
responsIble. If it is you, if you are angry, we ask your forgiveness. Ifwe have done wrong, pardon 
us. Do not let him die . Why do YOll not look after liS properly?" The words typically combine 
complaints, scolding, sometimes even anger, and at the same time appeals for forgiveness. 
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(Kopytoff, 1971 , cited in Josephs, 1997, p. 363) 
The example above is typical of an appeal to izinyanya in the event of an illness in the family. 
Similar appeals are made to incorporate new-bom babies into the family, during marriage 
ceremonies, significant achievements by family members, and in the event of death in the family. 
This highlights the penneable, dialogical and relational nature of the world of izinyanya and the 
living. Immorality results in the breakdown of this relationship. 
The Multiplicity and Fragility of the Self in African Thought 
The role of izinya/1ya in moral decision-making can be further understood with reference to the 
multiple nature of the self in traditional African thought. It has been shown that the self is 
.' . 
inextricably interwoven with spiritual beings. To explore this idea further, it is important to 
discuss an often overlooked, yet critical understanding of the self in traditional African societies. 
The self in traditional African thought is not only communicative and dialogical: it is multiple in 
space and time. 
From a traditional African point of view, the self is not only bound horizontally to the living, but 
also veliically, to spiritual beings and those yet to be bom. Spiritual beings and those yet to be 
bom are not "out there": they constitute an integral part of the living person. As Zahan (1979) 
argues, "the African carries within himself [ sic], physiologically and psychically, his own 
genitors and their respective ascendants" (p. 9). Ogbonnaya (1994) expresses a similar view. He' 
argues that "the human person must be seen as a community in and of itself including a plurality 
of selves" (p. 75) . He does not refer to a community outside the person. Rather, this is the 
community of selves constituting the intemal world of the person. He maintains that: 
The person in African worldview should be visualized as a centrifugal force capable of emanating 
other complex selves that can interpermeate each other as well as other selves generated from 
other persona-communal centers. This centrifugality of the person reaches into all directions and 
touches all events that contribute to the full person - the mythical past, the generational past, the 
ever present nature, and the self in the process of being born. (Ogbonnaya, 1994, p. 79) 
Sow (1980) concurs with Ogbonnaya (1994) and Zahan (1979) that the traditional African view 
of the self is multiple and deeply communicative: 
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Inseparable from his [sic] social dimension, the individual in Africa . . . appears composite in 
space. multiple in time. extending and testifYing to a culture of rich complexity . . .. Only an 
anthropological perspective that views the person as a living system of social relations and a 
system of interaction with the realm of the symbolic will enable one to grasp the way in which 
Africans experience the self. (Sow, 1980, p. 126, emphasis added) 
To further illustrate that the traditional African worldview is consistent with the idea of multiple 
selves within a person, Sow (1980) cites from the work of Thomas and Luneau, who wrote as 
fo llows: 
The concept of person sums up and brings together ideas and principles of traditional Negro-
African thought. Indeed, one finds there the necessity of pluralism, the networks of participation 
and correspondence that bind the subject to the group and to the cosmos, the verbal dimensions, 
the dynamic and unfinished quality, the richness and the fragility, the important role assigned to 
the milieu, and the inevitable reference to the sacred. (Thomas & Lineau, 1975, cited in Sow, 
1980, p. 127) 
The quotations above do not view the self only as multiple, but it is also situated in time, and 
within webs of independencies and relationships. It is also characterised as "unfinished" and 
"fragile" (Thomas & Lineau, 1975, in Sow, 1980), meaning that it cannot be described as 
"complete" at any point in time. The "unfinished" nature of the self in African thought brings us 
to an issue that has not been fully explored in the literature. That is, why do traditional moral 
systems promote hannony and interdependence? It is suggested that this is precisely because 0(-' 
the possibility of tensions between the various selves comprising the individual. In a world 
characterised by connection and plurality, destabilisation (tensions) are more likely than in a 
world of abstract, individualized thinkers. 
Ogbonnaya (1994) brings to our attention that selves within the person are always engaged in 
interplay with each other. The relationship between intemal communal selves resembles the one 
between the individual and the community. Ideally, the various selves should work together 
interdependently, without the loss or sacrifice of other aspects of the communal self. However, 
problems of power and dominance between selves arise, threatening to destabilize the 
community of selves. That is, selves can be in conflict with each other. The predicament of 
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someone called by izinyanya to become a healer, exemplifies this . Because the call is unsolicited, 
it may result in a struggle between the spiritual self and the individual personality. The former 
seeks to dominate the latter by directing it to assume a healing function in society. With the 
assistance of a highly trained spiritual medium, it is possible for an individual to enter into a 
dialogue with the spiritual self, and, through the medium of impepho9, request it to forgive him 
or her for not accepting the call to heal. 
If the chosen individual accepts the calling and qualifies as a traditional healer, the spiritual self 
becomes capable of holding an independent conversation with the individual self, and can be 
consulted for healing purposes. It is the general view that the spiritual self speaks with its own 
voice, independently of the voice of the healer. Because the healer is not aware of what the .... . . 
spiritual self is saying (through him or her), the service of an interpreter is usually solicited. This 
lends support to the view that multiple selves within a person can be engaged in a dialogical 
interplay with each other. The imbalance noted between the person and God or izinyanya can 
also occur internally, within the person, as highlighted by the example cited above. However, the 
ability of the self to take on new meanings, its "unfinished" ("fragile") quality, makes restoration 
of equilibrium possible. Morality (connection), therefore, could be viewed as an ongoing 
struggle to reconcile views emanating from the various parts of the self. 
Izinyanya as Moral Audiences 
--. --. 
Another way to conceptualise the role of izinyanya in moral decision-making is through the 
notion of moral audiences (Day, 1991). Day (ibid) and Day and Tappan (1996) have argued that 
individuals are never alone in moral decision-making. Moral action always occurs in the context 
of a relationship with others, be they real or imaginal. Actors use stories to rehearse and interpret 
moral dilemmas in relation to others, who fonn internalised audiences, "before whom they act, 
and by who111 they are judged" (Day & Tappan, 1996, p. 70). In this study, God and izinyanya 
formed important moral audiences. Moral actors rehearsed their stories before them. 
Respondents did not appeal to God and izinyanya in general, however. Their appeal was guided 
by the belief that the self is cOlmected to these systems. This appeal is consistent with a holistic 
9 Holy incense, used by diviners and elders, for traditional religious purposes. 
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worldview. It differs from traditional cognitivist approaches, which endorse a disembodied and 
transcendental view of the self. Kohlberg's subjects reason from an impartialist point of view, 
which can be adopted by anyone at any point in time and history. The results underscore the need 
to study moral dilemmas in their social, cultural, and historical contexts (Day, 1991; Day & 
Tappan, 1996; Gilligan et al., 1990). 
The notion of moral audiences is consistent with Bakhtin' s (1981) views on the addressivity of 
utterances. Bakhtin (1981, 1986) and Holquist (1983) argue that whenever an utterance is made, 
there is always an audience of imaginal listeners, whose responsive understanding is sought. 
The addresivity of utterances extends beyond individuals. It includes a system of ideas or belief 
systems (Bakhtin, 1986; Holquist, 1983). In this study, respondents appealed to religious beliefs . 
. ~ . . 
They tried to make sense of their moral dilemmas with reference to these idea systems. We are 
socialized into these beliefs in the course of growing up (Bhatia, 2000). 
The idea systems refelTed to above do not represent abstract, theoretical concepts that we come 
to know "cognitively". They represent the views of real people, whom we have met in 
relationships. Even when these people are no longer there, we continue to consider their beliefs, 
or what they stood for, in the face of moral dilemmas. This stems from the fact that the voice of 
the deceased in African thought is accorded immense religious and moral significance 
(Hold stock, 2000; Nsamenang, 1992). This is similar to the way the deceased are perceived in 
traditional Indian thought (Bhatia, 2000). Bhatia maintains that "within the Indian context, the" '" 
notion of the transmigration of the soul implies that people continue to have a relationship with 
the dead even after they have left the earthly world." (p. 159) This relationship includes moral 
obligations between the living and the deceased. The similarity between these two cultural 
traditions can be attributed to commonalities between Indian and African worldviews, especially 
their conception of the self as relational and extended in time (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
Conceptualising moral decision-making in telms of moral audiences makes it possible to account 
for individual and group changes in moral action over time. Day and Tappan (1996) argue that: 
Consistency of moral action thus has much to do with the consistency of the audience to which 
such actions are played . Moral principles are developed and sustained, or changed, in relation to 
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the parties who compose the audience, and moral actions are rehearsed before them. (p. 70) 
Although written with the view of intra-individual changes in mind, this paragraph applies to 
differences between individuals as well. It also explains intergenerational differences in moral 
action . In the narratives to come (e.g. Extract 4 below), we encounter moral actors whose 
dilemmas emanate from the fact that their descendants do not share their cultural point of view. 
This indicates that cultural reference systems are not important in and of themselves. The manner 
in which people dialogue with, and appropriate these systems individually, should be considered 
(Day & Tappan, 1996). 
Morality, Religion and Philosophy in Other Cultures 
It has .been argued that moral reasoning, from a traditional African perspective, is based on a 
religious and philosophical worldview. Researchers in other cultures have highlighted the 
importance of religious and philosophical assumptions in moral reasoning. For example, 
Huebner and GatTod (1991) argue that Western moral theories cannot adequately account for 
moral reasoning in Buddhist societies. They maintain that moral reasoning among Tibetan 
monks is based on the notion that suffering is an inescapable part of life. According to this belief, 
suffering is brought about by one's conduct in the previous life. It can only end when one is re-
bom. This means that to understand the moral reasoning of the Tibetan monks, one needs to 
understand phenomenal existence. Likewise, Vasudev and Hummel (1987) opine that moral 
reasoning among the Hindu is based on Ahimsa. Ahimsa is the principle of non-violence. It 
applies to all f01111s of life. In a similar vein, Dien (1982) argues that the Confucian tradition, 
which extols promotion of social han110ny and cultivation of one's inherent goodness, is the 
basis of moral reasoning in Chinese thought. Traditions such as the ones mentioned above, 
together with the results of the present study, underscore the impOliance of taking into account 
worldviews and philosophical assumptions in studying morality in varying cultural contexts 
(.Tensen, 1997). 
... " ~ . 
Cognitive-developmental approaches, on the other hand, separate morality and ethics from 
religion. Koh Iberg (1981) argues that the sequence of moral development is not "dependent on a 
particular religion or on any religion at all in the usual sense" (p. 25), nor is it affected by 
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varying cultural and social values. In the Westem tradition, "morality is fundamentally 
individualistic in nature. It is dictated by one's conscience and has little to do with outside 
religious forces" (Verhoef & Michel (1997, p. 394). This implies that if one studies morality, 
beginning with the assumption that religion and morality are independent, traditional African 
communities are unlikely to perfonn at the postconventionallevel. The postconventionallevel 
separates moral reasoning from social and religious values. The postconventionallevel in 
Kohlberg's moral scheme envisages that moral principles are valid independently of individuals 
and social groups subscribing to them (Kohlberg, 1981). 
Moral Decision-making and Connection to the Family 
The previous section touched briefly on the importance of the family in moral decision-making. 
This section expands on this theme. The need to refer to izinyanya again in this section arises 
from the fact that they are thought to occupy both the human and spiritual realms (cf. Mbiti, 
1991). Thus, they are also part of the family. So far, the focus has been on the implications of 
being severed from spiritual beings. The moral significance of being COlllected to the family will 
now be addressed. 
It may be stated that most cultures prize family solidarity. Although this is mostly tme, 
differences exist in the way "family" is defined. According to traditional African perspectives, 
"extended"lo family members are an integral part of the family, as are izinyanya (cf. Paris, 1995): 
Further, mature personhood is defined by immersion in, rather than separation from, the family 
(cf. Verhoef & Michel, 1997). On the other hand, traditional Westem approaches define the 
family primarily in nuclear temlS (cf. Shweder, 1982). The goal of psychological development is 
to individuate, in order to realize one's ilmennost potential (cf. Gilligan, 1977, 1982). Thus, one 
needs to be sensitive to cultural understandings of the meaning of the tenn "family". Culture-
specific, and often taken-for-granted obligations ensuing from being part of the family need to be 
considered. Unless otherwise indicated, the word "family" always refers to the "extended 
family" in this study. 
10 The Nguni equivalent, ul11l1deni, means "extended" family: It requires no qualification. 
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Forty-four respondents (85%) referred to morality and com1ection to the family. The moral 
significance attached to the family is highlighted by an extract from an interview with Baba 
Khumalo, a 68-year-old, retired fam1-worker. 
Nhlanhla: Thank you very much for agreeing to be part of these interviews. Could you please 
tell me about a situation where you were faced with a moral dilemma, and you did 
not know what to do? 
Baba Khumalo: My dilemma has a long history to it, son, but I will try to shorten it. We are a big family. 
Nhlanhla: 
My brothers and I came here as farm workers. Eventually, we settled permanently. All 
my brothers are now deceased: I am now the head of the entire family. The most painful 
thing is that the family is dispersing, because my brothers' children are very stubborn. 
:: . 
They do not want to respect. That puts me in a very difficult situation because I can see 
that times have changed. Things are no longer the way we were brought up. On the other 
hand , there is a problem, because they were left with me, under my guidance. That is my 
problem, son. It is an ongoing problem. 
1 hear, Baba. Now, how would you pinpoint the real problem in your situation? 
Baba Khumalo: As I've said, they were left with me. It is my responsibility to ensure that the family stays 
together. 
Nhlanhla: Why is it important that the family stays together? 
Baba Khumalo : Well, what a question! Thefamily is the backbone of a person's l([e. For example, I call 
myself Khumalo. Who is Khumalo? He was an outstanding member of the family. We 
derive our name from him. I can ' t call myself a person if there is no family. A person is 
not just dangling in the air: people are not born and then left on their own, like snakes. A 
person is connected to his/her family, and this goes back to the sleeping ones, izinyanya. 
Nhlallhla: Let me put it this way, Baba. The way I see it, the family is now too big. It follows 
that as the family gets bigger, dispersion is inevitable? 
Baba Khumalo: ] see the way you are thinking. What is important to me is that my brothers asked me to 
look after their children. For, me, it would be a personal failure ifthe family disperses 
before my very own eyes. 
Nhlanhla: Is there something else that came to your mind, while you were dealing with this 
situation? 
Baba Khumalo: As I' ve already said, my brothers gave me specific instructions to look after them. I have 
supervised the malTiage ceremonies of some of them. I'm looking forward to doing the 
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Nhlanhla: 
same with the rest. Sometimes I ask myself: Why bother! I never quarrelled with my 
brothers. We never looked down upon each other. The most painful thing is that they [the 
children] do not respect me. They talk anyhow, disregarding the fact thatthere should be 
no noise [quarrels] within the family. I cannot be involved in making noise within the 
fClllliZ)I, especially with the children. So, that makes me very sad. I sometimes think of 
leaving them alone. Then, I remember my brothers' words. I can't look down upon their 
words. 
Anything else that came to your mind? 
Baba Khu1l1alo: Another thing is that I am now old and I am looking at the way forward.!! I am the elder: 
Nhlanhla : 
I am the one who is looking after the family. It would be a grievous mistake if the family 
di sintegrates during my turn as elder. That would mean, my way toward izinyanya, in the 
next world, will not be clear. It is painful that the family will disintegrate during my 
:-.. 
{enure as elder. That means I am the one who failed. 
You mentioned that this means your way to the next world will not be clear? 
Baba Khumalo: We Blacks believe that family unity is very important. It is the responsibility of the head 
of the family to ensure it. If the family is united, until you return to the world of 
izinyanya , you place among them is ensured. 
Nhlanhla: Let me say, suppose there is an elder, like you. But this elder has failed to look after 
the family. What will happen to that person in the next world? 
Baba Khumalo: I cannot be sure, but I believe that person will never see the world of izinyanya . Once that 
person has left this world, he/she will wander aimlessly. Hislher soul will wander 
aimlessly, like an outcast. . . . That is undesirable, because a person's life ends with joy 
.. --~ . 
when she/he is re-united with kin in the next world. 
(Extract 4) 
This extract will be employed to show that connection to the family entails fulfilling one's 
responsibilities. Mostly, the nature of these responsibilities is dictated by one's position in the 
family hierarchy. Ability to meet one's responsibilities has a bearing on how the self is 
conceived . Challenges resulting from inter-generational differences, and other influences, are 
presented and discussed . 
11 This llle,lI1S that hi s days are numbered: he is looking forward to death. 
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Family and Position 
Worldviews incorporate an understanding of the nature of human relationships (cf. Jensen, 1997; 
Kluckholn & Strodtbeck, 1961). Baba Khumalo perceived the situation as a moral dilemma 
because, as head of the family, he saw it as his responsibility to ensure family unity. The 
situation is of moral relevance because of his position (elder, head). However, this goal seems to 
be eluding him. His brothers' children do not show him the respect he deserves: "The most 
painful thing is that they do not respect me. They talk to me anyhow, disregarding the fact that 
there should be 110 noise [quarrels] within the family." The moral ideal for the narrator is that 
family members should observe their positions, and respond accordingly. The children violate 
"?' • 
his integrity as an elder, by failing to relate to him in a maImer deserving of his status. 
The extract shows the significaI1ce attached to hierarchy and position in moral decision-making 
(cf. Verhoef & Michel, 1997). From a traditional African perspective, age is one of the most 
important determinants of status within the family. Younger members of the family are expected 
to respect elders. The latter are in turn entrusted with the obligation to ensure family coherence 
and survival (cf. Mbiti, 1991). By not respecting his position, the children make it difficult for 
the naITator to fulfill his moral responsibility of keeping the family united. 
It has been mentioned that the type of responsibilities toward others depends on one's position iii-
the family hierarchy. Position is defined not only by age or gender, nor need one be an elder to 
assume faI11ily responsibilities. Moral responsibility also emaI1ates from the uniqueness of one's 
position. For example, a person who is employed is better positioned to support the family 
economically, compared to the one who is unemployed. 
Responsiveness to one's unique position within the family is illustrated by Nomusa's dilemma. 
Nomusa, a middle-aged schoolteacher, was the sole breadwinner in her family. She decided to 
take unpaid study leave to improve her qualifications at one of the national universities. This 
meaI1t leaving her mother, a pensioner, aI1d her siblings, without adequate financial support. The 
narrator felt guilty because she could not support her family during her studies. Her moral 
191 







So, what was the moral problem for you in this situation? 
The moral problem was [that] I had responsibilities. I was a breadwinner at home. My 
mother was already on pension ... . While at the university, I thought a lot about the 
situation I left behind at home. I kept wondering how they were managing. As the 
breadwinner, . .. the responsibility was on my shoulders. 
Why is it important for a person to look after the family? 
That is very important. Especially, because your parents raised you, they carried you 
(bakuthwalile), they educated you, and did everything for you. It is the only way to thank 
them, especially if they are old and retired. It is now your turn to assume parental 
responsibilities. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT! VERY IMPORTANT! It isa way of 
., . 
showing that'you are a thankful person. 
I like the word you used, ukuthwala ("to carry"). It gives me a mental picture of the 
nature of the relationship between oneself and parents. Now, let us consider other 
people. They were also "carried" but when they are old, they forget their families, 
and their parents. How would you describe such people? 
That would be a very ugly thing to do! (kubi kabi lokho!). That is a person who lacks 
caring, an ilTesponsible person. A person who does not, especially who does not show 
love and . .. thankfulness . .. . Because, even if you come from a well-to-do family, ... 
there is always something you can do to thank your parents .... Because, I was born of a 
hUlIlan being, I am a human being, but I would not have been able"to raise myself. .. . I 
survived because someone was therefor me. Had my mother and father abandoned me;"! 
w()uld not have survived. In the course of growing up, they taught me many things. That 
is why I alll the person that I am now. So, there comes a time when the situation is 
reversed .... It is now my turn to help .... At this point, I lend a hand (ngelula isandla) 
tu acknowledge that it is because they are human beings . . . that I have also grown up to 
he a human being (Kungoba bangabantu, ukuthi nami ngingumuntu manje). 
(Extract 5) 
In the extract above, Nomusa construed her situation as a moral dilemma because of her position 
as sole breadwinner. She had to be sensitive to the special circumstances of her family. Taking 
unpaid leave put the burden of supporting the family squarely on her mother's shoulders. 
N0111usa felt guilty because her mother had to suppOli the family with her meager pension 
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income. It is the narrator's unique position as sole breadwinner that created the dilemma. This 
shows that position does not depend on hierarchy only. People are expected to be sensitive to 
their unique roles within their families. Failure to do so is regarded as immoral. 
Family and Conceptions of Self 
The view that human beings are connected to their families fonus an important part of self-
understanding in the extracts cited above. For example, family unity has a bearing on how Baba 
Khumalo (Extract 4) sees himself as a person. The family is an important part of his personal 
identity. "A person is connected to his/her family, and this goes back to the sleeping ones, 
izinyanya", he says. The embeddedness of the self in the family is illustrated by an isiZulu 
, . 
proverb about the offspring of snakes, which he cites. Unlike the offspring of snakes, which are 
left to cater for themselves from birth, a person remains cOlmected to others. For the narrator, 
personhood is inconceivable independently of the family (cf. Menkiti, 1984; Paris, 1995). He 
attempts to find meaning in life by immersing himself in the family's affairs, rather than by 
separating himself from them. 
Failure to meet his obligations brings to the fore the image of self-as-failure: "For, me, it would 
be a personal failure if the family disperses before my very own eyes." Later in the interview, he 
refers to failure again: "It is painful that the family will disintegrate during my tenure as elder. 
That means I am the one who has failed ." On the other hand, he spoke with great pride of his .. '-. 
accomplislunents in the role of elder. This includes having supervised the marriage ceremonies 
of some of his brothers' children (a successful self). This at least makes him feel accomplished 
as an elder. 
Another image of self emerging from this dilemma is what I would call a possible future self (c.f. 
Markus & Wurf, 1987). His concems are driven by the belief that "if the family is united, until 
you retum to the world of izinyanya, your place among them is ensured." Failure, on the other 
hand, could mean rejection in the next world: " Once that person has left this world, . .. his/her 
sou] will wander aimlessly, like an outcast. . . . That is undesirable because a person's life ends 
with joy when she/he is re-united with kin in the next world." This shows that the narrator 
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imagines himself in a different context in space and time. His conception of reality (cf. J ensen, 
1997) incorporates a world beyond the present one. Acceptance in the next world depends on his 
actions in the present, however. Most important, it depends on whether he has fulfilled his 
obligations as an elder. Thus, the nan·ator has to consider the envisaged future self in his actions. 
The vi ew that moral reasoning should take into account changes in time and place (cf. Day & 
Tappan, J 996; Gilligan et al., 1990) finds support in Extract 4. Baba Khumalo is fully aware of 
• 
the source of his dilemma. It emanates from cultural changes, brought over by time. He says of 
his predicament: "That puts me in a velY difficult position because I can see that times have 
changed. Things are no longer the way we were brought up." He tries to balance this insight with 
the memory of his brothers' words: "On the other hand, there is a problem, because they were 
;~ .. 
left under my guidance." The memory of his brothers comes to the fore when he is dealing with 
this issue: "So, that makes me very sad. Sometimes I think of leaving them alone. Then, I 
remember my brothers' words. I can't look down upon their words." He could not simply 
disregard this memory, especially given the belief that the last words of the deceased ought to be 
respected (cf. Mbiti, 1991). Thus, inter-generational changes require the nan-ator to play a lesser 
role in the affairs of the [extended] family. On the other hand, he is answerable to the memory of 
his deceased brothers, who fom1 an intemal audience (cf. Day, 1991). The dilemma highlights 
the importance of studying morality with reference to changes in context and time (cf. Day & 
Tappan, 1996; Gilligan et al., 1990). 
The view of the self that is immersed in relationships is also evident in Nomusa's nan-ative 
(Extract 5). For her, the obligation to care for family members stems from the memory of having 
been cared for by other family members. Caring for parents is important because " ... they 
carried you (bakuthwalile), they educated you, and did everything for you." This statement 
points at the reciprocity of human relationships, especially between parents and their children. 
The isiZulu word -thwala (to can-y) supports this. The word refers not only to the physical act of 
carrying (a baby). It points at the dependent nature of the relationship the child has with his or 
her parents. Parents take responsibility for the well-being of the child, who would otherwise be 
unable to cater for himself or herself. Having been cared for by others in time of need, the 
narrator felt morally obliged to reciprocate in kind. This supports the view that moral decision-
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making takes place within a network of relational ties (cf. Benhabib, 1992; Gilligan, 1982; Paris, 
1995). 
Extract 5 also highlights the view that failure to recognize the mutuality of human relationships, 
by caring for others, is considered in moral tenns. Nomusa describes failure to meet family 
obligations as absence of love and thankfulness, irresponsibility, and lack of care. In isiZu/u, 
thankfulness (ukubonga) is relational. It is about recognizing relationships that sustained one in 
time of need. Further, it points at the obligation to reciprocate in kind, where necessary and if 
one can afford to do so. This is partly in recognition that one becomes a human being through 
others' sacri fi ces, as the narrator points out: 
.'. 
T was born of a human being, I am a human being, but I would not have been able to raise myself. 
. . . I survived because someone was there for me. Had my mother and father abandoned me, I 
would not have survived. 
The expression "to be bom of a human being" is used to remind people of the pain of childbirth. 
It is a call to be empathetic to others. The expression is often contrasted with having "sprung out 
of a stone" (ukuqhuma etsheni). The latter is used to describe people who lack empathy, 
especially for those who are close to them. A stone is a thing: it feels no pain. Nomusa 
acknowledges that the moral sensibilities associated with being human result from having been 
cared for by others. Thus she "lends a hand" to acknowledge that" [it is] because they are human 
beings . . . that I have also grown up to be a human being." Failure to look after one's parents .. ... 
indicates that one does not have the thankfulness, care, and responsibility associated with a fully 
human (moral) being. 
Conceptions of morality evident in the extracts mentioned above cannot be fully understood 
without reference to the role ofthe family and the other in self-definition. Human beings do not 
constitute a closed system in African thought. People do not stand in opposition to the 
environment or others. Rather, they enter into a relationship with their surrounding environment, 
including other people. There is constant communication between the self and the other, "a sort 
of osmotic exchange, owing to which man [sic] finds himself permanently listening, so to speak, 
to the pulse of the world" (Zahan, 1979, p. 9). The high degree of penneability between the self 
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and the other or the environment means that people do not possess the unity attributed to them in 
traditional Westem thought. The human being is always in relation with others, including the 
sun-ounding environment. This view of the self, traditionally called interdependent, relational, or 
communal (Mwawenda, 1995, 1999; Sow, 1979; Zahan, 1979), is distinguished from the 
traditional Western concept of the self, called independent, disembedded, or abstract (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). The moral implications of the relational view of the self will now be discussed. 
Comparisons will be drawn with the moral point of view emanating from an independent view of 
the self. 
In traditional African thought, the family constitutes one of the most important reference systems 
for the self, and human beings find their place and meaning in life in relation to the family ., 
(Mbiti, 1991; Nsamenang, 1992, 1999). The (extended) family, which is the basic unit of societal 
organization, provides a reference system for the self. It extends on both the horizontal and 
vertical dimensions. On the horizontal dimension, relational ties to the living bio-lineage, such as 
parents, sisters, and brothers, bind the individual. On the vertical dimension, the individual is 
bound to izinyanya as well as those who are yet to be bom. 
Izinyanya, who partly belong in the spiritual world, while constituting an important part of the 
family, are immediately present in the world of the individual. They can manifest themselves in a 
variety of ways, such as in dreams or in the fonn of the family's totem. Success and happiness on 
earth,jt is believed, depend on the extent to which izinyanya are satisfied with family membe6/ 
actions. The relationship between family members is one of reciprocity (Coetzee, 1998). Family 
members who can afford to are expected to help those in need. Even in contemporary African 
society, it is usual for poor parents and relatives to jointly sacrifice their eamings to ensure that 
an academically able child gets an education that will maximize future employability. 
Interdependence is sustained if the child maintains regular links with the family, upon 
completion of his or her studies. This can be achieved by lending financial, moral, leadership and 
other forms of support to the family (Mwawenda, 1999). Failure to do so constitutes a moral 
failure, punishable by izinyanya . 
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Family and Morality in the Cognitivist Paradigm 
The importance which traditional African worldviews attach to the family in moral becoming, 
differs from cognitivist models. For Kohlberg (1981, 1984), people attain the highest and 
adequate forms of moral reasoning when they "graduate" from conventional to postconventional 
thought. It is thought that this transition brings with it the ability to appraise moral dilemmas 
independently of family and social groups. Respondents in the present study, on the other hand, 
regarded responsiveness to the family and others as an indispensable part of being moral. This is 
because they do not view psychological development in terms of separation from the family, but 
in terms of connection to it. Participants who subscribe to this view are likely to score at the 
conventional level ofKohlh'erg's moral scheme (e.g. Ferns & Thom, 2001). This should not be 
construed as evidence of moral deficiency. Rather, we should interpret it with reference to the 
perspective oftlle people concerned (Simpson, 1974). 
It should be noted that cognitivist approaches do not maintain that responsibilities toward the 
family and others have no moral validity at all. These responsibilities are regarded as 
supererogatory. They attain full moral status only when they are linked to justice or the 
protection of individual rights. Interpersonal responsibilities that do not involve justice issues or 
rights are deemed a matter of individual choice (supererogatory). This is based on the view that 
beneficence obligations (helping needy others) should be limited in scope to avoid exhausting .-- -
the moral agent. 
Miller (1994), Miller and Bersoff (1992) and Miller et al. (1990) however question the view that 
interpersonal responsibilities are supererogatory. They have shown that different cultures view 
these responsibilities differently. For example, Americans tend to view interpersonal 
responsibilities as either personal-moral or matters of personal choice. Personal-moral issues 
arOllse a sense of objective obligation, but do not fall within the scope of legitimate regulation. 
Matters of personal choice do not arouse a sense of objective obligation, nor do they fall within 
the scope of legitimate regulation. In India, on the other hand, people consider interpersonal 
responsibilities in fully moral tenns. For Indians, these issues involve personal obligation, and 
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are perceived to be within the scope oflegitimate regulation (Miller & Bersoff; 1992, Miller et 
al., 1990). This means that the view that the morality of interpersonal responsibilities is 
supererogatory is not universal. 
Miller (1994) argues that the above-mentioned cultural differences stem from variations in 
conceptions of the self. The Kohlbergian approach assumes an autonomous, decontextualised 
self. It is in line with the Rawlsian (1972) conception of subjects. Rawls's subjects enter into 
relationships voluntarily, in order to safeguard their own interests. This view ofthe selfis not 
universal (Shweder & Boume, 1991). Other cultures emphasize interdependence, which "entails 
seeing oneself as pcui of an encompassing social relationship cu1d recognising that one's behavior 
is detelmined, contingent upon, and, . . . organized by what the actor perceives to be the 
;" .. 
thoughts, feelings, cu1d actions of others in the relationship" (Markus & Kitaycuna, 1991, p. 227). 
Knowledge of one's role and responsibilities within the social order is an important component 
of this view of the self. Traditional Eastern (Indian) and African views of the self are similar in 
many ways (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Mwawenda, 1995). Both prize a com1ected, rather than 
a separate, self. 
Com1ection and the Community 
The idea of the connection between family members, is extended to the community. This view 
was expressed by 73% of the sample. Connection means that people are responsive to the needs' 
of others in their community. Community was not conceived only in geographic terms: it is seen 
as consisting of a network of people, with a shared history and memory of mutual 
interdependence (cf. Gbadegesin, 1998). A state of morality exists if the relationship between the 
individual and the community is characterised by mutual interdependence. This is realised if 
community members fulfil obligations toward one another. 
An extract from an interview with Mbali highlights the idea of connection between community 
members. She is a 30-yecu·-old executive in one of the government departments. Prior to the 










You have spoken about ubuntu l 2 in the family. How does the community come in? 
Well , it is the same practice in the community. My extended family should also look after 
their family members, etc. This spreads to the community as a whole. According to my 
knowledge, the community should be united. They should be a community. It [the 
community] should be together, although this does not always happen these days. People 
tend to live their lives in isolation. But, if things were done accordingly, like, for instance, 
T will tell you about communal burial schemes. In an African community, if a person 
dies, the neighbours are the first to visit the family, before the relatives an-ive, who may 
be living far away. The neighbours are the first to visit the family . You will see them 
busy helping out. The same thing happens if there is a marriage. So, you should have 
ubuntu to those who share life '3 with you. In return, they will have ubuntu with you. 
Ubulltu doe~ not end with the family. It spreads out? 
It spreads out. 
Let me stop here. Is there anything else you would like to say? 
We are talking about morality. These days people act anyhow. The bond between them 
has been lost. For example, do you know that our communities harbour criminals within 
them? People go out at night, and break into their neighbours' houses. And we keep 
quiet. So, I believe the bond between people has been lost. 
Why is the bond you are talking about important? 
The bond I am talking about is the future of our youth. If the bond is there, the youth 
grow up knowing that they are a community. They know that they must lend support to a 
neighbour in need. They grow up with a sense of community. Thi·s prevents the things 
.- _ . ..... 
I've been talking about, such as the criminal element. Criminals now roam at large 
because we are not united. The moral fibre has been lost. People do not feel personally 
atIected if a crime has been committed against their neighbours . . .. Whereas in a normal 
society, the community will not harbour a criminal. 
(Extract 6) 
Extract 6 above repeats many of the responsibilities expected among family members. 
Connection to the community means that its members acknowledge mutual responsiveness to 
I~ People have ubuntu if their relationships are characterized by care and interdependence. 
I., The respondent used the expression ukuphila nabo, literally, "to live with." Figuratively, the tenn means those 
whose lives are interwoven with yours. 
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each other' s needs. It is in view of this that the narrator opines : " . .. you should have ubuntu to 
those who share life with you." To "share life" with others is to acknowledge their happiness or 
suffering as one's own. This is expressed mostly through action, rather than mere words. For 
example, in the event of a death (which the narrator cites), the community mobilizes to provide 
counselling and other forms of support to the family of the deceased l4 . Thus, connection to the 
community points at a life of interdependence among its members. 
Connection is also expressed as a "bond" between members of a community. The nature ofthis 
bond is such that one feels affected by the plight of another. This contributes to moral and social 
stability. The narrator bemoans the loss of this bond: " .. . these days ... people live their lives in 
isolation." The weakening of connections between people is indicated by the fact that " . .. they 
; ... . 
do not feel personally affected if a crime has been committed against their neighbours." The 
issues raised by the narrator are similar to Ward's (1991) concerns. Ward argued that the 
violence observed among African-American adolescents resulted from the disruption of the 
bonds of interdependence: a violation ofthe principle of care and connectedness among 
community members: "What has been lost to the violent Black teenager is an awareness that 
aggression against the other. .. is aggression against the self' (Ward, 1991, p. 182). The results 
indicate that morality is characterized by interrelatedness and interdependence between 
community members. 
Connection as Ubuntu 
In many traditional African languages, the bond assumed to exist between community members, 
is known as ubuntu (or botho, in Sotho, and hunhu, in Shona). This is a complex word, pointing 
at both the bond between community members, as well as the moral be-ing of selves constituting 
the community. Ubuntu points to the state of flux, or becoming, between members of a 
community. The word is derived from the Nguni stem -ntu, meaning a human being. The prefix 
ubu- falls in the class of nouns that denote a process or becoming. The complete word, ubuntu, 
means the process of becoming a person, or the be-ing ofpersonhood. From this linguistic 
14 Known as ukulindisa (literally, to "wait with the family") if they happen before the funeral, or ukubona (to "see") 
If they happen after the funeral. The therapeutic value of these support groups cannot be discussed here. 
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analysis, it could be concluded that to define morality as ubuntu means that it is thought of as 
being an indispensable part of being a human being. However, personhood in African thought, it 
. will be recalled, is interwoven with the be-ing of others. Be-ing (ubu-ntu) is conceived as a 
perpetual movement and sharing of the values and virtues thought to constitute the life of a 
community (Ramose, 1999; Shutte, 1993, 2001). These are virtues such as care, justice, respect 
and empathy for others (Louw, 1999,2001; Ramose, 1999). As Tutu (cited in Holdstock, 2000) 
notes, people with ubuntu are compassionate, gentle and always willing to use their strength to 
support the weak. Absence of ubuntu is synonymous with being incomplete as a human being. 
Two extracts illustrate the view that ubuntu or morality is part of personhood (or the life of a 
people within a community!. The first is from an interview with Senzo, a 20-year-:old scholar 






You have said that people in the community should have ubuntu. Could you 
describe ubuntu? 
[A person without ubuntu] is lifeless (umuntu ongaphili). Ehh, No! [shakes head]. That 
person does not have life, if he/she cannot choose between right and wrong. 
What do you mean? Life in a bodily sense? 
I do not mean life in a bodily sense. I mean that such a person does not hqve ubuntu. 
He/she is not a person . ... That person is no longer complete in his/her be-ing 
(akaphelele ebuntwini bakhe), because it is the ability to know right from wrong, in the 
way you do things, that makes you a person. 
(Extract 7) 
Mandla opined in a similar manner: 
Nhlanhla: 
Mandla: 
What does morality mean to you? 
It means the root of ubuntu (kuyimpande yobuntu). I could say, in fact I can make two 
distinctions. It means a life that is complete in the good (impilo ephelele ebuhleni) . I do 
not refer to life in a medical sense, like getting sick and the like. I mean life ... as in 
one's lived experience (ngokwenkambo). I mean, life as it reveals itself in one's day-to-
day engagements with other people. (Extract 8) 
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Asked to define morality, both respondents referred to ubuntu, life, and "completion." The three 
concepts were used interchangeably, in line with the metaphorical nature of isiZulu. A person 
who cannot choose between right and wrong "does not have life" (Extract 7). Such a person is 
not "complete in his/her being ... because it is the ability to know right from wrong, that makes 
you a person." This extract indicates that morality is part of being a person. Immorality (absence 
of ubuntu) is indexed by being devoid of life. People have life if they live harmoniously with 
others. To be a person requires one to engage in the dynamism constituting the life of a people. 
This entails responsiveness to social obligations, among other things. Failure to do so is 
considered to be an indication of an "incomplete" self. The position developed in this thesis is 
consistent with Helanan's (1995) view, who has argued that in every community, developing a 
moral voce is an indispensable aspect of becoming a person. 
t - . 
Mandla (Extract 8) also sees morality as an integral part of ubuntu. He defined it as "the root of 
ubuntu", which is an interesting analogy. It indicates that morality is the source (the "root") of 
personhood. This means that ubuntu is inseparable from social relations and practices, namely 
the things people do. As Mandla points out, it is part of the good life or "lived experience." This 
finds support in the view that life "reveals itself in one's day-to-day engagements with other 
people." These engagements are referred to as inkambo in isiZulu. Inkambo means a life journey. 
It is derived from the Nguni root -hamba, literally, "to go or travel." Unlike a single journey 
(uhambo), inkambo is an appraisal of a person's life at a point in time, within a community of 
other people. It refers to a history of a person's relationships with others and his or her world. -An 
"incomplete" journey (inkambo engaphelele) means one has fallen short of the standards of 
ubuntu. This indicates that ubuntu (morality) is grounded in communal life. 
Connection to the Community and the Self 
Like connection to the family, connection to the community is an integral part of a person's 
sense of self. This self is enacted in one's relationships with others in one's community. This was 
evident in Doda's dilelmna, a middle-aged male nurse and traditional healer. His dilemma 







[So, one must come to the assistance ofthe other] even if that does not concern you 
directly? 
It depends! It depends on how that thing touches you. In my case, I was helping her not 
only because we worked together. WE LIVED TOGETHER. WE RENTED 
ACCOMMODATION AT THE SAME QUARTERS. SO, SHE WAS ALMOST LIKE A 
SISTER TO ME. Even if we did not stay together, we were like brothers and sisters at 
work. We lived like a community. We had that kind of relationship. She was one of the 
people who made my work enjoyable. They were giving me a lot of support. 
So, there was that connection. You lived like a family? 
Yaa! There was that mutual, I do not know how to put it, a mutual understanding, a 
connection, a bond . . . . Because, you see, if you start in a job, people are happy for you. 
They appreciate you as a person. Those people sustain you; they make you live 
(bayakuphilisa) . They make you feel like a person . . . She was one of the people behind 
my success, by merely appreciating the things I did. There was that connection among the 
staff. 
(Extract 9) 
This extract shows that Doda and his colleagues shared a way of life characteristic of a 
community. For example, he says: "WE LIVED TOGETHER. WE RENTED 
ACCOMMODATION AT THE SAME QUARTERS. SO, SHE WAS ALMOST LIKE A SISTER TO 
ME." He was not only motivated to help her because they lived and worked together, but she was 
also like a family member. As such, he had to respond to her plight in the same way he wouldto 
someone connected to him through family ties. The dismissal "touched" him. This means that it 
affected him personally and emotionally. The narrator viewed the situation from the point of 
view of one who was connected to it. 
The narrator also appeals to the reciprocal nature of relationships among the staff. There was 
"mutual understanding, a connection, a bond" between staff members. Their relationship was 
characterized by mutual interdependence. The colleague in question was" . .. one of the people 
who made my work enjoyable." She was" . . . one of the people behind my success, by merely 
appreciating the things I did." This statement points at the mutual responsiveness assumed in 
human relationships (cf. Paris, 1995). The narrator found personal meaning through participation 
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in the community of other workers. This is supported by the view that "these people sustain you 
(bayakuphilisa), they make you feel like a person." His own well-being and sense of self were 
dependent on this community. 
The resu Its presented above support the view that the self in traditional African thought is not 
only interwoven with the family, it is also embedded within interpersonal and social contexts 
(Mwawenda, 1999; Nobles, 1991 ; Nsamenang, 1992; Ogbonnaya, 1994). Selfhood can only be 
attained by maintaining a mutual and interdependent relationship with one's community. 
Consistent with this, children are socialized to realize that their well-being lies with the welfare 
of others in their society. The ideal goal of (psychological) development is to realise the self 
fully by contributing to so~i.ety, which in turn should develop its members (Dzobo, 1992). 
Human beings become fully human by virtue of incorporation . . . into the human community" 
(Nsamenang, 1992, p. 75). Without such socialization, people are not fully deserving of the term 
"human beings" (that is, abantu or moral beings) (Nsamenag, 1992). 
The above-mentioned view led Menkiti (1984) to conclude as follows about traditional African 
conceptions of personhood: 
It is in rootedness in an ongoing human community that the individual comes to see himself [sic] 
as a man, and it is by first knowing the community as a stubborn perduring fact of the 
psychological world that the individual comes to know himself as a durable, more or less 
permanent, fact of this world . (pp. 171-172) 
Likewise, Mbiti (1969) wrote: 
.. -~ ' . 
In traditional life, the individual does not exist alone but corporately. He [sic] owes his existence 
to other people, including those of past generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of 
the whole. The community mllst therefore make, create, produce the individual; for the individual 
depends on the corporate group . . . . Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole 
group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can 
only say: "I am, because we are, and since we are, therefore I am." This is the cardinal point in 
the understanding of the African view of man. (Mbiti, 1969, p. 108-109) 
The interdependence between the person and the community has moral implications. For 
example, children are traditionally regarded as an important asset of the community. Raising 
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them is a communal responsibility. Thus, a mother is responsible for her children as well as those 
of others because "all the children in the community are her children." (Verhoef & Michel, 1997, 
p. 396, emphasis original). Likewise, children are traditionally expected to be respectful to elders 
in the cOllllllunity, as if the latter were their biological parents. This is fostered by the use of 
terms such as "brother", "sister", "mother" and "father" beyond biologically related relatives to 
community members in the same age-cohort. Although there is no bond of kinship between the 
parties, people so described are morally and psychologically bound to behave consistently with 
the cultural scripts of the terms used (Nsamenang, 1992). 
The emphasis that traditional African communities place on observing one's obligations as a 
member of the cOl11munit)'.}ed Verhoef and Michel (1997) to describe indigenous African 
morality as a circular process. Traditional African communities, they argue, are always in motion 
or flux. The community is "unified through mutual obligations between individuals, . . . 
weakened by separation of individuals through moral transgression, [and] ... reunified through 
the interaction process of the whole community working together to re-establish the relationship 
between individuals" (ibid, p. 404). 
Comparisons with Gilligan's Relational Ethic 
The results of the present study are similar to those reported by Gilligan (1977, 1982) on women. 
Gilligan argues that emotional responsiveness is an important component of the moral domain':" 
Her theory of morality is situated: it is defined with reference to historical connections and 
relationships. Gilligan's (1982) moral agent is embedded, rather than separate and generalized 
(Benhabib, 1987, 1992; Blum, 1988). Similarities between African approaches to morality and 
Gilligan's relational ethic stem partly from the fact that both endorse an interdependent view of 
the self (Card, 1988). Despite these similarities, differences exist between the two. The African 
concept of relationships tends to be much more inclusive than Gilligan's. For example, it 
includes the deceased and even those who are yet to be born (Sow, 1980; Nsamenang, 1992). 
Further, underlying the importance attached to relationships in African thought is a metaphysical 
framework that COlmects people to izinyanya, God, and their social milieu. A proper study of 
morality in indigenous societies requires a critical dialogue with such ontologies. This is 
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consistent with the call to situate the study of morality in context and time (Bhatia, 2000; Day & 
Tappan, 1996; Gilligan et al., 1990). 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented a traditional African understanding of morality. The results support the 
view that moral reasoning is premised on comprehensive worldviews. Worldviews spell out a 
people's understanding of their place and position in the world, their orientation to others, and 
their understanding of reality (Jensen, 1997). Respondents in this sample understood morality 
with reference to cOlmection with others and one's social milieu. This stems from a traditional 
African worldview that con~eives the universe as a unified, interdependent whole (Myers, 1988; 
Nsamenang, 1992; Ramose, 1999; Sow, 1980; Zahan, 1979). According to this worldview, 
everything is functionally connected. Human beings are expected to live symbiotically with the 
universe. Moral goodness is not conceived in abstract, individualistic terms. Rather, morality 
exists when the balance between elements in the hierarchy of beings is maintained. Balance is 
maintained if people remain responsive to one another, according to their position and status. 
Immorality results from a disruption of the system's equilibrium. This happens ifpeop1e fail to 
be responsive to one another. 
It has also been shown that the concept of the self plays an important part in the understanding of 
.... ..... 
morality. A traditional African account of moral reasoning is premised on a relational and 
communicative view of the self. Further, morality is an indispensable part of becoming a person 
(ubu-ntu). Selfhood and morality are interwoven with the welfare of others. Neither can be 
realized independently of a community of other selves. 
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CHAPTERS 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: PART II 
In the previolls chapter, it was shown that morality in traditional African thought is 
found ed on the principle of connection. Moral orientations such as respect and care were 
hri efl y introduced . This chapter highlights the simultaneous existence of, and dialogic 
tensions between 1110ral points of view. These tensions arise from competing conceptions 
of selves within a single person. The chapter also presents influences of gender, power 
and positioning (cf. Hali'e & van Langenhove, 1999a) on moral decision-making. It is 
shown that positioning. i.s socio-cuJturally embedded. Collective voices or understandings 
of what it means to be a man or woman in one's society influence moral identity. Moral 
dilemmas ensue from the struggle to craft an identity, given the field of signs and 
symbols made available by the culture (cf. Penuel & Werstch, 1995). This underscores 
the need to study moral decision-making as it occurs in context and time. 
Dialogic Tensions in Moral Decision-making 
This section presents the tensions noted between moral positions and conceptions of 
sel ves in 1110ral decision-making. Fewer but longer extracts are employed, to enable the 
read er to follow tensions as they develop . First, the discussion captures the relational and 
emotional context of moral decision-making. Competing conceptions of selves are then 
ex amined, as are moral perspectives discernible from the extracts . 
To illu strate the issllesmentioned above, an extract from an interview with Vusi, a male 
post-graduate student from a rural background, will be used. Vusi was given the task by 
his brothers of dri ving them in a bid to avenge the death of a family member. The story 
unfold s as follows : 
Vusi: [t was during the beginning of this year. So, my brother, who works in X (a 






got a lead , as to who had killed him, and that they lived in this place called Y. So, 
as a family, we sat down and decided that we had to do something, because the 
boys who had killed him were lmown in the area: they specialized in hijacking 
ca rs. It was decided that we had to take action against them. So, we got a car and 
we had to drive to their place, called Y. I am the one with the driver 's licence. 
So, as a driver, 1 had to drive the car. We had to go to this place called Y. It was 
very painful! The person who had died was a major breadwinner. He was the 
most responsible family member. Personally, as a person who was very close to 
him, r had to show closeness, even after his death. So, I had to drive the car. 
There were five of us : four others and myself. The plan was that once we arrived 
at Y, I had to stay in the car, at a distance. Once they had done what they wanted 
to do, J w.o~J!d dri ve the get-away car. Inside, I was afi-aid. I thought about my 
education. I was doing something against my principles (imigomo yami) . In my 
entire life, I've never told myself that I will be involved in anything to do with 
killing or hurting another human being. Now, I was involved in the thing they 
wanted to do. At the time, 'vvhat they had done to our brother was very painful. 
AND J WANTED THEM TO BE PUNISHED! . .. This means that, to me, the 
conflict was: I had to do something that was against my life principles. In my 
eufire life, J never thought I would be involved in anything to do with killing and 
hurting others. At the same time, I had to show the family , my brothers and his 
mother, because we are brothers but our mothers are different I , I had to show that 
I loved him. Because we were very close. I remember that the night he was shot, 
we had been together during the day. So, when his mother saw me after they shot 
him, she said: "They have shot my son, but I am glad that you are alive!" 
His mother said that? 
Yes. So, that means I have to take his place in her heart. That meant a lot to me . 
The way everyone was angry! They wanted those who had done this to be 
punished. But what if we got caught? What about my studies? I am a student; my 
future is still ahead of me. Now, I had to be involved in such things. 
Anything that came to your mind? 
Yes. In my mind there was a great debate, which I could not resolve. When I 
tried to convince them otherwise, they said: "Don't worry, you will just drive. 
You won't be involved ." So, we arrived at this place called Y. We looked for an 





area called N, but we could not find it, and it was getting dark and dangerous. So, 
eventually we went back home, as we could not find them that day . So, I tried 
another plan. I said: "Why don ' t we contact the police? .. . But at the same time, 
11.1' l was giving this opinion, J did not want to appear as a coward. I had to avoid 
that; otherwise , they would think being educated has turned me into a coward. 
So, I gave this opinion in a matter-of-fact way . We contacted the police but at the 
sa me time we were scared, as they could have been in cahoots with the criminals . 
. . . Even though we contacted the police, we continued our search the next day. 
So, as we were tt-avelling, unel11beza was killing me inside, that I am driving a 
ca r, carrying would-be murderers. But at the same time they had to be punished 
because they had done wrong. He who lives by the sword dies by the sword . 
[nside, I wanted them to be punished, but I did not want to be personally .. 
involved .... But somehow they had to feel the pain that we felt. We were 
looking for them again, but unembeza was against what we were doing. "Why 
Me! Why should I be the one driving the car?" ... So, that is the most difficult 
situation I faced in my life, having to decide whether to withdraw or not, and the 
meaning the family would attribute to my withdrawaL What would they say? 
They would say I am forsaking him (the deceased) because he is dead? At the 
sa me time I thought: "What about me? If I do not think of myself as a member of 
the family, do I like what is happening?" And you find that inside; that is against 
your feelings, that I am doing this because they say I must do it. Although I do 
not want to do it, I do not want to show the Me (ubu-Mina). Because, my inside, 
it is weak compared to my outside, which is what I show. 
In this situation, what did you decide to do, eventually? 
There is a problem because we can't find these people, but the plan that they 
111 LI st be punished is still there. I've decided maybe I should find them another 
driver. But, I do not want to appear as a person who is withdrawing, a coward. 
You see, because I want to protect my integrity. When I'm among my brothers, 
yes, they know that I am furthering my studies but they expect me to conform to 
other things. Because, if! see this situation differently, they will say: "Look, he 
does not want to work hand in hand with us. " So, I want to do it [get another 
driver] and the way I've planned it, it looks like it is going to work. 
Previously, you mentioned your principles: that the situation was against 








Yes. fl1 my entire life , I've never seen myself hurting another human being. 
Because, I think everyone has the right to life. If someone is going to be harmed, 
I put myself in the position of that person, and I realize it must be painful. You 
see'! But ila person has caused pail1 to others, he/she must be punished. But I do 
not want to be the one responsible for the punishment. 
YOII also mentioned that your personal integrity was at stake in this 
dilemma'? 
You see, like, amongst us as brothers, we are a big family. Yes, I may be 
educated ... but, among my people, those I associate with, I WANT TO 
APPEAR AS A MAN AMONG MEN (UKUVELA NJENGENSIZWA 
KWEZINYE). [Even though I am educated] MY MANHOOD IS STILL THERE! 
Durll1g tF~ditional events (il11icil11bi), 1 CaITY a shield . Yeah! It must be clear that I 
(//11 Cl man: I do notfear other men. I sometimes tell people: "Men! (Madoda!), 
we2 may be educated, but as a boy, I went through all h'aditional courage testing 
rituals . I fought! (ngaqhathwa!). Sometimes I would lose, but I often won. You 
see, the fact that we are educated; education is just a means to get porridge.) It 
cannot change the fact that I am a man. MANHOOD! I WAS BORN WITH IT! 
WHEN I WAS BORN, MY MOTHER SAID: "BEHOLD, I HAVE BEGOTIEN 
A MAN." SHE DID NOT SAY: "I HAVE BEGOTIEN A COWARD." 
In other words, your manhood was at stake'? 
Yeah! If someone has wronged the family, AND YOU PUNISH THEM, when 
you return home [from punishing the person], you get the dignity you deserve as 
men. You send a message that people can't mess around with your family. The 
women who have married into thefamity will take pride in the fact that they have 
married rea/men. Men who deserve to be married! (amadoda okuganwa!). Men 
who do not like wrong! Even the children of the family will take pride in 
YOll . .. . Men in our village will respect us. Because, people were asking 
questions: "Why are you so quiet'?" You see, that alone, "Why are you so quiet?" 
That meant a lot to us .. . . It motivated us to take action. 
It must have been a very difficult situation indeed? 
"The lI se of "we" does not indicate a plural. It is a reflection of the tendency among the Nguni to sometimes 
speak J\1'Ollt themselves in the plural, e.g. when addressing a meeting. 











I regard it as the most difficult situation I've faced in my life .. .. I had to do 
something that violates my principles . But if I do it, inside I will remain guilty. 
Why me'? I've always told myself that I have compassion: that I do not want 
others to be hurt. So, I realized my principles were going to be broken, because I 
was going to do this ugly thing. 
You mentioned yOUl' education earlier? 
Education had a great role to play. Because, the more I'm educated, the more I 
become a coward. People even say that educated people are cowards. I do not 
know whether it is cowardice or thinking too much .... But there was a thought 
that we could be killed. And what about the time and other investments I have 
made in my education? All this would come to nothing. The death of one person 
does not mean that all of us must die. 
' . ' 
Earlier, you mentioned that unembeza was "killing" you, Could you 
elaborate? 
Unenzbeza, the way I see it: I associate it with biblical teachings. It is a voice that 
guides you to do the right thing. If! am doing something and I think of God, I get 
scared if it is a bad thing. 
You get scared? 
Yes. That 1 am doing something that contradicts the will of God. 
In other words, your decision is based on how God might see it? 
Yes. I tell myself that, because of Christian teachings, because we grew up under 
Christianity. If! am thinking of doing something, I consider that God can see me. 
1 f 1 am afraid when I think of God, it means the action I am contemplating is 
outside God's will. 
(Extract 1) 
This extract will be discussed with reference to the following points: the relational and 
emotional nature of moral decision-making, the conceptions of self embedded in the 
narrative, the tensions between moral voices, and the relationship between moral 
decision-making and gender identity. 
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The Relational and Emotional Nature of Moral Decision-making 
The \vebs of relationships within which the dilemma unfolds (cf. Tappan, 1991a) are 
worth noting. First, there is the relationship between the deceased and his entire family. 
The deceased seems to have occupied a very special position within the family. He was 
"a major breadwinner .. . [and] the 1110St responsible family member." To say that he was 
the "most responsible" indicates that his family relied on him for guidance and overall 
support. The loss of him was thus a major blow. The experience was a very emotional 
one for the family. It triggered anger and pain. Statements such as "[i]t was very painful" 
ancl "[t]he way everyone was angry!" indicate that the dilemma unravelled within a 
highly charged emotional atmosphere. 
-:- - . . 
The narrator 's dilemma was complicated by the special nature of the relationship between 
him and the deceased. He refers many times to the fact that the two of them were very 
close. This put him, as someone who was close to the deceased, under pressure to act: 
"Personally, as a person who was close to him, I had to show closeness, even after his 
death." The extract also indicates that the family expected nothing less than full co-
operation on his part: "At the same time, I had to show the family, my brothers and his 
mother . . . I had to show that I loved him. Because we were very close." The situation 
was complicated by the words uttered by the deceased's mother, when she saw the 
narrator for the first time after the incident: "They have shot my son, but I am glad that 
YOll are alive." These words strengthened the bond between the narrator and his family. 
The words meant that he had to take his brother's place in her heart. It is suggested that 
the mother's words remained embedded in him, serving as an audience of some sort (cf. 
Day & Tappan, 1996), as he grappled with the dilemma. The relational context made it 
very difficult for the narrator to distance himself from his family's intentions. 
Finally, there is the relationship between male members of the family and other men in 
the village community. The narrator and his brothers were concemed that failure to 
avellge the death would be seen as a sign of weakness. It would compromise their 
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standing as men in the eyes of other men in the village. Moral decision-making and 
mascu linity are discussed at length below. 
Conceptions of Selves in the NalTative 
A !lumber of concepts of selves emerge in Vusi's narrative extract. These selves are 
sometimes in rivalry with each other (cf. Hermans, 1996, 2001b; Wertsch, 1991). These 
are the communal (or the self-in-family) and the independent views of the self. The 
narrator was torn between these two perspectives of the self. Sometimes, the communal 
self dominates, while the independent self recedes to the background. On other occasions, 
the independent self dominates, and the communal one recedes. 
The self-in-family wants him to participate in the revenge mission. This would confilm 
his position as an integral part of the family. Failure to participate would give the family 
a different message. He says, for example: "So, that was the most difficult situation I 
faced in my life, having to decide whether to withdraw or not, and the meaning that 
would be attributed to my withdrawal by the family." He was concemed that non-
participation would be seen as an act of distancing himself from the family. This would 
mean that he vvould be severing the relationship with the deceased. The questions he 
posed to himself, in what resembled an intemal dialogue, reflect this: "What would they 
say? They would say I am forsaking him (the deceased) because he is dead?" This voice, 
representing the position of the family, is sometimes expressed with more conviction: 
"Yeah! If someone has wronged the family, AND YOU PUNISH THEM, ... you send a 
message that people cannot mess around with your family." The nalTator's situation was 
complicated by the fact that his sense of self is inextricably intertwined with the family. 
The independent view of the self(cf. Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1994) is evident in 
various parts of the extra~t. The natTator opines about having to drive the car: "Why me? 
Why should J be the one driving the car?" He resorts to the pronoun "I" (Ngi) to express 
his personal views (cf. van Langenhove & Harfe, 1999). He is also wOlTied that his 
possibly bright future, as a student, could be ruined if he participates in the revenge 
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mission: "But what if we get caught? What about my studies? I am a student, my future is 
sti 11 ahead of me. " Talking as an independent actor, the narrator feels uneasy about 
p,lrticipating in the revenge attempt. 
Although the lines cited in the paragraph above point largely at a separate view ofthe 
se lf, they cannot be interpreted simplistically. This is because the dialogical self is 
characterised by movement. The same words could take on different meanings, 
depending on how they are used (cf. Hermans, 2001a). For example, in the paragraph 
above the narrator sees education as a means to advance personal goals. Elsewhere, he 
sees it as a means to benefit the community: "Everything I do, most of the time, I do not 
do it for myself. .. . If! get education, I say to myself. .. 'In what ways are they [the 
~ - . 
community] going to benefit from my education?'" This complexity, characteristic of the 
clialogical self, highlights the need to focus on how the person vacillates between both the 
communal and independent selves. The unit of analysis should be the voice endowed to 
each utterance, as the self vacillates from one position to another. 
The way the narrator uses pronouns to associate or distance himself from the actions of 
his family members, illustrates the movement between various selves. For example, he 
mentions: "1 had to drive the car, . . . [and] once we arrived at Y, 1 had to stay in the car, 
at Cl di stance, [and] once they had done what they wished to do, 1 would drive the get-
away car. " Using the pronouns "I" and "they," he associates and distances himself from 
his brothers ' intentions. Later, he says: "As we were travelling, unembeza was killing me. 
[couldn't believe that, ME! I was driving a car carrying would-be-murderers." When the 
narrator talks with the voice representing the family, the people in the car are his 
brothers. When he examines the situation as an individual, they are "would-be-murders," 
wanting him to participate in "this ugly thing" that "they wanted to do." At the same 
time, he had to show empathy with the deceased, as a family member. The shifts between 
the 'T' and "they" indicate the various selves involved in the dilemma. This movement is 
made possible by the spatial organization of the dialogical self(cf. Hel1nans, 1996, 1997, 
2001 b; Herl11ans et aI., 1992); its ability to shift positions according to changes in place 
and tim e. 
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Moral dilemmas in this study point at the shortcomings of dualistic psychological 
ex planations, or the individual-society antinomy, represented by "methodological 
indi vidualism" and "methodological collectivism" respectively (Hermans & Kempen, 
1995 ; Wertsch, 1995) . M ethodological individualism regards individuals as existing prior 
to soc iety. Jt asserts that "no purported explanations of social (or individual) phenomena 
are to CO Llnt as ex planations, or . . . as rock-bottom explanations, unless they are couched 
wholl y in terms of facts about individuals" (Lukes, cited in Wertsch, 1995, p . 83) . 
Methodological individualism subscribes to the rational, objective view of the self. It 
assumes that people are fully defined before they enter into relationships with others 
(Foge!, 1993). Traditional cognitivist approaches to morality fall under the category of 
'~ .. 
methodological individualism. They attempt to explain moral reasoning in tenns of 
cognitive representations and inner principles (Day & Tappan, 1996). To be a fully moral 
se lf~ onc needs to reason "behind a veil of ignorance" and from "an original position" 
(Rawls, 1972). On the other hand, methodological collectivism explains everything in 
terms of social and cultural practices. All facts about individuals are explained in telms of 
societa I influences. 
The results of this study cannot be accounted for exclusively in tenns of either 
indi viduali sm or collectivism. Respondents' narratives were populated by many voices, 
which were struggling for hegemony within the self (Josephs, 1997; Tappan, 1997c). 
Moral dilemmas emanated from people' s attempts to live in a manner that is consistent 
with the communal view of the self. On the other hand, there were voices representing a 
different v ie\v of the selfin relationships. These voices endorsed an independent 
construal of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991 ; Sampson, 1988). Both views are socio-
culturall y mediated. That is, they do not ensue from "within" the person. Rather, they are 
a product of our exposure to multiple social and cultural points of view. Some of these 
views ex tol an individualistic view of the self, while others prize interdependence. 
The view that tools such as language mediate human functioning means that the 
psycho logical split between what is "internal" and "external" of the person is no longer 
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tenable. As Wertsch (1995) argues, "if one accepts the claim that cultural tools play an 
important role in mediated action, one is led to recognize that [mental functioning] . .. 
can never be attributed solely to individuals" (p. 90), but to individuals acting with 
med iation al means (Penuel & Wertsch, 1995). 
To make sense of the results discussed above, we need the dialogical view of selfhood. 
Dialogism acknow ledges the emergence of personhood from social and collective fonns 
of life. The self arises from the context of social relationships and practices, and hence, it 
is from the start a product of language (Day & Tappan, 1996). People are immersed in 
semiotic and linguistic milieus, "out of which come voices, languages, and fonns of 
discourse that serve to shape and mediate their psychological functioning" (Tappan, 
~ . . 
1991 a, p. 12). The dialogical self is populated by many voices and perspectives 
(Hermans, 1997, 2001a; Wertsch, 1995). Each voice is capable ofauthoring its point of 
view. Multipl e voices within the self can accompany and oppose each other dialogically 
(Hermans, 1997, 2001a; Hermans & Kempen, 1993). As Hem1ans and Kempen (1993) 
note, polyphony implies "a plurality of voices representing a plurality of worlds that are 
neither identical nor unified, but rather heterogeneous and even opposed" (p. 42). The 
tension between various selves (Hem1ans, 2001b), observed in this study, is explained by 
the fact that voices comprising the dialogical self can be ideologically independent of 
each other (MOl'son & Emerson, 1 (90). 
Cognitivism and the Role of the Other in Self-definition 
It could be argued that dialogism is not the only perspective that recognizes the role of 
the other in self-definition. Indeed, using the notion of relational schemas, some cognitive 
theorists have attempted to account for the role of the other in self-understanding 
(Anderson, J 983; Baldwin, 1992; Baldwin, Can"ell & Lopez, 1990). Relational schemas 
consist of three elements, namely (a) an interpersonal script, (b) a self-schema for oneself 
in the relationship, and (c) a schema for the other in the relationship. An interpersonal 
script is episodic in nature. It is a cognitive generalization based on repeated interactions 
with important others. It includes the roles of various people involved in the interaction, 
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thc pattern of the interaction, and a summary statement of resultant behaviors and 
responses. 
The relationship between actors in an interpersonal schema could be conceptualized 
dialogically. This, in a way, accounts for some of the interactions observed between 
actors in tbis study. However, relational schemas lack the critical innovative feature of 
trul y c1i alogical relationships (Hermans, 1997). Relational schemas are relatively stable 
beC,lll se they are based on "repeated experiences with similar interactions" (Baldwin, 
L 992, p. 468). The meaning ofrelational schemas is located in the past. The dialogical 
self, on other hand, is challenged not only by new information, but also by intemal 
contradictions as well. These challenges lead to new meanings, resulting in innovation or 
~ - . 
self-renewal (Hermans, 1996, 1997). The dialogical self is "unfinalizable" because it is 
always oriented toward the future. Its meaning is not located in the past but the future. 
This is particularly important for "moral experience, wherein different moral voices, from 
cl i fferent moral perspectives, must be kept alive, and treated with respect, so they can 
partake in tbe ongoing dialogue that is the self." (Tappan, 1997c, p. 384) 
Another problem with the concept of relational schemas is that it focuses on immediate 
interpersonal relationships between actors. It does not mention how cultural, historical, 
and institutional factors influence self-understanding. The dialogical self, on the other 
hand , emerges 11 0 t only from interpersonal experiences, but also from collective voices as 
welJ. Rel ational schemas cannot account for a special kind of multi-voiced ness, namely 
)lcl1lriLoquation, which involves individuals speaking with voices representing specific 
groups in society. As Hermans et al. (1992) argue, the dialogical self "is embedded in a 
historical context with deep implications for both the fom1 and content ofnan'atives and 
di alogical processes" (p. 29). The dialogical self seizes meaning from narratives in its 
social and historical context. Relational schemas, on the other hand, are limited to 
interpersonal interactions. 
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Tensions Between Moral Voices 
Tensions were observed between vari.ol1s moral voices in the respondents ' nalTatives. 
These were the voices of care, justice and respect for life, and unembeza. For example, in 
Extract I , Vusi speaks from a position associated with intense emotional pain and the 
des ire to punish the perpetrators: "At the same time, what they had done to our brother 
was very painful. AND I WANTED THEM TO BE PUNISHED!" He justifies this 
position because "if a person has caused pain to others, he/she must be punished." 
Another position coming to the fore is that inflicting ham1 on others is against his 
personal principles, such as the right to life and the injunction not to hann others: "This 
meant that, to me the conflict was: I had to do something that was against my life 
principles . . . . I've never seen myself hurting another human being. Because, I think 
everyone has the right to life." These principles were in conflict with the course of action 
he and his brothers were pursuing (inflicting hann). These positions engage dialogically 
with each other throughout the nalTative. Sometimes, the voice representing the family 
(i.e. emotional pain, the desire that perpetrators be punished) seems to dominate. On 
other occasions, it recedes to the background, while his "personal principles" take centre-
stage. 
Tbe fact that tbe narrator regarded himself as an empathetic person complicated his 
situation : " If someone is going to be harmed, I put myself in the position of that person, 
and I real ize it must be painful." This makes him uneasy with his role as a would-be-
accomplice to murder. On the other hand, emotional and family ties to the deceased 
required the narrator to empathise with him. Family members expected a visible 
demonstration of empathy, through active participation in the revenge effort. The nalTator 
W(1 S c(1l1ght between empathy for the deceased, and empathy for the would-be-victims of 
their revenge efforts. 
Another voice, unembeza. militated against participation in the revenge effort. He defines 
/.lII c lllhez{{ in religious terms : "In am doing something and I think of God, I get scared if 
it is (1 bad thing." It is interesting to note that unembeza is something he experiences 
emotionally and bodily. Unembeza could be conceptualised as an inner moral audience 
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(cf. Day & Tappan, 1996). The narrator concluded that God would not approve of their 
actions. This finds support in the statements: "So, as we were travelling, unembeza was 
killing me inside." In isiZulu, the expression "to be 'killed ' by unembeza" indicates he 
felt morally guilty. Unembeza was "killing him" because he was proceeding with a 
course of action he knew to be immoral. 
To further illustrate tensions involved in moral decision-making, an extract from an 
intervi ew with Mbaii, a Black postgraduate student, is introduced. Mbali related an 
incident that happened when she was an undergraduate university student and house 
committee member in her residence. She had to impose a fine on another Black student, 
who had neglected her l)?use duties. These were the early days of racial integration in one 
of the local university residences, and there were very few Black compared to White 
students in residence. Black students fOl111ed a very close-knit cOlmnunity. She found 
herself t0111 between faimess (fining the Black student) and the fear of alienating herself 




The situation you have just described, do you consider it a moral problem? 
It is very difficult, because when I was growing up at home, I was taught the 
proper way of doing things. That if there is a job that you have been assigned to, 
you have to do it. Or if you can't do it, you apologize or enlist someone to do it 
011 your behalf. So, it was a problem that she made a mistake and did not .... ". 
apologise. So, what caused the dilemma for me was that a person is a person 
because of others (ul11untu ngumul1tu ngabantu). I was taught that you 
accommodate people, you try to bend a little here and there, so that you can grow 
through people, and also allow them to grow through you. So, I did not know 
what to choose, between the maxim that a person is a person because of others, 
and applying the house rules. So, I told myself that ... I am going to lose a lot of 
support from Black students, but those who know me, those who are prepared to 
stand for the truth, will realise that it is indeed ubuntu that I should fine her. 
Otherwise. people will do as they please. 
Is there anything that came to your mind while you considered the 
situation? 
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MbaJi: This thing was unfortunate because it involved race, and I felt bad when I found 
out later on that some White house committee members did not fine White 
students . ... It was a gamble because the decision isolated me .. . But I told 
myself that, in the future , as a leader, am I going to be deciding on the basis of 
race? Because if I am deciding on the basis of race, then at another level, I am 
communicating that our [Black] people can't decide, they are lowering standards, 
they are not principled in their decision-making. So, it was important to be fair 
and honest. .. so as to preserve the dignity of Black people. 
(Extract 2) 
Faced with a racially-charged dilemma, Mbali found herself tom between empathy for a 
fellow Black student, and faimess. She also considered the consequences of acting fairly 
(personal alienation). This was important, given the history of South Afi.-ican race 
relations. Despite the possibility of personal alienation, she went ahead to apply the 
principle of faimess. 
In both Extracts 1 (Vusi) and 2 (Mbali) above, there is an interplay of mUltiple voices. 
These are voices such as care, faimess, justice (respect for life), and in Vusi's case, even 
revenge. Tensions between actors' voices and the voices of their families (Vusi) or their 
social groups (Mbali) occur throughout the narratives. The various voices constituting the 
moral landscape engage dynamically with each other. Individuals vacillate between them, 
according to changes in situation and time. The tensions ensue from the struggle of being 
an embodied (rather than abstract) being. Embodied beings are called upon to make 
1110ral choices in concrete, real life situations. They have to make judgements of a 
practical-moral type. This requires them to respond to the exigencies of the situation. In 
both cases, these exigencies are such that the narrators are called upon to act in a just and 
principled way, in contexts that are generally considered unjust. Dialogism enables us to 
study the circumstances in which one voice, rather than the other, comes to the fore under 
such circumstances. 
The tensions observed are consistent with the dialogical self. The dialogical self can 
vacillate between contradictory positions. It is characterized by a high degree of 
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movement. Gilligan et al. (1990) and Hennans and Kempen (1993) employ the musical 
metaphor to capture the fluid character of the self. Gilligan et af. (1990) argue that "the 
unity of self can be compared to the unity of musical composition where meaning at any 
one moment is indeterminate, since it can only be apprehended in time" (p. 109). In a 
similar vein, Henmms et af. (1992) note the fluid and indetenninate nature ofthe mUltiple 
positions that the dialogical self can occupy: 
The J has the possibility to move, as in space, from one position to the other in 
accordance with changes in situation and time. The I fluctuates among different and even 
opposed positions. The I has the capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a 
voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be established. (Hem1ans et al., 
1992, p. 28) 
Conceiving the self dia10gically enables us to transcend the shortcomings of the unitary 
self, which speaks with only one moral voice. Dialogismmakes it possible to study 
morality in terms of the tensions and the struggles between various parts of the self. As 
Day and Tappan (1996) argue, the moral selfresults from the process by which "the 
words, language and fOlms of discourses encountered in one's own context collide, 
collude, and combine, . .. provok[ing] a need to establish and define a voice (or voices) 
of one's own." (p. 73) 
The tensions between moral voices could be conceptualised as a struggle between 
authoritative and intemally-persuasive discourses (cf. Bakhtin, 1981; Day & Tappan, 
1996; Tappan, 1991a). Authoritative discourse represents voices belonging to others (the 
family, authority, etc.): rooted in the past, it demands that we obey it unconditionally. In 
the case of Vu si, his family required him to demonstrate empathy with the deceased, by 
participating in the effort to avenge his death. Vusi has not integrated the mUltiple voices 
in a way that represents a voice of his own (cf. Bakhtin, 1981). By his own admission, he 
does not want to show his own position (the "Me") because "my inside, it is weak, 
compared to my outside, which is what I show." Hence, despite his misgivings, he goes 
along with what "the family was doing." 
Internally persuasive discourse, on the other hand, merges others' voices with the 
person's. It awakens new and independent meanings in the person, and is always oriented 
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toward the future. Bakhtin (1981) notes that although "[o]ne's own discourse and one's 
own voice is born of another or dynamically stimulated by another, [they will] sooner or 
later begin to liberate themselves from the authority of the other's discourse" (p. 348). 
F or example, Mbali (Extract 2) battles with a situation similar to Vusi' s (Extract 1), 
namely personal views versus those of a group. It is of note that she re-defines her 
decision to fine the Black student (faimess) as a real embodiment of ubuntu. She 
maintains that " ... [t]hose who know me, those who are prepared to stand for the truth, 
will realise that it is indeed ubuntu that I should fine her." Fmiher, she maintains that this 
decision is in the interest of the (Black) group as a whole. It shows that Black people are 
not biased in their decision-making. What appears to be a principle-based decision is 
redefined to serve (at le~st) the long-tenn interest ofthe group. By re-defining the 
situation for herself, Mbali is able to honour her point of view. This is consistent with 
Bakhtin's (1981) position, who maintains that we "author" (express) who we are through 
the things we do, including the utterances we make. Authorship involves "honoring (or 
"authorizing") what one thinks, feels, and does with respect to what is right and wrong-
even in the face of potential conflict and disagreement." (Tappan & Brown, 1989, p. 190) 
The results discussed above support the view that people are not limited to speaking with 
a single moral voice (Day & Tappan, 1996). Gilligan and her colleagues (Gilligan & 
Attanucci, 1988; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988; Gilligan et al., 1990; Lyons, 1988) have 
noted the existence of two voices: justice and care. The voice of justice advocates 
fairness and equality, while the voice of care advocates responsibility in relationships. 
Considered alone, the voice of justice is inadequate for understanding the complexities of 
moral decision-making. The voice of justice stipulates that what is right for one person 
wi 11 be right for any person under similar circumstances (Shweder, 1982). As Shweder 
argues, this idea is incomplete because human beings will resemble each other in some 
respects, and differ from each other in other respects. The principle of justice falls short 
of specifying the resemblances and differences that are relevant to moral decision-
making. Abstract principles do not indicate to us what kind of society to fashion. Nor do 
they inform llS ofthe kinds of relationships we ought to have with one another (Shweder, 
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1982). By adding voices which speak of care and respect, to that of justice, we can come 
to a better understanding of moral reasoning in real life situations. 
The si mu ltaneous existence of more than one moral voice raises another problem, namely 
how people make moral decisions in the face of contradictory moral positions. This was 
evident in this study, where empathy for a family member was at odds with the demands 
of justice. Bakhtin's (1981) notion of authorship provides a partial answer to tlus 
problem. The problem is philosophical, and beyond the scope of this study. However, I 
would like to point the reader to the works of Ben ha bib (1992), who has explored the 
relationship between the voices of justice and care. Likewise, Gilligan et al. (1990) use a 
musical metaphor to higl~light the relationship between moral voices. They argue that 
moral voices can be "hal1110nized according to the laws of counterpoint" (p. 115). Moral 
voices with a melody of justice, for example, can be enriched by viewing the same 
situation from the perspective of care and respect. This metaphor provides a good starting 
point for elucidating how people solve dilelmnas involving tensions between various 
moral voices. 
Gender and Cultural Positioning in Moral Decision-making 
Tensions between different selves and moral voices in decision-making have been 
explored . This section explores the interface between gender and moral identity. The 
purpose is to show that the process of moral decision-making and gender identity are 
intertwined (cf. Tappan, 2000). It is argued that moral dilemmas ensue from the struggle 
to craft an identity as a woman or man, given the dominant scripts afforded by one's 
culture. 
To explore concepts of masculinity embedded in narratives of moral conflict, reference is 
made to Vusi's naITative (Extract 1 above) . Additional shorter extracts are also supplied 
. , 
111 support of the masculinity thesis. To highlight gender dimensions involved in women's 
narratives of moral choice, an extract from an interview with Tha (Extract 3) appears 
below. Later, it is supplemented with shorter extracts from other interviews. 
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At the age of 19, Tha found herself an only female member, among a group of students 
doing community work in a rural setting. The group expected her to perfoml typically 
"feminine" duties, such as cooking. She was also pressurized to have a romantic 







Could you tell me about a situation that posed a moral dilemma for you? 
As students, we volunteered now and then to do community service. We had this 
student organization called X, which placed us in groups anywhere in the 
country. Sometimes we worked in the old-age homes, orphanages, etc. So, it 
happened that one day I found out that I was the only girl in the group, and we 
were stationed far away, in a rural area. Other girls who were supposed to come 
could nOU'11ake it. I had to represent my school. My moral dilemma was that we 
had to stay there and sleep there, for three weeks. I was the only girl in the group. 
We were based in a very rural community. The community could not figure out 
my contribution to the job, as a woman, [especially given that] ... the job was of 
a manual nature. They assumed I must be someone's girlfriend. Even amongst us 
as students, we came from different backgrounds, and our perceptions about 
women were not the same. My conflict was that some students in the camp had 
certain perceptions about women in general. They thought that a woman belongs 
in the kitchen, or to entertain a man as a girlfriend, etc. So, I did not know how to 
handle the sexual interest they had in me, especially the project manager. The 
stereotypes of the community in which we worked did not help either. In 
particular, it was assumed that I must be the project manager's girlfriend: 
otherwise, why did I come alone? Even the group itself suspected that. So, I was 
under a lot of pressure to act like his girlfriend. My position, on the other hand, 
was that we were all the same. We were all there to make a difference to the 
community . I did not know how to handle this conflict. I am a human being too! I 
have feelings! I did not want to be used . The conflict was: How do I show him, 
nicely, that I have no [romantic] interest in him, without hurting his feelings. 
So, you were under pressure to be his girlfriend, the one in charge? 
Yes. 
How did he react to that? 
llmew him because we had been in touch telephonically, to anange for the 
project. I tried, jokingly, to explain my position to him. I explained that I am a 
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gender activist: I did not expect to be h"eated in a special way .. . . Initially, it was 
OK. We respected each other ... . But then, he came under pressure because of 
the community's assumptions. He was under pressure to look at me not as a 
comrade sister. ... Somehow, he felt he must entertain me. 
While you were thinking about this situation, what else came to your mind? 
I WAS IN TROUBLE! I WAS IN TROUBLE! (Sigh). He was older than me. I 
respected him. He had come all the way from Pretoria!4 He had a car and a 
cellphone, and everything. He never stayed in the camp. He just came to 
supervise our work and disappeared again. But we were supposed to work 
together with him, as a group .. .. But he remained very high! He would come 
and ask: "How are things going?" And then he would give me a lot of attention. 
That was ~~rong, because I was the only woman, and a group leader. That created 
a lot of tension in the group. 
So, your dilemma was, how to resolve this problem, given his position? 
HIS POSITION! HIS POSITION! We also depended on him for money and food. 
As a group leader, I could not afford to be in conflict with him. He was powerful! 
At the same time, I had to see to it that my group's needs were met. I had to 
ensure that my group remained happy. I had to maintain a good relationship with 
him. 
It must have been a very difficult situation? 
We often ran out of food. He [the project manager] would disappear from the 
campsite, without letting us know his whereabouts. Maybe he did it purposely, to 
undermine my role as a woman and group leader. So, we would run short of 
food . By the end of the day .. . and for the benefit of us all, I would prepare the 
food. As a woman. I can prepare a good meal, with velJ! few resources at my 
disposal (ngiyakwazi ukupatanisa). 
You said you told the project manager "nicely" that you were not interested. 
Why was it important to you to avoid hurting his feelings? 
Yes! Yes, because .. . he would think of himself as an inferior person. He would 
begin to question himself: "Tha does not like me! What is wrong with me?" That 
would have hurt the relationship in the group as a whole. 
[n other words, it was important to sustain the relationship in the group? 











Yeah! [I did not want to] hurt his ego, his manhood . Probably, where he comes 
from , he has a reputation, that no woman can resist him. No woman dismisses 
him. 
So, what did you do, eventually? 
It was difficult! It was difficult because, even though I tried to explain to him that 
we were comrades, please let us be together in this thing, he never understood. 
He regarded the other boys in the group as inferiors, and he thought they were 
standing on his way . It was a big challenge. 
So, what did you eventually do in this situation? 
We tried to hold group meetings with him. But even in those meetings, he would 
prevail, because of his superior education. Everything was in his favour. We gave 
him our suggestions, but he never considered them, because he thought we were 
silly, perhaps. 
So, what was the outcome in this case? 
When I raised a suggestion and he would not take it, I told the groupI was going 
to disappear, to get lost. They thought I was joking. So, I just hid in the near-by 
bushes. It was getting dark and they did not know where I was. That got them 
worried and that brought cohesion in the group. I could hear them talking to 
themselves: "Where is Tha? Where is Tha? She has disappeared as she said!" 
That was another strategy I resorted to, unintentionally, anyway. I also wanted to 
give myself some time because I could not take the pressure anymore .... When 
they found me, just sitting, they apologised . . .. They realized it was not that I 
was supporting him (the project manager). From then on they stood together with 
me when we had meetings with him. That made it a little easier, negotiating with 
him. 
What did you learn in this dilemma? 
[I learnt that] in order to live with yourself, ... to be congruent with yourself, 
you have to stand up for your beliefs, although it is hard. Because, once you 
diverge from your beliefs, you will never forgive yourself. Then you will see that 
you are a failure . In my case, I was standing up for other women. So, if I diverge 
[from my beliefs] , where is my leadership? 
(Extract 3) 
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The discussion below will show that gender and power dynamics play an important role 
in moral reasoning. Tlu'oughout the results, we encounter individuals struggling with 
dominant narratives of what it means to be a man or woman in their societies. Following 
Tappan (2000) and Penuel and Wertsch (1995), it is argued that the development of 
moral reasoning is an important part of identity fonnation, or ideological becoming 
(Bakhtin, 1981). First, the socio-cultural embeddedness of moral identity is explored. 
Second , it is shown that moral dilemmas occur during the course of an activity, as moral 
actors posi tion and re-position themselves in relation to the dominant gendered scripts in 
their cu lture. 
The Socio-cultural Embeddedness of Moral Identity 
, . 1 
Cultural narratives of what it means to be a man or woman played a major role in the 
dilemmas experienced by both Vusi (Extract 1) and Tha (Extract 3). Notions of manhood 
or womanhood unfold between the urban and educational, and the rural settings. The 
narrators were struggling with dominant gender discourses embedded in these settings. 
In the case of Vu si, the educational institution, where he is a student, and the rural 
community, where he resides, appear to endorse different accounts of what it means to be 
a man. Education is associated with cowardice in the rural setting. If the narrator failed to 
participate in the revenge mission, the view that he had become a coward would be 
supported. Thus, to protect his masculinity, he had to withdraw strategically from the 
fami ly's revenge mission. This is supported by the following concern, which he voices in 
an attempt to persuade his brothers that the murder should be left to the police to deal 
with : 
So, 1 tried another plan. I said: 'Why don ' t we contact the police?' .. . But at the same 
lim e. as J was giving this opinion. I did not want to appear as a coward. I had to avoid 
that: otherwise , they would think that being educated has tumed me into a coward. So, I 
gave this opinion in a matter-of-fact way. 
To avoid the perception that Western-type education had turned him into a coward, Vusi 
expresses an opinion, while pretending that he was not fully committed to it. 
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Withdrawing directly fi'om the revenge mission would compromise his image as a brave 
man ill his society; an important part of his male identity. This identity is most salient in 
the rural community, as indicated by the following lines: 
You see, like, amongst us as brothers, we are a big family. Yes, I may be educated, but 
p1110ng my people, those I associate with, I WANT TO APPEAR AS A MAN AMONG 
MEN .. . . [Even though I am educated] MY MANHOOD IS STILL THERE!" 
When the narrator is "among my people" education becomes something that could 
(potentially) deprive one of manhood. The need to show that he has not been deprived of 
manhood is at its strongest when he is "among my people", it could be argued. Thus, the 
meaning of manhood is contested between the educational setting and the rural context. 
A further reading of the story indicates that the narrator is of the opinion that the 
differences between him and his brothers result from differences in worldviews: "People 
say that educated people are cowards. I do not Imow whether it is cowardice or thinking 
too much, thinking differently about issues." This hints at the fact that education results 
in a different way of seeing the world. These differences are probably most evident to 
him, having been exposed to both settings and worldviews. The extract highlights the 
need to study moral dilemmas resulting from the simultaneous participation in different 
cultural communities. 
Like VlIsi's, Tha's dilemma (Extract 3) takes place in a rural setting, a point mentioned 
several times in the narrative. Embedded in this setting are understandings of 
relationships between men and women in that society. First, there is the relationship 
between the narrator and the rural conummity itself. The community has a different, and 
stereotyped, understanding of the position and role of women in society. This is 
complicated by the fact that the nalTator was the only WOmall in the group. She says: 
"The community could not figure out my contribution to the job, as a woman, [especially 
given that] the job was of a manual nature. They assumed that I must be someone's 
girlfriend." Second, the relationship between the nalTator and fellow group members was 
also coloured by gender stereotypes. She says that "[ e ]ven amongst us as students, we 
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came from different backgrounds, and our perceptions about women were not the same." 
The dilemma emanates from the discrepancy between her views about women, and the 
views of those around her. 
The extracts discussed above indicate that moral reasoning does not occur in isolation. 
Rather, \-\le found respondents battling with dominant fomls of talking in their particular 
cultural settings. This implies that moral reasoning does not happen "inside" people's 
heads, with reference to internally-held-principles (Day & Tappan, 1996). It is mediated 
by psychological tools such as language. Vygotsky (1981b) maintains that "psychological 
tools" or signs mediate human action. Mediated activity (e.g. thinking) is "human action 
carried out by an indivi~~al or a group, that 'employs a cultural tool' or 'mediational 
means'" (Wertsch, 1995, p. 89). Most important, these fonus of talking are embedded in 
social and cultural contexts, such as our communities and families. 
The socio-cultural embeddedness of conceptions of manhood and womanhood observed 
above, points to the necessity to situate the study of narratives of moral identity "in 
settings where f0l111ing identities are at stake in the course of an activity" (Penuel & 
Wertsch, 1995, p. 90). The study of moral becoming needs to focus on challenges social 
and cultural factors provide to moral identities as they emerge. These challenges are re-
enacted in settings such as the media, the community, and other areas of public discourse. 
Each setting has its own meanings, symbols, voices and field of signs (Penuel & Wertsch, 
1995). Tn this study, moral identities (e.g. the meaning of manhood or womanhood) were 
contested jn settings such as the family or the community. Moral actors struggled 
"against dominant discourses of their identity to construct a different way of speaking 
about themselves and develop new ways of action." (Penuel & Welisch, 1995, p. 90) 
The results of the study are consistent with Vygotsky's (1978) account of psychological 
development. Vygotsky argues that it is the very process or struggle, rather than the end 
point of development, that is of most psychological relevance. This view is captured by 
his "genetic" or developmental method, which stipulates that "to encompass in research 
the process of a given thing's development in all its phases and changes ... 
fundam entally means to discover its nature, . . . for it is only in movement that a body 
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shows what it is." (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 65) Unlike cognitivist approaches, which prize the 
end-point of development, Vygotsky calls our attention to processes that are undergoing 
transformation oyer time. In this study, it was the meaning of what it entails to be a man 
or woman in a particular setting or community that was contested. 
Meanings embedded in social and cultural institutions constrain the range of options 
availab le to individuals (Penuel & Wertsch, 1995; Tappan, 2000). This arises from the 
Fact that cultural tools are already imbued with others' meanings. Meanings embedded in 
them "belong to a cultural capital inherited and invested by new actors through history" 
(Hermans & Kempen, 1993, p. 73). Cultural tools have been used by others, to serve their 
own purposes. This implies that to understand the role of gender in moral becoming, we 
. -. ' 
need to engage with questions such as: What kinds of narratives about the self (being a 
woman or a man) are available in the social and cultural context? Do these nalTatives 
enable or constrain the kind of person one can become? Whose purposes do they serve? 
Activity, Positioning and Moral Discourse 
In both Extracts 1 and 3, gender identity is not a theoretical concept: it is contested 
practically, during the course of an activity. That is, it is with reference to particular 
activities (things that people do or fail to do), and in relation to other people, that 
gendered selves are contested. Let us consider the manner in which Vusi describes 
himself. The isiZulu expression, "a man among men", cited many times during his 
interview, refers to fearless people. Apart from denoting the masculine gender, the word 
"insizwu" (a man) refers to a person of great courage in battle. Vusi points at further 
evidence of his masculinity by drawing our attention to his biography, the things he has 
done in the past: 
During traditional events (imicimbi) I carry a shield. Yeah! It must be clear that I am a 
111an: [ do not fear other men . I sometimes tell people: ' Men! ... we may be educated, but 
as a boy, I went through all traditional courage testing rituals. I fought! ... You see, the 
I'act that we are educated; education is just a means to get pOlTidge. It cannot change the 
fact that 1 am a man. 
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Ln traditional Zulu society, the shield is a marker of manhood. It symbolizes readiness for 
battle. Not only does he cany a shield, he also participated in the events that boys must 
go through, in the transition to manhood. Most important, this biography is cited in 
settings where his manhood is in doubt, due to his education. When his brother was 
killed , Vusi was availed of the opportunity to demonstrate that his manhood, an impOliant 
part of his social identity, had not been negatively affected by education. His nanative 
hi ghlights the importance of studying moral decision-making in contexts in which 
identities are being formed and/or challenged (cf. Tappan, 2000) . 
In a similar manner, Tha (Extract 3) found herself positioned stereotypically not only by 
the community in whicb.she and the group worked, but also by the members of her group 
as well. Some members of her group, of which she was the immediate leader, "thought 
that a woman belongs in the kitchen, or to enteliain a man as a girlfriend, etc." The moral 
dilemma emanates from different perceptions of the roles and responsibilities of women 
in society. The meaning of womanhood is contested with reference to two activities (cf. 
Penllel & Wertsch, 1995). Both the group and the community thought she was there to 
play the role stereotypically associated with women: cooking and provision of sexual 
favours. The manual nature of the job (i.e. it required physical strength, associated with 
men) exacerbates the situation. The nanator had to deal with these dominant discourses 
of what it means to be a woman (cf. Penuel & Wertsch, 1995), in that setting. 
These extracts support the view that moral reasoning is not reducible to the act of solitary 
individuals. A mediated action approach focuses on what people do in specific social and 
cultural contexts (Tappan, 1997c, 1998; Penuel & Wertsch, 1995; Wertsch & Stone, 
] 985) . The primary unit of analysis in mediated action is not the individual's ilmer 
principles, but individuais acting with mediational means: 
fn this approach, what we are attempting to interpret, explain, or analyze is meaningful 
human action , rather than inner states of individuals or sociocultural processes considered 
in isolation. The language and other signs that people use to describe themselves in the 
course of action are not, in this view, seen as an impediment. By speaking and listening 
to others, the claim may be made, the signs as incorporated into the flow of action 
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actually construct, or build up the sense of self by providing terms to individuals they 
may employ when talking a:bout themselves to others . (Penuel & Wertsch, 1995, p. 91) 
Socio-cultural approaches to psychology conceive moral reasoning as an activity. It is a 
relational practice in temlS of which people feel, act and think, in relation to those around 
them (Brown & Gilligan, 1991; Gilligan et al.. 1990; Tappan, 1997c). This differs from 
the cognitivist approach, which abstracts moral reasoning from its context (Benhabib, 
1992). Moral reasoning is not about mastering advanced stages of moral thought. 
Instead, it is concemed with how people relate to one another. These relationships can be 
incorporated into the way people talk about themselves (Gilligan et aI., 1990). Viewed 
this way, the "moral life becomes an ongoing dialogue among different stories, scripts, 
and scenes ... that can be put into practice by the people who use them as their tools ... 
forjoining. reproaching. and in other ways mending and breaching relationships" (Day 
& Tappan, 1996, p. 75, emphasis added). Construing morality as a practical activity 
requires us to pay attention to the cultural scripts, or the mediational means, that people 
appeal to in their interactions with others. 
Positioning and Resistance 
It has been shown that people are positioned in a variety of ways in their interactions with 
others. One may be expected to assume a traditional male script (e.g. bravery) or a 
typical female role (e.g. cooking). However, people can resist positions assigned to them 
by others or their communities. Tha's interview nanative (Extract 3) illustrates this. 
Having been positioned by the group and the community as a sexual object and cook, she 
responds by re-positioning herself, thereby expressing a different view of gender and 
relationships. Tha rejects the positions assigned to her by appealing to her own point of 
view. Her position was that "we were all the same. We were all there to make a 
difference to the community." She appeals to equality between the sexes (we are all the 
same) and the purpose of their activities: changing the lives of the people in the 
community. In another attempt to re-position herself, the narrator also appeals to her 
rights to be treated with dignity, as a human being: "I am a human being too! I have 
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feelings! ] did not want to be used." This appeal echoes the principle of the universal 
dignity and equality of human beings (cf. Kohlberg, 1981, 1984). It should be noted, 
however, that this is not an appeal to an abstract principle. The nalTator refers to the fact 
that she has feelings. In other words, she is a concrete human being, capable of being 
(emotionall y) hurt, if treated as an object. She appeals to both the principle of respect and 
equality, and sensitivity to the feelings of real life, concrete actors. 
The narrator also attempts to re-position herself by appealing to her beliefs as a gender 
activist. This appears to be an important part of her identity. She warded off the project 
manager's 8dv8nces because "I am a gender activist: I did not expect to be treated in a 
special way." Being tre;;t~ed in a stereotypical fashion was incompatible with her ideals 
and principles. This is supported by the view that" ... in order to live with yourself ... 
you have to stand by your beliefs, although it is hard." Not only were her beliefs and 
principles at stake, but also the entire cause she stood for: the rights of other women. 
Thus, she says: "In my case, I was standing up for other women. So ifI diverged [from 
my beliefs], where is my leadership?" Through deliberate self-positioning, a process by 
which people express their personal identity by refelTing to their personal agency, beliefs, 
or biography (cf. van Langenhove & Hmi·e, 1999), Tha expresses a different view of 
gender and relationships. 
Positioning: The Tensions Between Mediational Means 
The various forms of positioning and counterpositioning, evident in Tha's interview, 
refl ect tensions between social and personal positions (Hennans, 2001 b; Wertsch, 1995). 
Social positions "are organized by societal definitions, expectations and prescriptions" 
(Herl11ans, 2001 b, p. 263). Positions available to people within a dialogue are not freely 
constructed : they are culturally embedded (van Langenhove & Harie, 1999; Moghaddam, 
1999). Conversations between participants reflect "nalTative fonns already existing in the 
culture, which are part of the repertoire of competent members, who ... can jointly 
construct a sequence of position/act-action storylines" (van Langenhove & Halie, 1999, 
pp. 19-20) . We learn the moral ascriptions associated with categories such as gender by 
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growi ng up as members of particular societies, and through patiicipation in the social 
languages and genres of our speech communities. On the other hat1d, "personal positions 
receive their fonn from the paliicular ways in which individual people orgat1ize their own 
lives, sometimes in opposition to or protest against the expectations implied by societal 
expectations" (Hermans, 200] b, p. 263). 
The fact that individuals can resist socially-ascribed positions points to the fact that the 
relationship between mediational means and action is not mechat1istic (Wertsch, 1995, 
1998). There is always an "ilTeducible tension, or dialectic, between mediational means, 
on the one hand, and their unique use by an individual or individuals, on the other." 
(Wertsch, 1995, p. 90))n other words, cultural tools can only be understood in action, 
when they are being employed by individuals to attain ends. The use of a cultural tool is 
characterized not only by tension (as others resist it), but also by the unpredictability of 
the outcome of the process of using the tool. For example, in this study, we saw 
participants trying to re-position themselves, in protest against social expectations arising 
from their social positions. People may re-position themselves by appealing to a different 
moral order (e.g. we are all human beings), or by referring to their specific individual 
attributes (e.g. I am a caring person) (Harie & van Langenhove, 1999b). In each case, the 
outcome was different, depending on how the process was negotiated. Thus, a proper 
study of moral reasoning should focus on the tension (dialectic) between: cultural tools 
and human action. 
Flexibility and Positioning Theory 
Flexibi lity is one of the distinguishing features of the dialogical view of the self (cf. 
Hermans , 1996, 2001a), a feature this view shares with positioning theory. The dialogical 
self can move from one position to another, according to situation and time, endowing 
each position with a voice in the process. This results in a vat·iety of independent, 
sometimes even contradictory meanings, being espoused by a single person. Movement 
from one position to another was noted in Tha's nalTative. Although she rejected being 
positioned as a cook, on some occasions, she accepted it: 
234 
I--le would disappear from the campsite, without letting us know his whereabouts. Maybe 
he did it purposely, to unden:nine my role as a woman and group leader. So, we would 
run short of food. By the end of the day, ... and for the benefit of us all, I would prepare 
the food . As Cl woman, I can prepare a good meal , with very few resources at my 
di sposal. 
A careful reading of these lines indicates that cooking is now endowed with a new 
meaning. The narrator cooked to protect her identity as a capable female leader, which 
she felt was being threatened by the manager's actions. Speaking as a competent female 
leader, a skill that otherwise communicated her subservient position, is tumed into a 
strength. The extract shows that the meaning attached to cooking was not fixed. It 
depended on the speakel:'s position and objectives. The extract highlights the usefulness 
of the notion of positioning, as opposed to roles, in theorizing about personhood. Roles 
indicate fixed, static personality attributes (van Langenhove & Halie, 1999). The 
dynamics observed in this study, on the other hand, can be more easily understood with 
reference to changes in subject positions. 
Positioning theory (Davies & Hmi·e, 1990, 1999; Halie & van Langenhove, 1999b) 
accounts for the gender dynamics observed in this study. Attributes such as rank and 
gender influenced interpersonal and even intrapersonal interactions among moral actors. 
The respondents assigned rights, responsibilities and duties to others, depending 
particularly on their gender. Positions are always assigned in relation to people. Men and 
"'''omen in this study were positioned in relation to each other by culturally defined scripts 
of what it means to be a man or woman, among other factors. The moral implication of 
positioning ensues from the fact that people may be expected to perfonn certain actions, 
or behave in Cl particular way, by virtue of the position they occupy, or because they 
belong to a particular institution (van Langenhove & Halie, 1999). Moghaddam (1999) 
concurs with this view. He argues that: 
positioning takes place within a specific moral order, such as a gender group, .. . ethnic 
group, tribe , and society. Moral orders are maintained by certain linguistic practices 
through which social relations between people ... and groups of people are regulated and 
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by which social norms or standards or personality, character, and physical appearances 
are promulgated. (p. 80) 
Positioning and Personhood 
Davies and Hari'e (1990,1999) maintain that the notion of positioning contributes to our 
understandi ng of personhood. Traditional psychological theorizing is based on a lmitary, 
self-contained view of the self. That is, the individual is thought to be a container of 
personal dispositions, such as thoughts, emotions, personality traits and attitudes. These 
dispositions, thought to reside "inside" the individual, are relatively stable over time. 
Positioning theory, on t}1e hand, focuses on how "subjectivity" emerges from discursive 
practices. These practices could involve interpersonal interactions, and the manner in 
which peop le interact with meanings embedded in social and cultural institutions. 
Discursive practices are not fixed: they are always shifting and changing with the • 
storyline. This means that meanings attributed to the self or one's position change as the 
storyline unfolds (Moghaddam, 1999). Positioning theory is thus better able to account 
for the changes in narrative positions adopted by the participants in this study. 
Contradictions in self-understanding, inherent in the notion of positioning, have been 
Llsed within post-structural feminist theory as entry points to an understanding of the 
gendered nature of our being (Davies & Harre, 1999). These contradictions are also 
consistent with dialogism, which recognizes the highly problematic and future-
directedness of meaning (He1111ans, 1996; Hennans & Kempen, 1993). 
Moral Identities and Collective Voices 
ft has been argued that socio-culturally embedded nalTatives mediate moral identity. 
Genclered cultural nalTatives do not e?Cist "out there", however. They can be represented 
internally in the way individuals talk about themselves and others. For example, Vusi 
(Extract 1) refers to collective f01111s of communication to make sense of his. dilemma. 
Let us consider the following: "WHEN I WAS BORN, MY MOTHER SAID: 
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'BEHOLD, I HAVE BEGOTTEN A MAN.' SHE DID NOT SAY: 'BEHOLD, I HAVE 
BEGOTTEN A COWARD. '" This does not mean that the narrator remembers what was 
said when he was born: he is simply ventriloquating what Zulu parents usually say, when 
a male child is born. The words do not refer to the biology of the child. Rather, they 
indicate the parents' wishes that the new-born will fulfil expectations traditionally 
associated vvith ma'nhood in that society. In other words, the nanator refers to a speech 
genre (cf. Bakhtin, 1986) to make sense of himself and his experience in the world (cf. 
Sampson, 1093). A speech geme, it will be recalled, is "a typical form of utterance; [it] 
correspond[s] to typical speech communication, and consequently, also to contacts 
between the meanings of words and actual concrete reality under certain typical 
circumstances" (Bald1tin, 1986, p. 61, emphasis original). Attention to speech gemes and 
:" .. 
social languages bring to the fore the role played by contextual factors in the mediation of 
moral reaso ning because, by their definition, collective forms of communication are tied 
to social and historical contexts (Penuel & Wertsch, 1995). 
Collective cultural scripts also positioned male members of Vu si's family. They felt 
pressuri sed to protect the integrity of their (extended) family in the village as a whole. 
The following supports this: 
Yea h! If someone has wronged the family , AND YOU PUNISH THEM, when you return 
home . .. you get the dignity you deserve as men. You send a message that people can't 
rness around with your family. 
I n the sentences cited above, Vusi echoes what appears to be a dominant belief in his 
cultural community. In the eyes of the villagers, ability to protect one's family defines 
one as a man (among other men). There was pressure to avenge the death "because 
peopl e were asking questions: 'Why are you so quiet?' That meant a lot to us .... It 
motivated us to take action." This intemal dialogue, in which the narrator repeats the 
words of others to himself, indicates that he is not alone in telling this story. He engages 
with the opinions of concerned others in his village community. In making his decision, 
Vusi had to take into account many voices emanating from the social context. 
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Ventriloquation and Moral Reasoning 
The extracts cites! above illustrate that social languages and speech genres lead to a 
special kind of l1lulti-voicedness, namely ventriloquation. Ventriloquation is a process by 
\vhich individuals speak through another voice or a voice type. Individuals are never 
alone in producing utterances: they always resort to the voices of their families, their 
communities, or social institutions (Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Welisch, 1990; Wertsch, 
1998). Bakhtin (1981) argues that utterances do not arise ex nihilo, from a single solitary 
voice. Instead, "the word in a language is half-someone else's" (Baldltin, 1981, p. 294). 
The words we use are not neutral, they belong to others. Words "have the taste of a 
profession, a genre, .. . ~ . ~ generation, an age group ... Each word tastes of the context 
and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words and fonns are 
populated by intentions" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 293). This means that a truly socio-cultural 
account of moral reasoning should explicate the process by which others' words are 
incorporated into one's own. Viewed this way, the study of moral decision-making 
should attempt to elucidate the origins of the voices that can be heard in individuals' 
narratives of moral choice. We should pay attention to questions such as: "Whose voices? 
[n what body? Telling what story about relationships (from whose perspective and from 
what vantage point?) In what societal and cultural framework?" (Brown & Gilligan, 
1991, p. 43) Such an approach broadens the study of moral reasoning beyond the 
paradigm of cognitive representations. It incorporates relationships between concrete 
embodied beings, as they exist in context, history and time. 
We sholl Id also note that collective fonns of communication do not have a single, static 
meaning, to which the meaning of utterances can be attached unproblematically. Shotter 
(1995) argues that "utterances have an argumentative meaning that can only be 
understood in the context of the culture at large, once all the counter-positions (or 
diLcmmotic themes) within it .. . have been elucidated" (Shotter, 1995, p. 65, emphasis 
original). Billig (1996) also notes the importance of examining positions and counter-
positions put forward in support of, or against, a particular point of view. In this study, 
these d i lemmatic positions were expressed mostly in temlS of differences between 
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personal positions available to moral actors, and their socially-ascribed positions. This 
indicates that morality should be situated not only in its cultural context, but it also needs 
to be analyzed critically. We need to attend to the polyphony of voices within a culture, 
their power dimensions, and the way the voices relate dialogically with each other. 
Dialogism enables us to examine claims and counter-claims as they relate to the self and 
morality. 
Gender and Power in Moral Decision-making 
In this study, the tensions between collective (social) and personal positions were often 
associ ated with gender and power. Power differences between men and women were 
~ .. 
evident in the extracts discussed above. In Vusi's narrative (Extract 1), women and 
chi Idren are positioned powerlessly. For example, while men get prestige in the village 
from their own actions or agency , women and children derive the same indirectly, 
through the actions of their men: "The women who have married into the family will take 
pride in thefact that they have married reaimen. Men who deserve to be married." This 
also applies to children: "Even the children ofthe family will take pride in you." The 
equation of women with children, it could be argued, indicates that the narrator does not 
regard men and women as equals. Women and children are depicted as powerless and 
dependent relative to men. 
However, it was not always the case that men depicted women as powerless. In another 
interesting nalTative, told by Zenzele, the relationship with an accomplished (powerful) 
woman became a status symbol for him, proving his manhood. Zenzele was a 22-year-old 
Technikon student at the time of the interview. His dilemma began when his girlfriend, a 
qualified social worker, requested "timeout" from the relationship, to decide whether they 
were mutually suitabl e. This troubled Zenzele, because it compromised his identity as a 
"compl ete" man. His standing among his peers, who envied him for going out with a 
profess ional woman, was also jeopardized. These concems are briefly illustrated in the 
following extract: 
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So, your girlfriend wanted a break in the relationship? 
Yaa! According to her, she did not want a complete separation, just a short break 
to reconsider our relationship . But I had this pride! (iqholo) . I thought I would 
not be a complete boy anymore (umfana ogcwele), if! gave her an opportunity to 
do that. I thought she wanted to try a relationship with someone else, before 
deciding whether I was the right guy for her. I had a problem .. . in arriving at a 
decision, because I really loved her. But. I did not want to lose my dignity 
(isithul1zi sami) in the ~)ies of'the other boys. 
Really, what was at stake for you? 
My dignity was at stake. 
Your dignity? 
Yaa! PeOP.le respected me because I was going out with this professional woman. 
I was a scholar at the time, not even at a tertiary institution . ... Although it was 
pain/it! to separate. preserving my dignity was essential. I was concerned about 
Ihe perception of'those who knew I was going out with her. 
You were concerned that you would lose dignity in the community and 
among your peers? 
Yaa! Dignity is very important to me. It [the relationship] gave me pride and 
confidence (iqholo nokuzethemba) . You see, .. . when I gave an opinion. among 
my peers, they listened to me. I had a voice among them (nganginezwi kubona). 
To lose dignity would mean that what I said would not carry much weight . . . 
because, they would say: "How does he know? He was jilted!" So, I feared losing 
vO Ice. 
(Extract 4) 
This extract indicates that the relationship was a source of pride and self-esteem to the 
narrato r. It enhanced his status among his peers, affording him the right to speak and be 
heard (i .e . it empowered him) . This finds support in the statement: "When I gave an 
opinion am ong my peers, they listened to me .. . . To lose my dignity would mean that 
what I said would not carry much weight. " It could be argued that he derived pride from 
having "conquered" a woman of superior standing (a professional), despite being a 
scholar. The request for "timeout" was a serious dent in his male identity (being a 
"complete boy") . It conjured up images of inadequacy. The nan'ator decided that 
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"preserving my dignity was essential" despite that "it was painful to separate." Despite 
emotional pain, the nanator adopted a fa<;:ade of independence ("1 went for a complete 
break" ), which be. considered truly definitive of manhood. 
Power issues were perhaps most evident in women's narratives of moral choice. The 
rel ationship between Tha (Extract 3) and the project manager best illustrates these power 
dimensions. The project manager derived inunense power from his position, gender, 
education and age. The nanator respected him because "he was older than me .... He had 
come all the way from Pretoria. He had a car and a cellphone, and everything." His 
power is symbolically represented by the fact that he came from Pretoria, the seat of the 
Sou tll African govenunent. The car and the cellphone are symbols of status, especially 
:1.- . 
among students. These material possessions, and superior education, gave him a 
competitive edge over the other boys, in the competition to gain the attention of the only 
woman in the group. Further, he appears to have been under pressure from the 
community to play the male "script", consistent with a man in a powerful position like he 
was: "Initially, it was OK. We respected each other. But then he came under pressure 
because of the community's assumptions . ... Somehow he felt he must entertain me." 
Power differences between the actors, and the beliefs of the people in the setting where 
the dilemma unfolds, limited Tha's options. 
Not only did the narrator contend with the power wielded by the manager, she had to take 
into acco unt the need to maintain cohesion in the group. The tension between herself and 
the manager threatened to disrupt group unity. The younger male members of the group 
felt undermined by his actions . The narrator opines: "He regarded the other boys in the 
group as inferiors, and he thought they were standing in his way." The nalTator found 
herself at the centre of a conflict in which the project manager was testing his dominance. 
Although the narrator was aware that the manager ' s actions were potentially disruptive, 
his position and power prevented her from unequivocally voicing her point of view. Her 
personal investment in the success of the project, and their material dependence on him, 
complicated the picture. This is captured in the following lines: 
241 
. .. ~ - , 
HTS POSITION! HIS POSITION! We also depended on him for money and food . As a 
group leader, I could not afford to be in conflict with him. He was powerful! At the same 
lime, 1 had to see to it that my group's needs were met. I had to ensure that my group 
remained happy. I had to maintain a good relationship with him. 
The narrator was tom between the group's needs, and the fear of alienating the manager. 
Her options limited by the power differences between them, she resorted to a series of 
indirect strategies, in an attempt to get her point across . These are explored below. 
Indirect Strategies Toward "Heal-ability" 
The extent to which one can he "heard" in a conversation or relationship is determined by 
one's position (cf. Henh~U1s, 2001b). Tha and her group are powerless in relation to the 
project manager: as a result, he does not consider their points of view seriously. In other 
words, th ey are not "hearable." Tha laments the fact that during group meetings, the 
manager "would prevail ... because of his superior education." Neither did he take their 
suggestions seriously "because he thought we were silly, perhaps." The power wielded by 
the manager constrained the interactions between him, the narrator, and the group. He 
cou Id afford to remain indifferent to their concems, without fear of incurring negative 
conseq nences. 
I n an attempt to get ber point across, without jeopardising her relationship with the 
manager, th e nalTator resorted to a series of strategic moves. For example, unable to tell 
him directly that she was not romalltically interested in him, she only "tried jokingly to 
explain my position to him." The fact that she could express herself only "jokingly" 
regarding his advances is testimony to her powerlessness. This is likely to compromise 
the impact of her message, however. She is running the risk of being misinterpreted or 
not taken seriously. Not surprisingly, this strategy did not work. 
Tt also emerges that the nanator was tentative in her conversations with the project 
manager to avoid hurting his masculine identity. She appears aware that relationships 
between women and men are an integral pali ofthe latter's social identity. The dilemma 
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provides a setting in which these identities are contested. For example, asked why it was 
important to avoid hurting his feelings, she replies: 
Yes! Yes, because . . . he would think of himself as an inferior person .. .. [I did not want 
to] hurt his ego , his manhood. Probably where he comes from, he has a reputation, that no 
woman can resist him. 
The narrator could not openly challenge the dominant discourses about gender that were 
unfolding, due to her powerlessness. What stands out in these lines is that she seems to 
infer conclusions from information beyond that which is immediately available to her. 
From her own knowledge of gender relations, she deduces that the manager "would think 
of himself as an inferior person" and that "[p ]robably where he comes from, he has a 
reputation, that no wom'an can resist him." The nanator has also leamt that one should 
not burt the ego of a powerful man. It could be argued these assertions are based on her 
knowledge of tvpical dynamics between (powerful) men and women in her society. 
Indeed, this is consistent with an analysis based on utterances, rather than isolated 
sentences. Speakers do not produce utterances alone or in isolation: utterances are related 
to previous utterances before them. This shapes and/or restrains what speakers can say in 
a conversation, and to whom it can be said. Bakhtin (1986) argues that "the topic of the 
speaker's speech, regardless of what this topic may be, does not become the object of 
speech for the first time in any given utterance" (p. 93). Each utterance contains 
viewpoints, opinions, worldviews, theories, etc., which have already been elucidated, 
debated and articulated in various ways, within a given sphere of cOlll11unication. In this 
case, established dynamics between men and women constrain the range of responses 
available to the nanator, and hence her resort to indirect strategies. 
Tentative suggestions did not help the n31Tator to deal with the project manager 311d the 
simmering tension in the group. It was only when she resorted to drastic measures 
(complete \vithdrawal), a fonn of protest, that her group realised she was not in cahoots 
with the manager: "When I raised a suggestion 311d he would not take it, I told the group I 
was going to disappear, to get lost. They thought I was joking." This strategy drove the 
message home. The group realized that she was not colluding with the manager. This 
unified the group, enabling it to successfully challenge the m311ager: "From then on they 
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stood together with me when we had meetings with him." Tha's strategy enabled her to 
influence the course of events to her own advantage. 
Strategic Topic Dominance 
Inability to state one's point of view, or doing so indirectly, is common in interactions 
characterized by power differences between paliicipants. However, the powerless party 
can slm{cgicallv dominate a conversation to avoid all uncomfortable situation. Zandi, a 
22-year-old woman, found herself in a situation similar to Tha's. She used this ploy, 
known as topic dominance (cf. Hemlans, 2001b), to ward off unwanted sexual adVallCeS 
from an older male figu.r~. When she was a scholar, she tumed down a proposition from 
one of her teachers . A few years later, this teacher held an influential position in an 
organization in which she had applied for a job. Zandi successfully used topic dominance 






Could you elaborate on your story? 
The problem is ongoing, because there is a possibility he may get me a job, if I 
remain close to him. (.) He is now working in the Department ofX. I really like 
working there. So, during the vacation, I was called for an interview in his 
department, and he gave me a lift from home. I do not like being in his company . .... , 
... But at the time, I had to get into his car, and drive with him. Seemingly, he 
does not see anything wrong with holding my hand, while driving. I do not feel 
comfortable with that, especially because I have nothing to do with him. He is 
not my boyfriend .... So. I kept talking, talking, talking, to avoid silence. which 
he would take advantage of to hold my hand. 
How did you feel in that situation? 
Helpless! Helpless! .... I never phone him. But, ifhe phones to say there are 
(job] interviews, I become interested. 
Extract 5 
This extract has many things in common with the previous one. Like Tha, Zandi is 
dealing with a powerful, older male figure. Not only is he her fonner schoolteacher; he is 
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in a position to influence her job prospects. It appears that he exploited this vulnerability 
on her part. The situation was compounded by the fact that he had resources (i.e. reliable 
transport), while she did not. She relied on him for a lift to the interviews, as the area was 
110t easil y accessible by public transport. Wary of jeopardizing the relationship , Zandi 
could only prevent him from holding her hand by dominating the discussion: "So, I kept 
on (alking. falking. talking, to avoid silence, which he would take of to hold my hand." 
A Ithou gh she dominates the discussion, she remains powerless, because circumstances 
prevent her from voicing her position directly and unequivocally. 
The results are consistent with a dialogical understanding of how power operates in 
relationships. Hennans n 996, 2001 b) and Hennans and Kempen (1993) note that in 
symmetri cal relationships, actors exchange the roles of "power holder" (speaker) and 
"power subject" (listener) . When the relationship becomes asymmetrical, one party does 
not relinquish the role of "power holder." This happens when one party becomes more 
dominant than the other. This limits the other person's opportunity to initiate the 
conversation and/or to state his or her point of view. This concurs with Shotter (1993b), 
who argues that the powerless lack the "formative" or "fonn-giving" function of speech. 
That is, the powerless find that ways of speaking are already in function in society, 
rell ecting the views of dominant groups, within which they are forced to fonnulate their 
experiences . In this study, women often found themselves positioned as powerless and 
dependent. As a result, their points of view were not heard. In other words, powerlessness 
silenced them. Brown and Gilligan (1991) and Gilligan et al. (1990) have reported 
similar findin gs. They note that patriarchy renders girls voiceless. These gender and 
power dynamics "can be partly understood as reproductions of culturally established and 
insti tutionally congealed provisions and constraints on communicative activities" 
(Hermans & Kcmpen , 1993 , p. 73). 
PO\ver cl i fferences have been noted to have similar effects in interactions between 
different cultural groups. Chang (1996) found that Chinese students studying in the 
United States experienced tensions in their relationships with Americans. They wanted to 
speak out to defend their integrity and dignity, but felt under pressure to remain silent in 
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order to maintain social hal1110ny. They could not speak out because they were positioned 
as powerless in the relationship. A theoretical and methodological approach that is 
concerned with voice, argue Brown and Gilligan (1991), enables us to "understand how 
those not represented as full human beings within such a system [of power] exist and 
resist, how they create and sustain their humanity both above ground and underground" 
(p . 44). 
Utterances as Units of Analysis in Power Relationships 
Power dilnensions observed in this study fmiher highlight the usefulness of utterances, 
rather than grammatically well-fol111ed sentences, as units of analysis in moral research. 
Unlike abstract sentences, which belong to nobody, utterances belong to real life, 
concrete actors (MOl·son & Emerson, 1990). They are thus appropriate for exploring 
Illoral conflicts between embodied actors. Sentences do not refer to the position of the 
speakers because "the sentence as a language unit is grammatical in nature. It has 
grammatical boundaries and grammatical completedness and unity" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 
74) . On the other hand, the utterance is a real, responsive unit, because, when it is 
finalized, the other has "the possibility of responding to it or, more broadly, of assuming 
a responsive attitude to it" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 76). As Bakhtin (1986) argues, "the speaker 
ends his [sic] utterance in order to relinquish the floor to make room for the other's 
responsive understanding" (p. 71). In this study, those speakers who had power were able 
to ex press their points of view, while those who were powerless were prevented from 
"taking the Door" to express their views directly. 
Another feature of utterances that makes them relevant to the study of morality is their 
orientation to the future, or what might unravel between speakers. Utterances are 
inherently ethical because they must take into account the possible reactions of those to 
whom they are addressed. Unlike sentences, which are abstract linguistic units, utterances 
have an author as well as an addressee (Bakhtin, 1986). When speakers fonnulate their 
utterances , they must take into account the addressee's rank and social position, for 
example. Speakers must consider the possible effects their utterances will have on their 
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audience. Bakhtin (l986) argues: "both the composition and paIiicularity of the utterance, 
the sty le of the utterance depend on those to whom the utterance is addressed, how the 
speaker (or writer) senses and imagines his [sic] addressee, and the force of their effect 
on the utterance" (p. 95). In this study, speakers fOl1nulated their utterances with the 
position and possible reaction of the addressees in mind. For example, Tha's decision to 
express herself "jokingly" (Extract 3) was taken to avoid hal1ning the manager's sense of 
mascuLinity (and probably, to avoid the repercussions of doing so). Throughout the study, 
we sec respondents orientating their speeches toward those around them, including their 
communities. Others were trying to influence or elicit a particular response from 
participants in various ways (e .g. to cook), or not to be seen in a particular maImer (e.g. a 
coward) . These illustnit~ that the position of the speakers, and the already established 
viewpoints within a given cultural sphere, are importaIlt in studying moral decision-
making. Moral decision-making is best studied with the utterance as a unit of aIlalysis 
because utterances demarcate gaps between speakers. Shotter (1992) argues that "it is 
these gaps, the 'distances' between the 'positions' of all those who might respond to what 
we say, and the struggles to which they give rise to, that constitute the ethico-rhetorical 
landscape .. . into which our attempted fOl1nulations must be directed." (p. 14, emphasis 
added) 
The power dimensions involved in moral decision making, especially in conflicts 
between men and women, have been noted. The results point at the need to take gender 
and power seriously when theorizing about moral reasoning. Given that the self is 
embedded and embodied, and the fact that it exists in history, space and time (Gilligan et 
al., 1990), only a situated, rather thaIl an abstract, account to moral reasoning can explain 
gender and power dimensions observed in this study. We need to recognize gender as a 
power system in society. Social scientists need to reflect critically about the vantage 
positions from which they speak about gender differences (Gilligan et al., 1990). 
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Conclusion 
This study has shpwn that moral decision-making is not a solitary activity: it is a 
relational process. Moral decision-making unfolds within webs of relational ties. These 
ties include other people, one's family, and the community. Taking the individual as the 
primary unit of analysis is thus unlikely to yield meaningful infonnation about moral 
decision-making across cultures. The relationship between the individual and his or her 
socio-cultural milieu needs to be taken into account. Moral decision-making is a 
mediated activity. Thus, the focus should be on how people employ cultural tools at their 
disposal to make sense of themselves and the world. 
The concept of the self plays a critical role in moral decision-making. However, 
individualistic and communal self orientations are not mutually exclusive. Rather, 
respondents were sometimes distributed between these two views of the self. The rivalry 
between these selves was noted, with each self articulating its own point of view. Also, 
participants espoused multiple moral voices: care, justice, respect and unembeza. These 
voices engaged dynamically and dialogically with each other. These results lend support 
to the call to diversity voices comprising the moral landscape (Day & Tappan, 1996; 
Gilligan et aI. , 1990). Dominance and other fonns of relationship between these voices 
need to be studied and articulated. 
The roles of gender and positioning in moral decision-making were discussed. Cultural 
narratives (Howard, 1991) or collective voices (Hennans, 2001b), constituting what it 
means to be a woman or man in one ' s society, have a bearing on moral reasoning. Moral 
di lemmas ensue from the struggle to craft an identity, given the fields of signs provided 
by one's cultural community. Gender and power in the dilemmas studied were 
intertwined . Some women could not directly articulate their positions, fearing the 
consequences of jeopardizing their relationships with powerful others, usually men. The 
results support the view that research on moral reasoning should move away from the 
paradigm of mental representations (Day & Tappan, 1996). Moral reasoning needs to be 
investigated as it occurs in culture, space and time (Gilligan et aI., 1990). 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Traditional cognitive approaches posit universal stages of moral development. These 
stages have 110t been empirically demonstrated to occur in all cultures, however. People 
living in traditional societies tend to score at Stages 3 and 4 ofKohlberg's (1981,1984) 
moral scheme. In this study, I have argued that traditional societies "fail" to attain 
aci v,mced stages of moral thought as measured by Kohlberg's moral scheme, because 
cognitivist moral theories assume an abstract view of the self. They also define morality 
narrowly, in teJ111S of ju?~ice concems only. Morally significant concems in cultures that 
traditionally prize a connected view of the self (Benhabib, 1992; Gilligan, 1982; Verhoef 
& Michel, 1997) are left out. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the meaning of morality in a sample of isiZulu 
speakers. isiZu lu is a sub-division of a larger group of languages, collectively known as 
isiNguni. The study is informed by two main (but inter-linking) theoretical positions. It 
draws from a traditional African ontological perspective, which conceives reality as being 
interconnected. Different elements within the ontological hierarchy interact dynamically. 
Th ey are thus capable of influencing, and being influenced, by others. The notion of a 
dialogical self (Day & Tappan, 1996; Helmans & Kempen, 1993) was also used. 
Dialogism accounts for the co-existence of, and dynamic interactions between, mUltiple 
perspectives within an individual. Drawing from the writings of Sow (1980) and Zahan 
(1979), 1 have argued that traditional African worldviews presuppose a dialogical account 
of the se lf and the world. 
The study posed four main research questions : 
• What is the meaning of morality for isiZulu speakers? 
• Ho'vv are these meanings related to concepts of personhood or the self? 
• How do famil y and community values influence moral decisiolH11aking? 
• What is the interface between gender and power in moral decision-making? 
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~~ta were collected using an adapted, isiZulu version of the Relat!onal Interview Method. 
This method was originally developed by Gilligan and her colleagues (e.g. Brown & 
Gi II igan, 1991). Fifty-two participants were interviewed: 48 isiZulu speakers, 3 isiXhosa 
speakers, and one respondent of Tswana origin. The narrative approach was chosen 
because it is 1110St suited to studying relational and culturally-embedded constructions of 
moral experience (Gergen & Gergen, 1988; Gilligan et al., 1990). Analysis followed the 
reading procedures as recommended by Brown and Gilligan (1991), Brown et al. (1989), 
and Mauthner & Doucet (1998). The methodology was adapted to take into account 
soc ial and cultural dynamics of isiZulu language and traditions. 
S llJ111l1ary of Conclusions About Research Questions 
Participants in this study regarded morality as living a life (impilo) connected to other 
people, the family, the community, and all beings one stands in relation to in the 
ontological hierarchy. Connection, which is an indispensable part of ubuntu (the process 
of becoming a human being among other human beings), entails caring, respectful, 
empathetic, and just (fair) relationships between human beings and their social milieu. A 
state of morality exists if each person who belongs to the community works toward 
maintaining its equilibrium by fulfilling social obligations, according to his or her status 
or position . Immorality is a state of being disconnected from the world of social and 
human relationships because one has failed in one's social obligations toward others. 
Disconnection (immorality) has an ontological dimension to it. It is not only about 
individuals being in disharmony (dissonance) with themselves, it also destabilizes the 
who le system's equilibrium. It is envisaged that this could manifest itself in unjust 
relationships, absence of care and the occurrence of illness or criminality among 
community or family members. Thus, it is considered important that all people work 
toward ensuring that equilibrium is maintained by fulfilling their obligations. The 
c1ialogical and communicative nature of this account of moral reasoning was underscored 
by the fact that, should disconnection occur, institutionalised practices may be employed 
to restore connectioll. 
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It was argued that the above-mentioned conception of morality is based on a holistic 
worldvi ew (Akbar, 1984; Myers, 1988). This worldview prizes a cOlmnunal view of the 
self. C0111munal approaches to the self differ from traditional Euro-American accounts of 
subjectivity, which regard the individual as a container of psychological processes. 
According to the latter, the goal of psychological development is to achieve personal 
autonomy. Hence, morality is regarded as a matter of individual legislation, wlinfluenced 
by socio-cu ltural factors and people's philosophical presuppositions about the nature of 
the world and their place in it. From the communal perspective, which is characteristic of 
lrad itional African approaches, personhood is a never-ending process of communicative 
and dialogical relationships between the person and his or her sUlTounding environment. 
Personhood, and hence moral be-ing, is inconceivable independently of the world in 
~ .. 
which one has to be moral. Moral personhood requires an ongoing balance between the 
needs of individuals and those of the system in which they belong. Individuals contribute 
their unique riches to the community, which in tUl1l sustains them, thus ensuring the 
system ' s equilibrium. 
These results highlight the importance of taking into account worldviews in studying 
psychological processes such as moral reasoning (Jensen, 1997). The nature of human 
relationships, or how the self in conceived in relation to others, is an important dimension 
of worldviews. Psychological development requires one to develop an understanding of 
what it means to be a competent member of one's society (Heelas, 1981; Oyserman & 
Markus, 1998). This involves responding to questions such as: "Who am I?" and "Where 
clo I belong?" People do not develop responses to these questions in isolation, nor do they 
fashion such responses anew all the time (Oyse11llan & Markus, 1998). Their responses 
are influenced by values and belief systems of the groups to which they belong. Concepts 
of personhood incorporate visions of a good life, or what it means to be a moral person. 
Thus, argues Taylor (1989), "To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a 
space in which questions about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what is not, 
what has meaning and importance for you, and what is trivial and secondary" (p. 28). 
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However, tensions were noted between individualistic and communal views of selfhood. 
Participants attempted not only to reconcile their personal positions with the need for 
belonging, they also vacillated between the two positions. Similar tensions were noted 
between moral orientations such as care, empathy, justice and respect. Moral voices not 
only ex isted simultaneously, they also engaged dialogically with each other, with 
individuals moving from one moral voice to another, depending on the view of the self 
sa lient at the time. These tensions support the view that the individual-society antinomy 
(Sampson, 1993; Wertsch, 1995) is unlikely to be helpful in cultural research. Due to 
perllleabl e cu ltural boundaries, people are increasingly exposed to multiple points of view 
(Herm<lns, 1996, 2001a; Hermans & Kempen, 1998), which are appropriated into the self. 
This results in the co-exi~tence of independent, and even contradictory conceptions of the 
self or points of view (Oysem1an & Markus, 1998). Dialogism not only recognizes the 
multiplicity of selves within a person, it also accounts for how selves position and re-
position themselves according to changes in situation and time (Hennans et al., 1992). 
Because the dialogical self is located in culture, space and time, it provides an appropriate 
model by means of which to study tensions between individuals (agents of action) and the 
cultural tools that mediate the self or moral being (Tappan, 2000). 
The study also investigated the interface between gender and power in moral decision-
making. The results indicate that gender identity, particularly the notions of what it 
means to be a man or woman in one's society, plays an important role in moral decision-
making. ManJ100d (masculinity) was associated with power, and womanhood 
(femininity) with powerlessness. Discrepancies between culturally detennined social 
positions and personally determined positions led to tensions and moral dilemmas. The 
results highlight the importance of gender and social positioning in moral decision-
making (Gilligan et al. , 1990). This suppOlis the view that moral decision-making should 
be studied while it occurs during the course of an activity, and in settings where fonning 
identities are at stake (Tappan, 2000) . 
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Unique Contribution of the Study 
The first contribution of the study is ofa methodological nature. This study is the first to 
apply the Voice-Centred, Relational Method to investigate indigenous conceptions of 
morality in a sample of isiZulu speakers in South Africa. Previous studies of moral 
reasoning among the indigenous people of Sough Africa have relied on Kohlberg's moral 
scheme (e.g. Ferns & Thom, 2001). The Relational Method is useful in studying situated 
accounts of moral reasoning because it allows categories of moral experience to emerge 
from the study itself. The method enables the researcher to see marginalized moral 
Ijerspectives, thus broadening the domain of moral experience. The research method is 
appropriate for those interested in studying how men and women of various cultures 
. ' . 
construe moral be-ing. Most important, the method allows the researcher to study the 
dynamic relationship between traditional African and traditional Euro-American 
conceptions of psychological experience. It could also be used to study topics such as 
(emerging) gender and racial identities, both of which are important in a country such as 
South Africa, with a colonial and apartheid legacy. 
The study also contributes to our understanding of moral reasoning in varying cultural 
contexts. The respondents' view that morality is a state of equilibrium, which can be 
destabilized by relationships devoid of ubuntu, and restored if people engage in 
appropriate reparatory processes, enlarges our understanding of moral experience. The 
study is the first to empirically show this systemic account of moral reasoning in the 
South African context. It is also the first to apply the theory of dialogism to account for 
the tensions and contradictions involved in ethical and moral decision-making among 
indigenous South Africans. Within the South African context, and in the African 
community in particular, the influences of social, cultural, and institutionally detennined 
gender and power dynamics in moral decision-making, have not until now been 
empirically explored . 
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Implications for Policy, Research and Practice 
The results of this study have several implications for research and health policy. 
Particularly, the study has implications for the understanding of research and professional 
ethics. Ethical conduct, be it in the fields of research or professional practice, requires the 
researcher or practitioner to enter into dialogue with the lifeworld of others, their 
worldviews and forms of life. Traditional, universalistic approaches to ethics often fail to 
take into account the historical background and the "corresponding memories, stories, 
and expectations" (Helmans, 2001 a, p. 24) of people in developing societies. These 
approaches assume an abstract and generalized view of the self. Considering others' 
points of view in ethical decision-making is a matter of ethics in and of itself. It affirms 
the other as a fully-fledged consciousness with whom one can enter into dialogue. The 
traditional African ontology presented in this study, and in particular the conception of 
morality as a state that exists between people and their context, can offer insight into our 
understanding of the general ethics debate. The importance of this issue is underscored by 
the many efforts that have been made to develop ethical guidelines for conducting health-
related research in developing societies (e.g. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002). 
One of the most complex problems to have arisen in the conduct of research in 
developing societies is that pertaining to individual versus community consent in research 
(Gasa, 1999; Lindegger & Richter, 2000; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002). From the 
traditional view of informed consent, individuals have the autonomy to consent to 
research and medical interventions. Traditional African approaches, on the other hand, 
emphasize the dynamic relationship between the person, the family and the community. 
This has] ed to many debates about whether individual or community consent is relevant 
when dealing with people of African descent. Concepts of subjectivity which emerged in 
this study, particularly the view that people exist within webs of relational ties, highlight 
the need to locate people in their social and cultural contexts. At the same time, the 
tensions between individuals and mediational means (cultural symbols) suggest that a 
process approach to ethics and infOlmed consent may be more meaningful. This would · 
entail conceiving the ethics of infOlmed consent to be a relational practice by means of 
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which one enters into dialogue with another. Conceived this way, obtaining infom1ed 
consent would involve phronesis or Imowledge of a practical-moral kind (Gadamer, 
1975; McGee, 1998). Phronesis is characterised by the ability to make judgements taking 
into accollnt the contingencies of a situation. It differs from teclmical or theoretical 
know ledge, which involves an application of codified rules and principles. In practice, 
phronesis in infom1ed consent would entail entering into a relationship with another. It is 
a joint meaning-making process involving both the researcher/practitioner and the 
participant. The parties work together to identify voices that have a bearing on the 
process, which are then critically related to the perspectives of both the researcher and the 
participant. This conception of ethics and informed consent, similar to the model 
suggested by Betan (1997), would require different approaches to ethics training which 
-:-.. 
would recognize power and other relational dynamics between actors. This training 
should also involve exposure to differing moral and ethical systems. 
The emergence of gender identity as an important factor in moral decision-making has 
inlplications for other applied fields in the social sciences. Taking note of the gender 
system can enable social scientists to develop culturally sensitive HIV / Aids interventions 
in Southern Africa. The study shows the centrality of masculinity and power dYl1amics 
supported by culturally-established practices in moral conflicts between men and women. 
Tt is conceivable that men might be resorting to having multiple female partners to "prove 
their manhood." Unfortunately, early HIV/Aids intervention programmes focused on 
individuals' cognitions. Such an approach fails to take into account the power dimensions 
inherent in the gender system. This study can inform efforts to incorporate the necessary 
understanding of the role of gender in HIV/Aids intervention programmes (e.g. UNAIDS, 
2000). 
Reports of violence among Black male teenagers in South African schools have increased 
recently. In this study, a link was found between conceptions of manhood and using 
violence to solve problems. It is highly likely that this problem-solving style will also 
spill over into the relationship with one's spouse or partner. Writing with respect to the 
African-American popUlation, Ward (1991) noted that alienated male teenagers may use 
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"acts of violence ... as a means of proving their manhood." (p. 180). This indicates that 
violence prevention programmes in the schools can benefit from the incorporation of 
components dealing with the gender identity - masculinity in particular. 
Implications for Theory 
Perhaps the greatest implication ofthis study has to do with the manner in which we 
theori ze about the psychological subject and psychology in general. The presuppositions 
that underpin Westem psychology - particularly the notion of a self-contained person -
are rooted ill particular philosophical and value systems. The imposition of theoretical 
frameworks and model~ derived from the West marginalizes local forms of knowledge . 
. ' . 
[n order to be responsive to its social, historical, and cultural context, psychology needs 
to incorporate the diverse ways in which men and women of various cultures and classes 
create meaning in their lives, including the mamler in which they reflect upon their lived 
experience (Parker, 1999). Psychology needs to take into account the indigenous 
languages, philosophies, and worldviews through which people make sense of themselves 
and the worlcl. Gergen et al. (1996) note that for a long period, psychology in India relied 
on borrowed theoretical and methodological frameworks. Traditional Indian 
philosophical traditions and concepts were not only denied entry to academic discourse, 
they were also given little respect, and were regarded with suspicion. Getgen et al. 
(1996), Paranjpe (2002) and Sinha (2002) maintain that traditional thought systems 
contain a goldmine of psychological insights that have not been exploited by 
psychologists . The same could be said about psychology in South Africa, which has by 
and large, maintained a distance from indigenous African thought systems (Holdstock, 
2000) . The inclusion of the metaphysical framework presented in this study into 
psychological discourse - and its attendant conception of the subject as a being-with-and-
for-others (umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu) - will broaden our understanding of the 
psychological processes at work in developing societies. It will also concretize our 
understanding of psychological functioning by locating human values, motivations and 
behaviours in their cultural context (Martin-Baro, 1994; Maiers, 1991; Prilleltensky, 
1997; Tolman, 1994). 
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The call for the indigenization of psychology does not mean that Western philosophical 
and psychological traditions have to be abandoned. As Gergen et al. (1996) note, the 
intention is not to-generate culturally-exclusive psychologies. The modem world is 
characteri zed by rapid changes, so cross-pollination of ideas between cultures occurs 
more rapidly than it did in the past. In the same way that Western psychology cannot 
afford to ignore African worldviews, it would be shortsighted of African scholarship to 
remai n insulated in only one conceptual framework. It is imperative to take into account 
the many factors that influence individual development. As mentioned previously, people 
li ve in multiple worlds, in which dialogues between the local and the 
national /international are common (Hern1ans & Kempen, 1998; Hern1aI1s, 2001a). What 
is therefore needed is dlalogue between different cultural, philosophical, and 
methodological traditions. In South Africa, this dialogue should address the dynamic co-
existence of, aI1d interactions between, traditional African aI1d Western worldviews. I 
h.ave argued that such dialogue is made possible by the socio-cultural tradition advocated 
by Vygotsky (1978) and Bakhtin (1981, 1990). I have also maintained that the holistic-
organic African worldview, which conceives the person in relation to the social 
environment, is compatible with dialogism (Sow, 1978; Ramose, 1999). However, we 
should also note that dialogue can only take place between equals, othelwise it 
deteriorates into monologue. Thus, inter-cultural dialogue cam10t proceed meaI1ingfully 
without a full explication and recognition oftraditional African thought systems. --_.-
Limitations and Criticisms 
Participants in this study were primaI-ily isiZulu speaking, with aI1 exception of four 
(three isi)'11Osa speakers, and one participant of Tswana cultural origin). Further research 
with other African populations in South Africa should be conducted to test the robustness 
of the "connection" thesis. Given that sampling in this study was purposive, one cam10t 
generalise the results to other African popUlation groups. Studies are needed to 
demonstrate that the "connection" thesis arises out of a shared philosophical framework, 
rather than being of Zulu or Xhosa cultural origin per se. 
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Another limitation arises from the fact that, throughout the study, the researcher had to 
strike a balance between capturing common conceptions of what constitutes morality for 
the sample, and needing to highlight and demonstrate tensions and contradictions 
inherent in actual moral decision-making. Further studies using even smaller samples, 
and analysing intra-individual tensions and contradictions at length, are needed. 
Perhaps the greatest limitation of the study is owing to the fact that interviews were 
conducted in isiNguni (isiZulu and isiXhosa), while the results and the discussion were 
presented in English. There are many differences between the Nguni languages, which 
are highly idiomatic and context-dependent, and English, which (comparatively) tends 
~ .. 
toward abstraction. Attempts were made to translate the interviews without losing 
idiomatic equivalence, but this cannot be guaranteed. Language points to something 
beyond itself, the background lifeworld or fonns oflife (Hekman, 1995; Wittgenstein, 
1953) 0 r a people, and these are very difficult to translate. This is particularly so for a 
bilingual researcher who, by virtue of his or her knowledge of the fonns of life inherent 
in the original language, can easily assume that these have been adequately captured in 
the target language (English). Likewise, there is a possibility that translated interviews 
will be read with reference to the fonns of life of the target language. I have tried to 
minimise such elTors by using footnotes to explain potentially confusing words. In some 
cases, original isiZulu words are also included in parentheses. This problem will remain 
with us so long as one language (voice) has to make itself known through another voice-
an inherently difficult process. I hope this problem will be minimized if various 
languages (forms of life) in South Africa are prepared to enter into dialogue with a view 
to fully understanding one another (Gadamer, 1975). 
Finally, this study could be criticised on the grounds that it has been influenced by the 
values and the theoretical and philosophical orientations of the researcher. In qualitative 
studies, which are concerned with the processes by which meanings are constructed, the 
phenomena under investigation are more important than method per se (Crawford & 
Val siner, 2002) . The Relational Method adopted in this study is appropriate for teasing 
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out meanings, tensions and cultural complexities in moral experience. This was the main 
objective of the study. 
Qualitative approaches to research are also criticised for supposedly having a lack of 
objectivity. From a qualitative perspective, subjectivity is an integral part of the research 
process. Qualitative approaches, unlike their quantitative counterparts, recognize that 
methodologies are rooted in philosophical and theoretical traditions. Methodology is not 
cOl1cei ved as a set of tools or methods. Rather, it "is a process oflinking theoretical 
frameworks and their guiding assumptions, phenomena, and methods" (Crawford & 
Valsiner, 2002, p. 92). From this perspective, the research design, research questions, 
analytical procedures, and the way the research is conducted, infonn each other in a 
~ .. 
cyclical manner. This approach recognizes that data do not exist as "facts" separate from 
the theoretical and philosophical orientations of the researcher. Data are mutually 
constructed or derived during the very process of their collection. The researcher's socio-
cultural positionality - his or her membership in a particular research community, the 
assumptions he or she makes about the world, and his or her intuitive and SUbjective 
experiences - influences data collection (Crawford & Valsiner, 2002). Validity in 
qualitative research does not hinge on methods but the explication of interpretive 
processes and the researcher's positionality (Crawford & Valsiner, 2002; Maxwell, 
1992). 
Indications for Fmiher Research 
The tensions between moral orientations such as justice and care indicate the need to 
study the dynamic relationship between moral voices . Such studies should address 
questions sllch as: Under what circumstances do people speak with one voice as opposed 
to another? How are tensions between individualised positions and societal positions 
resolved? What is the relationship between reason and emotion in moral decision-
making? Although Benhabib (1992) and Blum (1988) discuss some of these issues from a 
philosophical position, as does to a certain extent Gilligan et al. (1990), empirical studies 
need to be conducted to elucidate the relationship between moral voices. 
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Questions about the relationship between reason and feeling have a bearing on moral 
justifi cation . I ha'le argued that despite the seemingly problematic relationship between 
the two, moral justification is possible because moral agents are situated within 
interpreti ve communities (Tappan & Brown, 1992), which provide naITative fore-
structures, or grounding, for their actions. I further argued that this requires distancing 
(Ricouer, 1979), a process by which agents ' actions are situated within historical, 
cultural, and social contexts. Following the same line of thought, it is possible that we 
could learn more about tensions between moral voices if we situate them within moral 
communiti es . This means that rather than asking questions about individuals, research 
could be di rected towarp investigating what constitutes just and moral communities? We 
. ' . 
could then ask how people make moral decisions under conditions considered just and 
fair, as opposed to conditions considered unjust? This is based on the observation that 
tensions between reason and emotion were most intense in circumstaI1CeS where injustice 
was seen to inhere in the system itself (e.g. having to fine a fellow Black student, while 
operating within an unjust apartheid system). Such an approach to moral research, while 
it would probably raise philosophical problems beyond the scope of this study, would 
seem to be consistent with a view that conceives morality as ail organic relationship 
between elements within a system. However, given that there are many (moral) systems 
"out there", a truly moral point of view is the one that remains open to the infinite 
possibilities of dialogue between them (Bakhtin, 1984; Gardiner, 1992). This study is an 
invitation to South African psychologists, researchers and communities in general to 
begin this dialogue. 
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Appendix 1: IsiZulu Version of the Real Life Conflict and Choice Interview Schedule 
Isingeniso: Ngiyabonga- kakhulu ukuthi uvumile ukubamba iqhaza kulolucwaningo. Njengabantu, kuyenzeka 
sibhekane nezimo ezidinga ukuthi sithathe izinqumo. Kungaba isemsebenzini, ekhaya, izinqumo ezithinta 
abasondelene nathi ngokothando, neminye imikhakha yempilo. Kwesinye isikhathi kuye kwenzeke singabi naso 
isiqiniseko ukuthi iziphi izil1qumo okumele sizithathe. Ngicela ungichazele ngesimo owake wabhekana naso, lapho 
kwaklll11ele uthathe khona isinqumo, kodwa wazithola usunokushayisana kwemibono kuwena ngaphakathi, ngoba 
ungel1aso isiqiniseko SOkllthi isinqul110 sakho sinabo yil1i ubulungiswa. Ngicela ungixoxele udaba lwakho lonke, 
ukuthi kwaqalaphi, kwenzekani, kwaye kwafikaphi. Ukhululekile ukuthatha isikhashana usacabanga ngesimo 
esinjengalesi owake wabhekana naso. 









Ngicela ungichazele isimo owabe ubhekene naso (thola isimo ngokugcwele) 
Kulesisil110 owawubhekene naso, yini eyabe id ala ukungquzulana kwemibono kuwena ngokobu-Iungiswa? 
Kungani lento yabe idala inking a yokushayisana kwemibono kuwe? 
Ngesikhathi ucabanga pgozokwenza, yini owabona kumele uyibhekele? Ikhona enye into owabona kumele 
uyibhekele, ngaphezu k.wale osuyishilo? 
Wagcina uthathe siphi isinqumo? (Buzisisa ngemiphumela yesinqumo enkathini eseduze, nemiphumela 
yaso ngokuhal11ba kwesikhathi, noma enkathini ezayo, uma umxoxi engavange achaze) 
Ucabanga ukuthi lokhu owakwenza kwabe kuyinto efanele (enobulungiswa)? KunganiiKungani 
knngenjalo? 
Yini eyabe ibalulekile, ikuthinta kakhulu kulenkinga? Yini eyabe ithinta abanye? Yini eyabe ibalulekile nje 
jikelele') Isinqumo sabe sinamuphi umphumela kuwe, noma sabe sinokuba namuphi umphumela kuwe? 
Yimiphi imizwa owaba nayo ngalesisimo? Yimiphi imizwa owaba nayo mayelana nabanye ababethinteka 
kulesisil11o? Ubani owazwelana nawe wakwesekela kulesisimo? Wabhekana kanjani nalokhu kungquzulana 
kwemibol1o kuwe? 
Ngabe ikhona indlela eyahlukile esingabona l1gayo lenkinga owawubhekene nayo, ngaphandle kwalokhu 
osukuchazile? 
Ake sibheke lendlela owagcina wenze l1gayo. Ngabe isitshelani mayelana nawe njengomuntu (noma, 
Ul11untu oyi-____ , isibonelo, umholi, umuntu wesifazane, njll, ngokuhambisana nesikhundla sallo 
ophendulayo ). 




Uma ungase ubhekane nesimo esithi asifane nalesi enkathil1i ezayo, ngabe uyophinde wenze ngalendlela 
owenza ngayo? KunganiiKungani ungeke wel1ze njalo? Ake sithi lesisimo sesibandakanya omunye umuntu 
lloma elinye iqembu, hhayi lomuntu noma leliqembu olichazile. Ngabe ullgenze ngendlela efanayo 
kulomuntu/kuleliqembu? (inhloso ukubona imincele yobulungiswa, ukuthi buhambisana nomuntu noma 
iqembu yini) 
Ngabe lesisimo osichazile singachazwa njengesibandakanya inking a yobulungiswa? KunganiIKungani 
kungenjalo" Ngabe ubulungiswa busho ukuthini kuwe? Yini iyenza into ibe inking a ephathelene 
nobulul1giswa? 
13 . Kwenzeka kanjani ukuthi umuntu abe umuntu onobulungiswa? (Buzisisa ngeqhaza lomndeni, abaphansi, 
inkolelo , kanye nOl11phakathi, Ul11a Iowa ophendulayo engavange akubalule lokhu). 
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Appendix 2: Sample Contact Summary Sheet 
Name: Tha 
Age: 19, Female 
Occupation: Scholar 
Date: 18 March 2000 
Striking issues in the contact 
• The importance of gender and power in the moral dilemma. 
• Contradictions in story: Shifts between individualistic and collectivist concerns. Respondent tries 
to establish independence from her family , yet she is very proud of her family tradition (see how 
she cites her clan names with pride, and the fact that she is an inkosazana (princess) of the clan. 
• The encounter (and interview) were characterized by a high degree of emotion. 
Inf01111ation obtained : 
• The cultural prescription of moral behaviour (e.g. a "good girl" behaves like this!) 
• Some cultural narratives are constraining (as the one cited above), and others are a source of 
pride (e .g. being a princess of the clan). 
• The interplay between feelings, action and thoughts in moral decision-making 
• Negotiation as a problem-solving strategy (but note her powerlessness in the relationship), and 
the strategies she uses to counter it. 
Areas for further clarification: 
• The view that moral people have "life" (baya-phila) . 
• The view that to be moral is to be a "human being." See how other respondents respond to these 
issues. 
• How does one recognise a "moral being"? What does it entail, behaviourally? 
... -~ . 
288 
Appendix 3: Sample Field Notes 
Interview with Sindi 
clash between the good of the individual and the good of the group 
family and ancestors in decis~on-making - role played by deceased 
Moral person is one who is cOlmected- disconnected person is dead 
The good is that which promotes hannony: "in helping others you are helping 
yourself. " 
Reference to umuntu umuntu ngabantu (a human being is a human being because 
of other human beings) 
Morality involves respect for life (i.e. not to kill) 
Morality involves respecting oneself and others 
[nterview with Zenzele 
Strong sense ofinanhood in interview: respondent felt his being as a man would 
be "incomplete" if she allowed girlfriend "timeout" from the relationship .. . to see 
if they were compatible. 
His masculinity is the key issue 
At stake: his "personal dignity" and status among peers, and in his community 
Relationship gave him confidence, voice among peers 
Decision involved conflict of emotions 
Morality: Elders model appropriate behaviour 
Morality- A life-long project, a person's life (inkambo yomuntu emhlabeni) 
The role of God in moral reasoning 
Family: trains you to be a moral person 
Moral people have inner voice (conscience) that talks to them (unembeza) 
Morality is to think for oneself as well as for others 
Interview with Thobi 
Morality is inkuliso (upbringing): it reflects the way your family and community 
raised you. 
Morality is responsibility toward the family: it is ubuntu 
The need to live in hamlony with one's community 
A bond between members of a community: connection 
Respect for elders and others: Elders to model moral behaviour 
The role of religion in moral reasoning 
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Appendix 4: Sample Worksheet for Reading 1 
Purpose of Reading: To understand story as it was experienced by the narrator 
- To identify recurrent images, metaphors, and contradictions 
Personal Reflection 
Narrator: Tha (19- year- old female student) 
Background: Female student is an only female in a group of students doing voluntary 
community service in a rural area. Expected by the rest of the group, and the community 
they were serving, to conform to traditional stereotypes of womanhood, by having a 
relationship with the project manager and by doing typical feminine chores (e.g. 
cooking). 
TIu"eats: Of sexual hara~sment and/or rape and physical abuse. 
Recurrent Metaphors: "Heaviness": Indicating that the situation was experienced as an 
extremely difficult and a challenging one to handle, due to her being powerless in relation 
to the project manager. The situation was "Very tough! Very tough! Very tough!" 
Images and Feelings: Situation experienced as emotionally exhausting and frustrating. An 
image of being "trampled upon" and being "killed" or "killing" others emotionally. 
Tensions and Contradictions: 
• Balancing the need to respect project manager, while not allowing herself to be 
used or abused 
• Avoiding damaging the project manager's sense of masculinity by hurting his 
feelings 
• Preserving unity in the group by doing some of the feminine chores she is good at 
without sacrificing her beliefs as a gender activist 
• Ongoing tension between her beliefs as an individual and communal or group 
beliefs 
Reflection: Nana's situation is a good example of the gendered dimension of moral 
experience. It reflects the frustrations faced by many women in society due to cultural 
prescriptions and powerlessness on their part. The frustration caused by the difficulty to 
escape from the situation is of note. 
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Appendix 5: Sample Worksheet For Reading 2 
Purpose of Reading: To identify the "speaking sUbject" or "I" in the story 
To identify tensions between the voice of the person ("I") and the 
voice/s of the group or others ("We") 
To look for emerging conceptions of the self 
Narrator: Tha (19- year- old female student) 
The "I" 
• A clear sen~se of an independent (feminist) voice, speaking against perceived male 
domination 
• Reference to her own personal principles and beliefs 
• In tenns of activities, her personal position is indicated by the refusal to do 
feminine duties (e.g. cooking) 
• The decision to withdraw and hide from the group is an attempt to state her 
independent position, given her powerlessness. 




Self is also defined in relation to her family. For example, she takes pride in being 
a princess of her clan, as indicated by the extensive citation of her clan names 
during the interview 
Concemed with the welfare of the community that they were serving 
Her decision to cook so as to preserve group unity (but also to protect her identity 
as a capable female leader) 




The sense of self is caught between two moral worlds: the view that sees women 
as subservient to men, and an independent view of the self, defined in terms of 
personal principles and actions 
There are tensions between the pride of being a member of a clan with a proud 
tradition, and the fact that the same clan tradition could be used to restrict her 
independence. 
The self vacillates continually between these two positions. 
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Appendix 6: Sample Interview Summary 
Participant: Mandla (Middle-aged College lecturer, male) 
Participant in a moral dilenm1a as cousin produces a gun, threatening to shoot people during a traditional 
religious ceremony. Action violated the sacred nature of the ceremony, including the ancestors. He wants to 
disarm him and yet he is scared this could cause commotion, resulting in people being hurt. His cousin's 
sister eventually disarms him by appealing to the religious nature of the function. 
Emerging Conceptions of Morality 
Morality is an integral part of being a person 
Respondent of the view that morality defines one as a person: it is the "root of being a person" (kuyimpande 
volJ/lJ1tu) . A person firmly rooted in personhood respects hin1self or herself, young and old, animals, and 
nature. Respondent says respect makes one a moral person and at the same time, "respect is morality 
itself. " 
Morality is to live a life that is "complete in the Good" (impilo ephelele ebuhleni) 
< , 
The respondent does not mean life in a bio-medical sense, but life in terms of how one relates to other 
people, or one 's lived experience. This life is about practical, day-to-day engagements with others: it 
includes compassion for others, and sharing what one has, including knowledge. This, according to the 
respondent, is an essential component of being a "complete person." Lived experience also requires one to 
be diligent: people should work to improve themselves so that they can be "complete people". This 
necessitates contributing toward the welfare of one 's family and the community. Respondent says 
conu11lmity is not merely defined by one's immediate neighbourhood: it can be fOlTI1ed spontaneously by 
those who "share life' (i.e. those who, by virtue of their actions, recognise the bond of interdependence 
among themselves). 
Morality as a quality of being thoughtful toward others and being guided by principles 
People who can distinguish between right and wrong are thoughtful toward others. Their interactions with 
others are guided by principles such as fairness, caring, respect and kindhemtedness. These principles are 
interdependent: one carLl10t be a caring person and yet be disrespectful toward others, for example. The 
principles are also an indispensable part of being a "complete person" or of living a life "complete in the 
Good." One cannot develop these principles if one's life is not complete in personhood (uma impilo yakho 
ingaphelele ebuntwini). 
Morality is a Godly quality in the person 
To conduct oneself morally means to conduct oneself in a manner that is Godly (ngendlela 
el1o/JuN/wlunkulu) . The family teaches one to respect God, and hence, it could be regarded as the backbone 
of growing into moral personhood. The family teaches us that umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (one becomes a 
human being because of other human beings). 
Morality is harmony with family members and izinyanya (ancestors) 
Failure to live harmoniously with others, especially within the context of the family, angers the ancestors, 
causing them to withdraw their protection. This leaves the family vulnerable to harm. To avoid this, family 
members must do their respective duties. Family are morally obliged to support one another, especially in 
time of need. 
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Appendix 7: Sample of a Matrix ofInfom1ants by Readings 
Informant 1: Age: 40 Gender: Female Occupation: Cleane r 
Reading I : The Reading 2: The Speaking Reading 3 : The Self-in-Relation Reading 4: The Socio-cu ltural Co ntext : 
Plot: Subject 
Conte~l Tension Re lationshiQ with mother The Family: 
-A young girl -Between the self cr) and ThoU!lhts: -The moral imperative to support the fam ily: ··The 
leaves her fami ly the need to support mother -Worried by thoughts such as ··what wil l most important issue for me \Vas that there was no 
(ikhaya) to find and fami ly (""We·'). Choice happen to my mother if I get married,)·· one to look after my family ... as a person who is 
empl oyment to between marriage (for responsible for "the fami ly" (l1jel1gomlll1/11 ophethe 
support her family herse lf) and her mother and Feelings: ikhaya). 
-Finds work but her siblings, whom she Empathy for her mother: "I really fe lt fo r 
poor pay. Not supported. my mother, she had been working since Marriage 
enough money to we [she and her sibli ngs] were very 
send to the fam il y. Sense of se lf yo ung" (l1gal1gil1okul11zwela) - The cultural be lief that a woman find s 
-Loses job and '·completion" in marriage versus her 
unemployed for a -Self is defined in terms of Re lationshiQ with boyfriend responsibilities toward her family of o ri gin: .. I 
short whi le. re lationsh ip with mother should not put marriage before everyth ing e lse, I 
and the family : " I cannot Thoughts: while [members of my family] are going hungry.'· 
ConJlict: leave my mother fo r the -Was concerned about what wou ld happen 
joys of marriage. I have to if her boyfriend asked her to "stop Gender and Power in RelationshiQs 
-Needs to to send struggle where I began" working once we are married. What will -Note the view that a man can decide that his w ife 
money home but (kul11ele ngizabalaze la happen to my mother thenT' cannot continue working: " He could have agreed 
cannot do so ngaqala khona). [to let me continue to work] prior to marriage, only 
during period of Action : to refuse me permission to work thereafter" 
unemployment -Dialogue: " We sat down and discussed ( .. . kanti uzobuye ashintshe ul11qondo wakhe. athi 
(wi ll fami ly the issue. He felt empathy for me when I angihlale ). 
understand?) stated my position" (wazwelana nami 
-Gets romantica lly kwisimo engikuso) . Individual's historical context 
involved with -Note the view that moral reasoning is contextual: 
man. Decision: it is influenced by one ' s hi storica l circu mstances, 
-Concerned that -They agreed to help each other: ·'We will such as the memory of how one was raised: 
the man will help both ways. He will help my family, "People ' s lives are not the same. For those of us 
propose marriage, and I will help his too [after we get who grew up observing the suffering of our 
w hich will mean married] (Sizolekelelana: UzongiJaka fami lies (usizi lwasekhaya) , we always think about 
leav ing her mother isandla. nami ngimfake isandla). whether they have eaten or not" [i.e. their well-
and her siblings being]. 
w ithout financial 
support. 
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Appendix 7 Continued: Informant 2 Age: 22 
Reading I : The 
Plot: 
Context 
-She is 8 student in 
8 racially-mi xed 
Uni vers ity 
res idence. 




fine offenders. She 
is the only Black 
person in a 
committee of 30. 
- Black friend has 
to be fined: Her 
difficulty is that she 
knows she is from a 
poor background 
-Fining her is also 
difficult as she is 
perceived as a 
" representative" of 
a Black voice in a 
racially-charged 
environment. 
- The Black 
cleaning staff in the 
residence also saw 
her as a 
representative of 
Black people. 
Reading 2: The Speaking Subject 
Tension 
-The ten s ion is between her viell's as a 
person . dri ven by her intern al principles 
and standards Cl"), and concern for the 
group ("We"), arising out of the hi story 
of Black oppression in SA . 
Sense of isolation 
-Disconnection from fellow Blacks: 
" Within the House Comm, I was very 
isolated." 
-She feared further isolation should she 
punish Black student: "We came to the 
university together, we struggled 
(sitaba/asa) together. I knew her 
condition and background" (Thi s is a 
" We" voice). 
- Note the tension between the principle 
of fairness (in an environment 
historically considered unfair to Blacks) 
and the need to connect to the group. 
Emerging self 
She re-frames her decision to fine her in 
a manner that is consistent with group 
interests : She was a role model of "a 
principled Black person ." Her action 
indicated that Blacks are not biassed 
decision-makers. This enables her to 
maintain her sense of belonging. 
Gender: Female Occupation : Student 
Reading 3: The Self-in-Relation 
Relationship with friend : 
Feeling,s : 
She \Vas hurt. Friend shouted at her. 
calling her a '·sellout.·' 
Thoug,hts: 
- She thought about the implications 
offining the Black student: "What 
am I trying to prove? To whom')" 
Action: 
-She decided to fine, justifying this 
on the grounds that " I had been very 
patient with her. " 
Feelings about action: 
-She was emotionally hurt: " My heart 
was very painful. ... It was like I had 
to sacrifice one of our own so as to 
prove myself. But she is the one who 
put me in a tight spot" (Note again 
how she justifies her action) . 
Consequence of her action 
-It led to alienation from friends and 
Black staff. One friend supports her, 
saying: "You did well. " 
Relationship with parents 
~Faced with the dilemma, she thought 
about how her parents raised them: 
"if a child is wrong, she/he is wrong, 
and must be treated the same [as 
other children"]' Note again 
reference to fairness. 
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Reading 4: The Socio- Cultural Context 
The South African hi stor\ ' 01' race relation s 
-The apartheid policy. and the 8ntagoni sm 
it generated between BI8cks and Whites. 
influenced her reasoning: "There were 30 
of us in the team, and I was the only Black. 
So, I had to stand for the Black voice ... . 
There were very few of us [Blacks] in 
residenc'e, especially on our floor. So, we 
had to stand together" 
Family backg,round 
-Her family, and the offending student's 
family, were both considered : " I had to take 
into consideration my own family 
background, the fact that I like her, a lso 
come from a difficult family background. 
My Blackness ( made things even more 
difficult. And the background that I come 
from , the background of " heaviness" 
[difficulty]. (Note her appeal to a common 
history of difficulty and oppression), 
The Context in which she had to act 
-She discovered that unlike her, other 
House Committee members were biassed in 
favour of their race groups, indicating the 
generally unfair context in which she had to 
act: "I was very disappointed to learn that 
house comm members of other race groups 
(referring to Whites) did not penalise those 
of their race group, There were very few of 
us who were fair. " 
Appendix 8: An Example ofa Consent Fonn: Isizulu Version 
UNIVERSITY OF NATAL 
Psychology Department 




Ngingl1mfundi esizindeni sezemfundo ephakeme sase-Natali. Njengenxenye yezifundo zami, kumele 
ngenze ucwaningo ngthole izimvo zabantu mayelana nesihloko esithile. Inhlosoyocwaningo lwami 
l1kwazi kabanzi ngokuthi abantu bazenza kanjani izinqumo uma bebhekene nezimo lapho 
kunokungqubuzana kwemibono ethintana nobulungiswa, noma uma unembeza wabo uphikisana nabafuna 
ukukwenza. Ngizokucela ukuthi ungixoxela udatshana lapho wazithola usesimweni esifana nalesi 
empilweni yakho. Ngizobe sengilandelisa ngemibuzo ukucacisa lapho kungacacile khona. Ngicabanga 
ukuthi lengxoxo izothatha cishe imizuzu engu-50. Ingxoxo YOl1ke izoqoshwa ngesi-qophamazwi, bese 
ibuye ibhalwa njengoba injalo ukuze ihlaziywe . 
. Ukuzibandakanya kuloluc~aningo kungokukhululekile, akunampoqo. Il1kulumo-ngxoxo iyohlelwa 
ngesikh~thi esihambisana nawe. Ngaso sonke isikhathi umcwaningi uyokuhlonipha ukuba yimfIhlo kwayo 
yonke imininingwane ecoshwelwe kule-nkulumo-ngxoxo. 
Uma kwenzeka ushintsha umqondo wakho l11ayelana nokuzibandakanya nalolucwaningo, unelungelo 
lokuhoxa noma inini, ngisho noma ucwaningo seluqalile. Umcwaningi uyolihlonipha lelilungelo ngaso 
sonke isikhathi: Ukuhoxa ngeke kube nomthelela ol11ubi kuwe. 
Il11iphume1a yalolucwaningo iyobhalwa ngokufmgqiwe. Yize kunokwenzeka ukuthi kucashunwe 
engxoxweni yakho njengoba injalo ukucacisa amaphuzu athile, il11ininingwane ebalula umuntu ngamunye 
iyogodlwa. 
Uma ufisa ukubamba iqhaza kulolucwaningo, uyacelwa ukuba ulobe igal11a lakho uphinde usayil1de 
emgqeni ngezansi . 
Mina (igama) ngiyavuma ngokukhululekile ukubamba iqhaza 
kulolucwaningo oluchazwe ngasenhla. Ngichazelwe inhloso yocwaningo nokuthi lubandakanyani. 
Ngiyaqonda ukuthi ngingahoxa noma inini uma ngifisa. 
Sayinda Indawo Usuku 





Appendix 9: An Example of a Consent Fonn: English Version 
Dear Sir / Madam 
UNIVERSITY OF NATAL 
Psychology Department 
Private Bag XO 1, Scottsville, 3209 
Telephone 033-2605963 
Fax 033-2605809 
1 am a registered student at the University of Natal. I am conducting research as part of my 
studies . The purpose of this research is to understand how people make decisions in the face of 
real life moral dilemmas. You will be requested to tell a story involving a moral conflict you once 
faced. The interviewer will then ask you questions to clarify aspects of your story. The interview 
will take about 50 minutes. The interviews will be recorded and later transcribed verbatim for the 
purposes of analysis. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. Appointments for interviews will be held at a time that 
suits you. The researcher will respect the confidentiality of the information collected during the 
interviews. 
Should you change your mind or feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview, please 
exercise your right to withdraw at any point. The researcher respects your right to do so. You will 
not incur any negative consequences by exercising this right. 
The results of this study will be presented in the form of a summary. Although verbatim extracts 
from your interview could be used for illustrative purposes, particulars that could identify you 
personally will be removed. 
Should you be willing to participate, please indicate this by writing your name and signature 
below. 
I (name) voluntarily consent to participate in the study as 
described above. The purpose and nature of the study have been explained to me. I also 
understand that I can withdraw at any point, should I wish to do so. 
Signature Place Date 
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